Lindley v. Frazier

Seawell, J. The relationship of daughter-in-law has been held not to raise the presumption that services performed while living within the family are gratuitous. Dunn v. Currie, 141 N.C. 123, 53 S.E. 533; Nesbitt v. Donoho, 198 N.C. 147, 150 S.E. 875; Landreth v. Morris, 214 N.C. 619, 200 S.E. 378; Francis v. Francis, 223 N.C. 401, 26 S.E. 2d 907. But, although the plaintiff may not have been confronted with this presumption to hurdle, the burden still rested upon her to show circumstances from which it might be inferred that the services were rendered and received with the mutual understanding that they were to be paid for. The quantum meruit must rest upon an implied contract. Nothing else appearing, such an inference is permissible when a person knowingly accepts from another services of value, or, as it is sometimes put, under *47 circumstances calculated to put a reasonable person on notice that the services are not gratuitous. Francis v. Francis, supra; Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E. 2d 764; Ray v. Robinson, 216 N.C. 430, 5 S.E. 2d 127; Potter v. Clark, 229 N.C. 350, 49 S.E. 2d 636; Pew v. First National Bank, 130 Mass. 391, 54 A.L.R., Anno., p. 549. But the transaction with which we are dealing in the instant case is not so simple; much else appears to challenge the application of the rule and defeat the inference. Carlson v. Krantz, 214 N.W. 928 (Minn.), 54 A.L.R. 545, Anno., pp. 548, 549. The strongest bid for recognition of an implied contract lies in the testimony of Dwight Lindley that bis father stated to him and bis wife that be intended they should have a home, and that be bad made a deed for eight acres, (which was never delivered). This, however, appears in the evidence without any attempt to attach it or couple it with any promise made by A. O. Lindley and, in fact, without reference to the subject of compensation at all and may well be attributed to parental motives. It is not in evidence that any promise was made. The whole evidence seems to indicate that the parties, in living together, were engaged in a joint venture or enterprise, each contributing to the extent of bis or her abilities for the common good without mutual understanding that any of the services so contributed were to be paid for. No obligation survived the termination of the modus vivendi. The demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained and the motion for nonsuit allowed. The judgment to the contrary is Reversed.