State v. . Grigg

Clare, J.: Slander was formerly cognizable only on the civil side of the docket bjr an action for damages. The law under which the defendant is indicted is one of many recent statutes making indictable acts which were previously punishable civilly only. These statutes, it is generally understood, have been passed in consequence of the decision in Dellinger v. Tweed, 66 N. C., 206, in which it was held (by a divided Court, PearsoN, C. J., and Rodman, J., dissenting), that the homestead and personal property exemptions were valid against torts. In the absence of the civil remedy for private wrongs thus taken away, statutes became necessary to make them indictable as if public wrongs. In construing the statute, we are left entirely to the precedents in our own Reports, as we believe no act of tbe like tenor has been adopted in any other State. The statute (The Code, § 1113) under which the indictment is brought, was originally adopted in 1879 (ch. 156), and to it was prefixed the same preamble as that to the act of 1808 (now The Code, § 3763), which made the same language actionable. The similarity of the two statutes, and the identity of the evil to be remedied, would seem to indicate an intention to give the woman aggrieved a remedy by indictment, whenever she could have sustained an action for damages. We think, therefore, the more accurate and just definition of the words “innocent woman,” is that given by Ashe, J., in State v. Aldridge, 86 N. C., 680, in which he defines the meaning to be a “chaste and virtuous woman.”' *885 If the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time the words were spoken, and at the time of the trial, the prosecutrix was a chaste and virtuous woman, exemplary as to virtue in life and conduct, and that the defendant, in a wanton and malicious manner, by false charges of ineontinency, attempted to destroy her reputation, she is entitled to the protection intended to be given by this law. Evidence offered to show a slip from virtue, at some former period, by a woman who has since been altogether exemplary, would be competent, as tending to shake the testimony of her subsequent good character. In State v. Davis, 92 N. C., 764, the Court affirmed, for the first time, a charge of the Judge below, in which he defined an “ innocent woman ” to be one “ who had never had actual illicit sexual intercourse with any man.” In doing so, the Court intimates strongly that this rule was too stringent for the prosecutrix, but says, “ the defendant has no cause to complain ” — that is, that while a woman who had never had illicit sexual intercourse with any man is an innocent woman, still, one who has had such intercourse, but who has repentedjthereof and become exemplary, chaste and virtuous, might also be an “ innocent woman ” within the meaning of the statute. The definition of an “innocent woman ” given in State v. Davis, has been approved since in State v. Brown, 100 N. C., 519, and State v. Hinson, 103 N. C., 374, but in both instances the objection to that definition came from the defendant. All three cases are, therefore, simply authority that no conduct less than actual illicit sexual intercourse will deprive a woman of being an “ innocent woman ” within the meaning of the statute. Equally with State v. Davis do the two supporting cases leave open the question, whether a woman who falls short of that rule, by having at some time had such intercourse, but who comes within the definition of an “innocent woman” laid *886 down in State v. Aldridge, supra, i. e., a “ chaste and virtuous woman ” is entitled to the protection of law against attempts to destroy her reputation by false imputations of unchastity, wantonly and maliciously made. . We assent to the strong intimation given in State v. Davis, supra, and do not think it was meant “ to exclude from the protection of the law every woman who has, at some time of her life, made a slip in her virtue. Every man, in the course of his life, must have had instances brought to his knowledge of unfortunate females who have, at some period of their lives, been led from the path of virtue by the wiles of a seducer, who have afterwards reformed, and, by a course of exemplary conduct, established for themselves a character for chastity above all reproach. Shall it be said that these unfortunates are not to be allowed a locus peni-tentise, and are to be subject forever to the vile tongue of the maligner and slanderer?” His Honor’s charge, in this case, presents this point for decision for the first time. As given, it was not in conflict with any precedent in this Court, and we think he was correct in instructing the jury, that if the prosecutrix had been a virtuous woman since the illicit intercourse, prior to her marriage, with one who has since become her husband, she was an “innocent woman” within the purview of the statute, and not subject to have her peace and reputation destroyed with impunity by false charges, if wantonly and maliciously made, of present unchastity. _ Affirmed.