Weaver v. . Chunn

Merrimon’, J., (after stating the case). All the evidence produced on the trial, bearing upon that point, tended to prove that the maker of both the deeds of trust in question resided in the County of Buncombe, and that he conducted his principal business in that county, while he conducted a branch of it in the County of Yancey. Under appropriate instructions from the Court, the jury found the fact so to be, and it must be so accepted for the purposes of this action. The statute (The Code, § 1254,) provides that, “ no deed of trust, or mortgage for real or personal estate, shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust, or mortgage, in the county where the land lieth; or in case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor resides; or in case the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor shall reside out of the State, then in the county where the said personal estate or some part of the same is situate; or in *434 ■cases of choses in action, where the donee, bargainee, or mortgagee resides.” Applying this statutory provision to ■the case before us, we are of opinion that the plaintiffs had title to the property in question and were entiled to recover. It appears that the bargainor in both the deeds of trust mentioned, at and before the time he executed the same, resided in this State and in the County of Buncombe. The first of the two deeds was executed to the appellant and purported to convey personal estate of the bargainor, situate in the County of Yancey. Under the statute just cited, it could operate at all and be valid “as against creditors and purchasers for a valuable consideration,” only from the time of its registration in the County of Buncombe. Its registration in the County of Yancey went for naught and served no purpose, because the bargainor resided in the County of Buncombe, and the deed purported to convey personal estate; to give it the effect intended, registration in the latter county was essential. Before it was registered in the last mentioned count}', the bargainor, by his second deed of trust, conveyed the same and other property to the appellees, and this deed was duly registered on the day of its execution in the County of Buncombe. The appellees, as has been decided in like cases, were purchasers for a valuable consideration, and as their deed was registered in the proper county before that of the defendant, they got the title to the property in controversy. Fleming v. Burgin, 2 Ired. Eq., 584; Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C., 358; Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C., 235; Bank v. Manufacturing Co., 96 N. C., 305. It was suggested on the argument by the counsel of the appellant that, as the bargainor in the deed of trust to the appellant, conducted a branch of his business in the County of Yancey, he had such a residence there as was sufficient to render a registration of the deed there valid. It may be that a person can have residence in two or more counties in the *435 State, and that the registration of a deed of trust or mortgage executed by him would be sufficient in any one of the counties where he resided, but we need not decide that this is so, because there was no evidence that the bargainor resided in Yan-cey County at all; he conducted a branch of his business there, and the evidence went to prove that he prosecuted it through an agent. The mere fact that he had personal property there did not constitute residence. The purpose of the statute is to have the deed of trust or mortgage registered in the county where the donor, bargainor, or mortgagor has actual personal residence; and the reason is, that persons interested, to have knowledge in such respect, would go to the county where a person resides to see what disposition he had made of his personal property by deeds and other instruments required to be registered; they would not ordinarily look elsewhere. The statutory requirement is too plain to be mistaken. The counsel for the appellant contended, also, that as the latter got actual possession of the property under the deed to him, such possession rendered his title good and effectual. This is a misapprehension. The deed as against the appel-.lees was absolutely void, and passed no title to the appellant— he had the simple possession • of the property without any right or title thereto as against creditors and purchasers for a valuable consideration — the title did not pass out of the bargainor to the appellant — the former, notwithstanding his deed to the latter, had capacity to convey and did convey the property to the appellees by the deed of trust executed to them. The statute rendered the deed of trust to the appellant wholly nugatory as to the appellees. Judgment affirmed.