Valley v. City of Gastonia

Brogden, J. Is it a negligent act for a municipality to maintain in the center of a populous street intersection a traffic post or silent policeman properly constructed and sufficiently lighted? The decided cases discussing the question now under consideration are Aaronson v. City of New Haven, 110 Atlantic, 872; Riley v. City of Ronceverte, 151 S. E., 174; Vicksburg v. Harralson, 101 Southern, 713; *666 Town of Hobart v. Casbon, 142 N. E., 138; Titus v. Town of Bloomfield, 141 N. E., 360. See Annotations, 12 A. L. R., 328, 39 A. L. R., 777. The Hobart and Titus cases, supra, were decided by the Indiana Court. The Hobart case involved a broken traffic post upon which no light was burning* and around which there was no barricade at the time of the injury. It was held in the Titus case that a concrete post, without guard or light, or other means of notifying* persons traveling upon the street, constituted a defect or obstruction of the street. The Vicksburg case decided by the Mississippi Court involved injuries sustained by reason of certain bumpers put in the street for slowing up traffic at intersections. Obviously, none of these cases are decisive of the principle involved in the case at bar. The general principle governing* liability of a municipality in such cases was stated by the Connecticut Court in the Aaronson case, supra. The Court said: “But, irrespective of the allegations of this complaint, it cannot be said that a sufficiently conspicuous guidepost for traffic placed at the intersection of two streets makes the highway defective. We take judicial notice of the common use of such devices at such locations, and that they do serve a useful purpose in directing traffic and promoting obedience to the law.” The syllabus of the Court in the Riley case declares that: “The presence of a sufficiently conspicuous silent policeman, although not painted or equipped with a warning light, is not a defect in the highway within the meaning of the statute giving a right of action for injury caused by such defects (Code, chap. 43, sec. 167), if the city maintains, with reasonable diligence, lights in the vicinity thereof sufficient to inform travelers exercising ordinary care in the use of the way by night of its presence.” The plaintiff relies upon Graham v. Charlotte, 186 N. C., 649, 120 S. E., 466, and Swinson v. Realty Co., 200 N. C., 276, 156 S. E., 545. The Swinson case involved the right of an individual to make permanent use of a portion of a public street, and the Graham case involved the encroachment of concrete posts beyond the curb line and in the line of travel, a distance of from one foot to three inches. These cases have no particular legal bearing upon the principle involved in the case now under consideration. In the final analysis, the defendant properly installed a traffic post in the center of a populous intersection. Ample space for the use of travelers was provided on each side of the post. The post carried a small light designed to shine upon the base, and a four-way signal light at the top. These lights were all burning at the time of the unfortunate injury. The intestate of plaintiff drove down the center of the street, turning neither to the right nor to the left, but headed straight into *667 a lighted post and lost his life. The traffic signal was properly installed, and free from defect of any kind. Manifestly, such signal posts serve both a useful and necessary purpose in safeguarding human life. Consequently it was not a negligent act to properly install and maintain such a signal device at a dangerous intersection, and as the correct result has been attained the judgment is affirmed, Ramkin v. Oates, 183 N. C., 517. No error.