Baker v. . Legget

MerrimoN, J., (after stating the case). The right of homestead provided and secured by the Constitution (Art X, §§2, 5, 8,) is incident to residence in this State. Only residents have and are entitled to it. A non-resident has no such right, although he may be the owner of real property situate in the State. The terms of the Constitution do not embrace him, and moreover, the plain purpose is to exempt the homes of those who have or can acquire them “from sale under execution or other final process obtained on any debt.” He has no home for himself or his family, and the reason for the exemption as to him does not exist. And when a resident removes from the State and becomes' a resident elsewhere, he thereby abandons — relinquishes hist right of homestead — as to him it becomes suspended — he ceases to be within the terms, the purpose or spirit of the *306 constitutional provision, and all the property, both real and personal, that he may leave behind him becomes at once subject to the satisfaction of his debts; there is in that case no longer any exemption in his favor. No doubt he might, before removing from the State, in good faith sell or part with his homestead in any lawful way, and the purchaser would get a good title for the land, and having turned the same into cash or other personal -property, he might take so much of it as would be exempt from sale with him, but as to such as he might leave behind no exemption would prevail. The plaintiff contends that while the land in question constituted the homestead of his debtor Regan, he took a mortgage upon it to secure his debt, as he might lawfully do. But, unfortunately for him, he failed to have that mortgage registered; if he had done so, then he had been secure as to it. While Regan remained in this State the homestead right helped the plaintiff, because the homestead itself was exempt from sale under execution or other final process, and his mortgage was effectual between the mortgagor and mortgagee without registration, but as soon as the mortgagor removed from the State, he left the land — his late homestead— relieved from the quality of exemption, and exposed to the right of his creditors to have the same sold to pay their debts. The plaintiff’s mortgage, unregistered, was not effectual as against creditors of the mortgagor, and hence at once upon his removal from the State, any creditor of his might levy his attachment upon it, or sell it under any other process, for the purpose. The plaintiff’s' unregistered mortgage did not place him upon any better footing after the removal than any other creditor. It was his folly or his misfortune that he failed to promptly register his mortgage. The de•fendant, seeing his opportunity, levied his 'attachment on the 'land, and thereby secured a special lien that preceded that ..created by the plaintiff’s mortgage, which was not registered *307 until after the levy of the attachment, when it first became effectual as against creditors. The lien of the attachment was precedent to it, and when the defendant bought the land at the sale of the sheriff, made under and in pursuance of the writ of venditioni exponas, founded upon the judgment and levy of the attachment mentioned, he got a good title. Adrian v. Shaw, 82 N. C., 474; same case. 84 N. C., 832; Watkins v. Overby, 83 N. C., 165. There is no error and' the judgment must be affirmed. Affirmed.