Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Cone

Barnhill, J. The right of the State of North Carolina to condemn a right of way across the memorial park property for use'by the National Park Service for maintaining a scenic highway is unquestioned. Should the plaintiff sit idly by and suffer this to be done without any effort to preserve the trust, the maintenance by it of the land described in Indenture A as a memorial park would be seriously endangered. The dominant right of the government would so impede the plaintiff that it would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to comply, substantially and in good faith, with the conditions of the trust indenture so as to accomplish its prime objective. Seeking to avoid this result and prevent the defeat of the trust objective, it procured from the National Park Service, an agency of the United States Government, the agreement which is set forth in the proposed conveyance. This agreement, in the form of a deed of conveyance, assures the continued maintenance of the property as a memorial park for the use of the public in substantial compliance with the terms of the trust indenture and in a manner equal, if not superior, to that which would be possible by the trustee. Thus the objective of the trust is preserved and its accomplishment is assured. That a court of equity, under the circumstances herein disclosed, has the power to authorize and direct the proposed conveyance, the very purpose of which is the preservation of the trust itself, cannot be successfully challenged. Cutter v. Trust Co., 213 N.C. 686, 197 S.E. 542; *296 Penick v. Bank, 218 N.C. 686, 12 S.E. 2d 253; Redwine v. Clodfelter, 226 N.C. 366, 38 S.E. 2d 203. “Courts of equity have general, inherent, exclusive supervisory jurisdiction over trusts and the administration thereof. In the exercise of that power they may authorize whatever is necessary to be done to preserve a trust from destruction. The prime consideration is the necessity for the preservation of the estate.” Trust Co. v. Rasberry, 226 N.C. 586, 39 S.E. 2d 601, and cases cited. Furthermore, Indenture A is to the plaintiff, its successors and assigns, in fee simple, upon the trusts and conditions therein set forth, to be forfeited only upon a breach of the stipulated conditions. The trust is to be executed by the grantee, its successors or assigns. Thus, it is apparent the grantor contemplated the possible appointment of a substitute trustee by conveyance. In any event, the grantee is, under the terms of the conveyance, vested with that authority. In the final analysis the proposed conveyance, referred to as Indenture I>, constitutes an appointment of a substitute trustee for administrative purposes and a conveyance of the property to the substitute trustee to that end. The property is to be held by the United States Government under the conditions set forth in the original trust agreement and is to effectuate the trust. If it fails so to do, the property reverts as originally provided. The dedication of the scenic highway right of way and the minor modifb cations of the conditions in Indenture A are essential for the preservation of the trust. The interest of those who may eventually take under the reverter clause is remote and of infinitesimal value. Such rights as they may have are preserved in the proposed conveyance. Hence, whether the limitation over to the heirs of Moses H. Cone upon forfeiture of the estate by the trustee is violative of the rule against perpetuities is wholly immaterial here. Therefore, it must not be understood that we either approve or disapprove that conclusion of the court below. We will cross that bridge when and if we ever come to it. The grantee in the proposed conveyance takes a fee subject to he defeated only upon breach of the conditions therein set out. It is so stipulated in the instrument and the stipulation is valid and binding. The Attorney-General, as the representative of the public at large, was made party defendant and filed his answer. In his brief here he assures this Court that in his opinion “the determination made by the Court is in the public interest and will best preserve for future generations the public charity in a manner that will best serve the whole people of the State and effectuate the principal intent of the donor.” In that conclusion we concur. Therefore, the judgment entered is Affirmed.