Barnhill v. . Hardee

Olakk, C. J. Tbis is an action for trespass which turns upon tbe location of tbe dividing line of tbe adjoining lots of tbe parties in Green-ville. Both claim under tbe same title. Tbe plaintiff’s deed, from W. A. Taylor in 1907, describes bis boundaries as follows: “Beginning at tbe corner of Bead and Second streets and running south with Bead street 30 feet, thence an easterly course parallel with Second street 59 feet to tbe line of Miles Grimes, thence with tbe line of Miles in a northerly direction 30 feet to Second street, thence in a westerly direction to tbe beginning, being a part of lot No. 148 in tbe plan of the town of Green-ville.” Tbe description in defendants’ deed, executed by W. A. Taylor in 1914, is: “Known as a part of lot No. 148 in the-town of Greenville, beginning on tbe east side of Bead street at a point 30 feet south of tbe intersection of Bead and Second streets, it being tbe southwest corner *86 of the lot which was conveyed to Haywood Barnhill by said W. A. Taylor and wife and running from thence with Read street south 41 feet;, thence' east at right angles with Read street 59 feet, thence a northerly direction parallel with Read street 41 feet to line of the lot now or formerly owned by Haywood Barnhill, thence a westerly direction with the line of the said Haywood Barnhill lot 59 feet to the beginning.” It will thus be seen that the controversy depends upon the location of the corner of Read and Second 'Streets. The southern line of the plaintiff is described as “beginning 30 feet” from that corner and running east 59 feet, and the northern line of the defendant calls for the southern line of the plaintiff’s lot. ' If the corner on Second street is where the plaintiff claims, then the defendant has trespassed upon 7 feet of the plaintiff’s lot eastwardly 59 feet, and the jury has found in accordance with the plaintiff’s contention. There is but one exception which requires our consideration. S. T. Hooker testified that he has lived in the town of Greenville fifty years, knows the reputation of the size of the blocks, and the width of the streets in said town; that his knowledge of this general reputation extends back thirty or thirty-five years; that he has no knowledge of the width of Second street, except from general reputation; that by the general reputation as to the width of Second street, running back as far as thirty years, the width of Second street is 49% feet. He says that the streets of Greenville are of different widths; that he does not know the actual width of Second street below or east of Read street; that he never heard a question raised as to the width of Second street; that he lived on the corner of Second street. The judge permitted the witness to state, as above, the general reputation that the width of Second street was 49% feet, and defendant excepted. We think the evidence of the general reputation, thirty or thirty-five years old as to the width of the street was competent under the rule laid down by this Court in Threadgill v. Wadesboro, 170 N. C., 641; Sullivan v. Blount, 165 N. C., 7; Bland v. Beasley, 140 N. C., 628. He testified as to the general reputation which began long before this litigation, and before either of the parties owned any of the land in controversy. No error.