Henry v. . Sanders

Devin, J. The question presented by this appeal is whether a judgment entered against an unmarried woman in her name at that time and docketed shortly after her marriage and consequent change of name, constitutes a lien on after acquired real property. The statute (C. S., 613) requires that judgments shall be indexed and cross indexed, and that the entries must contain the names- of the parties. While docketing is not an essential condition to the efficacy of a judgment, docketing is required in order that third persons may have notice of the existence of the judgment lien. Trust Co. v. Currie, 190 N. C., 260. C. S., 614, provides that a judgment docketed on the judgment docket of the Superior Court of any county “is a lien on the real property, in the county where the same is docketed, of every person against whom any such judgment is rendered, and which he has at the time of docketing thereof in the county in which such real property is situated, or which he acquires at any time thereafter.” In Dewey v. Sugg, 109 N. C., 329, it was said that these statutes were intended “to enable any person to learn that there is a docketed judgment' in favor of a certain party or parties, and against certain other parties. . . . The purpose is, that the index shall point to a judgment against the particular person inquired about if there be a judgment on the docket against him.” Trust Co. v. Currie, supra. Appellant contends that on the facts stated the plaintiffs lien was lost and cites in support of his view the case of Huff v. Sweetser, 8 Cal. App., 689 (1908), where, upon facts somewhat similar, the Court held the purchaser took title freed from the lien of the judgment. While the reasoning in that case is persuasive, we are not inclined to apply it to the facts in the case at bar. A purchaser of land is affected with such notice as the docket and index entries afford. “If they (the entries) are of such character as would induce a cautious and prudent man to make an examination, he must make such investigation, or the failure to do so will be at his peril.” Metz v. Bank, 1 Neb., 165. Here it is admitted that the defendant knew that the name of his grantor before her marriage to Baynard was Minnie Brewer. An examination of the judgment docket for the name of Minnie Brewer would have revealed plaintiff’s judgment. The fact that he did not impart his knowledge of the pertinent facts to his attorney cannot avail him. We concur in the ruling of the court below, and the judgment is Affirmed.