In Re Disbarment of Brittain

Stacy, C. J. Tbe constitutionality of tbe act incorporating tbe State Bar is not perforce presented on tbe present record. In re Parker, 209 N. C., 693, 184 S. E., 532. Nor is it necessary tbat we here decide whether tbe General Assembly intended to make its provisions retroactive as well as prospective in effect. Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C., 369, 151 S. E., 725. Tbe respondent has confessed bis guilt in open court to four crimes, all involving moral turpitude, and be has been disbarred from prácticing in tbe District Court of tbe United States. Nothing is offered in defense or by way of excuse. Tbe record engenders but a single conclusion. Tbe respondent’s admissions require bis disbarment, and tbe action of tbe Attorney-General is well advised. S. v. Spivey, 213 N. C., 45, 195 S. E., 1; S. v. Harwood, 206 N. C., 87, 173 S. E., 24; In re West, 212 N. C., 189, 193 S. E., 134, and eases there cited. This course renders academic tbe question presented by tbe appeal. What shall it profit tbe respondent if be gain tbe whole case and lose bis own license ? Disbarment must ultimately result in any event. *97 Nor is it necessary tbat there should be further proceedings in the matter. The facts are not in dispute, and the indictments, pleas and judgments in the criminal prosecutions speak for themselves. Respondent’s disqualification is complete. Rut even if the record were less compelling or respondent’s peccancy less glaring,-the findings and recommendation of the Trial Committee, approved and adopted, as they are, by the Council of the State Bar, would perhaps afford sufficient predicate for disbarment on motion of the Attorney-General. Respondent disbarred. Appeal dismissed. Sea well, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.