Mitchell v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

Hoke, J. Under tbe statute as it formerly prevailed, Revisal of 1905, sec. 2632, a penalty was imposed for unreasonable delay in tbe •transportation of goods. Construing tbe statute in Alexander v. R. R., 144 N. C., 93, tbe Court held tbat tbe term “transportation” did not include a delivery to consignee at tbe point of destination, and if goods shipped by a carrier bad been properly placed at tbe point of destination, no penalty was incurred under tbe law for a negligent delay in delivery from tbe car or warehouse of tbe company. Subsequent to tbe facts presented in tbat case, tbe Legislature amended tbe statute (Revisal 1905, sec. 2632), and in ch. 461, Laws of 1907, provided: “Tbat tbe act imposing a penalty for delay in tbe transportation of freight shall not be construed as referring only to delay in starting tbe goods from tbe station where received, but, in addition thereto, shall be construed to require delivery at its destination within tbe time specified.” And with tbe provision, “Tbat if tbe delay be incident to causes, which could not have been foreseen in tbe exercise of ordinary care, and which were unavoidable, and these facts are established to tbe satisfaction of tbe justice of tbe peace or jury trying tbe cause, tbe defendant company shall be relieved from tbe penalty,” etc. An amendment which has been included in C. S., 3516, and being part of tbe section on which tbe present action is instituted. A statute or amendment formally passed is presumed and if permissible should be construed so as to have some meaning, and unless tbe amendment referred to is intended to extend tbe penalty to cases of negligent default in making delivery of freight to tbe consignee, it will be entirely without significance. This assuredly is tbe permissible and *165 reasonable construction of tbe law, and we are of opinion that his Honor made correct decision in denying defendant’s prayer for instructions. There is nothing in Wall v. R. R., 147 N. C., 407, that in any way militates against this interpretation of the statute. In that case the company was contending that the penal statute ceased to apply when it had placed the shipment, a carload lot, in the company’s yards at Winston-Salem, the point of destination. In disallowing the position, the Court said the statute continued to apply until the goods were in the company’s warehouse, and notice duly given. There was nothing to call the Court’s attention to the effect of the amendment so recently made, and as a matter of fact, this amendment did not apply to the case as the facts determining liability had taken place and transaction terminated before the amendment to the law was made. We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. No error.