Myers v. . Kirk

*703 BkogdeN, J. There was competent evidence of the negligent operation of the car, and also of serious and permanent injuries sustained by plaintiff. There was evidence to the effect that on 1 January, 1926, prior to the injury, the defendant, Royal Blue Transportation Co., had sold this car to the Piedmont Stage Line, Inc., and that on the date of the injury the car was owned and operated by the Piedmont Stage Line, Inc., and not by the defendant, Eoyal Blue Transportation Co. The whole case resolves itself, therefore, into the question as to whether or not there was any evidence that the Eoyal Blue Transportation Co. owned and was operating the car at the time of plaintiff’s injury. The record discloses the following indicia of ownership and operation of said car: 1. The driver of the car causing plaintiff’s injury wore a uniform bearing the insignia “Royal Blue Transportation Co.” 2. The defendants honored each other’s tickets and placed passengers on the first bus leaving Charlotte, regardless of the ticket held. 3. The car in which the plaintiff was riding was registered in the Department of Revenue and was operating under a license issued to the defendant, Royal Blue Transportation Co., said license having been issued on 30 June, 1924. 4. The application for the registration of said car for title certificate designated the Royal Blue Transportation Co. as the owner of said car. 5. The mechanic in Salisbury, who pulled the wrecked car in and repaired it, testified, without objection, that he repaired the car and sent the bill to the Royal Blue Transportation Co., and, further, that “Royal Blue Transportation Company responded to that notice by coming after the car.” 6. L. F. Barnard, president of the Royal Blue Transportation Co., told Mr. Ervin, an attorney of Charlotte that the car causing the injury was the property of the Royal Blue Transportation Co. at the time of the wreck. There was no objection to the testimony of this witness. There was other testimony to the same effect. ¥e are of the opinion that these facts and circumstances constituted sufficient evidence of ownership and operation of said car by the defendant, Royal Blue Transportation Co., to be submitted to the jury. Freeman v. Dalton, 183 N. C., 538; Hensley v. Helvenston, 189 N. C., 636. The evidence, it is true, was conflicting upon this phase of the case, but conflicting testimony affects only the credibility of the witness or witnesses, and does not warrant the withdrawal of the case from the jury. Shell v. Roseman, 155 N. C., 90; Christman v. Hilliard, 167 N. C., 5; Shaw v. Handle Co., 188 N. C., 236; In re Fuller, 189 N. C., 512; Smith v. Coach Line, 191 N. C., 589. *704 Tbe defendant excepts to evidence as to tbe amount of money collected by tbe defendant, Royal Blue Transportation Co., and also as to tbe number of cars in use. Tbis evidence was competent to sbow tbat tbe defendant was operating as a carrier of passengers on tbe date of plaintiff’s injury. If tbe evidence bad been elicited for tbe purpose of showing tbe commercial rating of defendant, it would bave been irrelevant; but, even so, it would not constitute reversible error under tbe facts and circumstances presented in tbis record. Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 176 N. C., 504. Exceptions 70 and 71 relate to tbe testimony of witness Ervin, wbo testified tbat L. B. Yreeland was attorney for tbe Royal Blue Transportation Co. Tbe witness said: “Tbe only way I can answer tbat question is by stating wbat Mr. Vreeland did as attorney for tbe party to tbis action. Mr. Vreeland, as attorney for tbe Royal Blue Transportation Co., representing bimself as attorney for tbe Royal Blue Transportation Co., signed an agreement tbat all notices tbat be bad given or might be given as to taking of tbe deposition bad been waived by tbe Royal Blue Transportation Co.” Tbe witness was an attorney and was negotiating in tbe interest of O’Henry Moore, wbo was a passenger in tbe ear with tbe plaintiff, and was also injured in tbe wreck. Barnard, president of tbe defendant, was present at tbe conversation. There were facts and circumstances which tbe jury might well bave found reasonably induced a careful and prudent person to suppose tbat tbe attorney was authorized to act for bis client in tbe matter. Bank v. Hay, 143 N. C., 326; Trollinger v. Fleer, 157 N. C., 81. Tbe case in its final analysis presents only issues of fact, and these issues, under a proper charge, bave been resolved against tbe defendant, and tbe judgment is upheld. No error.