Snow v. . Hawkes

Adams, J. Contempt of court signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of its orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of the law into disrespect or to defeat, impair, or prejudice the rights of witnesses or parties to pending litigation. At common-law contempts were classified as direct and consequential. Direct contempt may be defined as words spoken or acts done in the presence of the court which tend to defeat or obstruct *367 tbe administration of justice; and consequential, or indirect, or constructive contempt is an act, baying like tendency, done at a distance, and not in tbe presence of tbe court. Tbe distinction between these classes is preserved in our statute law. Acts punishable for contempt are set out in section 978, and acts punishable as for contempt in section 985 of tbe Consolidated Statutes. In case of tbe former tbe offender may be instantly apprehended and dealt with, but for tbe latter, ordinarily a rule based upon affidavit is issued requiring tbe suspected party to show cause why be should not be attached. But in either instance suitable punishment may be administered. In McCown's case, 139 N. C., 95, Walker, J., in a learned and comprehensive opinion said, in substance, that tbe power of tbe courts to punish for contempt is a part of tbe fundamental law; that it is not conferred by legislation, being an inherent power which tbe Legislature can neither create nor destroy; and that it arises from necessity, because it is necessary to tbe exercise of all other powers. And Blackstone characteristically remarks that tbe process of attachment for contempt “must necessarily be as ancient as tbe laws themselves.” 4 BL, 286. Tbe respondent does not controvert tbe power of tbe court to punish for contempt, whether direct or constructive; but to tbe judgment rendered in tbe case at bar be interposes two objections. He contends (1) that tbe act complained of is not punishable as for contempt, and (2) that if it is, tbe act was done outside tbe territorial jurisdiction of tbe court. As to tbe first contention, tbe instant question is whether tbe means used by tbe respondent to effect dismissal of tbe plaintiff’s suit tended to impair or prejudice tbe rights or remedies of tbe plaintiff, or to defeat tbe administration of justice. At common law contempt might be committed by treating with disrespect tbe rules or process of tbe court, or by perverting such process to tbe purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice. 4 BL, 286. Tbe common-law principle includes any attempt to intimidate or willfully and unlawfully to prevent a person from instituting or defending an action in any court of record. Rapalje on Con., 27 n, 1. To compass tbe same end our statute in like manner provides that every court of record shall have power to punish as for contempt any person whose unlawful interference with tbe proceedings in any action shall tend to defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice any party’s rights or remedies, and that such power shall extend to all cases where before tbe statute was enacted attachments and proceedings as for contempt bad been adopted and practiced in courts of record for tbe enforcement of remedies or tbe protection of rights. C. S., 985, subsecs. 3 and 7. This principle is applied in numerous decisions. It has been held, for example, that a person who presents to tbe court a *368 fraudulent claim for tbe payment of money, or willfully interposes a false answer, or decoys a witness or dissuades bim from attending tbe trial, or insults, on account of an adverse verdict, a juror wbo bas been discharged, or willfully does any other act which tends to defeat tbe rights of any party to a pending action-may be punished as for contempt. In re Fountain, 182 N. C., 49; S. v. Moore, 146 N. C., 653; In re Young, 137 N. C., 553; In re Gorham, 129 N. C., 481; Ex parle Toepel, 102 N. W., 369; Scott v. State, 109 Tenn., 390. Here it may be noted that the last paragraph of section 978 is applicable not to constructive but to direct contempt. If the respondent, by the direct application of overpowering physical force, had obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, his act would have been no more effective than intimidation or duress by a threat of imprisonment; and the written agreement procured under duress, although the court was not in session, was unquestionably an act which tended directly to interfere unlawfully with the pending suit, and to impair the remedy and defeat the rights of the plaintiff. The second objection involves a question of jurisdiction, but in our opinion it cannot avail the respondent. It is true that the plaintiff’s signature to the alleged agreement was procured in Virginia, and that the court had no extra-territorial jurisdiction; but since the respondent appeared in court, answered the rule, and made his defense the question of jurisdiction is material only as it relates to the operation and ultimate effect of his wrongful act. It is perfectly obvious that the respondent’s paramount object was to secure dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit by fraud, deceit, and imposition on the court. The imposition was to be consummated in the county where the action was pending through an unlawful scheme which was intended to be not only continuing, but coextensive with the illegal purpose, and therefore operative in the Superior Court of Surry. The respondent’s act is plainly embraced in the provisions of the statute to which we have referred and the mere fact of his absence at the time he put the agency in motion cannot absolve him from the imputation of constructive contempt. There being no error in the record, his Honor’s judgment must be Affirmed.