Twining v. City of Wilmington

Seawell, J. 1. We approve of tbe findings of Judge Cranmer tbat none of tbe projects mentioned was a necessary purpose. 2. If tbe provisions of Article VII, section 7, of tbe Constitution still apply, tbe issue of tbe bonds. is without authority, since none of tbe proposals were approved by a majority of tbe qualified voters at tbe election. Tbat may be true, also, by application of tbe statute, under which tbe proceeding leading to tbe bond issue was bad. Article VII, section 7, of tbe Constitution is as follows: “7. No debt or loan except by a majority of voters. — No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of tbe same except for tbe necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein." Tbe pertinent part of Article V, section 4, of tbe Constitution is as follows: “. . . and for any purpose other than these enumerated tbe General Assembly shall have no power to authorize counties or municipalities to contract debts, and counties and municipalities shall not contract debts, during any fiscal year, to an amount exceeding two-tbirds of tbe amount by which tbe outstanding indebtedness of tbe particular county or municipality shall have been reduced during tbe next preceding fiscal year, unless tbe subject be submitted to a vote of tbe people of tbe particular county or municipality. In any election held in tbe State or in any county or municipality under tbe provisions of this section, tbe proposed indebtedness must be approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon." To summarize, for tbe creation of debt for unnecessary purposes, Article VII, section 7, of tbe Constitution requires tbe approval of a *658 majority of tbe qualified voters; to overcome tbe restriction placed upon tbe creation of debt by Article Y, section 4 (wbicb was necessary in tbis case), it is only necessary to bave tbe approval of a majority of those voting. These sections of tbe Constitution are not in conflict. It was competent for tbe people of tbe State, in their Constitution, to place what emphasis they pleased upon restrictions in tbe creation of debt, and in doing so to distinguish between debts differing in kind and necessity, and we see no indication in tbe adoption of tbe amendment to Article Y, section 4, that there was any intention on their part to modify tbe measure of restraint expressed in tbe more rigid requirements of Article YII, section 7, as a condition precedent to tbe contraction of debt for an unnecessary purpose. One referendum only is required, but when tbe proposal is to issue bonds for a purpose wbicb cannot be classed as necessary, it must be approved by a majority of tbe qualified voters, as required in Article YII, section 7, although a majority of those voting is sufficient to satisfy tbe requirements of Article Y, section 4, as to tbe particular restriction imposed therein. We may say further that tbe city has undertaken tbe issue of tbe bonds under the Municipal Finance Act of 1917' — C. S., 2936, et seq.— and is bound by its provisions. Section 2948 requires that where the bond ordinance provides for tbe issuance of bonds for a purpose other than tbe payment of necessary expenses of tbe municipality, tbe approval of a majority of tbe qualified voters is necessary to make tbe ordinance operative. Hemric v. Comrs. of Yadkin County, 206 N. C., 845, 175 S. E., 168. Upon tbis reasoning, tbe judgment of tbe court below, restraining tbe issuance of tbe bonds, is Affirmed.