J. Goldman & Co. v. Crank

Per Curiam. Tbe principle on which it is uniformly held in this State that parol testimony is not admissible as evidence to contradict or alter tbe terms of a written instrument, in an action between tbe parties to tbe instrument, is well settled. Lytton Mfg. Co. v. House Mfg. Co., 161 N. C., 430, 77 S. E., 233. This principle is applicable in tbe instant case, for tbe plaintiff, although not a party to the bill of sale, is claiming under tbe contract between tbe defendants, Trannie Crank and Susie Crank, and tbe defendant, W. D. Taylor. It is immaterial that tbe provisions of C. S., 1013, known as tbe “Bulk Sales Statute,” were not complied with in tbe instant case. If tbe statute was applicable to tbe sale of tbe sboe shop, it does not follow that tbe defendant, W. E. Taylor, as purchaser of tbe “Crank Sboe Sbop,” became personally liable for tbe debts of tbe defendants, Trannie Crank and Susie Crank, tbe vendors, contracted by them in carrying on their business, as the result of noncompliance with its provisions. At most, the sale of the shop was void as to the plaintiff, who was a creditor of the vendors at the date of the sale. There was no evidence at the trial of this action tending to show that the defendant, W. D. Taylor, is personally liable to plaintiff, on the account, for articles of personal property sold and delivered by plaintiff to the defendants Trannie Crank and Susie Crank. There is, therefore, no error in the judgment dismissing the action as to the defendant, W. D. Taylor. The judgment is Affirmed.