Craig v. . Price

Devin, J. Plaintiff bases his action upon the alleged breach of an agreement to delay the foreclosure of a deed of trust long in default. There being no consideration for the promise to extend the time for foreclosure, it will not support a contract enforceable in law, or give ground for an action for damages for its breach. Cromartie v. Lumber Co., 173 N. C., 712; Jackson v. Bank, 203 N. C., 357. A promise is not binding in law if founded solely on a consideration which the law holds insufficient to create a legal obligation. Hatchell v. Odom, 19 N. C., 302; Williams v. Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C., 29. The breach of contract is alleged to have occurred in October, 1929, and, more than three years having elapsed before suit was instituted, it would seem plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations; nor is the evidence sufficient to show that defendant is estopped to plead the statute, under the rule laid down in Oliver v. Fidelity Co., 176 N. C., 598; McIntosh Prac. & Proc., sec. 130; Bryant v. Kellum, 209 N. C., 112. *741 Plaintiff complains that be did not receive personal notification of the foreclosure sale, but there was no evidence that the provisions of the deed of trust or of the statute, with respect to advertisement, were not fully complied with. Plaintiff does not base bis action upon breach of parol contract to convey the land to him. But this would not avail him, for the alleged promise is denied, and it would not be necessary for the defendant to specifically plead the statute of frauds to render the evidence incompetent to prove the contract. Winders v. Hill, 144 N. C., 614; Clegg v. Bishop, 188 N. C., 564. The motion for judgment of nonsuit was properly sustained, and the judgment is Affirmed.