Bisanar v. . Suttlemyre

Stacy, C. J., after stating tbe case: It is tbe uniform bolding in.this jurisdiction that, except by consent, or unless authorized by statute, a judge of tbe Superior Court, even in bis own district, has no authority to bear a cause, or to make- an order substantially affecting tbe rights of tbe parties, outside of tbe county in which tbe action is pending. Gaster v. Thomas, 188 N. C., 346; Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C., 5; Mann v. Mann, ibid., 353; Cox v. Borden, 167 N. C., 320; Bank v. Peregoy, 147 N. C., 293; Godwin v. Monds, 101 N. C., 354; McNeill v. Hodges, 99 N. C., 248; Moore v. Hinnant, 90 N. C., 163. See, also, Thomas v. Watkins, ante, 630. *713 Mr. Freeman, in his valuable work on Judgments, Yol. 1 (5 ed.), 2(39, speaking to the subject of correcting judgments after term, says: “As a general rule, unless control over it has been retained in some proper manner, or a statute otherwise provides, no final judgment can be amended after the term at which it was rendered or after it otherwise becomes a final judgment. The power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprisions and to' make the record speak the truth by nunc fro tunc amendments after the term does not enable them to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect. And this is true even though the judgment has not been formally entered of record by the clerk, where such entry is not essential to its validity. Consequently, it is well settled that, in the absence of statute permitting it, the law does not authorize the correction of judicial errors, however flagrant and ' glaring they may be, under the pretense of. correcting clerical errors. To entitle a party to an order amending a judgment, order, or decree, ordinarily, he must establish that the entry as made does not conform to. What the court ordered.” In the case at bar, by consent of the parties, the judge was authorized to sign judgment out of term and out of the district. This ended, we think, when he signed the judgment, tendered by the defendant, on 23 December, 1926. His subsequent orders, therefore, were without warrant of law. Dunn v. Taylor, 187 N. C., 385. The defendant’s exceptions to these must be sustained, but this will be done without prejudice to the rights of the. plaintiff to question the judgment signed on 23 December, 1926, by motion in the cause, or other appropriate remedy. To this end the cause will be remanded for such further proceedings as the rights of the parties may require. On defendant’s appeal, Error. On plaintiff’s appeal, Remanded.