Leathers v. . Morris

Merrimon, J. The defendant relied upon a judgment in an action determined before a Justice of the Peace, asan estoppel upon the plaintiff. The latter objected that the supposed judgment was a nullity, upon the ground that the Justice of the Peace had not jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action. The Court sustained the objection, and the appellant assigns this decision as error. The action before the Justice of the Peace was brought to recover possession of a mule. The summon&therein simply commanded the defendant “to answer the complaint of W. H. Morris for the wrongful detention of one dark bay mule.” It did not specify the value of the mule, nor does this appear in the whole course of that action, or in the judgment therein, except that in the affidavit in the claim and delivery pro *187 ceeding, it is stated that “ the actual value of said property (the mule) is about fifty dollars.” The statute (The Code, § 832,) among other things, provides that the summons issued in actions in Courts of Justices of the Peace, shall “ also contain the amount of the sum demanded by the 'plaintiff.” The important purpose of this requirement is to show by such demand that the limited jurisdiction of the Court arises and attaches as soon as the summons shall be served. And it is deemed essential that such demand shall so appear, whether the cause.of action be founded on contract or it be a demand for the possession of property or for its value. The Code, § 887; Allen v. Jackson, 86 N. C., 321; Noville v. Dew, 94 N. C., 43; Singer Manufacturing Co., v. Barrett, 95 N. C., 36. The statement of the value of the property in the affidavit mentioned to be “ about fifty dollars” was not sufficient if this had been in the summons, because the demand must be for fifty dollars or a sum less than that to give rise to the jurisdiction. But a proper statement of the sum of money demanded in the affidavit, if it had been found there, was not sufficient to cure the defect of the absence of the proper-demand in the summons; it has been so decided. When however the cause of action, the sum demanded, was in fact within the jurisdiction of the Court, and the demand was omitted by inadvertence or mistake from the summons, the Court might, pending the action, allow a proper amendment to show the demand, not to give jurisdiction, but to make it appear in and by the summons from which it had been so omitted. Such amendment would relate back to-the date of the summons and render it efficient; it could not in such case work injustice to the parties because in fact the jurisdiction existed; it only helped, cured defective process. Noville v. Dew, supra; Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Barrett, supra. As to the supposed judgment in question it does not appear that the Court of limited jurisdiction ever acquired *188 jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action in which it was given, and particularly a requirement essential to give that Court jurisdiction does not appear in the summons as the statute requires. The Court below therefore properly held that the judgment was null and void. Affirmed.