Winner v. . Brice

CoNnob, J. The juvenile courts of the several counties of this State, which were created by statute (ch. 97, Public Laws of North Carolina, 1919, N. C. Code of 1935, secs. 5039-5062), have exclusive original jurisdiction of any child residing in their respective counties: “(a) Who is delinquent or who violates any municipal or State law or ordinance, or who is truant, unruly, wayward or misdirected, or who is disobedient to parents or beyond their control, or who is in danger of becoming so; or “(b) Who is neglected, or who engages in any occupation, calling or exhibition, or is found in any place where a child is forbidden by -law, and for permitting which an adult may be punished by law, or who is in such condition or surroundings or is under such improper or insufficient guardianship or control as to endanger the morals, health, or general welfare of such child; or “(c) Who is dependent upon public support or who is destitute, homeless or abandoned, or whose custody is subject to controversy.” It is provided by statute that “when jurisdiction has been obtained in the case of any child, unless a court order shall be issued to the contrary, or unless the' child be committed to an institution supported and controlled by the State, it shall continue for the purposes of this act during the minority of the child. The duty shall be constant upon the court to give each child subject to its jurisdiction such oversight and control in the premises as will conduce to the welfare of such child and to the best interest of the State.” By virtue of the "foregoing statutory provisions the juvenile court of Duplin County, on the facts alleged in the petition and admitted by the demurrer, has exclusive original jurisdiction of each of the four children named in the petition. Each of said children is under the age of sixteen; he resides in Duplin County; he is now under such conditions and surroundings and under such improper guardianship and control as to endanger his morals, health, and general welfare, and his custody is subject to controversy. These facts are sufficient to give the said court jurisdiction of said children, for the purposes of the statute, provided the said court has jurisdiction of this proceeding. It is provided by the statute that “any person having knowledge or information that a child is within the provisions of this act, and subject *299 to tbe jurisdiction of the court, may file with the court a petition verified by affidavit, stating the alleged facts which bring such child within said provisions. The petition shall set forth the name and residence of the child and of the parents, or the name and residence of the person having the guardianship, custody or supervision of such child, if the same be known or ascertained by the petitioner, or the petition shall state that they are unknown, if that be the fact.” This proceeding was begun by a petition which complies in all respects with these statutory requirements and is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court of the proceeding. Whether or not the petitioner is the duly constituted and duly appointed guardian of the children named in the petition is immaterial, at least for purposes of jurisdiction. It appears from the allegations of the petition, which are admitted by the demurrer, that the petitioner is a person who has knowledge or information of the facts alleged in the petition which are sufficient under the statute to confer jurisdiction upon the court, both of the children named in the petition, and of the proceeding which was begun by the filing of the petition. This, under the express provisions of the statute, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction for the purposes of the statute. It is provided by the statute that “upon the filing of the petition or upon the taking of the child into custody, the court may forthwith or after an investigation by a probation officer or other person, cause to be issued a summons signed by the judge or the clerk of the court, directed to the child, unless such child has been taken into custody, and to the parents, or in case there is no parent, to the person having the guardianship, custody, or supervision of the child, or the person with whom the child may be, requiring them to appear with the child, at the place and time stated in the summons to show cause why the child should not be dealt with according to the provisions of this act.” The notice issued by the judge of the juvenile court of Duplin County, addressed to the respondents and appearing in the record, was sufficient compliance with the foregoing statutory provisions. This notice was duly served on'the respondents who appeared as required and filed answer to the petition. It was within the discretion of the court as to whether summons should be issued to and served on the children. The respondents have no cause to complain that no summons or notice was served on the children, who were in their custody. The validity of the statute creating juvenile courts in the several counties of this State has been upheld, and its provisions construed and applied by this Court in In re Coston, 187 N. C., 509, 122 S. E., 183; In re Hamilton, 182 N. C., 44, 108 S. E., 385, and S. v. Burnett, 179 N. C., 735, 102 S. E., 711. In view of the situation presented by the record in this proceeding, it may be well to direct attention to the following provisions of the statute: *300 Tbe court “may commit the child to a suitable institution maintained by the State or any subdivision thereof, or to any suitable private institution, society or association incorporated under the laws of the State and approved by the State Board of Charities and Public Welfare, authorized to care for children or to place them in suitable homes.” N. C. Code of 1935, see. 5047, subsection 4. “In committing any child to any institution or other custodial agency other than one supported and controlled by the State, or in placing the child under any guardianship other than that of its natural guardians, the court shall as- far as practicable select as the custodial agency an institution, society, or association governed by persons of like religious faith as the parents of such child or an individual holding the same religious faith.” N. C. Code of 1935, sec. 5053. There was error in the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing this proceeding on the ground that the juvenile court of Duplin County was without jurisdiction of the children named in the petition, of this proceeding, and of the respondents. The judgment is reversed to the end that the order of the judge of the juvenile court, overruling the demurrer and denying the motion that the proceeding be dismissed, may be affirmed'and the proceeding remanded to the juvenile court of Duplin County that it may be heard by said court. Beversed.