Southern Railway Co. v. Gaston County

Clakkson, J. The question involved: Did the court commit reversible error in holding that chapter 256 of the Public-Local Laws of 1929, which was ratified by the General Assembly of North Carolina on 11 March, 1929, was repealed by chapter 344 of the Public Laws of 1929, being the Machinery Act, ratified by the General Assembly on 19 March, 1929, and in signing judgment granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiff? We think not from the language of the Machinery Act. This action was brought by plaintiff against defendant to recover $326.41. On 23 January, 1930, the Southern Railway Company tendered to J. W. Carroll, tax collector of Gaston County, the sum of $32,641.25 in payment of taxes assessed or levied against the plaintiff company, but he declined to accept the said sum in full payment and demanded payment of the further or additional sum of $326.41, said sum being a one per centum (1%) penalty on said taxes, which he contended was due and payable under and by virtue of the provisions of chapter 256 of the Public-Local Laws of 1929, which was ratified 11 March, 1929, because plaintiff had not paid or tendered such taxes on or before 1 January, 1930. The plaintiff paid the $326.41 under protest and brought this action. N. C. Code, 1927 (Miehie), sec. 7880 (189). The statute applicable to Gaston County imposes a penalty of one per cent (1%) for January, the Machinery Act did not, so the question is, as before stated, which act prevails? The general principle of law on the subject is thus stated in Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C., at p. 452: “Again, it is established that where a general and a special statute are passed on the same subject, and the two are necessarily inconsistent, it is the special statute that will prevail, this last being regarded usually in the nature of an exception to the former. Cecil v. High Point, 165 N. C., 431-435; Commissioners v. Aldermen, 158 N. C., 197-8; Dahnke v. The People, 168 Ill., 102; Stockett v. Byrd, 18 Md., 484, 'a position that obtains though the special law precedes the general, unless the provisions of the general statute *783 necessarily excludes such a construction. Rodgers v. U. S., 185 U. S., 83; Black on Interpretation o£ Laws, p. 117.’ ” (Italics ours.) S. v. Davis, 129 N. C., 570; S. v. Cantwell, 142 N. C., 604; S. v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 685; Bank v. Loven, 172 N. C., at p. 670; Young v. Davis, 182 N. C., at p. 203; Felmet v. Commissioners, 186 N. C., 251; Blair v. Commissioners, 187 N. C., 488; Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N. C., 736; Greensboro v. Guilford, 191 N. C., 584; Monteith v. Commissioners, 195 N. C., 75-6. See S. v. Fowler, 193 N. C., 290. We think the provisions of the general statute, the Machinery Act, necessarily excludes the construction that the local statute was an exception. It expressly repeals the local statute. The language of the Machinery Act: "All taxes assessed and/or levied by a/ny county in this State, in accordance with the provisions of this act, shall be due and payable on the first Monday of October, of the year in which so assessed and levied,” and if actually paid in cash (3) “After the first day of December, and on or before the first day of February next after due and payable, the tax shall be paid at par or face value.” In Bauldwin Century Edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1929), the word “any” is defined: “It is synonymous with 'either,’ 3 "Wheel. Grim. Law Gas., 508; and is given the full force of 'every’ or 'all,’ 43 Mo., 254; 4 Q. B. D., 409; 91 U. S., 265. Frequently used in the sense of 'all’ or 'every,’ and when thus used it has a very comprehensive meaning. 2 A. & E. Ency. (2 ed.), 414. For example, it has been held that 'any’ contract is sufficiently comprehensive to include special contracts as well as contracts which arise by implication. 91 U. S., 265.” “Federal court held to have jurisdiction of personal action by ship’s carpenter, injured while repairing completed vessel in navigable waters of United States, without regard to his citizenship, since act 4 March, 1915, sec. 20, as amended by act 5 June, 1920, sec. 33 (46 U. S. O. A., sec. 688), giving 'any’ seaman authority to sue at law, applies to 'every’ seaman and requirement of Federal court’s jurisdiction of such action is exclusive of that previously and generally imposed by Judicial Code, sec. 24 (28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41). Kuhlman v. W. & A. Fletcher Co. (C. C. A. N. J.), 20 F. (2d), 465, 468.” "We think under the Machinery Act “any” means “all” or “every.” For the reasons given the judgment of the court below is Affirmed.