Long v. . Trantham

Winborne, J. Decision on this appeal requires consideration only of plaintiff's exception to the judgment as of nonsuit entered in the trial court. This exception is pivoted on the question as -to whether Dilling-ham and Bagwell were equitably estopped by the petition and judgment in the cartway proceedings from thereafter asserting that their co-petitioner L. Y. Long was not entitled to cross their land on the old road to get to the land of Trantham, over which clearly the Board of Commissioners laid off and established cartway. They are precluded if their conduct would make such assertion obviously unjust to Long. The facts revealed in the record lead to an affirmative answer to the question. See Thomas v. Conyers, 198 N. C., 229, 151 S. E., 270; Henning v. Warner, 109 N. C., 406, 14 S. E., 317; Harris v. Carter, 189 N. C., 295, 127 S. E., 1; McNeely v. Walters, 211 N. C., 112, 189 S. E., 114; In re Young, 222 N. C., 708, 24 S. E. (2d), 539; McDaniel v. Leggett, 224 N. C., 806, 32 S. E. (2d), 602. The applicable principle is stated by Adams, J., in Thomas v. Conyers, supra, in this manner: “Equitable estoppel in pais owes its origin and development to the notion of justice promulgated by courts of chancery. It embraces estoppel by conduct which rests upon the necessity of compelling the observance of good faith . . . This estoppel arises when any one, by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist, and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.’ ” *514 “Tbe doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on an application of tbe golden rule to tbe every day affairs of men. It requires tbat one should do unto others as, in equity and good conscience, be would have them do unto him, if their positions were reversed . . . Its compulsion is one of fair play.” Stacy, C. J., in McNeely v. Walters, supra. In tbe light of this principle and bearing in mind tbat tbe land of Long was separate and apart from tbat of Dillingham and Bagwell, it is significant tbat in tbe joint petition of Dillingham and Bagwell and Long they pray for a cartway to “their property,” and they say tbat “their property” has been served for 25 years by tbe road tbat was then closed and which they sought to have opened. Tbe words “their property” as so used necessarily included tbe separate property of Long as well as tbat of Dillingham and Bagwell. Moreover, tbe petitioners jointly say tbat in their opinion tbe most economical route for tbe cartway “would be to open tbe present road tbat has been closed.” This is tantamount to saying tbat tbe old road as it ran from Long’s land across tbat of Dillingham and Bagwell served both, and tbat tbe obstacle in tbe way was tbe obstruction placed by Trantham. Under these circumstances it would be manifestly unjust to Long for them to deny to him tbe use of tbe old road across their land to get to tbe cartway established across Trantham’s property. This they may not do. Tbe defendants Tran-tham having thereafter purchased tbe land of Dillingham and Bagwell stand in privity of title to them and would likewise be estopped to deny tbe right of Long to use tbe old road. See Dillingham v. Gardner, 222 N. C., 79, 21 S. E. (2d), 898. In tbe light of these principles tbe judgment of nonsuit is Reversed.