Foy v. . Haughton

Ruffin, J. As the defendant was-- without the aid' of counsel in this court, and his exception points to no particular error, we have carefully examined the- whole case-to discover-if possible something of which- he has a right to-complain, without, however, being able to do so.. As stated in his own answer; his right to the relief he asks seems-doubtful. There is- not a- single allegation of any false affirmation on the part of the plaintiff in regard to his title to the land, or the date, or efficacy of his deed from the sheriff, nor the slightest pretence that the- defendant had ever seen the registry o-f that deed before completing hie contract with the plaintiff. So far as the allegations of the defendant gOj.a-11 that the plaintiff did- in the premises was to-have his-deed registered *172 an the county in which'the land lay, and this he was not only encouraged by the law to do, hut required by every fair consideration of duty; seeing that the defendant was .•about to sell, and the purchaser should have notice before parting with his money of plaintiff's claim to the land, ■whether well founded or otherwise. But upon the proof, the'defendant being the only witness deposing, the wea-knesspf hisease becomes apparent. When the parties are brought face to face, whether at Raleigh or Newbern, there is literally nothing in the conduct.of the plaintiff as given by defendant himself, from which a purpose to defraud and circumvent the defendant can be a legitimate inference. On the contrary, it is apparent, as well from the testimony as the pleadings, that the defendant had doubts as to the ■validity of the title he -was getting from the plaintiff, and that his object in buying w,as to rid his own title of all •question, and thereby remove .all objections on that score which might be entertained by Mclver,;-otherwise, it is impossible to account for the defendant’s willingness to accept tfrom the plaintiff a mere quit-claim i.n lieu of an absolute deed for the land. Conceding, even, that the law imposes upon every vendor rthe duty of disclosing every known defect in his title to the •subject of the sale, there -is nothing -to show that the plaintiff in this ease was aware of the existence of the defect in his dee-d now .-suggested .by the defendant beyond -that presumption of the knowledge of the law which all persons are ■supposed to have — a presumption, however, which is never so far indulged as to convicta party of fraud who is in fad ■innocent. As said in the ease of Tilghman v. West, 8 Ired. Eq., 183, fraud cannot exist, as a matter of fact, where the intent to deceive does not exist, for it is emphatically the action of the mind which gives it existence. But the rule of law is that in sales of land it is the duty of a purchaser to *173 guard against! all defects as well- of title as of encumbrance- or quantity, by taking proper covenants looking to-the end,- and if be fail to do so it is his folly,-against which the law,, that encourages no negligence, will give him no relief. If there be on the part of the vendor any act of actual/misrepresentation, or other positive fraud in regard to a maternal matter reasonably relied-on-, then-the purchaser will be-afforded relief,-otherwise the maxim-of caveat emptor applies-in all courts,- whether of law or equity. Etheridge v. Vernoy, 70 N. C., 713. The charge given by bis Honor to- the jury in- this case it being one in which a fraudulent intent to deceive is-alleged, very properly left the question of the guilty knowledge on the part of the plaintiff to- be determined by the-jury, that being the point upon which the whole case’hinged. As to the intimation which it is-said in>the case he gave-to the jury about the effect which the laches of the sheriff’ should have upon the plaintiff’s title, we confess we do not-see i-ts pertinency, but as we cannot see that i-t worked any harm to defendant, or indeed,- tell what his-Honor did say on the point, we must decline to disturb the judgment rendered in the court below on account thereof. No error, Affirmed,