State v. Manhart

Per Curiam. The state has appealed three separate orders from three separate cases dismissing indictments for involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(B). We reverse in all three cases. I These appeals originate from three separate cases below, all addressing the constitutionality of R.C. 2903.04(B). Prior to September 29, 1994, R.C. 2903.04(B) stated: “No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate *501 result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor.” 144 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1566, 1570. In State v. Collins (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “[a] minor misdemeanor may not serve as the underlying predicate offense for purposes of the involuntary manslaughter statute, R.C. 2903.04(B).” The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the legislature’s use of the term “misdemeanor” and reasoned that “we do not believe the General Assembly intended to include a minor misdemean- or as a predicate misdemeanor offense for purposes of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.” Id. at 116, 616 N.E.2d at 225. Responding to the Supreme Court opinion in Collins, the legislature clarified its intent by adding the language “of the first, second, third, or fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor ” to the end of R.C. 2903.04(B) (emphasis added). 145 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5116, 5117. Thus, the legislature has clearly expressed its intent to include minor misdemeanors as predicate offenses for purposes of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. The cases herein involve a constitutional challenge to the legislature’s inclusion .of minor misdemeanors within the ambit of R.C. 2903.04(B). In the case of Douglas R. Manhart, Summit App. No. 19069, C.P. No. CR-1997-09-2129, Manhart was indicted in part for involuntary manslaughter based on the minor misdemeanors of failing to maintain a lane of travel in violation of R.C. 4511.25 and failing to maintain an assured clear distance in violation of R.C. 4511.21. Manhart moved to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge as a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Ohio and United States Constitutions and as a -violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted the motion, finding R.C. 2903.04(B) to be a violation of equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In the case of Lorenzo Lavelle Hayes, Summit App. No. 19070, C.P. No. CR-1997-09-2039, Hayes was indicted for involuntary manslaughter based on the first degree misdemeanors of driving with a suspended license in violation of R.C. 4511.192 and failing to stop after an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02, and on the minor misdemeanor of failing to yield the right of way when turning left in violation of R.C. 4511.42. Hayes moved to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge as a violation of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The trial court granted Hayes’s motion based on the same reasoning that' was employed in Manhart’s case. In the case of Tracy L. Stalnaker, Summit App. No. 19134, C.P. No. CR-1997-09-2084, Stalnaker was indicted for involuntary manslaughter based on her failure to yield the right of way when turning left in violation of R.C. 4511.42 and on her failure to follow the rules for turning at an intersection in violation of R.C. 4511.36, both of which were rendered fourth degree misdemeanors by Stalnaker’s *502 prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle without reasonable control in violation of R.C. 4511.202. See R.C. 4511.99(D)(1)(b). Stalnaker moved to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge as a violation of her right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Ohio and United States Constitutions and as a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted this motion. The prosecution has appealed from all three dismissals and the Attorney General has filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the prosecution. Because the three appeals all involve the same issues, they have been consolidated for our review. II The prosecution’s sole assignment of error on appeal states: “The trial court committed error when it dismissed [the] involuntary manslaughter count[s] in the indictmentfs], which was predicted [sic"] on the commission of a minor misdeanor [sic ].” The prosecution’s arguments raise two issues for our review: (1) whether R.C. 2903.04(B) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when applied to minor misdemeanors, and (2) whether applying R.C. 2903.04(B) to minor misdemeanors violates the principle of equal protection. “In determining the constitutionality of legislative enactments * * *, we begin with the well-settled principle that all enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and before a court may declare the statute unconstitutional, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provision are clearly incapable of coexisting. Further, doubts regarding the validity of a legislative enactment are to be resolved in favor of the statute.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Gill (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 1200, 1201. A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on this issue. In State v. Weitbrecht (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 715 N.E.2d 167, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “R.C. 2903.04(B), as applied to a minor misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide, does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” Therefore, appellees’ cruel and unusual punishment claims are not well taken. B. Equal Protection. *503 Appellees also claim that their equal protection rights were violated when the prosecution charged them with involuntary manslaughter rather than vehicular homicide. Appellees cite State v. Wilson (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 55-56, 12 O.O.3d 51, 54, 388 N.E.2d 745, 748, wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “if the statutes prohibit identical activity, require identical proof, and yet impose different penalties, then sentencing a person under the statute with the higher penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Appellees argue that involuntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide apply to identical activities and require identical proof, but impose different penalties. While involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(B) is considered a third degree felony, R.C. 2903.04(C), vehicular homicide is merely a first degree misdemeanor, R.C. 2903.07(B). Thus, appellees argue that the state denied them equal protection by pursuing charges of involuntary manslaughter under these circumstances. However, appellees’ argument in this regard has been rejected by every Ohio appellate district that has addressed the issue. See, e.g., State v. Campbell (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 762, 773-774, 691 N.E.2d 711, 718 (Second Appellate District); State v. Shy (June 30, 1997), Pike App. No. 96 CA 587, unreported, 1997 WL 381782 (Fourth Appellate District); State v. Brown (1996), 117 Ohio App.3d 6, 11, 689 N.E.2d 979, 982, (Sixth Appellate District). But, see, State v. Brown, 117 Ohio App.3d at 11-12, 689 N.E.2d at 982 (Melvin L. Resnick, P.J., dissenting). Appellees also emphasize the seemingly unrestricted discretion that is placed in the hands of the prosecution in making the charging decision. Appellees claim that this discretion permits the prosecution to treat similarly situated people differently. However, similar arguments have also been rejected by other Ohio appellate districts. See, e.g., State v. Carper (Mar. 1, 1999), Fayette App. No. CA98-06-009, unreported, 1999 WL 98990 (Twelfth District); Shy; Brown; State v. Stanford (Aug. 30, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5358, unreported, 1996 WL 537856. In light of the dispositions of these courts regarding similar equal protection arguments, appellees’ equal protection claims are also not well taken. Ill Accordingly, the judgments of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas are reversed. Judgments reversed. Baird, P.J., and Slaby, J., concur. Carr, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.