Weiss v. Kearns

*482 Kovachy, J. This is a pending case on the docket of this court which was appealed on questions of law and fact from a judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. Defendant-appellee, A. L. Kearns, hereafter designated appellee, has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on questions of law and fact “for the reason that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal.” He cites as authority the recent decision of the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Appellate District, Buckeye Union Casualty Co. v. Braden, 116 Ohio App., 348, and an article which appeared in The Ohio Bar, Vol. XXXV, No. 39, at page 1150 (October 8,1962), written by our esteemed colleague, Judge Lee E. Skeel. The burden of Judge Skeel’s article is that the language incorporated in the 1944 Amendment to Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, wherein it is stated that “the courts of appeals shall have # * * such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders * * *” empowers the General Assembly to enact laws to provide the method and procedure to appeal cases to the courts of appeals on questions of law only since the use of the words “review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse” historically, in the court system of Ohio, mean “error proceedings” (now known as appeals on questions of law) and the Supreme Court, following the 1912 Amendment to the same Section and Article, has declared that the expression “as may be provided by law” gives the General Assembly no power to enlarge the jurisdiction so indicated but merely to provide by law the method of exercising that jurisdiction, and since the 1944 Amendment leaves out the expression “appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases,” which was part of the 1912 Amendment, appeals de novo on law and fact are eliminated. Paragraph one of the syllabus of the Buckeye Union Casualty Company case, supra, reads as follows: “Courts of Appeals do not have jurisdiction in appeals on questions of law and fact.” Judge Radcliff, the writer of the opinion in that case, also relies heavily upon articles written by Judge Skeel appearing in SkeePs Ohio Appellate Law, 1961 Cumulative Service, 88, et *483 seq., Section 200-1, and 12 Western Reserve Law Review, 645. Judge Radcliff, moreover, believes that the original reason and need for an appeal on law and fact no longer exists for the reason that when Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution was amended in 1883, creating the circuit courts to replace the district courts, all possibility of an appeal coram nobis (appeal to oneself) was abolished, and it became impossible for a judge to preside in an equity case “on the trial level and then sit as one of three judges reviewing the same case on appeal.” Plaintiffs-Appellants, hereafter designated appellants, argue that the 1944 Amendment of Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, by providing that: “The courts of appeals shall have * * * such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse judgments or final orders * * *.” (Emphasis added.) confers plenary power upon the General Assembly to change the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals within the ambit “to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse,” that the language encompasses a “review” on questions of law and fact as well as on questions of law and, in accordance therewith, empowers the General Assembly to enact Sections 2501.02 and 2505.21, Revised Code, effective October 4, 1955, conferring jurisdiction upon the courts of appeals to “review” certain designated classes of cases on questions of law and fact. Parts of Section 2501.02, Revised Code, pertinent to our discussion here, read as follows: “ * * * In addition to the original jurisdiction conferred by Section 6 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution, the court shall have jurisdiction: “(A) Upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district, including the finding, order, or judgment of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent, neglected, or dependent, for prejudicial error committed by such lower court; “(B) Upon an appeal on questions of law and fact the court of appeals in cases arising in courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district, shall weigh the evidence and render such judgment or decree as the trial court could *484 and should have rendered upon the original trial of the ease, in the following classes of actions, seeking as a primary and paramount relief: “1. The construction or enforcement of a trust, including the enforcement or establishment of constructive or resulting trusts. “2. The establishment or enforcement of equitable estates arising from the conversion of property. “3. The foreclosure of mortgages and marshalling of liens, including statutory liens. “4. The appointment, removal and control of trustees and receivers. “5. The restraint of commission of torts. “6. The reformation and cancellation of instruments in writing. “7. The restraint of actions or judgments at law. “8. The quieting of title to property, the partition of property, and the registration of land titles. “9. The specific performance of contracts, or the restraint of the breach thereof. “10. Injunction, accounting, subrogation or interpleader. “In all cases not falling within the classes designated above the court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to proceed as in an appeal on questions of law only. ££* # # Parts of Section 2505.21, Revised Code, captioned, “Hearing on appeal,” read as follows: ££###?> “An appeal taken on questions of law and fact entitles the party to a hearing and determination of the facts de novo which shall be upon the same or amended pleadings. The court shall review the final order, judgment or decree upon such part of the record made in the trial court as any party may present to the court and such additional evidence as upon application in the interest of justice the court may authorize to be taken, such evidence to be presented in the manner and form prescribed by the court.” (Emphasis added.) It is conceded by appellee that the case here appealed comes within the purview of Section 2501.02, Revised Code, as a “law *485 and fact” appeal for the reason that the ultimate relief sought by appellants was the granting of an injunction permanently restraining appellee from attempting to satisfy a default judgment obtained by him against appellants in the Court of Common Pleas. The sole question before us is whether these laws, vesting the courts of appeals with jurisdiction to “review” the classes of cases set forth in Section 2501.02, Revised Code, on questions of law and fact in accordance with the method and procedure outlined in Section 2505.21, Revised Code, are repugnant to the provisions of Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, as amended in 1944, and, therefore, unconstitutional enactments of the General Assembly. In considering the question whether these enactments of the General Assembly are constitutional, we must keep in mind that the constitution under which Ohio operates was adopted in 1851 and that Section 6, Article IV, an integral part of such organic law, has undergone four amendments, each aimed at improving the administration of justice in intermediary reviewing courts — in 1883, 1912, 1944 and 1959. (The 1959 Amendment merely authorizes the General Assembly to add additional judges.) Much of the significant language used in the 1944 Amendment had been used before in the ninety-three year old constitution and in statutes enacted pursuant to its authority, and resort must be had to the history of the times when these words, phrases and expressions were first employed to understand the meaning and sense to be accorded them. The following is stated in 11 American Jurisprudence, 676, Section 63: “It is settled by very high authority, that in placing a construction on a Constitution or any clause or part thereof, a court should look to the history of the times and examine the state of things existing when the Constitution was framed and adopted, in order to ascertain the prior law, the mischief, and the remedy. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.” Judge Stephenson of the Supreme Court of Ohio sets forth *486 the established rules of construction in determining the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature at page 282 in the case of Board of Elections v. State, ex rel. Schneider, 128 Ohio St., 273, as follows: “1. It must be accorded the presumption of constitutionality. “2. The question of constitutionality must be determined in the light of the Constitution in its entirety. “3. If the Act can be fairly reconciled with the Constitution, we must so reconcile it. “4. In considering the scope of the Act we must not only consider past and present evils, if any, but we must determine whether its existence would naturally tend to lead us into future evils. Village of Euclid v. Camp Wise Assn., 102 Ohio St., 207, at page 215, 131 N. E., 349. “5. If the maxim ‘Expressio unius est exelusio alterius’ is involved, we must consider it. State, ex rel. Robertson Realty Co., v. Guilbert, Aud. of State, 75 Ohio St., 1, 78 N. E., 931. “6. Courts have nothing to do with the policy, justice or wisdom of a statute, so long as it can be said that it does not contravene the Constitution. Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Horstman, 72 Ohio St., 93, 73 N. E., 1075; B. & O. Rd. Co. v. Chambers, 73 Ohio St., 16, 76 N. E., 91, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1012; Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St., 94, 91 N. E., 991, 137 Am. St. Rep., 764. “7. It is dangerous for any court to hold that an act of the General Assembly contravenes the spirit, but not the letter, of the Constitution. The spirit of the Constitution is like any other spirit. We cannot see it, nor handle it, consequently we do not know much about it. We are too prone to insist that the spirit of the Constitution is what we think it ought to be. Unless such spirit is clearly manifest, it had best be left in the spirtual world. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607; State, ex rel. Evans, v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St., 437; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; State, ex rel. Garnes, v. McCann, 21 Ohio St., 198. “8. However, the General Assembly exercises delegated authority only, and any act passed by it not fairly falling within the scope of legislative authority is as clearly void as though expressly prohibited. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville Rd. *487 Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 77; Baker v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St., 534; Lehman v. McBride, supra; State, ex rel. Garnes, v. McCann, supra; Bloom v. City of Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 461. “9. A constitution is to be construed by the same rules as those employed in the construction of statutes, except that since the terms of the constitution are more general the grants of power should be construed more liberally. County of Miami v. City of Dayton, 92 Ohio St., 215; 110 N. E., 726. “10. History of the law may lend light to construction. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitation (8 Ed.), Yol. 1, pages 132 and 133.” (All subsequent emphases in this opinion are supplied unless otherwise indicated.) Before the Ohio Constitution of 1851, Ohio operated under a constitution adopted in 1802 wherein provision was made for three constitutional courts: justices of the peace, common pleas, supreme, and such other courts as the Legislature might from time to time establish (Section 1, Article III). The supreme court was the only court which entertained appeals from the court of common pleas and had original and appellate jurisdiction, both in common law and in chancery, “in such cases as shall he directed hy law.” (Section 2, Article III.) All cases appealed to it were retried de novo. An intermediary court of review between the supreme court and the court of common pleas was first established in the Ohio Constitution of 1851, Section 5, Article IV, which provided for district courts composed of the judges of the court of common pleas of the respective district and one of the judges of the supreme court. Its jurisdiction was prescribed in Section 6 and it had “like original jurisdiction with the supreme court, and such appellate jurisdiction as may he provided hy law.” The Legislature on March 23, 1852, passed “an act regulating appeals to the district court. ’ ’ 3 Curwen, Statutes of Ohio, Chapter 1124 (page 1725), 50 Ohio Laws, 93, Sec. 1, March 23, 1852. Parts of Section 1 of such Act read: “* * * appeals may be taken from all final judgments in civil cases at law, decrees in chancery, and interlocutory decrees dissolving injunctions rendered by the Court of Common Pleas, *488 the Superior and Commercial Courts of Cincinnati, and the Superior Court of Cleveland, which said courts have original jurisdiction, * * *; and the cause so appealed shall be again tried, heard and decided, in the District Court, in the same manner as though the said District Court had original jurisdiction of the cause.” In 1880 provision was made for appeals on questions of law as we know them in present day practice. Under Ohio Revised Statutes in force January 1, 1880, Title IY, “Error, Mandamus and Quo Warranto,” in Chapter 1, “Jurisdiction and Procedure in error,” Section 6707 reads: “An order affecting a substantial right in an action * # * is a final order which may be vacated, modified, or reversed, as provided in this title.” Section 6708 reads: “A judgment rendered by * * * or any other tribunal * * * inferior to Common Pleas Court may be reversed, vacated or modified by the Common Pleas Court.” Section 6709 reads: “A judgment rendered or final order made by the Court of Common Pleas or any Superior Court may be reversed, vacated or modified by the district court, for errors appearing on the record.” Trials de novo to the district court were provided for in Section 5 as appears in 55 Laws of Ohio, 82, as follows: (C # * # ‘ ‘ That appeals may be taken from all final judgments, orders or decrees in civil actions in which the parties have not the right * * * to demand a jury * * * and action so appealed shall be again tried, heard and decided in the district court in the same manner as though the said district court had original jurisdiction of the action.” A court similar to our present court of appeals was created by an amendment to Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution on October 9, 1883. It was known as the circuit court and was established as the successor to the district court and given like original jurisdiction with the supreme court and “such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law.” On September 7, 1885, the Legislature passed Section 6709 which provided that: *489 “A judgment rendered, or final order made by tbe court of common pleas * * * may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court, for errors appearing on tbe record.” and Section 6710 passed at tbe same time read as follows: “A judgment rendered, or final order made by any court, * * *, may be reversed, vacated, or modified by tbe supreme court for errors appearing on tbe record; * * *.” It will be observed that in each instance where tbe General Assembly invested reviewing courts witb jurisdiction to bear cases “in error proceedings,” now known as appeals on questions of law, it spoke of judgments or final orders being reversed, vacated, or modified, and wherever these words are used, they refer to an appeal on questions of law. Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, as amended in 1912, reads, in part, as follows: “Tbe courts of appeals shall have * * * appellate jurisdiction in tbe trial of chancery cases, and, to review, affirm, modify, or reverse tbe judgments of tbe courts of common pleas, superior courts and other courts of record within tbe district as may be provided by law. # * * ” This was tbe first instance in tbe juridical course of tbe Constitution wherein tbe General Assembly was not authorized to determine tbe appellate jurisdiction of tbe intermediate reviewing courts. Tbe amendment was proposed by a Constitutional Convention which sat from January 9 through June 7 of tbe year 1912. Two volumes, designated “Proceedings and Debates Ohio Constitutional Convention 1912” contain a verbatim record of tbe convention. It is interesting reading and sheds much light on tbe language used in Section 6, Article IV, as amended in 1912. It appears that tbe reviewing courts of tbe state in those days were congested and years behind in their dockets. This condition existed in tbe circuit courts because of tbe many cases which bad to be retried, making litigation drawn out and cumbersome. (All cases in which a party did not have a right to a jury trial were again tried in tbe circuit court as though it bad original jurisdiction.) Tbe slogan of tbe Convention was “One Trial and One Review” and reforms to tbe judicial system centered around that concept. The great debates dealt witb the *490 elimination of a second trial in tbe circuit courts which again required the appearance of witnesses at a full hearing. It was argued by many of the delegates that the trial in common pleas court in the class of cases permitting retrials was a sham, because lawyers would not put on their full case, realizing that a retrial of .the cause could be had in the circuit court. This, they argued, made the trial of causes of fencing contest — the first trial merely serving the purpose of disclosing what evidence an adversary had. It was pointed out that Ohio was almost alone in providing for a complete retrial in a reviewing court of chancery cases and that most other states and the federal procedure provided for the reviewing court to determine the matter anew on a transcript of the evidence presented in the trial court. The Committee on Judiciary and Bill of Rights presented a unanimous report proposing the following amendment to Section 6, Article IV of the Constitution: “The courts of appeal shall have * * * original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus and procedendo and appellate jurisdiction to review, and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgments of the courts of common pleas and superior courts of the district, in all cases, and judgments of said courts of appeal shall be final in all * * * cases, except such as involve questions arising under the constitution of this state, or the United States, or cases of the infliction of the penalty of death, or of imprisonment for life, or cases of which it has original jurisdiction. ’ ’ The chairman of this committee made it clear to the delegates that the committee intended that the word “review” have a broad meaning and include the concept of the court of appeals reviewing a chancery case tried before a judge in the common pleas court on the transcript of the evidence on law as to ell as on fact, and stated that “It was intended that the word ‘review’ should be broad enough to include trial on facts on merely a review of the record.” The debates which followed for days make it manifest that every delegate to the convention understood that such was the meaning intended by the use of the word “review.” After debate, the proposal was adopted and the convention at the time was convinced that such amend *491 ment would achieve the judicial reform most wanted. The convention thereafter was recessed for several days which gave the delegates an opportunity to discuss this proposed amendment with the people of their various districts. Upon reconvening, the delegates who returned from the rural parts of the state reported that the folks back home were dissatisfied. A motion was made to amend by adding the sentence ‘ ‘ and for the retrial of equity cases appealed in any of said courts.” The argument was that circuit courts offered such retrials and that the people wanted such procedure to continue in the new court of appeals; that the one judge who tried and decided equity cases without a jury usually knew the parties involved and was so close to the controversy that he was bound to have some bias in the matter; that the people wanted those cases retried before three judges of the court of appeals who would be removed from such influences; that the transcript of the evidence was too costly for poor litigants and that the summoning of witnesses for retrial was much cheaper; and that they had more confidence in a trial in which the judges could see the witnesses face to face to determine their credibility rather than to have to make such determination from a cold transcript. The delegates from the urban areas argued, however, that the circuit courts in their district, by rule of court, required that the trial of “cases appealed” be heard on the transcript of the testimony rather than on the basis of a rehearing of the witnesses; that the results were just as satisfactory as a retrial; and that a retrial of the case made for two trials and no review, which was exactly what the convention was trying to prevent. The proponents of the motion then argued that a retrial in the reviewing court was nothing more than a form of a “review” of the trial had in the court of common pleas, that, in reality, the litigant was given a “review” by way of an actual trial instead of a “review” by way of a printed record, and that such proceeding might be called a trial rather than a retrial. This argument carried the day and the amendment, previously adopted, was amended to incorporate the following wording: “in the trial of chancery cases and’ ’ after the word ‘ ‘ jurisdiction. ’ ’ The proposed amendment now read: “The courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in *492 quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and procedendo and appellate jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases, and, to review, affirm, modify or reverse the judgments of the courts of common pleas, superior courts and other courts of record within the district as may be provided by law * * *.” The amendment, as finally drafted, retained the trial de novo in chancery cases and, under the well known maxim “ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius” preempted such retrial for other cases. The word “review” thus became of little significance because the use of the words “affirm, modify or reverse” plainly gave the court of appeals jurisdiction to hear cases other than chancery cases “in error proceedings.” The Supreme Court, in the case of Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St., 415, 111 N. E., 159, in interpreting the language “review, affirm, modify or reverse” gave no special consideration to the word “review.” And the Supreme Court in interpreting the expression “in the trial of chancery cases” in the case of Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St., 443, 113 N. E., 397, stated the following in paragraph one of the syllabus: “1. Section 12224, General Code, purporting to vest the courts of appeals with jurisdiction in the trial of cases on appeal, is unconstitutional and void. The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in the trial of cases on appeal is expressly limited by the constitution to chancery cases, and this jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by the general asembly.” Also see, memoranda case of Snyder v. Deeds, found at 91 Ohio St., 407, 110 N. E., 1068. We come now to the consideration of Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution as amended in 1944. It reads as follows: “The courts of appeals shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and procedendo, and such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse judgments or final orders of boards, commissions, officers, or tribunals and of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district, * * *. All laws now in force not inconsistent herewith shall continue in force until amended or repealed; * * In 10 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), 134, Constitutional Law, *493 Section 33, under the heading, “Intent of Framers and Adopters as Controlling,” states the following: “The polestar in the construction of constitutions as well as other written instruments is the intention of the makers and adopters. The very object of construction, and its only proper purpose, is the determination and effectuation of such intent. The real intention of the body forming the law and the people adopting it must be ascertained and given effect unless this is impossible.” See, Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607; State, ex rel. Evans, v. Dudley, 1 Ohio St., 437. In Section 37 of the same volume we find this statement: “ * * * The fundamental law of the state is to be construed in no narrow and illiberal spirit. * * * Since a constitution deals in general terms, it should receive a broader and more liberal construction than statutes in order that its purposes may be achieved. * * *” In Section 43 it is stated: “The history of a constitutional provision, including the history of its subject matter, may lend light to construction.” “Particularly in regard to amendments to a constitution, the courts are under a duty to consider the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.” And in Section 44, “Debates and Proceedings of Convention, ’ ’ parts relevant here read: “It is a well established rule that in construing the Constitution recourse may at times be had to proceedings in the convention which drafted that instrument * * *. “Their consideration is proper in determining the purpose, intent and consequent meaning of doubtful provisions in which case they may be given great weight. Debates of the convention certainly may legitimately aid in removing doubts and fortify the court in following the natural import of the language of the constitution. They may show the mischief intended to be prevented under the new order of things by the adoption of an amendment to the fundamental law.” See, State, ex rel. Harbage v. Ferguson, 68 Ohio App., 189, 36 N. E. (2d), 500, dismissed by Supreme Court, 138 Ohio St., 617, 37 N. E. (2d), 544; State, ex rel. Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St., 574, 53 N. E. (2d), 501. *494 Tbe 1944 Amendment to tbe Ohio Constitution was sponsored by tbe Judicial Council of Obio, wbicb is a body created by statute and organized for tbe “continuous study of tbe organization, rules and method of procedure and practice of tbe judicial system of tbe State of Obio, tbe work accomplished, and tbe results produced by that system and its various parts.” In its report to tbe General Assembly, as required by law, it recommended, among other things, tbe following: “1. Tbe Council recommends tbe amendment of Section 6, Article TV, of tbe Constitution to return to tbe General Assembly tbe power it originally bad to provide by law for tbe appellate jurisdiction of tbe courts of appeals throughout tbe state.” One of tbe conditions complained of, at tbe time tbe 1944 Amendment was placed before tbe people for a vote, was tbe lack of uniformity in proceedings with respect to law and fact appeals. In most of tbe appellate districts appeals on law and fact were beard and decided on a transcript of tbe testimony presented in tbe court below with such additional testimony as was desired by either party wbicb by order of the court was obtained through a master commissioner and transcribed for tbe use of tbe court in establishing tbe facts anew. In other appellate districts, usually in rural areas, a trial was bad with witnesses appearing in court. Under both systems tbe conditions complained of during tbe debates of tbe Constitutional Convention of 1912 again obtained. Lawyers merely participated in a sham trial, knowing full well that tbe real trial of the cause would take place in tbe court of appeals. Moreover, it was believed that tbe General Assembly was in a better position to correct abuses of tbe judicial system than having to resort to a constitutional amendment to bring about desired changes. Tbe people of Obio were fully informed before voting on this amendment. Tbe sponsors, tbe Judicial Council, with tbe aid of tbe State Bar Association, judges, lawyers and laymen, gave speeches and issued statements and a pamphlet, prepared by tbe Judicial Council, was widely distributed throughout tbe state. Tbe reasons for tbe amendment were many: tbe elimina *495 tion of tbe compulsory review of chancery cases by a retrial in the court of appeals; the return of power to the General Assembly to establish all appellate jurisdiction so that changes that the people desired could be made more readily; the establishment of a uniform procedure throughout the state in cases appealed on law and fact; the insuring of full and complete trials of chancery cases in the trial court; the simplification of litigation by providing for one trial and one review; the reduction of disputes over the question of what is a chancery case. See, 17 Ohio State Bar Association Report, 169; 16 Ohio State Bar Association Report, 32; 16 Cleveland Bar Association Journal, 219; Pamphlet of Judicial Council (as quoted on page 7 of appellee’s brief, filed in Supreme Court, Case No. 30,706, Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St., 221); 31 Ohio Opinions, 358; 31 Ohio Opinions, 561; 14 Ohio Opinions (2d), 352. The amendment states that the courts of appeals shall have # such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review, affirm, modify, set aside or reverse judgments or final orders * * Appellee contends that this language merely empowers the General Assembly to provide for the method and procedure for appealing cases on questions of law alone because the words, “review, affirm, modify, and reverse,” were used in the 1912 Amendment and interpreted to mean appeals on questions of law. It is our view that the 1912 Amendment bears no analogy to the 1944 Amendment. The 1912 Amendment conferred the appellate jurisdiction on the courts of appeals and the General Assembly had no power to enlarge on it and was relegated to the role of merely providing the method and procedure, and law and fact appeals were confined to “trials in chancery cases,” constraining the conclusion that the words “review, affirm, modify and reverse” meant appeals on questions of law and nothing else. The 1944 Amendment empowers the General Assembly to establish “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” within the ambit “to review, affirm, modify, set aside and reverse” and thus returns the authority to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the intermediate reviewing courts to the *496 General Assembly where it was for sixty-one years prior to 1912. The words “review, affirm, modify and reverse” are here not only brought under different auspices but assume a meaning attached to them prior to the 1912 Amendment when they were inaugurated in Ohio constitutional history during the Constitutional Convention of 1912. The Convention first adopted an amendment to Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution which read: “The courts of appeals shall have * * * appellate jurisdiction to review, and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments * * The purpose was to carry out a basic purpose of the Convention: creation of a judicial system providing for one trial and one review. The word “review” in this amendment took on a broad and generic meaning and the amendment embraced the concept of reviewing chancery cases on questions of fact as well as law on a transcript of the evidence presented to the lower court. It is reasonable to believe from all the circumstances bringing about the 1944 Amendment that such interpretation of the word “review” was contemplated by the sponsors and fully understood by the General Assembly which passed the resolution placing the amendment upon the ballot and by the people of Ohio who voted on it. If appellee’s contention that this language grants the Legislature the authority to provide the method and procedure for appeals on questions of law and no more, the framers were awkward indeed. All that needed to be stated with such purpose in mind would have been: “Jurisdiction to reverse, modify or set aside judgments or final orders as may be provided by law.” Surely appellee gives no meaning to the language “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” and the word “review.” The expression, “as may be provided by law,” before 1912, always meant the power of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of the courts by the enactment of suitable laws. “Such jurisdiction,” as used in the 1944 Amendment, plainly means the kind or nature of the jurisdiction which the General Assembly sees fit to provide, “Review” means “a *497 second or repeated view; judicial reexamination” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition). By giving this language the liberal interpretation permitted and in the light of Ohio constitutional history, the determination that the General Assembly was empowered to provide for a “reexamination” of a case appealed on facts as well as on law seems manifest to us. It is stated in Williams v. United States, 289 U. S., 553, 77 L. Ed., 1372, that “* * * in expounding the Constitution every word must have its due force and appropriate meaning * * We therefore find no difficulty in determining that the General Assembly was fully authorized by the 1944 Amendment to pass legislation to invest the courts of appeals with the jurisdiction to entertain appeals on questions of law and fact and to provide the method and procedure necessary. The Supreme Court of Ohio must have come to the same conclusion when it decided the case of The Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co. v. City of Youngstown et al., 147 Ohio St., 221, 70 N. E. (2d), 649 (1946). The 1944 Amendment says that, “All laws now in force, not inconsistent herewith, shall continue in force until amended or repealed.” The Supreme Court held that the word “laws” as used in this sentence included the Constitution and that, “Unless and until there is * * * legislative action, the appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals remains as it was at the time the amendment was adopted.” Now, if the 1944 Amendment did not empower the General Assembly to pass legislation to give the courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear cases appealed to them on questions of law and fact, it would necessarily follow that the 1912 Amendment, which did provide such jurisdiction in chancery cases, would be inconsistent with the 1944 Amendment in such respects, and for this reason appeals on law and fact to the courts of appeals would no longer exist. That the Supreme Court felt that the General Assembly under the 1944 Amendment was empowered to enact legislation to provide for law and fact appeals is apparent from its decision. Also see, Schottenstein v. Newburger, 148 Ohio St., 71, 72 N. E. (2d), 903. The statutes enacted by the General Assembly strike at the very heart of the unsatisfactory conditions that prevailed in law *498 and fact appeals by providing tbat tbe cause in tbe court of appeals be tried on the record made in tbe trial court and tbat only sucb additional evidence as may be authorized by tbe court of appeals in tbe interest of justice may be produced in tbat court. These sections make a trial with witnesses testifying on tbe appeal impossible and require tbat tbe parties in an appeal on questions of law and fact bave a full and complete trial in tbe original forum intended for sucb proceedings. Moreover, they provide for a “review” with power to “weigh tbe evidence and render sucb judgment or decree as tbe trial court could and should bave rendered upon tbe original trial of tbe case * * *” which, in contemplation of law, is tbe equivalent of a trial de novo and brings to fruition tbe concept of one trial and one review. We bold, therefore, tbat Sections 2501.02 and 2505.21, Revised Code, are constitutional enactments of tbe General Assembly passed by it under powers granted it by Section 6, Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio, and tbat, as a consequence, courts of appeals bave the jurisdiction to bear tbe case herein appealed on questions of law and fact. Tbe motion to dismiss tbe appeal on law and fact is accordingly overruled. Exceptions. Hurd, J., concurs. Skeel, C. J., dissents.