Greer v. McNeal

Opinion of the court by McAtee, j.: It is provided in the Statutes of 1893, under the chapter upon probate courts, and upon -the subject of their jurisdiction, that: “(1171). 2. The proceedings of this court are construed in the same manner, and with like intendments, as the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction, and to its records, orders, judgments and decrees there are accorded like force, effect and legal presumption as to the records, judgments and decrees of district courts/5 And by section 1576, section-1, that there shall be a probate court, “which shall have the jurisdiction and proceed in the manner provided in the laws governing proceedings in probate courts and of guardians and wards.” And by section 1426 that: “The settlement of the account and the allowance thereof by the court, or upon appeal, is conclusive against *523 all persons in any way interested in the estate, saying, however, to all persons laboring nnder any legal liability, their right to move for canse to reopen and examine the account, or to proceed by action against the executor or administrator, either individually or upon his bond, at any time before final distribution; and in any action brought by any such person, the allowance and settlement of such account is prima facie evidence of its correctness.” And it is again provided in section 1470: “Orders and decrees made by the probate court, or the judge thereof, need not recite the existence of facts, or the performance of acts upon which the jurisdiction of the court or judge may depend, but it shall only be necessary that they contain the matters ordered or adjudged, except as otherwise provided in this chapter * * *.” These provisions of the statute thus plainly and explicitly declare the probate court to be, upon the matters with which it is authorized to deal and upon which it has jurisdiction, a court of record and of final authority, that its final judgments are absolute unless appealed from, and that its records and judgments shall so be taken in all proceedings properly before it and within its' jurisdiction, and shaLl be so taken without the recitation of facts upon which the jurisdiction of the court may depend. One of the subjects included within its jurisdiction is the settlement of final accounts, and the judgment of the probate court, therefore, upon the only count upon which the district court rendered judgment against plaintiff in error,, was final and absolute as against the administrator, Pentecost. The finding of the court was that Pentecost was in default for the payment of various sums of money amounting *524 to the judgment fund against him, which he was ordered to pay oyer as administrator, and which he failed and refused to do. He did not, therefore, in the terms of the bonds sued upon, “faithfully execute the duties of the trust as such administrator, according to law,” and the obligation was therefore in full force and effect as against his sureties. The uniform holding of the courts has been that in the absence of fraud and collusion, the amount found to be due against the administrator by the judgment of the probate court, is conclusive, not only upon him, but upon his sureties, in an action upon the administration bond, unless an appeal has been taken or the judgment reversed upon a proceeding in error. It cannot be said that the sureties were not privy to the proceedings affecting their principal, or that they were in any sense strangers to the proceedings against him. “It was said in Braiden v. Mercer, 44 Ohio St. 342, that: “The sureties in an undertaking in attachment contract to pay the defendant all damages sustained by reason of the attachment if the order prove to have been wrongfully obtained. Has it ever been doubted that the determination by the court in the attachment proceeding that the order was wrongfully obtained concluded the sureties upon that question in an action upon their undertaking? By an undertaking in replevin the sureties contract that their principal will duly prosecute the action and pay all costs and damages which may be' awarded against him. Nobody will claim that the award of damages in the replevin suit is not final against the sureties in an action against them upon the undertaking. An undertaking in an injunction proceeding is conditioned to secure the party enjoined the damages he *525 may sustain if it be finally decided that tbe injunction ought not to have been granted. It bas never been supposed that tbe sureties in an action against them could be beard to say that they were strangers to the injunction proceeding, and that tbe decision of the court that tbe injunction ought not to have been granted should be disregarded and that question again litigated. “It is not easy to distinguish the principles involved in these proceedings from the one we are considering. “Indeed it may well be considered an established principle that whenever a surety has contracted with reference to the conduct of one of the parties in some suit or proceeding in court, he is, in the absence of fraud and collusion, concluded by the judgment.” Many cases, cited in affirmation of the principle, are to be found in the decisions of the supreme courts of Wisconsin, Michigan, New Hampshire, Connecticut, the supreme court of the United States, California and others. The judgment of the district court is, therefore, affirmed. Burford, C. J'., who presided in the court below, not sitting; all the other Justices concurring.