First Presbyterian Church of Perry v. Myers

The opinion of the court was delivered by McAtee, J. : It was assigned as error (1) that the paper denominated a “call” was admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant, and (2) that the court erred in refusing instructions numbered 8 and 4 asked by the plaintiff in error. The defendant in error argues in his brief that as the only errors assigned are those of the court in regard to the admission of documentary evidence designated as a “call” and the instructions given and refused, all such entire evidence is not before the court and the .court must affirm the judgment of the trial court. The case-made is certified to by the probate judge as “a true and correct statement of all the pleadings, motions, orders, evidence, findings, proceedings and judgment in said action.” We cannot say in the presence of this certificate that the evidence is not all here. The probate judge before whom the evidence was taken and the case tried certifies that it is all here and the assignments of error will be considered upon that statement. The proposition is, upon the merits of the case, whether the plaintiff below had a right to regard the “call” made out by the officers of the defendant corporation as a contract made with him directly or whether as the plaintiff in error contends, the “call” was a tentative proposition for a contract which could not become effective without the concurrence of the Presbytery of the church; that the defendant in error was, like the plaintiff in error, bound by the rules and regulations prescribed by the “Form of Government of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,” *819 and that these had to be complied with in order to establish the pastoral relation which is here claimed by the plaintiff, and that in as much as, under the rules and regulations, “no minister or candidate shall receive a call but through the hands of the Presbytery,” and if it be true that the Presbytery- never placed the “call” in the defendant in error’s hands that, as a matter of law, it was non-effective for any purpose and ought not to have been admitted to show the written part of the contract alleged in the petition, and ought not to have been given to the jury to consider for any purpose in behalf of the defendant in error. Questions of a similar character in which the legal effect of the rules and regulations adopted by the chief governing bodies of the churches in this country and 'the effect of the action of their various judicatories, together ' with the rules and regulations which they adopt, have been considered in the supreme courts of a number of the states, and to a certain extent by the supreme court of the United States, and it has been uniformly held that wherever religious associations have been organized to assist in the expression and dissemination of religious doctrine and have created for their direction in matters of doctrine, church government and discipline, tribunals within the association, and that the final and controlling effect of the ecclesiastical polity thus formed upon the individual members, congregations and officers within the general association, will not be questioned, but will be given effect to in the civil courts. And that all who unite themselves to such a body do so with the implied consent to submit to the system of ecclesiastical control and are bound by it, and that it would be vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, *820 if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions should appeal to the secular courts and could -thus have that voluntary control which they had thus agreed to, reversed and destroyed. And that it is of the essence of these religious unions and it is their right thus to establish tribunals for the decisions of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance in matters of doctrine and discipline, and that this control goes to the extent of controlling the terms upon which the pastoral relation shall be formed and the salary accompanying it shall be demanded. It was said in the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, in the supreme court of the United States, by Justice Miller, that: “We do not see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large and influential bodies, (to mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal the Methodist Episcopal and the Presbyterian churches), has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their usages and customs, which, as to each, constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.” The opinion proceeds further to say that: “In the very important case of Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, recently decided in the same court, Judge Lawrence, *821 who dissented, says: ‘We understand the opinion as as implying that in the administration of ecclesiastical, discipline, and where no' other right of property is involved than loss of the clerical office or salary incident to such discipline, a spiritual court is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction, and that its decision of that question is binding upon the secular courts.’ And he dissents with Judge Sheldon from the opinion’ because it so holds.” And it further said that: “We cannot better close this review of the authorities than in the language of the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of German Ref. Ch. v. Seibert, 3 Pa. St. 291: ‘The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best judges of what constitutes an offense against the word of Grod and the discipline of the church. And any other than those courts must be incompetent judges of matters of faith, discipline and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt which would do anything but improve either religion or good morals.’ ” It cannot be otherwise than concluded that, in order to maintain the unity of the faith and doctrine as held in either of the voluntary religious associations of this country, the individual opinions of the pastors placed in authority and charge over the various chnrches of the denominations respectively should be the proper subject of ecclesiastical control and discipline, to be treated of and regulated by the various authoritative church bodies and jurisdictions to which each respectively belong. And that in the presence of rules and regulations, if such are found to have been made .by the supreme governing body of such a voluntary association, the various members, *822 congregations and officers who have voluntarily associated and have subscribed to such rules and regulations and books of discipline shall be bound by them, and, as in this instance, to the extent of holding that the right to salary as an incident to such discipline and that the spiritual court provided for in the book of discipline is the exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction and that its decisions upon all questions touching the. establishment of the pastoral relation, if treated of and if the terms upon which that relation is provided for in such books of discipline, is final and binding on the secular courts. And this is the view which has been held and fully announced in the case of West v. First Presbyterian Church of St. Paul, 41 Minn. 94. In that case the call was extended to the plaintiff regularly by the Presbytery but was never formally accepted by him. It was therefore contended that he had never become a regular pastor of the church. The opinion holds that: “According to the usage and form of government of the Presbyterian church the call is made by the congregation duly convened, and the amount of compensation or salary is fixed by it, and inserted in the call. But the pastorial relation can only be established with the consent and under the authority and direction of the Presbytery having jurisdiction. The call and proceedings of the parties under it are subject to the usages and discipline of the church, and the courts will not interfere any further than is necessary to ascertain and protect the strict legal rights of the parties. The call made by the congregation is submitted to the Presbytery, and if approved by that body, and accepted by the candidate, the pastorial relation is then formally constituted by installation by or under the direction of the Presbytery, and usually as soon as conveniently may be. The call and its acceptance are deemed equivalent to a petition and *823 request of the congregation and pastor-elect for such installation; but, as the pastoral relation can only be formally consummated with the formal sanction of the Presbytery, so that the judicatory may withdraw its approval and refuse to proceed with the installation, and according to its rules and established usage it will refuse to do so, if, at the time appointed therefor, the congregation, then declines to receive the candidate as their minister. “The Presbytery, it appears, has the supervision and care of the churches in a particular district in connection with it, and in general has authority to order whatever pertains to their spiritual welfare, so that it mayapprove and establish a pastoral relation, or disapprove and annul it, and a dissolution of the pastoral relation, or a refusal to install puts an end to the civil contract. Citing Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 135; Connitt v. Church, 4 Lans. 339.” And it was held in Paddock v. Brown, 6 Hill, p. 592, that: “The form, character and purpose of it, as well as the authority whence it issues, will be seen by referring to the fifteenth chapter of the Form of Government, etc., of the Presbyterian church, (Const, of the Presb. Church, p. 436, ed. of 1842), which may be resorted to, upon established principles of law, in order to arrive at the true meaning and legal effect of the ‘call.’ It will there be found to be an instrument issuing from the congregation, which may be signed either by the elders and deacons, by the trustees, or by a select committee, and attested by the moderator of the meeting. In the case before us it did so issue, was signed by three elders and one trustee, and attested by the moderator. “The plaintiff was himself a minister of the Presbyterian denomination, and was of course familiar with the prescribed mode of proceedings preparatory to and in making out a ‘call’ in due form.” The question in that case was one as to the liability of the congregation itself or of the trustees. No question *824 arose as to the action of the Presbytery upon the call, and consequently no action of the Presbytery was requisite in order to make the “call” valid. The case was decided in 1844, and it is cited here solely for the purpose of showing that the courts will consider the call, its form, character and purpose and will charge the minister who may sue with knowledge of the prescribed' mode of proceedings preparatory to and in the making out of a “call” in due form.. Other authorities are: East Norway Lake, etc., Church v. Halvorsen, 42 Minn. 503; Watson v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183; McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pac. St. 21; McRoberts v. Mondy, 19 Mo. App. 26; Powers v. Vudey [Neb.], 63 N. W. Rep. 476; Kerus v. Robertson, [Ill.], 40 N. E. Rep. 343; Krecker v. Shirley, [Pa.], 30 Atl. Rep. 440; Pavender v. Ash, [Neb.], 63 N. W. Rep. 476; Juker v. Com. 20 Pa. St. 484. Adopting the views thus uniformly expressed, it is manifest that in as much as the rules and regulations of the Presbyterian church require that a “call” should be made out by a regularly called meeting of the congregation, and when thus made out it should be presented to the Presbytery under whose care the person called shall be, and thát if the Presbytery think it expedient to present the call to him it may accordingly present it, and no minister or candidate shall receive a call but through the hands of the Presbytery, and that if the Presbytery had declined to place the call in- the plaintiff’s hands, then it could never have been effective, nor could ever have been so considered by the defendant in error. The plaintiff himself admitted that the call had never been presented to him or confirmed by the Presbytery in whose jurisdiction the local church, the defendant, was *825 situated, and that while be was serving the defendant church during the period, that he served them as minister only, and never as “pastor.” The call itself provides in express terms for a “pastorate.” It is an invitation to the plaintiff to undertake the pastoral office of said congregation, and creates a compensation upon the condition of “your being and continuing to be the regular pastor of said congregation.” Leaving out of view that control and effect which this court must concede to the judicatory termed Presbytery in the Presbyterian church system, it is here admitted by the plaintiff that he never undertook the work to which the call offered by him in the case and introduced in evidence, invited him, that is, that he never became the regular pastor of said congregation, and upon this contention alone it would appear that he must fail in this action unless it be held that the casual service termed “ministration” is held to be equivalent to and identical with the service, office and responsibility of the “regular pastor” filling the pastoral office. But this cannot be, since a minister is one who, having been ordained to the ministry, undertakes to perform certain services for another, while a pastor is one who has been “installed according to the usage of some Christian denomination in charge of the specific church or body of churches.” (Century Dictionary, titles, Minister and Pastor; Webster’s Dictionary, same titles). And under the form of government of the Presbyterian church, it is one who has been installed by the Presbytery itself over the particular church, and that they have approved the “call” made out by the congregation and placed the same in his hands and he has accepted it. The “call” specifies that the cempensation shall be paid for “services as our pastor.” We hold that the “call” should not have been admitted in evidence to prove the *826 contract in the absence of evidence to prove the contract here sued upon, but that the court should, as a matter of law, have instructed the jury, that the written instrument relied upon by the plaintiff in support of his second cause of action and denominated a “call” is not, under the government and rules of the Presbyterian church, by which both parties are bound, a contract or obligation binding upon the church. And that, since it was admitted that the call was not presented to the plaintiff by the Presbytery controlling this territory, the “call” should not have been considered, alone, as fixing any liability upon the defendant corporation. The case will therefore be reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with these views. All the Justices concurring.