Lowry v. Mitchell

Opinion of the court by Gillette, J.: Only one question is presented by the briefs of counsel for determination of this court, and that is, *246 will the action, of forcible entry and detainer lie to recover possession of a tract of land in a case where the plaintiff in such procedure had an action of injunction then pending against the same defendant, the object and prayer of which is to perpetually enjoin the defendants from interference with plaintiff’s complete use and enjoyment of the same. In the. trial of this case in the court below that court manifestly followed the determination of this court in Richardson v. Penny, 6 Okla. 328, where the court says: “Here the defendant sought to plead the pendency of the equitable action of injunction as a defense to an action of forcible entry and detainer between the same parties. While this court has probably gone as far as any to authorize the action of injunction for the various kinds of grievances relating to realty, we are not prepared to say that it has, even in this jurisdiction, displaced the actions of both ejectment and forcible entry and detainer, and we still hold to the well, if not universally established doctrine that when a party has a plain and adequate remedy at law, he cannot invoke the powers of a court of equity to issue its writ of injunction. This was the position taken by the trial court in the case at bar, which was eminently correct.” We are not able, however, to accept this as conclusive of the rights of the parties in this case. In Richardson v. Penny, supra, it is shown by the answer of defendant that the plaintiff, prior to the bringing o’f the forcible entry- and detainer action, had filed in the district court a petition for injunction, seeking to obtain possession -of the property, and to prevent further occupancy thereof by the defendant, upon which an order of injunction had been granted. The trial court upon the trial of the forcible entry and detainer action in sustaining an objec *247 tion to the introduction of any testimony sustaining the paragraph in defendant’s answer pleading the pendency of the injunction, said: “The court dissolved that injunction on the ground that they had an adequate remedy at law, and that was forcible entry and detainer, and this is the remedy they are pursuing.” This is quite a different condition of affairs from that presented in the case under consideration. In this case it was sought to be shown that upon the application of the plaintiff a temporary injunction had not only been granted, but in the hearing therefor a finding and order had been made that the defendant w,as entitled to the possession of the house on the premises, and to certain unmatured crops, which he was permitted by the order to harvest, and was authorized to occupy jointly with the plaintiff certain pasture land, which was a portion of the tract involved, and subject to the further order of the court. Tinder this determination of the court then, in the action of injunction, the defendant had been awarded certain rights and privileges which he was in the enjoyment of when the action of forcible entry and detainer was commenced, and we think it would be placing an erroneous construction upon our code of procedure to permit the plaintiff after proceeding thus far, to go back into the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to have the right of the defendant to such possession further determined in that tribunal. In Richardson v. Penny it is not shown that an order had been entered awarding the defendant possessory rights, and herein lies a broad distinction between that case and this. *248 It is here shown by the answer that upon the application 0/ plaintiff through her petition filed in the" district court, on the equity side thereof, the court acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter and all of the parties, and upon a hearing without objection from either party the court entered a judgment and order which brought under the control of the court the real estate which was the subject-matter of this litigation, and had such control of the same when' this action of forcible entry and detainer was commenced. The commencement of an action of forcible entry and detainer therefore, .was an action the direct purpose of which was intended to oast the court of-the control it alreadjf had over the subject-matter of the litigation and nullify its judgment and order. This we think could not be done. The authorities arc numerous to the effect that where equity obtains jursidietion for equitable purposes, it will retain it to give full relief, whether legal or equitable, as to all purposes relating to the subject-matter, even though it be required to give relief in matters which would not have been proper subjects of equitable interposition if they alone wore the original subject of relief. —Cathcari v. Robinson, 30 U. S. 263; and Martin v. Martin, 44 Kan. 295, 24 Pac. 418, where the court says: “The court below, having acquired jurisdiction, of the parties and the subject-matter of the suit, had the inherent power to make all necessary orders, decrees and judgments, so as to settle the matter in controversy, and thus prevent litigation. Where a court of equity obtains jurisdiction of a suit for the purpose of granting some distinctly equitable relief, and the special relief prayed for is not practicable, the court may retain the cause, decide all the issues involved, and may decree the payment of mere compensatory damages.” *249 Also Seibert v. Thompson 8 Kan. 66: “Where a court •of equity has all the parties before it, it will adjudicate upon all the rights of the parties connected with the subject-matter of the action, so as to avoid multiplicity of .suits.' “A more substantial exception than the foregoing to the doctrine that equity will not take jurisdiction where the legal remedy is adequate, is found in the rule that if jurisdiction has once been assumed, equity will often retain it throughorrt' the litigation, though the relief originally sought is denied, and that finally granted is not equitable in its nature. This rule has been applied in applications for injunction, suits for specific performance, and in foreclosure, proceedings. (Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 201.) We conclude therefore that where, as' in this case, a ■court has acquired equitable, jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties, and has proceeded in such equitable action to the extent of defining the rights ■of the parties and according rights to each pending a final determination of the subject-matter, such jurisdiction is superior to a jiirisdiction at law originally and subsequently acquired in a lower court with reference to and controlling the same subject-matter. The case of Richardson v. Penny, supra, in so far as it conflicts with the decision herein, is hereby overruled. It was error therefore for the district court of Nay county to have entertained in this case the procedure in forcible entry and detainer, when the action by injunction was pending and undisposed of. The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to proceed therein in accordance with this opinion. Hainer, J., who presided in the court below, not sitting; •all the other Justices concurring.