Ravenscraft v. Sumner Coal Mining Co.

Opinion by RUTH, C. This cause is brought to this court by the plaintiff in error, Caroline Ravenscraft, one of the defendants below, who appeals from an order of the district court of Rogers county, striking from the files her motion to discharge a receiver appointed by the court upon the application of the defendant in error, Sumner Coal Mining Company, plaintiff below, and for convenience the parties will be designated as they appeared in the trial court. It appears from the record, the plaintiff, Sumner Coal Mining Company, is a corporation, and held certain automobiles, trucks, steam shovels, .and equipment, and operated a “strip mine” from which coal was being taken. Lot Ravenscraft, as president of the plaintiff company, leased to Lpt Ravens-craft, the individual, all the property, real, *95 personal, or mixed, corporeal or incorporeal, belonging to or held by tbe Sumner Coal Mining Company for a period of five years, in consideration of tbe sum of $1, and tbe further consideration of tbe payment of a certain sum per ton for all coal mined or taken from plaintiff’s premises. “Lot”, tbe individual, then assigned tbe lease to H. L. Daugherty, a brother-in-law, wbo in turn assigned tbe lease to Caroline Ravenscraft, mother of Lot. Tbe petition then alleges.the Ravencrofts operated tbe “strip mine,” contracted debts for labor, etc., amounting to $4,000; that laborers and others bad filed liens against tbe property; that large quantities of coal bad been mined and sold, but no rentals or royalties had been paid to tbe company; that all this bad been done by “Lot” without tbe formality of calling a special meeting of tbe stockholders, or consulting with tbe board of directors. It is further alleged that tbe Ravenscrafts bad. after getting in control of the property, sold a Ford car, Buick truck, Delco lighting system, and other property of tbe mining company, and it would appear from the pleadings that tbe mine being operated was not only a “strip” mine but tbe company was a “stripped” company. “Lot,” however, must have overlooked the charter of tbe company and left it banging on the wall, where it was found by tbe stockholders, wbo with that as a basis, brought action to annul the lease; for accounting; for royalties and rentals; for damages for the personal property sold and converted to the defendant’s use, and for a receiver. A receiver was duly appointed and Lot and Caroline Ravenscraft filed their motion to discharge the receiver. Upon bearing bad, the motion was denied, and thereafter defendants filed their motion for rehearing, which was in due time by the court denied. It appears from the record that all parties were present either in person or by attorney, and no notice of appeal was filed or noted, and the order denying the motion to discharge the receiver, as well as the motion for a rehearing thereon, became final. Section 525, Comp. Stat. 1921, provides in part as follows: “In all cases in the district or superior court, in which a receiver may be appointed, or refused, the party aggrieved may, within ten days thereafter, appeal from the order of the court, or a judge thereof, refusing to appoint, or refusing to vacate the appointment of a receiver, to the Supreme Court, etc.” The section further provides that upon the applicant filing bond, the authority of the receiver shall be suspended until final determination of such appeal. After the expiration of tbe time for filing an appeal, no notice of appeal having been given, the defendant Caroline Ravenscraft, without joining Lot Ravenscraft, filed her separate “motion to discharge the receiver,” wherein she sets up substantially the same matters just determined in the motion wherein she joined Lot Ravenscraft, and does not set up any further matter , which could not have been set up in the joint motion. The plaintiff thereupon .filed its motions to strike the last motion to discharge receiver from the files, for that the orders and judgment of the court denying the former motion to 'discharge the .receiver “is a former adjudication of the matters and things involved in the present application, and the right of said defendant Caroline Ravenscraft to ask for or to have the order appointing said receiver vacated or .set aside.” This motion to strike being by the court ‘ sustained, the defendant perfects her appeal to this court from the order striking her motion from the files. Defendant contends the judgment of the court refusing to discharge the receiver on her motion joined in by her codefendant, does ont estop her from again filing her motion to discharge the receiver, and the question is not res adjudica-ta. It may be true sudden changes may take place; adjustments of differences may be effectuated; all parties in interest may ratify the acts of the corporation not wholly void; payments of damages, royalties, and rentals may be made, thus enabling the identical parties to come into court and maintain a motion to discharge a receiver, but no such condition confronts us in the case under review. The defendants joined in a motion to discharge the receiver, which motion was by the court denied. Under section 525, Comp. Stat. 1921, they might have perfected their appeal to this court. Not having availed themselves of this right, the judgment of the "court became final upon all questions presented. Lamb v. Alexander, 45 Okla. 573, 145 Pac. 443; Greening v. Maire Bros. Co., 79 Okla. 136, 192 Pac. 202; Skelly Oil Company v. Grove Oil Co., 87 Okla. 225, 209 Pac. 321. To permit defendants to first file a joint motion, and, upon adverse judgment, permit them to file separate motions where conditions have not changed, and in which no new fact is set up which might not have *96 been' set up in the joint motion, or was not within the knowledge of the defendants when they filed their joint motion, would entail the court in an endless round of hearings upon such motions, should the interested parties be numerous. Not only is the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the merits of a controversy, final and conclusive between the parties thereto in any subsequent controversy between them where the same question arises, but also as to every question which might have been presented and determined therein. Pratt v. Ratliff, 10 Okla. 168, 61 Pac. 523; Alfrey v. Colbert, 44 Okla. 246, 144 Pac. 179; Comanche Ice & Fuel Company v. Binder & Hillery, 70 Okla. 28, 172 Pac. 629; Bruner v. Bearden, 80 Okla. 154, 195 Pac. 117; Baker v. Vodder, 83 Okla. 140, 200 Pac. 994; Freeland v. Dolan, 84 Okla. 286, 203 Pac. 182; Cromwell v. Hamilton, 87 Okla. 66, 209 Pac. 395; Stutsman v. Williams, 87 Okla. 64, 209 Pac. 406; Bisley v. Mahaffey, 87 Okla. 258, 209 Pac. 920; Good v. First National Bank, 88 Okla. 110, 211 Pac. 1051; Miller v. Gorman, 88 Okla. 229, 212 Pac. 983; Goodeagle v. Moore, 89 Okla. 211, 214 Pac. 725. No .question having been presented by, defendant's second and separate motion which was not, or might have been, set up and determined in the joint motion of the defendant, the judgment of the court upon the joint motion became final when unap-pealed from, and the court committed no • error in striking the separate motion from the files, and the .judgment of the court below should be affirmed. By the Court: It is so ordered.