Lachele v. Oregon Realty Exchange Investment Co.

COSHOW, J. The further and separate defense and set-off presented by the defendant was not tested either by demurrer or motion. Issue was joined thereon by a reply. For that reason we are not required to pass upon either the sufficiency or validity of setting up an action for malicious prosecution as a counterclaim to a complaint containing the ordinary allegations for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage given to secure an ordinary promissory note. We seriously doubt that the allegations in the answer constitute a counterclaim to the complaint. The motion for a new trial filed by the defendant was evidently filed under Section 174, Or. L. Five of the causes enumerated in that section are incorporated in the motion for a new trial in the language of the statute. Said Section 174, Or. L., is not applicable to suits in equity. . It is a part of Chapter VIII of the Code. That chapter is not found among the chapters nor any of its sections among the sections made applicable to suits of equity by the Code: In re Seidel’s Estate, 64 Or. 321 (130 Pac. 53). The term of court at which the decree was rendered had not expired when the motion was filed for an order vacating the decree and granting a new trial. It was discovered after an execution had issued upon the decree that an error had been made in computing the amount due on the note involved in this suit. The answer does not tender any issue as to the amount of the note or the amount paid thereon. The defendant relies entirely upon its *588 counterclaim for damages to defeat plaintiffs’ claim. The only controversy as to the amount due revolved around a claim on payment of interest. When the mistake was discovered plaintiffs promptly filed a remittitur. It is not disputed that the remittitur corrected the mistake. Indeed, the Circuit Court in setting aside the decree and granting a new trial found that the original decree was excessive in the amount mentioned in the remittitur. The proper practice would have been to have corrected the decree and judgment and denied the motion for a new trial. Instead of following that practice the case was opened and evidence heard as though the case had never gone to a decree. At both trials the allegations of the complaint were sustained and the counterclaim or offset was rejected. At both trials the court found that the matter set up as a counterclaim had not been proven and that the former suit brought to foreclose the same mortgage was not begun maliciously or without probable' cause. We concur in these findings. The original decree allowed the plaintiffs $250 as an attorney’s fee for instituting the suit to collect the note and foreclose the mortgage. On the second trial this amount was reduced to $100, not because the amount was unreasonable, hut because the plaintiffs had instituted the former suit subjecting the defendant to great expense and annoyance. The language of the court is as follows: “That in view of the fact that plaintiffs wrongfully commenced suit against defendant to foreclose said mortgage, when they knew, or should have known, that no condition of the mortgage was broken, and in spite of the fact that they lost their case in this court, appealed to the Supreme Court in a censurable effort to overreach and wrong defendant, and thereby wrongfully and without justifiable excuse, as the record of the ease discloses, subjected defend *589 ant to great expense and annoyance, $250.00 or any other or greater sum than One Hundred Dollars would not be reasonable to allow plaintiffs as attorney’s fees in this suit, and the Court finds that under all the circumstances One Hundred Dollars and no more would be a reasonable sum to allow plaintiffs as attorney’s fees herein.” It appears from the record that there was a sharp controversy over the question involved in the prior suit to foreclose said mortgage. The matter having been determined against the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court they appealed to this court. The right to appeal was given by the statute and the evidence is not sufficient to show that plaintiffs appealed in bad faith. For that reason we think it was error for the court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fee as originally allowed. There was no evidence taken on the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee after the first decree was rendered and entered. That matter was not properly before the court to be determined. A motion to vacate a decree because of errors or to correct errors or for rehearing when granted brings up before the court only such matters as are contained in the motion or petition for that purpose: 10 R. C. L. 571-577; 21 C. J. 701-705, 706, § 874; 713, § 877. The texts cited treat of bills of review which have been abolished in this state: Or. L. 390. It is the form of the bill that has been abolished. The same result is now obtained upon application by motion or petition to correct obvious mistakes or by original suit where the error is not apparent on the record: Crews v. Richards, 14 Or. 442 (13 Pac. 67); Smith v. Nelson, 46 Or. 3 (78 Pac. 740). The same reasons are pertinent to the question of costs. Neither attorney’s fee nor costs was before the court in the second trial. The discretion reposed in a court of equity by Section 567 Or. L., *590 does not authorize the modification of a former decree as to costs unless that matter is put directly in issue by the application to rehear the case. That was not done in the instant ease. The discretion confided in an equity court in regard to costs is not arbitrary, but is a legal discretion. It was an abuse of that discretion to overturn the original decree as to attorney’s fee and costs. The decree appealed from is affirmed as to the amount of judgment in favor of plaintiffs and modified as to attorney’s fee and costs so as to allow plaintiffs $250 as a reasonable attorney’s fee and their costs and disbursements in the Circuit and this court. Modified. Bean, Belt and Rand, JJ., concur.