Ewing v. Ryan

BELT, J. The principal contention of the plaintiff is that after he was delinquent in his payments, the vendor accepted payment and thereby waived the force and effect of the time essence clause embodied in said contract. This clause is for the benefit of the vendor and may be waived. It being optional with the vendor whether to declare a forfeiture by reason of nonpayment, such clause is not self-executing and does not become operative until exercised. Failure to pay installments when they mature does not ipso facto work a forfeiture of a contract under a clause conferring an option to do so, but merely gives a right to declare a forfeiture which is waived unless exercised promptly: Graham v. Merchant, 43 Or. 306 (72 Pac. 1088). When default is made after waiver, a forfeiture cannot be declare^ until a definite, specific and reasonable notice has been given to the vendee that the contract.will be canceled and payments forfeited if the amount due is not paid: Mitchell v. Hughes, 80 Or. 583 (157 Pac. 965); Gray v. Pelton, 67 Or. 244 (135 Pac. 755); Graham v. Merchant, supra. In the instant case there was a waiver of *229 the time essence clause when the. vendor accepted payment on April- 20, 1922, as the vendee was then in default. But was he lulled into a false sense of security by the indulgence of the vendor? Was he led to believe that the vendor would not in the future insist upon a strict performance of his contract in reference to time of payments? No. At the very time that he made this payment of $37.50 the vendor informed him that “if he did not keep his contract that he would cancel it.” He was thus put upon his guard. After the expiration of the ninety-day grace period as provided in the contract due and sufficient notice was given by letter to Asher and the General Finance Company, plaintiff’s grantee, to the effect that the vendor would exercise his right of forfeiture, but no action was taken by the plaintiff until February, 1923, or about nine months after he was in default. In our opinion the defendant properly exercised his right of option to declare a termination of the contract in question and a forfeiture of the payments made. Plaintiff claims that at the time he made his last payment on April 20, 1922, he had an agreement with the defendant R. R. Ryan, acting as agent for his son, defendant herein, whereby all rental received for the use of the premises in question should be applied on the balance due under the contract of purchase. Plaintiff testified positively that at the time this agreement was made he made arrangements with a Mrs. Williams, who was then occupying the premises as a tenant, to pay the rental to Ryan for the purposes above stated. The record, however, discloses beyond doubt that the property at such time was not occupied by her. Mrs. Williams says that she commenced as a tenant August 7, 1920, and when called as a witness by counsel for appellant it is noteworthy that she did not corroborate the plain *230 tiff so far as this ■ alleged agreement is concerned. R. R.. Ryan denies ever having made snch agreement. The trial court found against plaintiff in this contention, and we concur in such finding. The conclusion herein reached that the plaintiff' defaulted in making his payments under the terms of. the contract and that the vendor gave due and proper notice of his intention to declare a forfeiture and a cancellation of the contract is decisive of the ease at bar and makes it unnecessary to consider the question of tender and abandonment of the contract as presented by counsel for respondent. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.