Marshall v. Town of Middlefield

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Kerry L. Marshall appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J.) granting Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the ground that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and the principle of comity deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying *228 facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. This Court reviews de novo a district court’s legal conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). To the extent that the district court granted summary judgment, this Court reviews such orders de novo and determines whether the district court properly concluded there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), i.e., “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341; see Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir.1989) (explaining that the TIA prevents district courts from providing injunctive and declaratory relief as long as there is a “plain, speedy and efficient” state court remedy). Similarly, the principle of comity prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages in a § 1983 action if a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had in state court. See Long Island Lighting Co., 889 F.2d at 431. Before the TIA may be invoked to bar district court jurisdiction, two conditions must exist: (1) the assessment or surcharge in question must constitute a tax; and (2) the plaintiff must lack a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy in state court.” Hattem v. Schwarzenegger, 449 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir.2006). This Court has explained that “the TIA should be interpreted to preclude jurisdiction only where ‘state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling them to avoid paying state taxes.’ ” Luessenhop v. Clinton County, 466 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 107, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004)). Here, the district court properly concluded that Appellant’s complaint sought to avoid the payment of taxes. The parties disputed whether Appellant had paid a particular motor vehicle property tax bill that had been assessed on his Dodge Intrepid. Furthermore, although Appellant argues that his case is analogous to Lues-senhop and Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir.1975), he is not directly challenging the method by which he was notified of the delinquent taxes, nor the state statute specifying that he must pay the delinquent taxes on the Dodge Intrepid before he is allowed to pay the taxes on his other automobile. We note that Connecticut provides multiple methods by which a taxpayer may contest property taxes: (1) the taxpayer may administratively appeal the assessment to a board of assessment appeals, and he may then appeal that decision to Connecticut Superior Court, under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 12-117a; or (2) the taxpayer may directly file an action in Connecticut Superior Court to claim that the property has been wrongfully assessed, under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 12-119. See, e.g., Second Stone Ridge Coop. Corp. v. City of Bridgeport, 220 Conn. 335, 597 A.2d 326, 326 (1991) (distinguishing between § 12-119 *229 and § 12-117a, which was formerly codified as § 12-118, in the context of challenges to valuation). Appellant argues that it would have been impossible for him to have timely filed a claim under § 12-119 in state court since the assessment concerned the 1997 tax year and he only learned of the assessment in 2007. However, even assuming this is true, it does not appear likely that the Connecticut state courts would construe the statute of limitations in a way that would completely foreclose any claim. See, e.g., Wiele v. City of Bridgeport, No. CV074020814S, 2008 WL 5253146, at *2-4 (Conn.Super.Ct.2008); Lawrence & Memorial Hosp. v. City of New London, No. CV074007075, 2008 WL 271664, at *4-5 (Conn.Super.Ct.2008); cf. Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 253 Conn. 531, 754 A.2d 153, 158 (2000) (calling a result in which application of the § 12-119 statute of limitations would have left plaintiff with only six days to file an appeal “bizarre”). Thus, the district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider his claims under the TIA and the principle of comity. See Long Island Lighting, 889 F.2d at 433. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.