Waccamaw Grocery Co. v. Dawsey

The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Carter. This case, which was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County, November 13, 1926, is an action on the part of the plaintiff, Waccamaw Grocery .Company, for recovery of judgment against the defendant, J. E. Dawsey, in the sum of $15,000.00, based on the alleged unlawful seizure and conversion by the defendant of certain stock of goods, wares, merchandise, and money, alleged to have been owned by the plaintiff. Under the allegations set up in the plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff asks not only for actual damages but for punitive damages also. By way of answer the defendant denied the material allegations set up in plaintiff’s complaint, and alleged that he got possession of the said property in a peaceable and lawful way, and, further, that he was entitled to the same. Mr. Scarborough, defendant’s counsel, who filed the answer for the defendant, died in November, 1927, and for this reason, it appears, the trial of the case was delayed. Eater the case was tried at the spring, 1928, term of said Court, the defendant appearing in person and without counsel. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $243.00. On motion of plaintiff, the defendant consenting in person, a new trial of the case was ordered. It appears, further, that the case was again tried at the October, 1928, term of said Court, before Hon. T. S. Sease, Circuit Judge, and a jury, the defendant again appearing in person and without counsel, which trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00. Following the return of said verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant in person made a motion for a new trial. Thereafter, he employed counsel and the motion [77] for a new trial was heard before his Honor, Judge Sease, who issued an order, dated October 19, 1929, refusing the motion. From the said order refusing the motion for a new trial and from judgment entered on the verdict, the defendant has appealed to this Court, and the case was heard in this Court in May, 1932. It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the exceptions raise eight issues, and we shall consider the same in the order presented. The first question, stated by counsel, reads as follows: “Was it error to refuse appellant’s motion for a new trial?” One of the grounds upon which the motion for a new trial was based was that, on account of defendant having no counsel to represent him at the trial, and he being unlearned in the law and the procedure in the trial of cases, incompetent and prejudicial testimony was presented to the jury. We are unable to agree with this position. In the first place the appellant had ample time to procure counsel, and, so far as the record discloses, no motion for a continuance was made upon that ground. Furthermore, an examination of the entire record convinces us that there is no merit in this contention, for we find no instance during the entire trial of the case in which the advantage was taken of appellant by reason of his not having any counsel. Another ground upon which the motion for a new trial was based was that the Court permitted to be introduced in evidence certain papers and notes. In our opinion, these exhibits liad a bearing on the issues involved, and for that reason the trial Judge committed no error in allowing them to be introduced in evidence. Furthermore, the defendant during his cross-examination of Mr. Jenerette, a representative of the plaintiff, went into matters covering the entire business transaction of the parties, and we are satisfied that the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of the papers complained of. [78] Another ground upon which the motion for a new trial was based was that the trial Judge erred iii asking the defendant questions while the defendant was testifying during the trial of the case. The testimony in the case was very confusing and evidently difficult for the members of the jury to understand. In our opinion, in asking the questions, the trial Judge was endeavoring to get the facts in the case and what his Honor did tended to assist the defendant. We see no ground for complaint in this respect. Still another ground upon which the motion for a new trial was based was that the trial Judge asked the counsel for the plaintiff, in the presence of the jury, to state the plaintiff’s position in the case. Clearly in doing this the trial Judge had in mind getting the issues straightened out so that in his charge he could make the issues clear to the jury. There was nothing to have prevented the defendant from stating his position if he had so desired. The defendant was certainly in no way prejudiced by the action of the trial Judge. In the defendant’s motion for a new trial, he also complained that the trial Judge committed error in his charge to the jury. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss herein the Judge’s charge, and we deem it sufficient to state that, after a most careful consideration of his Honor’s charge, we fail to see wherein the defendant was in any way prejudiced by any instruction that his Honor gave the jury or any statement made by his Honor. Further, it is our opinion that his Honor gave the jury sufficient instruction as to their duty on every issue to enable them to render a correct verdict, and that the defendant was not prejudiced by his Honor having not given additional instruction as to any issue. As to the question of punitive damage, there was ample evidence to go to the jury on that issue. The second, third, fourth, and fifth issues raised by the exceptions, as stated by appellant’s counsel, read as follows: “2. Was irrelevant and improper testimony allowed to be introduced ? [79] “3. Did the Court abuse its discretion by interrupting and examining appellant as witness on the stand and thereby prejudice the case against him? “4. Was it error to allow respondent’s counsel to state his position in open Court in the presence of the jury? “5. Did the Court err in charging the jury and in failing to charge the whole law applicable to the case?” These questions are disposed of by what we have said herein in our consideration of the motion for a new trial. Under the sixth issue, as stated by counsel, errors are imputed to the trial Judge as follows: “6. Errors relating to the verdict as follows: “(a) Did the Court err in directing and allowing the finding of a general verdict, both actual and punitive damages having been prayed for ? “(b) Did the Court err in failing and refusing to direct a verdict for appellant as to punitive damages? “(c) Did the Court err in allowing the sum of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars actual damages, as excessive and unwarranted by the testimony?” As to the question of punitive damages, as stated above, there was ample evidence to go to the jury on that issue, and it was not incumbent upon the trial Judge to instruct the jury to separate actual from punitive damages. Furthermore, we cannot say that the verdict was excessive. The defendant, to say the least, acted very unwisely, and his conduct was certainly not commendable. He had no right, under the law, to take forcible possession of the property in question, but should have applied to the Court for that purpose, if he thought he was entitled to the same. The seventh question raised by appellant’s exceptions reads as follows: “7. Did the Court abuse its discretion in the matter of rushing the jury in its deliberations and cautioning it in relation thereto?” [80] A close reading of the entire record fails to reveal to us that the Court did anything to rush the jury in reaching a verdict in this case. At one time, when the jury was brought out before him for instruction, his Honor stated to the jury, in effect, that, while the Court was waiting on them, for them not to hurry, but to take whatever time was necessary in deciding this case. The following is the eighth issue presented by the appellant: “8. iDid the Court err in excluding from the jury’s consideration as an offset any indebtedness owed by respondent to appellant?” According to our view of the case, the appellant has no ground to complain in this respect. It does not appear that any evidence was excluded regarding the claims of the defendant, and, furthermore, the pleadings could not be said •to contemplate the proof of such alleged claim. We may state, further, that the defendant was given wide range in testifying to matters concerning the entire transaction, and it was only in a very few instances that any objection was interposed. After a careful consideration of the entire record in the case, it is our opinion that the defendant had a fair trial, and the exceptions will have to, therefore, be overruled. It is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be, and the same is hereby, affirmed. Mr. Chiee Justice BeEase and Messrs. Justices StabEEr and Bonham and Mr. Acting Associate Justice W. C. Cothran concur.