Rumbaugh v. Morriss

COBBS, J. This suit was filed by appel-lee against appellant to recover $5,000 as attorney’s fees, the alleged value of legal services performed under a contract of employment in connection with the sale and exchange of property then owned by appellant, known as the did Electric Park, to the San Antonio school board for a cash consideration of $35,000, and its conveyance, in addition thereto, of real estate on South Flores street, to appellant, all situated in San Antonio. Appellant filed a number of exceptions and a cross-action to recover $1,000 from appellee, upon the alleged ground that, acting under appellee’s advice, A. Saladino was employed to assist in securing a favorable vote of a member or members of the school board to consummate the trade, from which he received no benefits. Appellant' alleged: That appellee sent for said Saladino, and, after conferring witl( him, the appellee represented to appellant that said Saladino wanted $1,-000 for his services in such matter, and appellee advised appellant to employ him, and appellant, acting solely upon the advice and insistence of appellee as his attorney, agreed to pay said Saladino said $1,000, hut soon thereafter the said Saladino demanded an additional $500, making a total of $1,500 for his services, which appellee advised appellant to pay, and, acting solely upon the advice of appellee, the appellant agreed to pay said Saladino the sum of $1,500 for his services in procuring the vote of the member of said school board with whom he claimed great influence, favorable to the acceptance of appellant’s proposition. That, acting upon the advice of appellee, the appellant paid the sum of $1,000 cash to said Saladino,- and agreed to pay him an additional $500 upon the acceptance by said school board of appellant’s proposition. Appellant then alleged that appellee was negligent in advising Mm to socure the services of said A. Saladino and to pay to A. Saladino the sum of $1,000, and prayed for a judgment over against appellee for the return of said $1,000, and prayed that appel-lee take nothing by the suit. There was no error committed by the court in sustaining the exception to strike out appellant’s cross-action. There was no cause of action alleged that would justify a recovery against appellee. There is no allegation of fraud committed by appellee in connection therewith. It is not germane here any [199] way to any real issue in this case, and obviously it is a matter of concern only between appellant and Saladino. This is a fact case, and'the sole question to be determined is, Was appellee employed as alleged by appellant to perform the services in connection with the sale and exchange of this property, and was it a valid contract? That' he was so employed is shown by the undisputed testimony. The court correctly submitted to the jury the undisputed question as to the value, as follows: “What was the reasonable value, if any, of the services, if any, rendered by the plaintiff Will A. Morriss, as an attorney, at the instance of the defendant George S. Rumbaugh? Answer, stating the amount. “In ascertaining the reasonable value of the services, if any, of the plaintiff inquired about in the foregoing question, you may take into consideration the nature of such services, the amount involved, the interests at stake, the capacity and fitness of the plaintiff for the required work, the services and labor rendered by the plaintiff, the length of time occupied by such services, and the benefit, if any, derived by the defendant from such services.” And the jury_ answered that $4,500 was a reasonable amount for the services performed. As a fact case, was there sufficient evidence to support the verdict? Now, let us see what benefits appellant secured in connection with appellee’s personal services, legal advice, and assistance: (1) Preparing and filing formal answer in suit of Compton-White Co. v. Rumbaugh, in which a large amount is involved. (2) Writing five letters to school board. (3) Preparing and filing answer in suit of A. Saladino v. Rumbaugh. (4) Examining abstract of title to South Elores street property. (5) Writing one quitclaim deed from City of San Antonio. (6) Writing two warranty deeds. (7) Writing one release. (8) Rearranging one lease. (9) Looking after remission of part of taxes on Electric Park property whereby $70 was saved. The value alleged of the Electric Park property traded to the school board by Mr. Rumbaugh was only worth $50,000, and the property on South Elores street that was exchanged by the school board to Mr. Rum-baugh in part payment of the Electric Park property was alleged to be worth $61,900. It was shown by the evidence that the South Elores street property and $35,000 in cash were exchanged by the school board for the Electric Park property; the value of the Electric Park property being placed at $85,-000, and the value of the South Elores street property at $50,000 in the deal, so that, according to the testimony of appellee and his witnesses, he was endeavoring to sell to the school board and did actually sell to the school board, for $85,000, a piece of property that was alleged only worth $50,000, and that in making the exchange the school board put in a piece of property for $50,000 that was alleged actually worth $61,000. Appellant does, not seem to have much cause for complaint in putting over the trade of property worth $50,000 to the school board for property worth $61,000, and in addition $35,000 in money of the realm; a clear excess in alleged values of $35,000 over 'what he gave. The suit is for personal services rendered in connection with that sale. If the contract was illegal it does not lie in the mouth of appellant to set it up to defeat the recovery for services. It does not so appear on the face of the pleading, and the contract is nowhere pleaded or shown to be illegal. The appellee’s right of recovery is not dependent upon any part of an illegal contract to enforce its performance. The court looks with disfavor upon any illegal transaction or acts of either party. It closes its doors to both, but if appellant shows a contract in which he is not obliged to prove his own illegal act to support a recovery, though such may incidentally appear, it presents no obstacle to a recovery. Brewing Co. v. Coonrod (Tex. Civ. App.) 230 S. W. 1099. We think appellee has shown a valid contract. It makes no difference that part of the services he performed was in endeavoring to secure the exchange of property. Oscanyan v. Winchester, 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 545; Trinity Portland Cement Co. v. Bonding Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 229 S. W. 483. Having fully considered this case, and all the assignments of error and propositions thereunder, we find no reversible error assigned and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.