Gambrell v. Bruce

COBBS, J. Appellee filed suit in justice’s court, precinct No. 1", Tarrant county, against appellant for $177.41, for which he práyed judgment, together with .reasonable attorney’s fees. Judgment was rendered in that court in favor of appellee, and appellant appealed to the county court, where judgment was again rendered in favor of appel-lee. Appellant appeared in neither court in person, nor set up any character of answer to plaintiff’s petition in the county court. It was twice set for trial in the justice’s court, and at neither time did appellant appear in that court in person or through an attorney. And, after having appealed to the county court as stated, the cause was set twice for trial, and ati neither of said sittings did appellant or his attorney appear in person. After being twice passed on account of appellant’s absence in the county court, the case having been regularly again set'for trial, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee on evidence introduced sufficient to support the judgment. Appellant thereafter filed a motion for a new trial upon grounds substantially to wit: “(1) That defendant did not know said cause was called for trial, because his attorney had not notified him of the fact. “(2) That defendant had a good and sufficient defense to plaintiff’s cause of action. “(3) Thai defendant’s attorney was detained at home on account of illness, of his infant child, and could not be in court Lili 10 o’clock. “(4) That said cause was tried out of its regular order on the days set.” The trial court fully heard and considered all the facts presented in connection with the record, and overruled the mlotion. There must be allowed much discretion to trial courts in the disposition of their dockets, setting and calling cases for trial and their disposition, else their dockets get clogged up thereby, preventing speedy justice. It is the duty of the parties or their attorneys to be present in court whenever their cases are called for trial. A strong reason for their absence must be presented to the court if they are not there. It must be remembered that the adverse litigant has his rights too. “The law rewards the diligent” one, not the tardy one. Cato v. Scott (Tex. Civ., App.) 96 S. W. 667; Ranson v. Leggett (Tex. Civ. App.) 90 S. W. 669; Millar v. Smith, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 67 S. W. 429; Woolley v. Sullivan (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 919; Power v. Gillespie, 27 Tex. 370; Garza v. City of San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 488; Fisher v. Hemming (Tex. Civ. App.) 164 S. W. 913; White v. Powell, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 38, 84 S. W. 836. We do not believe appellant has presented any good and sufficient reason to account for the absence or shown such an abuse of discretion on the part of the court as is spoken about in Alexander v. Smith, 20 Tex. Oiv. App. 304, 49 S. W.' 917, to justify us in setting aside the judgment of the trial court; therefore ffhe judgment is affirmed.