Lawson-Richards, Inc. v. Blalock Lumber Co.

McClendon, c. j. This cause was tried to the court without a jury. From the court’s findings and the statement of facts we make the following statement: [798] Conrad H. Lawson had for many years been engaged in buying and selling cement, sand, and gravel in Houston, and bad frequently made purchases of W. M. Macatee & Sons, to whom we will refer as Maeatees. . Lawson ceased business for a time about 1926, and later formed the Lawson-Riehards, Inc., corporation, of which he was president, and under which he conducted the same business. Purchases from Macatee were continued, but the account was carried in the name of Lawson under circumstances which made Lawson personally liable, although the purchases were .for the corporation. About August, 1927, this account showed an indebtedness to Maeatees of approximately $2,-000, which was still owing in March, 1928. Lawson-Ri'chards, Inc., had a contract to furnish Belgium cement for a building in Houston known as Richey Tabernacle. On March 8, 1928, Lawson ordered by telephone from Blalock Lumber Company three cars (900 barrels) of Portland cement, at $2.50 per barrel, invoiced at 30 days net with a discount of 10 cents per barrel if paid in ten days. Lawson represented to Blalock, the company’s president, that the cement was immediately needed to fill a contract Lawson-Riehards, Inc., had to furnish cement on the Richey Tabernacle; that payment would be made out of the money received from its sale; and that the bill would be discounted under the ten-day privilege. On the afternoon of March 8th the cement was delivered on the tracks to Lawson-Riehards, Inc., and on the following day, or the day after, it was delivered by Lawson-Riehards, Inc., to Maeatees át $2.30 per barrel, in settlement of the above account. On March 19th, Lawson-Riehards, Inc., executed a note in favor of' Blalock Lumber Company for the $2,250 (contract price of cement without discount) due April 1,1928. This note was taken upon the representation by Lawson to Blalock that he was ill and had been unable to make collections. The Blalock Company did not then know that the cement had not been used in the Richey Tabernacle, but ascertained that fact on or shortly prior to March 28, 1928, on which date this suit was filed by Blalpck Company against Lawson, Lawson-Riehards, Inc., and Maeatees. The petition alleged that the cement was obtained by fraud and sought to recover the cement, and in the alternative its value as for conversion. The allegations of fraud, in substance, were: (1) Ealse representations that the corporation was a solvent going concern with net assets of $5,000; (2) that the corporation was a “mere pretense” created by Lawson to avoid personal liability for his debts; and that he bought the cement in order to use it to discharge his personal obligation to Maeatees; and (3) false representations that the cement was to be used in the Richey Tabernacle under a contract which Lawson-Richey had with the contractors. The court rendered judgment for plaintiff against Lfiwson personally, and Lawson-Richards, Inc., for $2,250, and in favor of Maca-tees. From this judgment Lawson and Blalock Lumber Company have each appealed. The court’s judgment is predicated upon findings to the effect that the debt to Maca-tees was that of Lawson-Riehards, as well as of Lawson; that at the time of the purchases by Lawson “he did not have a fraudulent intent not to pay for said cement” ; and that “title to said cement passed out of plaintiff and into Lawson-Riehards, Inc., at the time of the sale.” The court’s conclusions of law follow: “From the foregoing findings- of fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, that because there was not present a fraudulent intent on the part of O. H. Lawson, at the time he ordered said cement, not to pay therefor. That the title to said cement passed to Lawson-Richards, Inc., and that, therefore, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover the possession of said cement from W. L. Macatee & Sons, or to recover from W. L. Macatee & Sons as for conversion of said cement. “I conclude that under the particular facts of this case, that Conrad H. Lawson having used said cement to pay his personal obligation, with full knowledge that said cement .had not been paid for, and that the plaintiff believed the same was being used in the Rich-ey Tabernacle job, that in order to do exact justice between the parties, the court should subrogate the plaintiff to the cause of action against Conrad H. Lawson, individually, and that plaintiff should have judgment against Lawson-Riehards, Inc., and Conrad H. Lawson, for said cement, and judgment has accordingly been so rendered.” Lawson contends that he was entitled to a judgment under the above findings of fact. We sustain this contention on t,wo grounds: First, the finding of the trial court that the title passed to Lawson-Riehards made plaintiff merely a general creditor of the corporation; and regardless of whether the corporation had a claim against Lawson for disposing of the cement, such claim could not be reached by a general creditor through the process of subrogation. It could only be reached by garnishment, or, in a proper case, by creditor’s bill. Second, the court’s findings preclude any right of recovery by the corporation against Lawson because the cement was used to discharge a debt for which as between him and the corporation the latter was primarily liable. Regardless of the relations between Lawson and Maeatees inter sese, Lawson was merely lending his credit to the corporation, and if he had personally paid the debt he would have -been entitled to reimbursement from the corporation. We see no [799] escape from either of these conclusions. They are elementary and need no citation of authority. Lumber Co. v. Long (Tex. Civ. App.) 5 S.W.(2d) 162, cited by Blalock Company, is manifestly not in point. .[4, 5] In a supplemental finding of fact the court found that while the account stood in the name of Lawson, and he was liable personally, the purchases were made for the benefit of the corporation. Blalock Lumber Company contend that the supplemental findings should not be considered because filed after the time allowed in the general statutes for filing findings of fact. This point, has been decided adversely to this contention by the Galveston Court in Lamm v. Gohlman (Civ. App.) 279 S. W. 552. Independently of this supplemental finding, we think the original finding that both the corporation and Lawson were liable for the account is tantamount to a finding that the account was for the benefit of the corporation. The only theory on which the corporation could be liable at all, since the account stood in the name of Lawson individually, was that it was in fact its account. Blalock Company contest this finding on the ground that it is nbt supported by the evidence. This contention we overrule. The evidence certainly supports the finding, if it does not in fact conclusively establish it. The appeal of the Blalock Company is predicated upon assignments which question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and judgment as a matter of law. In this connection it is contended that the evidence conclusively shows fraud in each of the three respects pleaded as above set out. We have carefully examined the entire statement of facts and conclude that these assignments should be overruled. The sufficiency of the evidence is questioned only as a matter of law, and our jurisdiction to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial in the interest of justice is not invoked. The testimony of Lawson amply supports the specific finding of the court that he had no fraudulent intention not to pay for the cement when he ordered it. The court made no finding upon the allegation that Lawson represented that the corporation was solvent, and had net assets worth $5,000. Upon this issue the evidence was conflicting. Blalock testified to the representation and Lawson denied it. The court specifically found that Lawson did represent that the cement was to be used in the Richey Tabernacle under a contract which the corporation had with the contractors, but there was no finding that this constituted actionable fraud. In order to be such Blalock Company must have relied upon it. On cross-examination Blalock testified relative to the representation in question: “If he had not made that statement I would not have sold him the cement. That was the statement on which I sold it to him, and he told me he would pay me out of the money he, received. He told me he was a going and solvent concern and had $5,000 net assets. If he had not told me' that I would •not have sold it to him. That was the,inducing fact that led me to make the sale. If it was a solvent and going concern I would not have cared where he sold the cement because I could get my money regardless of where he sold it.” It must be borne in mind that Blalock was an interested witness and the testimony was oral in the presence of the trial judge, to whom exclusively is committed the question of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. This affirmative testimony on Blalock’s part as to the inducing cause of the sale could with propriety have been regarded by the trial judge as negativing Blalock’s other testimony to the effect that he relied upon other representations, and was sufficient we think to support a finding that he relied solely upon the credit of the corporation in making the sale, and not upon the representation that the cement was to be used in the Richey Tabernacle. Blalock Company made no request for additional findings, and the only exceptions it made to the findings were that in specific particulars they were contrary to the law and evidence. Under these circumstances, to' paraphrase the holding in Cockrell v. Steffens (Tex. Civ. App.) 284 S. W. 608, the finding to the effect that the title passed at the time of the sale was in effect a finding against all the allegations of fraud. “It is the duty of a party complaining of the inadequacy of findings of fact to request additional or more specific findings; otherwise he may not be heard to say on appeal that such findings are insufficient, particularly if the evidence would have justified a finding against the party who complains of its omission.” Texas Jurisprudence, vol. 3, p. 224. There are a number of facts and circumstances in evidence which raise the issue of fraud on each allegation, and it may be that this evidence can properly be characterized as preponderating in favor of plaintiff. That question, however, is not presented, and we are unable to conclude that the evidence conclusively shows actionable fraud as a matter of law. The judgment of the trial court against Lawson personally is reversed, and judgment is here rendered in his favor. In .other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and rendered.