Vonzell White v. City of Chicago

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15‐1280 VONZELL WHITE, Plaintiff‐Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, and CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER JOHN O’DONNELL, Defendants‐Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 11‐cv‐7802 — John Z. Lee, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 21, 2016 ____________________ Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. From 2008 until 2010, the FBI and Chicago Police Department conducted a narcotics investiga‐ tion on Chicago’s West Side called “Operation Blue Knight.” As the operation was wrapping up, defendant Officer John O’Donnell applied for dozens of arrest warrants, including one for Vonzell White, the plaintiff in this civil case. Other of‐ ficers had observed White and his brother sell heroin to an 2 No. 15‐1280 informant. The observations were in a more comprehensive report that O’Donnell used as the basis for his arrest warrant application. White was arrested, but the charge was dropped. He then brought this civil lawsuit alleging that Officer O’Don‐ nell’s actions and a City of Chicago policy violated his Fourth Amendment rights. All of White’s claims are based on the the‐ ory that Officer O’Donnell failed to present the judge who is‐ sued the warrant enough information to establish probable cause for the arrest. The district court dismissed the policy claim against the City on the pleadings and later granted summary judgment to Officer O’Donnell on the individual claim against him. Al‐ though we agree with White on some important legal points, in the end we affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants. Officer O’Donnell’s written application for an arrest warrant, supported by his oral testimony about the report of the sur‐ veillance of the drug deal, provided probable cause for the ar‐ rest warrant. I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Operation Blue Knight From 2008 until 2010, the FBI and the Chicago Police De‐ partment jointly targeted high narcotics areas on the West Side of Chicago in “Operation Blue Knight.” Operation Blue Knight used confidential informants to carry out and record drug deals. On July 31, 2010, Operation Blue Knight officers set up surveillance with an informant stationed near a bus shelter. The officers were targeting Vernon Chapman, who is plaintiff Vonzell White’s brother. Both Chapman and White were known to law enforcement as members of the Traveling Vice Lords gang, a target of the investigation. The officers No. 15‐1280 3 watched Chapman and White drive up, park, and walk to‐ ward the bus shelter where the informant was waiting. The officers reported that they watched White and Chapman both speak with the informant. White testified at his deposition that Chapman walked thirty feet away from White and spoke alone with the informant. After the conversation, White and Chapman drove away from the area and police ended surveil‐ lance. For purposes of reviewing the grant of summary judg‐ ment, we assume the officers did not actually see a hand‐to‐ hand transfer of heroin to the informant. The informant then called the officers and told them that he had purchased heroin from White and Chapman. The of‐ ficers met with the informant and retrieved the drugs. The in‐ formant identified White and Chapman in a photo array, and field tests confirmed that the drugs were heroin. The officers’ observations from the July 31 purchase were summarized in a Narcotics & Gang Investigations Section Supplementary Re‐ port, called the NAGIS Report, prepared by one of the partic‐ ipating officers. B. Arrest Warrant Several months later, in November 2010, Operation Blue Knight officers prepared to arrest and prosecute numerous suspects. Chicago Police Officer John O’Donnell, who did not participate in the July 31 surveillance, was in charge of sub‐ mitting the arrest warrant requests for Operation Blue Knight. He discussed the matter with the prosecutor and signed a criminal complaint against White on the basis of the NAGIS Report. The complaint form, which is used regularly by the Chicago Police Department, contained spaces for personal de‐ tails and a brief description of the alleged offense. The com‐ plaint against White alleged in relevant part that “Vonzell 4 No. 15‐1280 White … committed the offense of Delivery of a Controlled Substance in that he/she Knowingly and Unlawfully deliv‐ ered … a substance containing a controlled substance to wit: 3.0 grams of heroin.” The complaint gave the date and street address of the charged delivery but contained no additional factual details about White’s alleged drug deal or the basis for the accusation. On November 16, Officer O’Donnell and the prosecutor appeared before a state court judge to seek an arrest warrant for several Operation Blue Knight suspects, including White. Officer O’Donnell presented the criminal complaint and testi‐ fied under oath about White’s actions as detailed in the NAGIS Report. The judge issued a warrant to arrest White. To support his claim that Officer O’Donnell failed to pro‐ vide the state court with sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest him, White emphasizes that Officer O’Donnell and the prosecutor could not remember at their depositions in this federal civil case exactly what Officer O’Donnell told the judge about White’s participation in the drug deal. Nevertheless, Officer O’Donnell specifically testi‐ fied: “On November 10, 2010, I signed a criminal complaint against Vonzell White for delivery of a controlled substance based on the 7/31/10 NAGIS report documenting that Vernon Chapman and Vonzell White delivered a controlled substance to the C/I in a covert narcotics purchase on July 31, 2010.” He added that the “NAGIS report identifies Vonzell White, a/k/a ‘Zebo’ and Vernon Chapman a/k/a ‘C‐Dog’ as affiliated with the Traveling Vice Lords and lists both Chapman and White as the offenders who delivered heroin to the C/I on July 31, 2010, in the covert narcotics purchase. Based on my experi‐ ence and understanding of the incident, I believed the No. 15‐1280 5 7/31/2010 NAGIS report set forth sufficient probable cause to secure the arrest of Vonzell White for delivery of a controlled substance.” The NAGIS report’s account of the controlled buy, if believed, provided sufficient information to find probable cause to arrest White. C. Dismissal of Criminal Case and Filing of Civil Suit White was arrested on November 17, 2010. He remained in custody until January 5, 2011. On July 21, 2011, prosecutors dismissed the charges against him, apparently because the in‐ formant was not available to testify against him. White then filed this civil suit against both Officer O’Don‐ nell and the City of Chicago alleging that he was arrested in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and was prosecuted maliciously under state law. White contends that Officer O’Donnell knowingly sought an arrest warrant with‐ out probable cause. White argues that the sparse description of the offense on the standard complaint form failed to pro‐ vide the state court judge with sufficient information to find probable cause for the arrest. White also alleges a Monell claim against the city for the allegedly widespread practice of seek‐ ing arrest warrants on the basis of the conclusory complaint forms. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 , 694–95 (1978) (rejecting respondeat supe‐ rior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but allowing claims against local governments for official policies or customs that violate federal rights). The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss the Monell claim for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the complaint did not allege a sufficient factual basis to believe the alleged 6 No. 15‐1280 practice was actually so widespread as to support a Monell claim. Defendants later moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The district court granted summary judg‐ ment for Officer O’Donnell on the federal claim for false ar‐ rest, finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity, and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law malicious prosecution claim. White has ap‐ pealed. II. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Officer O’Donnell We first consider summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim against Officer O’Donnell as an individ‐ ual. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2014). We review the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non‐moving party—here, plaintiff White. Id. We give him the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, id., citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), but not speculative inferences in his favor, see Tubergen v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Center, Inc., 517 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2008), quoting McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the mov‐ ing parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non‐moving party on the ev‐ idence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co., 94 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1996). White asserts that he was arrested based on an invalid warrant because Officer O’Donnell failed to present sufficient No. 15‐1280 7 information to allow the state court judge to evaluate prob‐ able cause for arrest. White argues that the bare‐bones crimi‐ nal complaint could not establish probable cause and that the insufficiency was not cured by Officer O’Donnell’s testimony because he could not recall his testimony more specifically. Defendants respond that Officer O’Donnell’s affidavit and deposition testimony establish that he gave sworn oral testi‐ mony about the NAGIS Report. Both sides agree that the NAGIS report contains information sufficient to establish probable cause for White’s arrest. White argues that because O’Donnell’s testimony to the state court judge was not rec‐ orded, there is a genuine issue of material fact about just what he said and thus whether the warrant was issued on the basis of probable cause.1 When a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, the plaintiff may prevail on a false arrest claim only if a reasonable officer should have known that the infor‐ mation provided to the judge was insufficient to establish probable cause. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432 , 441–42 (7th Cir. 2013). To succeed on this claim, the plaintiff must demon‐ strate that the officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reck‐ less disregard for the truth sought a warrant on the basis of legally insufficient information. Beauchamp v. City of No‐ blesville, 320 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). Of course, the plain‐ tiff may not succeed if the officer did in fact present sufficient 1 While White disputes some of the facts contained in the NAGIS Re‐ port, this dispute is immaterial since he does not claim that Officer O’Don‐ nell actually lacked probable cause to seek an arrest warrant. 8 No. 15‐1280 evidence to “support the independent judgment of a disinter‐ ested magistrate.” Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Peniten‐ tiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 (1971); Williamson, 714 F.3d at 442 . This is not a case where an officer sought an arrest warrant solely on the basis of a bare‐bones complaint. In fact, we agree with White that the complaint in this case would be insuffi‐ cient by itself under Whiteley because it lacks any factual in‐ formation about the alleged offense or the basis for the accu‐ sation that would allow the judge to make an independent judgment about probable cause. See Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568 . The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar situation in Spencer v. Staton, 489 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2007), where a Mr. and Mrs. Spen‐ cer and one Zinnerman were suspected of being involved with murders in a botched robbery attempt. Id. at 660–61. De‐ tectives went to the house where all three were staying and discovered that they had left. Id. at 661 . Fearing that they were attempting to flee, the detectives obtained arrest warrants for Mr. and Mrs. Spencer and Zinnerman, and they charged Mr. Spencer and Zinnerman with armed robbery and first‐degree murder. Id. Mrs. Spencer was charged as an accessory after the fact. Id. She was acquitted of the accessory charge through a plea deal involving her husband. Id. at 661 . She then brought a civil suit alleging that the arrest warrant application submit‐ ted by the detectives was facially invalid and unsupported by probable cause to arrest her. Id. The district court had granted summary judgment for the detectives on the basis of qualified immunity, but the Fifth Circuit reversed: “After reciting Spencer’s biographical and contact information, the affidavit states nothing more than the charged offense, accompanied by a conclusory statement that No. 15‐1280 9 Spencer assisted her husband and Zinnerman in evading Lou‐ isiana authorities. It does not supply the factual basis for probable cause necessary for issuance of an arrest warrant.” Id. at 661–62. The lead detective sought to cure this problem by asserting that he supplemented the affidavit with oral tes‐ timony “based on his personal knowledge and investigation such that—in the aggregate—the information conveyed to the judge” supported probable cause for Spencer’s arrest. Id. at 662 . There was “significant uncertainty” in the record “con‐ cerning what oral testimony” the detective provided to the judge and when. Id. at 662 . The court concluded that the war‐ rant application to the issuing judge was “a textbook example of a facially invalid, ‘barebones’ affidavit.” Id. at 661 . The court also noted that the detective did not allege that his statements to the judge were made under oath. Id. at 663 . We do not disagree with the analysis or result in Spencer, but there are two key differences here. The undisputed facts here show that Officer O’Donnell did not seek the arrest war‐ rant on the complaint alone or on the basis of unsworn oral assertions to the judge. Instead, Officer O’Donnell’s uncontro‐ verted deposition testimony establishes that he gave a state‐ ment under oath about White “being a named offender in a narcotics transaction” based on the contents of the NAGIS Re‐ port, which gave detailed and specific grounds for probable cause that White had been part of an illegal heroin deal. White contends that there is no evidence “about the actual words spoken by O’Donnell,” but we see no basis for finding a gen‐ uine issue of material fact simply because the testifying officer cannot recount the precise words he spoke to the judge under oath. A police officer seeking a warrant can rely on infor‐ mation from other officers. See United States v. Williams, 627 10 No. 15‐1280 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The collective knowledge doc‐ trine permits an officer to … arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer or police agency, even if the officer himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of suspicion to permit the given action.”). It is undisputed that the NAGIS Report detailed the surveillance of the drug transaction involving White and that Officer O’Donnell testified on the basis of that report. His deposition testimony establishes that he presented sufficient evidence to the judge to establish probable cause. White has offered no evidence presenting a genuine issue of material fact. In his reply brief, White argues that the “procedure” of seeking arrest warrants on the basis of sworn oral testimony “may result in distorted subsequent testimony as to what in‐ formation was presented orally”—though White is careful to note that he does not challenge the constitutionality of the practice. A written affidavit or recorded testimony would of course make it easier for an officer to establish the sufficiency of the evidence presented to a warrant‐issuing judge. But White cites only authorities dealing with applications for search warrants, not arrest warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Un‐ like an arrest warrant, which describes a person with particu‐ larity when that person is identified, a search warrant requires a “particular description of the things to be seized” and the scope of the location to be searched. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). The practi‐ cal concerns about establishing the evidentiary basis for par‐ ticularized descriptions for a search warrant are not as signif‐ icant for arrest warrants, where the officer must show only probable cause for a person’s arrest. While the district court No. 15‐1280 11 granted summary judgment for Officer O’Donnell on the ba‐ sis of qualified immunity, we conclude that he is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim against him. The undisputed facts in the summary judg‐ ment record show that he provided the state court judge with a sufficient factual basis to support the arrest warrant. III. The Monell Claim of Unconstitutional Practice The district court dismissed White’s Monell claim on the pleadings. White v. City of Chicago, 2014 WL 958714 at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The court held that White failed to state a Mo‐ nell claim because his claim was “based upon the sole allega‐ tion that O’Donnell acted in accordance with a widespread practice of the police department of the City of Chicago when seeking a warrant.” Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). This, the court said, was not enough to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the City maintained a policy, cus‐ tom, or practice that deprived him of his constitutional rights. Id. This was an error, but a harmless one. The Supreme Court held in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993), that federal courts may not apply a “‘heightened pleading standard’—more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce‐ dure—in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under … 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .” The Court emphasized that “Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only a ‘short and plain state‐ ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re‐ lief.’” Id. at 168 ; see also Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 748, n.3 (7th Cir. 2012). The Leatherman holding has sur‐ vived the Court’s later civil pleading decisions in Iqbal and Twombly, which require the pleader to allege a “plausible” 12 No. 15‐1280 claim. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). White alleged in his amended complaint: “In accordance with a widespread practice of the police department of the City of Chicago: O’Donnell requested the judge to issue a war‐ rant on the basis of O’Donnell’s conclusory allegation that other law enforcement officers claimed or believed plaintiff had committed an offense, and O’Donnell did not present the judge with an affidavit setting out any affirmative allegation of facts that would indicate that plaintiff had committed an offense.” Together with the individual claim against O’Don‐ nell and the standard printed form that does not require spe‐ cific factual support for an application for an arrest warrant, this allegation was enough to satisfy the “short and plain statement of the claim” requirement of Rule 8(a)(2). White was not required to identify every other or even one other in‐ dividual who had been arrested pursuant to a warrant ob‐ tained through the complained‐of process. See, e.g., Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151 , 152–53 (7th Cir. 1995). In the end, however, Officer O’Donnell’s sworn testimony about the NAGIS Report provided sufficient evidence to es‐ tablish probable cause. Probable cause also establishes that White did not suffer a constitutional injury, which is a neces‐ sary element of a Monell claim. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Since White’s Monell claim fails on other grounds, the error on the sufficiency of the pleading was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.