Zhi Guo v. Independent Chinese Pen Center Inc.

SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff Zhi Guo appeals pro se 1 from the dismissal of his due process and First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against the Independent Chinese Pen Center Inc. (“ICPC”) and several of its members in connection with the termination of Guo’s ICPC membership. 2 We review a judgment of dismissal de novo, “accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in *10 the plaintiffs favor.” Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants violated plaintiffs federal rights while acting under color of state law.” McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014). For purposes of § 1983, a private entity acts under color of state law if (1) “the State compelled the conduct,” (2) “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the private conduct,” or (3) “the private conduct consisted of activity that has traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The fundamental question ... is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are fairly attributable to the state.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Guo failed to allege facts satisfying any of the three standards for “fairly attribut[ing]” private action to the state. Guo’s allegations that ICPC (through NED) received federal funds and was the subject of federal oversight are insufficient for two reasons. First, the federal government is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See United States v. Acosta, 502 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that § 1983 “does not apply to allegedly unlawful acts of federal officers”). Second, even if we were to construe Guo’s complaint to plead an implied action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), “a predominance of public funding”, alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the funded private entity is acting under color of law. Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2004). 3 We have considered Guo’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Footnotes [1] Plaintiff has represented himself pro se throughout motion practice and appellate litigation, but the operative complaint bears a lawyer’s signature. Accordingly, we construe his briefs liberally, see Wright v. C.I.R., 571 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2009), although we need not extend the same liberal construction to his counseled pleading, see Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). [2] Guo also sued the National Endowment for Democracy ("NED”) and several of its members. He does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claims against these defendants. Thus, we do not discuss those claims further. See LoSacco v. City of Middle-town, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that pro se appellant abandons issues not raised in appellate brief). [3] The district court, declining to exercise sup- • plemental jurisdiction, dismissed Guo’s state-law conversion claim. Guo does not challenge this dismissal on appeal, and so we need not consider his state-law claim here. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d at 92-93. In any event, we identify no abuse of discretion by the district court in its dismissal. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that district court decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary and therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion).