Ex Parte Thomas Michael Dixon

ACCEPTED 07-14-00433-CR SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 1/13/2015 2:50:32 PM Vivian Long, Clerk

No. 07-14-00433-CR FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS __________________________________________ AMARILLO, TEXAS 1/13/2015 2:50:32 PM In the Court of Appeals for the VIVIAN LONG CLERK Seventh Judicial District Amarillo, Texas _______________________________________

EX PARTE THOMAS MICHAEL DIXON, Appellant. _______________________________________

On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas The Honorable Jim Bob Darnell Presiding ____________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S BRIEF ____________________________________________________________

Frank Sellers Daniel W. Hurley Selden Hale HURLEY, GUINN & SELLERS ATTORNEY AT LAW 1805 13th Street 310 Southwest 6th Avenue Lubbock, Texas 79401 Amarillo, Texas 79101 P: 806.771.0700 P: 806.372.5711 F: 806.763.8199 F: 806.372.1646

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

L IST OF P ARTIES & C OUNSEL

Defendant/Appellant   Trial  and  Appellate  Counsel

Thomas Michael Dixon Frank Sellers Daniel W. Hurley HURLEY, GUINN & SELLERS 1805 13th Street Lubbock, Texas 79401 P: (806) 771-­‐‑0700 F: (806) 763-­‐‑8199 E: frank@hurleyguinn.com

The  State  of  Texas   Appellate  Counsel

Jeff Ford Lauren Murphree Wade Jackson LUBBOCK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE P.O. Box 10536 Lubbock, Texas 79408-­‐‑3536

Trial  Counsel

Matt Powell Sunshine Stanek Wade Jackson Lauren Murphree LUBBOCK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE P.O. Box 10536 Lubbock, Texas 79408-­‐‑3536

ii

T ABLE OF C ONTENTS LIST OF PARTIES & COUNSEL ...........................................................................II

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... III INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... V STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................................... 2

ISSUE PRESENTED .......................................................................................... 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 2 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................... 7 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 8

1. Because this appeal deals with a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, this Court has jurisdiction. ...................................................... 8

2. The law prohibits excessive, oppressive bail. ..................................... 9

3. Nearly all of the relevant factors weigh in Dixon’s favor; this Court should reduce bail to $100,000. ........................................................ 10

A. Sufficient to Assure Appearance ................................................. 10

B. Not to be Used as an Instrument of Oppression ......................... 15

C. Nature of the offense ................................................................... 16

D. Ability to Make Bail ...................................................................... 19

E. Future Safety of the Victim and the Community .......................... 21

F. Remaining Factors....................................................................... 21

G. Willing to Comply with Conditions ............................................... 23

iii PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..................................................................................... 24 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.............................................................................. 26 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 26

iv

I NDEX OF A UTHORITIES

CASES

Badall v. State, No. 09-­‐‑04-­‐‑211 CR 2004 WL 1699911 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2004, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) .......................... 12

Ex  parte  Beard,  92  S.W.3d  566  (Tex.  App.—Austin  2002,  pet.  ref'ʹd)  ....  9,  12,  19 Ex  Parte  Brooks,  376  S.W.3d  222  (Tex.  App.—Fort  Worth  2012,  pet.  ref'ʹd)  ..  15 Ex  Parte  Davis,  147  S.W.3d  546  (Tex.  App.—Waco  2004,  no  pet.)  .................  12

Ex Parte Evans, No. 06-­‐‑11-­‐‑00048-­‐‑CR, 2011 WL 2623589 (Tex. App.— Texarkana July 6, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ................................................................................................. 11, 12

Ex parte Goosby, 685 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ), ............................................................................................................. 13

Ex parte Herrera, No. 05-­‐‑14-­‐‑00598-­‐‑CR, 2014 WL 4207153 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ........... 8

Ex parte McDonald, 852 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no writ). ...................................................................................................................... 12, 19

Ex parte Milburn, 8 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.) .... 10, 13, 14, 21

Ex  Parte  Miller,  631  S.W.2d  825  (Tex.  App.—Fort  Worth  1982,  pet.  ref’d).  ..  19 Ex  parte  Rubac,  611  S.W.2d  848  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1981)  ............................  10,  22

In re Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ................................................................................................................ 15, 16, 23

In  re  Estrada,  398  S.W.3d  723  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  2008,  pet.  ref’d)  .....  13

v In  re  Estrada,  398  S.W.3d  723,  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  2008,  pet.  ref’d).  ...  20 In  re  Henson,  131  S.W.3d  645  (Tex.  App—Texarkana  2004,  no  pet.)  .............  12 Ludwig  v.  State,  812  S.W.2d  32  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991)  ...................................  12 Ludwig  v.  State,  812  S.W.2d  323  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991).  ................................  21

Nguyen v. State, 881 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) .................................................................................................................... 23

Ragston  v.  State,  424  S.W.3d  49  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  2014)  ....................................  8 Smithwick  v.  State,  880  S.W.2d  510  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  1994,  no  pet.)  15

Vasquez v. State, 03-­‐‑13-­‐‑00717-­‐‑CR, 2014 WL 3732962 (Tex. App.—Austin July 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ..................... 8

STATUTES

TEX.  CODE  CRIM.  PROC.  ANN.  art.  17.15  ..............................................................  10

RULES

TEX.  R.  APP.  P.  9.5(d)  .............................................................................................  25

CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS

TEX.  CONST.  art.  I,  §  11  .........................................................................................  21 TEX.  CONST.  art.  I,  §  13  ...........................................................................................  9 U.S.  CONST.  amend.  VIII  ........................................................................................  9

vi

S TATEMENT OF THE C ASE Appellant Thomas Michael Dixon was arrested on July 16, 2012, and

charged   with   capital   murder.   (3   RR   4:   DX   1). 1  His   bail   was   set   at $10,000,000.   (Id.).   A   Lubbock   County   Grand   Jury   subsequently   indicted Dixon  for  two  counts  of  capital  murder.

Dixon’s   trial   began   on   October   27,   2014.   (CR   8).   After   a   three-­‐‑week jury   trial,   the   jury   was   unable   to   reach   a   verdict.   (Id.).   The   trial   court declared  a  mistrial.  (Id.).

Several  weeks  after  the  mistrial,  Dixon  filed  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus seeking  a  bond  reduction.  (Id.  at  5).  After  a  hearing  on  December  17,  2014, the  trial  court  refused  to  reduce  Dixon’s  bail.  (Id.  at  15).  Dixon  filed  notice of  appeal  to  this  Court  the  same  day.  (Id.  at  9).

1 Citations to the record appear as follows: Writ Hearing—Reporter’s Record: __ RR __; Defense Exhibit: DX __. Clerk’s Record: CR __. Original Trial Transcript: __ TR __, where the first blank represents the day of trial and the second blank the transcript page. All citations to the original trial come from DX 14 offered at the writ hearing. The writ hearing exhibit volume lists this as a State’s Exhibit that was mailed to the Court. As the Court can tell from the numbering of the exhibits, this was a defense exhibit. If the Court has not received the DVD, Dixon requests this Court advise the parties in order for the Court to have the benefit of the entire record before deciding this case.

S TATEMENT R EGARDING O RAL A RGUMENT In order to allow the Court to render a quick judgment, Dixon does

not  request  oral  argument.

I SSUE P RESENTED Courts are to consider twelve factors when determining an

appropriate  bail  amount.  Numerous  courts  have  approved  $100,000  bail  in capital  murder  cases.  Here,  only  the  factors  dealing  with  general  nature  of the   offense   and   potential   punishment   support   higher   bail.   But   even   those factors,   when   carefully   considered,   support   a   monumental   bail   reduction because  six  jurors  voted  to  acquit  Dixon  at  his  prior  trial.  Did  the  trial  court err  by  refusing  to  reduce  Dixon’s  bail  from  $10,000,000  to  $100,000?

S TATEMENT OF F ACTS Thomas Michael Dixon, an Amarillo surgeon, was arrested on July

16,  2012.  (2  RR  33).  Dixon  was  charged  with  two  counts  of  capital  murder. His  bail  was  set  at  $10,000,000.  (2  RR  15;  3  RR  4:  DX  1).  For  eight  months, Dixon  was  in  solitary  confinement.  (13  TR  24).  Dixon  never  sought  a  bond reduction.

Over  two  years  later,  the  State  tried  Dixon.  The  State  sought  to  prove that   Dixon   hired   co-­‐‑defendant   David   Shepard   to   kill   Lubbock   pathologist Joseph  Sonnier,  III  or,  alternatively,  that  Dixon  was  a  party  to  a  murder  in the  course  of  a  burglary.  After  a  three-­‐‑week  jury  trial,  a  Lubbock  jury  was unable   to   reach   a   unanimous   verdict.   (CR   8).   Two   jurors   provided affidavits  of  their  recollection  of  the  final  votes  prior  to  the  mistrial.  (3  RR 15:  DX  12;  3  RR  16:  DX  13).  Both  jurors  swore  that  numerous  jurors  voted  to acquit  Dixon  of  every  felony  charge  submitted  to  the  jury.  (3  RR  15:  DX  12; 3  RR  16:  DX  13.).  The  State  offered  no  evidence  to  dispute  these  affidavits. Following  the  mistrial,  Dixon  filed  this  application  for  writ  of  habeas corpus  seeking  a  bond  reduction.  At  the  hearing,  Dixon  offered  a  number of  exhibits  and  called  two  witnesses:  Ken  Herzog  and  Mary  Dixon. Herzog,  manager  of  Lubbock  Bail  Bond,  the  oldest  bonding  company in  the  Lubbock  area,  testified  that  it  would  probably  be  impossible  to  post  a $10,000,000   bond   in   Lubbock   County.   (2   RR   9).   He   doubted   that   any bonding  company  would  be  permitted  by  its  insurance  company  to  write  a bond   in   that   amount.   (Id.).   Herzog   testified   his   company   would   require   a *4 cash   fee   of   $1,000,000   up   front,   as   well   as   “collateral   –   or   some   kind   of property  to  back  the  biggest  part  of  the  10  million.”  (Id.  at  10).  Herzog  had spoken  to  Dixon’s  family  and  informed  them  that  it  would  not  be  possible for  his  bonding  company  to  post  the  bond  at  its  current  amount.  (Id.  at  11). The  State  did  not  question. Mrs.   Dixon,   Dr.   Dixon’s   mother,   testified   about   Dr.   Dixon’s upbringing   and   her   attempts   to   secure   her   son’s   release   on   bond.   Mrs. Dixon   was   born   and   raised   in   Spearman,   and   her   family   has   been   there since  the  1800s.  (Id.  at  18).  Likewise,  Dr.  Dixon  was  raised  in  Spearman  and still  has  family  and  friends  there.  (Id.  at  19).  Dr.  Dixon  has  three  children, ages  15,  19,  and  26,  all  of  whom  live  in  Amarillo.  (Id.  at  19–20).  From  2003 until   the   time   of   his   arrest,   Dr.   Dixon   practiced   medicine,   specifically plastic   surgery,   in   Amarillo.   (Id.   at   20).   In   addition,   Dr.   Dixon   still   owns Sensei   Med   Spa,   an   Amarillo   business   that   has   struggled   to   break   even since   his   arrest.   (Id.   at   28).2  Mrs.   Dixon   also   testified   about   the   twelve Lubbock   bonding   companies   she   contacted   in   order   to   secure   her   son’s

2 Sensei does not own any real property. (2 RR 34).

release.   (Id.   at   23).   Only   one   bonding   company   was   willing   to   make   the current   bond,   and   that   company   would   require   a   $1,000,000   cash   down payment,  as  well  as  collateral  worth  $3,000,000  from  Dr.  Dixon.  (Id.).  Mrs. Dixon   testified   that   because   her   family   had   already   spent   upwards   of $1,250,000  on  the  first  trial,  the  family  could  not  afford  to  make  either  the down  payment  or  provide  the  collateral.  (Id.  at  23–24).3 Mrs.   Dixon   also   provided   insight   into   her   son’s   current   financial condition.   Since   his   arrest   over   two   years   ago,   Dr.   Dixon   has   had   no income.   (Id.   at   21).   Yet,   with   the   help   of   his   family,   he   has   continued   to meet  his  child  support  obligations  of  $1,800  per  month,  (Id.  at  25),  as  well  as pay   contractual   alimony   of   $3,000   per   month.   (Id.).   Dr.   Dixon’s   only seemingly  significant  asset  is  his  home  in  Amarillo,  but  the  home’s  value  is roughly  equal  to  its  mortgage  debt  —  perhaps  less.  (Id.  at  26–27).  He  also has   an   interest   in   an   oil   and   gas   lease   that   pays   less   than   $150   per   month (Id.  at  30),  as  well  as  a  1994  Jeep  valued  at  $1,500–  $2,000.  (Id.  at  34).  Finally,

This is especially true in light of the fact that the State has indicated it may seek the 3

death penalty at the retrial, which would exponentially increase the Dixons’ financial obligations. (2 RR 25).

Dr.  Dixon  had,  in  his  residence  at  the  time  of  his  arrest,  $1,800  in  currency and  a  collection  of  coins  with  an  unknown  value.  (Id.  at  30). In   light   of   the   astronomical   expense   the   Dixon   family   has   already incurred   and   will   continue   to   incur   going   forward,   Mrs.   Dixon   requested that  the  Court  set  her  son’s  bond  at  $100,000.  (Id.  at  26). Mrs.   Dixon   also   told   the   Court   that   her   son   was   willing   to   wear   a GPS-­‐‑tracking   ankle   monitor.   (Id.   at   28).   Dr.   Dixon   also   surrendered   his passport  to  the  court.  (Id.  at  17).

Dr.   Dixon   offered   a   number   of   exhibits   in   addition   to   the   juror affidavits   mentioned   above.   He   offered   ten   Lubbock   County   capital murder   indictments   showing   the   bond   amounts   for   each   case.   The admitted   exhibits   showed   that   the   highest   bonds   in   those   cases   were $1,000,000.4  (3  RR  6:  DX  3;  3  RR  14:  DX  11).  Dr.  Dixon  also  offered  a  DVD containing   all   of   the   witness   testimony   from   his   prior   trial.   (3   RR   17:   DX 14).

Despite the fact that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in habeas corpus bond 4

reduction hearings, TEX. R. EVID. 101(d)(1)(E), the trial court refused to admit the indictments from other Lubbock County district courts.

The  State  did  not  call  any  witnesses  or  offer  any  exhibits. The  trial  court  denied  Dixon’s  request.  (CR  15).

S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT The trial court erred in refusing to reduce Dixon’s bail. The Court of

Criminal   Appeals,   this   Court,   and   other   Courts   of   Appeals   have   held $100,000  as  reasonable  bail  in  a  capital  murder  case.  The  State  has  already tried  and  failed  to  prove  Dixon  guilty  of  capital  murder.  Dixon  has  strong ties  to  the  community,  including  three  children,  a  business,  and  a  medical practice  in  Amarillo,  Texas.  Dixon’s  behavior  evidences  his  desire  to  clear his  name.  Because  the  State  presented  no  evidence  to  contest  any  of  these or  the  other  factors  courts  must  consider  when  setting  bail,  this  Court  must reduce  bail.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW This Court reviews a trial court’s bail-­‐‑amount decision for abuse of

discretion.  Ex  parte  Milburn,  8  S.W.3d  422,  424  (Tex.  App.—Amarillo  1999, no  pet.).

A RGUMENT 1. Because this appeal deals with a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, this Court has jurisdiction. While the Court of Criminal Appeals does not allow appeals from

pretrial   orders   denying   motions   for   bond   reductions,   Ragston   v.   State,   424 S.W.3d   49,   50   (Tex.   Crim.   App.   2014),   this   prohibition   does   not   apply   to writs  of  habeas  corpus  seeking  the  same  relief.  Ex  parte  Herrera,  No.  05-­‐‑14-­‐‑ 00598-­‐‑CR,   2014   WL   4207153,   at   *3   (Tex.   App.—Dallas   Aug.   26,   2014,   no pet.)  (mem.  op.,  not  designated  for  publication)  (“The  clerk'ʹs  record  shows appellant   is   appealing   from   the   denial   of   his   writ   application.   Both appellant   and   the   State   agree   the   Court   has   jurisdiction   to   consider   this appeal   .   .   .   .   Because   jurisdiction   is   evident,   we   need   not   further   address appellant'ʹs  first  issue.”);  Vasquez  v.  State,  03-­‐‑13-­‐‑00717-­‐‑CR,  2014  WL  3732962, at  *1  (Tex.  App.—Austin  July  25,  2014,  no  pet.)  (mem.  op.,  not  designated for  publication)  (“When  interpreting  the  holding  in  Ragston,  various  courts of   appeals   have   concluded   that   although   appellate   courts   do   not   have jurisdiction  over  interlocutory  appeals  of  motions  for  bond  reductions,  they do  have  jurisdiction  over  denials  of  applications  for  writs  of  habeas  corpus asserting  that  the  amount  of  bail  set  was  excessive.”).  Therefore,  this  Court *9 has   jurisdiction   to   decide   whether   the   trial   court   abused   its   discretion   in denying  Dixon’s  writ  application.

2. The law prohibits excessive, oppressive bail. Both our federal and state constitutions forbid excessive bail. U.S.

CONST.   amend.   VIII   (“Excessive   bail   shall   not   be   required   .   .   .   .”);   TEX. CONST.   art.   I,   §   13   (same).   In   setting   bail,   the   trial   court   must   balance   the accused’s  presumption  of  innocence  and  the  State'ʹs  interest  in  assuring  the accused’s   appearance   at   trial.   Ex   parte   Beard,   92   S.W.3d   566,   573   (Tex. App.—Austin   2002,   pet.   ref'ʹd).   Bail   is   excessive   if   it   is   “set   in   an   amount greater  than  is  reasonably  necessary  to  satisfy  the  government'ʹs  legitimate interests.”  Id. In  addition  to  the  constitutional  prohibition  against  excessive  bail,  the Texas  Legislature  has  given  the  following  statutory  guidelines:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.

TEX.   CODE   CRIM.   PROC.   ANN.   art.   17.15.   Texas   law   further   permits consideration   of   the   following   factors:   the   possible   length   of   sentence   for the  indicted  offense;  the  nature  and  any  aggravating  factors  of  the  offense; the   accused'ʹs   employment   record;   the   accused’s   family   and   community ties;   the   accused’s   length   of   residency   in   the   jurisdiction;   the   accused’s conformity   with   previous   bond   conditions;   and   the   accused’s   prior criminal   record.   Ex  parte  Milburn,   8   S.W.3d   422,   425   (Tex.   App.—Amarillo 1999,   no   pet.)   (citing   Ex   parte   Rubac,   611   S.W.2d   848,   849–850   (Tex.   Crim. App.  1981))  (citation  omitted).

3. Nearly all of the relevant factors weigh in Dixon’s favor; this Court should reduce bail to $100,000. A. Sufficient to Assure Appearance This is not the typical capital murder bond reduction appeal. The

State   has   had   a   chance   to   prove   Dixon   guilty   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt. Instead,  up  to  six  jurors  believed  he  was  not  guilty.

Dixon   has   been   able   to   find   only   one   case   dealing   with   a   bond reduction  following  a  mistrial  based  on  jury  deadlock.  Ex  parte  Evans,  No. 06-­‐‑11-­‐‑00048-­‐‑CR,   2011   WL   2623589,   at   *3   (Tex.   App.—Texarkana   July   6, 2011,   no   pet.)   (mem.   op.,   not   designated   for   publication).   Evans,   an unpublished   opinion   carrying   no   precedential   value,   is   distinguishable   in at   least   three   ways.   First,   the   defendant   was   charged   with   murder   after   a drive-­‐‑by  shooting.  The  Court  found  this  significant  —  likely  because  drive-­‐‑ by   shootings   by   themselves   are   a   danger   to   the   community.   Here,   Dixon was  not  present  during  the  killing  of  a  lone  victim.  More  importantly,  the actual   killer   and   State’s   star   witness   —   who   is   serving   a   life   sentence without  parole  —  testified  that  Dixon  did  not  pay  for  or  plan  the  murder:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, almost immediately you told me that Mike Dixon did not pay you to kill Dr. Sonnier; isn'ʹt that true?

[DAVID  SHEPARD]:  That'ʹs  correct,  sir.

Q. And you also told me that he was not involved in any way in any planning of the killing of Dr. Sonnier; isn'ʹt that true?

A.  Killing  or  hurting  anybody,  yes,  sir.

Q. In fact, he did not even want him to be harmed in any way; isn'ʹt that true?

A.  That'ʹs  correct,  sir.

(E.g.,  10  TR  8).  Second,  Evans  had  recent,  prior  criminal  history.  Dixon  has none.  Finally,  the  bail  in  Evans  was  set  at  $370,000  —  over  twenty  times  less than   the   bail   here.   Evans,   No.   06-­‐‑11-­‐‑00048-­‐‑CR,   2011   WL   2623589,   at   *1. Because  there  are  no  cases  like  this,  the  Court  must  look  to  what  has  been held  reasonable  in  other  capital  murder  cases. Other   courts   have   held   bail   of   less   than   $100,000   in   capital   murder cases  to  be  reasonable.  See  Ludwig  v.  State,  812  S.W.2d  323,  325  (Tex.  Crim. App.  1991)  (two  counts  murder,  capital  murder  for  murdering  both  victims during   same   criminal   transaction,   bail   reduced   from   $2,000,000   to $1,000,000   by   Court   of   Appeals   and   then   to   $50,000   by   Court   of   Criminal Appeals);  Ex  parte  McDonald,  852  S.W.2d  730,  736  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio 1993,   no   pet.)   (bail   reduced   from   $1,000,000   to   $75,000).5  Similarly,   this

See also Ex Parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 546, 553 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (capital 5

murder for hiring and aiding assailants after the drug-­‐‑related murder, bail reduced for both defendants from $1,000,000 to $500,000 and $750,000, respectively); Ex Parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d) (capital murder, injury to elderly person, bail reduced from $8,000,000 to $500,000); Badall v. State, No. 09-­‐‑04-­‐‑211 CR 2004 WL 1699911, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2004, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (bail reduced from $1,000,000 to $400,000); In re Henson, 131 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (three counts of capital murder, bail reduced from $750,000 to $500,000 for each count); In re Estrada, 398 S.W.3d 723, 727–728 (Tex. App.—

Court   determined   in   Ex   Parte   Milburn,   that   a   $2,000,000   surety   bond   or $500,000   cash   bond   was   unreasonable   and   reduced   bail   to   $100,000.   8 S.W.3d  422,  427  (Tex.  App.—Amarillo  1999,  no  pet.).6  At  least  one  court  has observed,  “There  has  been  a  substantial  decrease  in  the  value  of  the  dollar over   these   periods   of   time[,]”   Ex   parte   Goosby,   685   S.W.2d   440,   442   (Tex. App.—Houston   [1st   Dist.]   1985,   no   writ),   but   actual   adjustments   for inflation  would  look  like  this:

Case Reduced Bond Amount Amount in 2014 Dollars7 Ludwig $50,000 (1991) $86,692.73 McDonald $75,000 (1993) $122,569.72 Milburn $100,000 (1999) $141,747.30

San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d) (felony theft of a vehicle, capital murder, and burglary of a habitation, bail reduced from $1,000,000 to $600,000). In Milburn, the victim’s father was charged with capital murder for intentionally or 6

knowingly causing the death of his two-­‐‑year-­‐‑old son by blunt force trauma to the stomach. Id. at 423. Despite the egregious nature of the offense, this Court reduced the bail because the accused did not have any assets or money for bail, had no prior felony offenses, but did have strong community and family ties. Id. at 426–427. This Court also considered the accused’s denial of any implication in his child’s death. Id. at 427. The Court finally found that the accused did not pose a danger to the community or a flight risk for purposes of the trial. Id. Adjustments were calculated using the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics’ CPI 7

Inflation  Calculator.  http://data.bls.gov/cgi-­‐‑bin/cpicalc.pl  (last  visited  Jan.  13,  2015).

Here,   Dixon   lacks   the   resources   to   post   bail   at   the   current, extraordinary   amount.   (2   RR   21,   26–27).   Dixon   has   had   no   income   for   the past  two  years.  (Id.  at  21).  He  has  had  to  pay  monthly  expenses,  depleting the   only   money   he   had   prior   to   his   arrest.   Dixon   has   strong   ties   to   the community  as  a  businessman  and  father  to  children  that  also  currently  live in   the   Amarillo   community.   Dixon   does   not   pose   any   danger   to   the community.  At  the  time  of  his  arrest,  he  had  two  established  businesses,  a home,  paid  his  child  support  and  alimony,  and  was  a  productive  member of  society.  Like  in  Milburn,  Dixon  denies  any  involvement  with  the  offense, and   his   denial   is   corroborated   by   Shepard’s   testimony   that   Dixon   did   not pay,   plan,   or   participate   in   Sonnier’s   murder.   Milburn,   8   S.W.3d   at   426. Dixon  does  not  have  any  criminal  history.  There  is  simply  no  evidence  to even   suggest   that   Dixon   will   not   comply   with   his   court-­‐‑ordered obligations. Rather,  the  record  strongly  supports  the  opposite  conclusion—Dixon intends   to   clear   his   name.   Even   after   police   questioned   him,   Dixon   left town  for  an  overnight  trip  but  returned  quickly  to  Amarillo  until  the  time *15 of  his  arrest.  (13  TR  183–184).  Smithwick  v.  State,  880  S.W.2d  510,  511  (Tex. App.—San   Antonio   1994,   no   pet.)   (commenting   on   defendant’s   voluntary return   to   Texas   during   investigation).   And   at   trial,   Dixon   insisted   upon testifying.   Cross   examination   alone   lasted   two   days.   Put   simply,   the evidence  supports  the  conclusion  that  Dixon  wants  to  return  for  trial  once again  to  face  these  accusations  head  on. Moreover,  “[t]he  State  presented  no  evidence  that  [Dixon]  is  a  flight risk   or   that   he   has   outstanding   bonds   or   warrants[.]”   Ex   Parte   Brooks,   376 S.W.3d  222,  224  (Tex.  App.—Fort  Worth  2012,  pet.  ref'ʹd). This  factor  weighs  in  favor  of  a  $100,000  bail,  an  amount  more  than sufficient  to  assure  Dixon’s  appearance  at  his  retrial.

B. Not to be Used as an Instrument of Oppression Bail is oppressive when the amount is so excessive that neither the

accused   nor   the   bail   bonding   companies   can   afford   it.   In   re   Durst,   148 S.W.3d  496,  499  (Tex.  App.—Houston  [14th  Dist.]  2004,  no  pet.)  (reducing $3   billion   bond   to   $150,000).   Here,   only   one   bonding   company   said   it would   be   able   to   make   this   bond.   The   trial   court,   however,   expressed concern   over   whether   that   one   company   would   be   a   member   of   the   bail *16 bond   board   much   longer,   making   it   ineligible   to   make   any   bonds.   (2   RR 23).  Even  with  the  lone  willing  company,  Dixon  would  be  required  to  pay $1  million  cash,  as  well  as  provide  an  additional  $3  million  in  collateral.  As discussed   below,   he   does   not   have   that   ability.   Neither   does   his   family, especially   in   light   of   the   amount   they   have   already   paid   and   will   have   to pay   in   the   future   for   Dixon’s   retrial.   Because   the   $10   million   bail   seems “designed   solely   to   prevent   [Dixon]   from   getting   out   of   jail,”   it   is   “being used  as  an  instrument  of  oppression.”  Durst,  148  S.W.3d  at  499.

C. Nature of the offense The State’s theory at trial rested entirely upon a statement made by

co-­‐‑defendant   David   Shepard   two   years   prior   to   Dixon’s   trial.   That statement  was  Shepard’s  lifeline.  By  giving  the  statement,  the  State  allowed Shepard   to   plead   no   contest   to   killing   Dr.   Sonnier,   thereby   avoiding   the death  penalty  in  favor  of  a  life  sentence  without  parole.  Shepard  complied, entered  a  plea,  and  avoided  the  death  penalty.  (8  TR  147-­‐‑48). At   Dixon’s   trial,   however,   Shepard   admitted   that   he   lied   in   the statement  to  obtain  the  favorable  plea  bargain.  (Id.  at  145–147).  Repeatedly, Shepard  testified  that  what  he  said  in  his  October  2012  statement  was  not *17 true.   (Id.   at   226–227)   (testifying   that   his   previous   statement   that   Dixon required  him  to  go  by  Dr.  Sonnier’s  house  to  get  Dr.  Sonnier’s  patterns  was “a  complete  embellishment,  a  lie.”);  (9  TR  14)  (testifying  that  his  previous statements   about   how   he   acquired   the   murder   weapon   and   that   the weapon  was  given  to  him  to  murder  Dr.  Sonnier  was  “a  lie.”);  (10  TR  70) (testifying  Dixon  “never  planned  anything  my  decision  to  go  back  there[,]” and   that   his   statement   about   Dixon’s   planning   and   participation   in   the murder   was   a   “complete   embellishment.”).   Instead,   Shepard   testified   that Dixon   did   not   pay,   plan,   or   request   that   Dr.   Sonnier   be   harmed.   (Id.  at   8) (testifying  that  Dixon  was  not  involved  in  “[k]illing  or  hurting  anybody[,]” and   that   Dixon   did   not   want   Dr.   Sonnier   harmed   in   any   way);   (Id.   at   73) (testifying   that   Dixon   never   planned   to   harm   anyone   and   that   he   never paid  Shepard  to  harm  anyone);  (Id.  at  74)  (testifying  that  “there  was  never  a plan.  If  there  was  a  plan,  all  it  was  was  to  –  for  me  to  get  organized  in  how I  could  try  to  locate  them  so  we  could  play  the  trick  on  them  to  cause  them distress   in   their   relationship.   .   .   .   But   as   far   as   a   plan   to   hurt   somebody, *18 there   never   was   a   plan.”);   (Id.   at   163)   (testifying   that   Dixon   never   asked Shepard  to  harm  Dr.  Sonnier  in  any  way). Up   to   half   of   the   jury   believed   Shepard’s   recantation.   Looking   to Juror   Knight’s   affidavit,   he   avers   that   six   jurors   voted   not   guilty   on   every charge   except   criminal   trespass.   (3   RR   15:   DX   12).   And   looking   to   Juror Fuhrmann’s  affidavit,  four  jurors  voted  to  acquit  Dixon  of  every  charge.  (3 RR  16:  DX  13).  Whatever  the  truth,  this  is  a  far  cry  from  an  11-­‐‑1  hung  jury. It   is   likely   that   if   the   case   were   retried,   it   would   again   result   in   jury deadlock. Admittedly,  a  capital  murder  charge  is  the  most  serious  in  our  Penal Code.  Even  though  the  punishment  could  be  death,  this  case  also  allowed for   the   possibility   of   probation   on   both   counts.   Indeed,   the   jury   charge included   instructions   for   charges   as   low   as   manslaughter   in   count   1,   and criminal  trespass  in  count  2.  (See  3  RR  15:  DX  12).  Thus,  although  Dixon  is charged   with   an   offense   that   is   “among   the   gravest   crimes   defined   in   our criminal   law   and   that   it   carries   a   correspondingly   severe   penalty,”   the Court  must  remain  “mindful  of  the  rights  guaranteed  appellant  under  the *19 Texas  Constitution,  our  responsibilities  under  the  Texas  Constitution,  and our   obligation   to   uphold   the   Texas   Constitution   and   adhere   to   its principles.”   Ex   parte   McDonald,   852   S.W.2d   730,   735-­‐‑36   (Tex.   App.—San Antonio  1993,  no  pet.). Because  the  State  has  tried  and  failed  to  prove  Dixon  guilty  of  capital murder,  and  up  to  half  of  the  jury  did  not  believe  the  evidence  was  strong enough   to   convict   him   of   anything   but   criminal   trespass,   the   nature   and circumstances  of  the  offense  weigh  in  favor  of  a  significantly  reduced  bond.

D. Ability to Make Bail “Just as a defendant'ʹs inability to afford bail does not, in itself,

demonstrate  that  bail  is  excessive,  a  defendant'ʹs  ability  to  afford  bail  in  the amount  set  does  not  in  itself  justify  bail  in  that  amount.”  Ex  parte  Beard,  92 S.W.3d  566,  573  (Tex.  App.—Austin  2002,  pet.  ref’d). The  accused  must  “show  that  he  had  made  an  effort  to  furnish  bail  in the   amount   set.”   Ex   parte   Miller,   631   S.W.2d   825,   827   (Tex.   App.—Fort Worth  1982,  pet.  ref’d). Dixon’s   mother   testified   that   she   called   twelve   Lubbock   bonding companies  in  an  attempt  to  secure  her  son’s  release,  and  only  one  bonding *20 company  was  willing  to  make  the  current  bond.  (2  RR  23).  However,  Mrs. Dixon’s   testimony   indicated   that   neither   Dr.   Dixon   nor   his   family   can afford   the   requisite   $1,000,000   cash   down   payment   and   $3,000,000 collateral;   this   is   particularly   true   because   the   family   spent   approximately $1,250,000  for  Dr.  Dixon’s  first  trial  and  faces  additional  expenses  to  finance a  retrial.  (2  RR  23–24). Mrs.   Dixon’s   testimony   reflects   that   the   Dixon   family   is   willing   to assist  in  posting  bail  (in  addition  to  legal  fees  and  associated  expenses  for his  retrial),  but  also  reveals  the  family’s  lack  of  resources  to  post  the  current bail.  The  Dixon  family’s  attempts  to  post  Dr.  Dixon’s  bail  after  paying  for the  trial  and  for  his  child  support,  alimony,  and  business-­‐‑related  bills,  are important.   But,   more   importantly,   an   accused’s   family   bears   no   legal obligation   to   help   him   post   bail.   See   In   re   Estrada,   398   S.W.3d   723,   727–28 (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  2008,  pet.  ref’d). In  addition,  Dr.  Dixon  has  been  in  custody  for  two  years.  His  funds have  been  depleted  and  his  only  asset,  his  house,  has  no  equity.  Effectively, the   current   bail   amount   constitutes   no   bail   because   it   forces   Dixon   to *21 remain  in  jail  pending  retrial.  See  Ex  Parte  Milburn,  8  S.W.3d  422,  424  (Tex. App.—Amarillo   1999,   no   pet.);   see   also   TEX.   CONST.   art.   I,   §   11   (“All prisoners  shall  be  bailable  by  sufficient  sureties  .  .  .  .”).  This  factor  weighs heavily  in  favor  of  a  $100,000  bail.

E. Future Safety of the Victim and the Community “The State presented no evidence concerning safety of the

community   if   [Dixon]   is   released   on   bail.”   Ex  parte  Milburn,   8   S.W.3d   422, 426   (Tex.   App.—Amarillo   1999,   no   pet.).   This   factor   weighs   in   Dixon’s favor.

F. Remaining Factors In Ludwig v. State, an en banc Court of Criminal Appeals specifically

highlighted  a  few  factors  also  found  here  to  support  its  decision  to  reduce  a capital  murder  bail  from  $1,000,000  to  $50,000:  significant  community  ties, license  to  practice  medicine,  no  prior  criminal  record.  812  S.W.2d  323,  324 (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1991).  The  Ludwig  court  warned:  “[T]his  Court  has  yet  to condone   a   bail   amount   even   approaching   seven   figures,   even   in   a   capital case.  Id.  at  325.

Dixon   has   deep   roots   in   west   Texas.   He   was   born   and   raised   in Spearman,  and  most  of  his  family  still  lives  there.  Dixon  still  owns  a  home in  Amarillo.  He  has  three  children  that  live  there.  He  still  owns  a  business in  Amarillo.  Prior  to  his  arrest,  Dixon  made  Amarillo  his  home  since  2003. (13  TR  35).  Other  than  time  spent  obtaining  a  master’s  degree  in  Clemson, South  Carolina  in  the  1980’s,  (Id.  at  31),  and  a  two-­‐‑year  surgical  specialty  at the  University  of  Oklahoma  in  the  early  2000’s,  (Id.  at  35),  Dixon  has  lived in  Texas  his  entire  life. Dixon’s  education  and  employment  history  support  a  lower  bond.  Ex parte  Rubac,  611  S.W.2d  848,  850  (Tex.  Crim.  App.  1981)  (citing  “petitioner'ʹs education   and   ability   to   pursue   gainful   employment”   as   support   for lowering  an  appeal  bond).  Dixon  has  a  chemistry  degree  from  West  Texas State   (13   TR   28),   a   master’s   degree   in   microbiology   from   Clemson   (Id.   at 30),   an   MBA   from   SMU   (Id.   at   32),   a   medical   degree   from   Texas   Tech University   Health   Science   Center   (Id.  at   34),   and   a   surgical   specialty   from the   University   of   Oklahoma   (Id.   at   34-­‐‑35).   Prior   to   his   arrest,   he   was   a licensed  surgeon  with  a  practice  in  Amarillo.  (Id.  at  35).

Dixon   has   no   history   of   complying   with   previous   bond   conditions because  he  has  no  prior  criminal  record. Because  nearly  all  of  the  non-­‐‑statutory  factors  weigh  in  Dixon’s  favor, this  Court  must  reduce  his  bail.

G. Willing to Comply with Conditions Willingness to comply with conditions favors a reduction from an

already   reasonable   bail.   In   re   Durst,   148   S.W.3d   496,   501   (Tex.   App.— Houston  [14th  Dist.]  2004,  no  pet.)  (citing  Nguyen  v.  State,  881  S.W.2d  141, 144  (Tex.  App.—Houston  [1st  Dist.]  1994,  no  pet.)).  For  example,  in  Durst, the   trial   court   ordered,   inter   alia,   that   Durst   surrender   his   passport   and wear   an   electronic   GPS   monitor   if   he   were   able   to   post   the   $3   Billion   bail set.  Durst,  148  S.W.3d  at  501.  The  appellate  court,  however,  first  found  that a   reduction   to   “well   over   .   .   .     $300,000”   would   be   reasonable   but   then addressed   the   effect   of   the   trial   court’s   conditions   on   the   bail   amount.   Id. The   Court   concluded   that   the   conditions   imposed   brought   the   otherwise unusual   case   into   the   proper   range   and   ultimately   set   bail   at   $150,000   for each  offense.  Id.

This   Court   should   do   the   same.   Dixon   has   agreed   to   self-­‐‑imposed conditions.  He  surrendered  his  passport  to  the  Court  without  being  asked (2   RR   17)   and   is   willing   to   wear   a   GPS   monitor   (Id.   at   28).   Dixon’s willingness  to  comply  with  these  conditions  supports  an  even  lower  bail.

P RAYER FOR R ELIEF The State of Texas has tried and failed to prove Dixon guilty of

capital   murder.   In   the   process,   Dixon’s   financial   resources   have   been exhausted,   as   have   over   $1   million   of   his   family’s   resources.   No   Lubbock County   capital   murder   defendant   has   ever   been   forced   to   post   a   bail   as high   as   this,   even   before   their   first   trial.   Dixon   should   not   be   forced   to either. WHEREFORE,  Dixon  prays  this  Court  reverse  the  trial  court’s  decision and   fix   bail   at   $100,000,   or   whatever   other   amount   the   Court   deems appropriate.

Respectfully  submitted,

_________________________ Frank Sellers Texas Bar No. 24080305 frank@hurleyguinn.com Daniel W. Hurley Texas Bar No. 10310200 dwh@hurleyguinn.com

HURLEY, GUINN & SELLERS 1805 13th Street Lubbock, Texas 79401 P: 806.771.0700 F: 806.763.8199

Selden B. Hale, III Texas Bar No. 08734000 Sbhale310@aol.com ATTORNEY AT LAW 310 Southwest 6th Avenue Amarillo, Texas 79101 P: 806.372.5711 F: 806.372.1646

Attorneys  for  Thomas  Michael  Dixon

C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5(d), this brief was served on opposing counsel via email to jford@lubbockcda.com & lmurphree@lubbockcda.com on January 13, 2015.

_________________________ Frank Sellers

C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that this brief contains 4,844 words (excluding the caption, identification of the parties, index, list of authorities, signature, certification, and certificate of compliance). This is a computer-­‐‑generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14-­‐‑point typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12-­‐‑point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.

_________________________ Frank Sellers