Rodriguez, Raul — freecase.ai

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Rodriguez, Raul

PD-0016-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS No. PD-0016-15 AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 2/5/2015 7:31:35 PM In the Accepted 2/6/2015 3:36:11 PM Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas ABEL ACOSTA CLERK At Austin  No. 01-12-00688-CR In the Court of Appeals For the First District of Texas  No. 1348372 In the 178th District Court Of Harris County, Texas  RAUL RODRIGUEZ Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee  State’s Petition for Discretionary Review 

DEVON ANDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas

KELLI JOHNSON DONNA LOGAN Assistant District Attorneys Harris County, Texas February 6, 2015 CLINTON A. MORGAN Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas State Bar No. 24071454 morgan_clinton@dao.hctx.net

1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 755-5826 FAX: (713) 755-5809

Counsel for the Appellant

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

The background subject in this case will require this Court to interpret a complex interaction between Texas’s self-defense and concealed-handgun-license laws. Also, the State’s third point questions the Court of Appeals’s novel holding that an appellee could be estopped from making a harm argument regarding jury-charge error. This holding has far-reaching implications, as jury charges frequently contain error and the deciding issue on appeal is the harm analysis. The State requests oral argument so that the parties can address any questions or concerns this Court might have after reading the parties’ briefs.

Identification of the Parties Counsel for the State:

District Attorney of Harris County — Devon Anderson

Assistant District Attorneys at trial — Kelli Johnson Donna Logan

Assistant District Attorney on appeal — Clinton A. Morgan 1201 Franklin St. Houston, Texas 77002

Appellant: Raul Rodriguez

Counsel for the Appellant at trial: Neal Davis & Bill Stradley 515 Caroline St. Houston, Texas 77002

Counsel for the Appellant on appeal: Neal Davis, Bill Stradley & Jonathan Landers 515 Caroline St. Houston, Texas 77002

Trial Judge:

Presiding judge — David L. Mendoza

Table of Contents

Page

Statement Regarding Oral Argument .......................................................... i Identification of the Parties ........................................................................ ii Table of Contents .......................................................................................... iii Index of Authorities ....................................................................................... v Statement of the Case ................................................................................... 1 Statement of Issues Presented .................................................................... 1 Statement of Procedural History ................................................................ 1 Factual and Legal Background I. The appellant filmed his armed confrontation with his neighbor. ........ 2 II. The jury charge included an instruction based in part on a correct statute and in part on an inapplicable statute. ........................................................ 3 First Ground for Review The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the appellant’s objection — that there was no evidence to support the submission of a particular jury instruction — was sufficient to preserve the error that was found on appeal — that the instruction was misworded. ......................................................................... 7 I. The appellant objected that the instruction was a “comment on the weight of the evidence” and that no evidence supported the charge. ........... 8 II. The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the appellant’s objection was sufficient to preserve for review the trial court’s use of the wrong statute. ...................................................................................................................................... 9 Second Ground for Review The Court of Appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Reeves by holding that confusion alone was sufficient to constitute “some harm,” regardless of whether that confusion actually helped the appellant. ..........................................12

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Third Ground for Review The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the State’s Almanza harm argument based on its belief that the State was estopped from making that argument. ...................................................................................................................................16 I. The State argued that the appellant’s self-defense claim failed as a matter of law, thus he was not harmed by minor errors in the discussion- of-differences instruction. ............................................................................................. 16 II. The Court of Appeals erred to apply the doctrine of estoppel to an Almanza harm analysis because there is no burden of proof in a harm analysis and estoppel only has meaning if one party has a burden of proof or persuasion. ..................................................................................................................... 18 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 21 Certificate of Compliance and Service ..................................................... 22 Appendix ....................................................................................................... 23 Rodriguez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-12-00688-CR, 2014 WL 7206226 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2014). .......................................................23

Index of Authorities

Cases Andrews v. State 774 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.— Eastland 1989, pet. ref’d) .................................................................................................. 10 James v. State 418 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) ....................................................................... 10 Ovalle v. State 13 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .......................................................................... 19 Reed v. State 14 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) .......................................................................... 19 Reeves v. State 420 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ....................................................................... 13 Rodriguez v. State ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-12-00688-CR, 2014 WL 7206226 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.], Dec. 18, 2014) ....................................................................... passim Taylor v. State 769 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ....................................................................... 12 Walters v. State 247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ....................................................................... 10 Warner v. State 245 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ....................................................................... 18

Statutes TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14 ............................................................................................ 10 TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.02............................................................................................................... 3 TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.035 ............................................................................................................ 5 TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.15............................................................................................................... 4 TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31 ........................................................................................................4, 5, 6

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Statement of the Case

The appellant was indicted for murder. (CR 2). The appellant pled not guilty. (3 RR 300). A jury found him guilty as charged. (CR 2376, 2393). The jury assessed punishment at forty years’ confinement. (CR 2392, 2393). The trial court certified the appellant’s right of appeal, and the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. (CR 2395, 2398).

Statement of Issues Presented

1. The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the appellant’s objection — that there was no evidence to support the submission of a particular jury instruction — was sufficient to preserve the error that was found on appeal — that the instruction was misworded.

2. The Court of Appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Reeves by holding that confusion alone was sufficient to constitute “some harm,” regardless of whether that confusion actually helped the appellant.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the State’s Almanza harm argument based on its belief that the State was estopped from making that argument.

Statement of Procedural History

On direct appeal, the appellant raised twenty-two points of error, seven relating to the guilt phase of trial and fifteen related to the punishment phase. On December 18, 2014, the First Court of Appeals issued a published opinion *2 sustaining the appellant’s first point of error, relating to the guilt-phase jury charge, and reversing the appellant’s conviction. Rodriguez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-12-00688-CR, 2014 WL 7206226 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], Dec. 18, 2014).

Factual and Legal Background

The appellant took his gun with him when he walked to his neighbor’s house to make a noise complaint, and he wound up killing the neighbor. At trial, he claimed self-defense. The trial court instructed the jury on the right to self-defense, including several qualifications on that right. Parts of this instruction were based on an inapplicable statute. This petition regards the Court of Appeals’s conclusion that this error requires reversal.

I. The appellant filmed his armed confrontation with his neighbor.

On May 1, 2010, Kelly and Mindy Danaher held a joint birthday party for Mindy and their daughter at their home in rural Harris County. (5 RR 220, 222). As the party stretched late into the night, the appellant called in noise complaints to the local constable’s office. (4 RR 66). When the constable did not shut down the party, the appellant grabbed his pistol, an extra magazine, and a video camera and went to the Danahers’ house. (State’s Ex. 6). For fiteen minutes he stood in the road filming the party from a distance, then he used *3 his flashlight to get the partiers’ attention. (Ibid.). The partiers came out to the road, but as soon as they got close to the appellant he pulled his gun and threatened to shoot them. (Ibid.) The partiers backed away for a while, but eventually an intoxicated partier got within a dozen feet of the appellant and laughed, at which point the appellant opened fire. (Ibid.; 5 RR 277; 6 RR 91-92). The appellant shot three of the partiers before they were able to subdue him; one, Kelly Danaher, died at the scene. (5 RR 280-87; 6 RR 91-95). At trial, the appellant presented no evidence but relied on a State’s exhibit (the video he recorded) to prove his self-defense claim. He also relied on the State’s evidence that he had been issued a concealed handgun license (CHL). (State’s Ex. 4).

II. The jury charge included an instruction based in part on a correct statute and in part on an inapplicable statute.

At the charge conference, the parties discussed an instruction based on Penal Code Section 9.31(b)’s qualification on self-defense that an actor’s use of force is not justified “if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor’s differences with the other person while the actor was carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02 [Unlawful Carrying Weapons].” TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(b)(5)(A); (see 9 RR 110-13; CR 2368). Section 46.02 prohibits, inter alia, carrying a handgun “if the person is *4 not on the person’s own premises or premises under the person’s control, or inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person or under the person’s control.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.02(a).

It is undisputed that the appellant sought a discussion of differences with Danaher, was carrying a handgun, and was on premises that were not his or under his control. The problem the court ran into in incorporating this qualification to the right of self-defense is that the appellant is a CHL holder. Penal Code Section 46.15 exempts several categories of individuals from Section 46.02, one of them being individuals who are “carrying a concealed handgun and a valid [CHL].” TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.15(b)(6). Thus, if the appellant were carrying a concealed handgun and his CHL when he went to discuss his differences with Kelly Danaher, he would not be in violation of Section 46.02 and the discussion-of-differences qualification would not apply to him. On the other hand, if his handgun was not concealed when he went to discuss his differences, or if he did not carry his CHL with him, his use of force could not be justified. Page 9 of the jury charge was an attempt to put this matter to the jury:

You are further instructed, as part of the law of this case, and as a qualification of the law on self-defense, that the use of force by a defendant against another is not justified if the defendant sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the defendant’s differences with the other person while the defendant was

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failing to conceal the handgun that he was carrying as a concealed handgun license holder, in violation of the law.

A person commits an offense if, while the person was a holder of a license to carry a concealed handgun, the person intentionally failed to conceal the handgun.

A person commits an offense if, while the person was a holder of a license to carry a concealed handgun, the person carried a handgun and was intoxicated.

“Handgun” means any firearm that is designed, made, or adapted to be fired with one hand.

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Raul Rodriguez, did then and there on May 2nd, 2010, fail to conceal a handgun in violation of the law stated above, before seeking an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the defendant’s differences with the other person, then you will find against the defendant on the issue of self-defense.

(CR 2368).

The first paragraph is an accurate statement of the law. The phrase “in violation of the law” at the end is redundant — had the appellant failed to conceal his handgun, he would have been in violation of the law — but otherwise the paragraph is accurate, as far it goes.

The second and third paragraphs, however, should not have been included in this portion of the charge. These paragraphs describe two different ways to violate Penal Code Section 46.035, Unlawful Carrying of Handgun by License Holder. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.035(a), (d). That offense has no *6 relevance to the discussion-of-differences qualification.1 The first and fifth paragraphs reflect this fact, as they do not instruct the jury on how to apply the second and third paragraphs to the issue of self-defense.

The fourth paragraph is an accurate and relevant definition, but the fifth paragraph has a couple of errors. It asks whether the appellant failed to conceal his gun “before seeking an explanation from or discussion with” Danaher. However, the relevant question (which the first paragraph stated correctly) was whether he failed to conceal his gun “while” seeking an explanation or discussion. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(b)(5). The improper tense is relevant because the State presented evidence from one of the appellant’s neighbors, Pete Fornols, that the appellant was walking around the neighborhood with two unconcealed handguns at 8:30 pm, four hours before the killing. (See 7 RR 182-89).

Also, the fifth paragraph asks whether the appellant “fail[ed] to conceal a handgun in violation of the law stated above” which seems to refer to the second and third paragraphs. However, incorporating those paragraphs in this way does not do much; incorporating the second paragraph only requires that the failure to conceal be intentional, and incorporating the third paragraph

1 It is relevant to the duty to retreat, as Section 9.31(e) absolves a defendant of a duty to retreat only if, inter alia, he is “not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used.” The duty-to-retreat instruction was given elsewhere in the charge.

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does nothing at all, as it makes no reference to a law violation resulting from a failure to conceal.

On appeal, the parties and the Court of Appeals agreed that this portion of the charge was erroneous. See Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7206226 at *8-10. The State believes, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of whether these errors required reversal. The Court of Appeals’s errors fall into three categories: It erred in determining that the appellant’s objection alerted the trial court to these errors; it erred in assessing the harm caused by these errors; and it erred in refusing to consider the State’s argument that, because the appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction at all, the errors were harmless.

First Ground for Review

The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the appellant’s objection — that there was no evidence to support the submission of a particular jury instruction — was sufficient to preserve the error that was found on appeal — that the instruction was misworded.

The Court of Appeals held that the appellant’s objection to the existence of this jury charge was sufficient to preserve the errors in the wording of the charge. The State does not believe that the appellant’s objection alerted the trial court to the errors found by the appellate court, thus it was error to hold *8 that the appellant preserved his complaint and could gain reversal under Almanza’s “some-harm” standard. If the Court of Appeals’s published holding is left standing, it will encourage parties to sandbag trial courts by raising vague trial objections but precise appellate complaints.

I. The appellant objected that the instruction was a “comment on the weight of the evidence” and that no evidence supported the charge.

During the charge conference, defense counsel specified his complaints about the five-paragraph instruction that would become page 9 of the court’s charge:

I think this is improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Also, I don’t think the evidence supports this charge in this case. Specifically, there’s absolutely no … credible evidence that [the appellant] failed to conceal his firearm or that he was intoxicated.

(9 RR 110). Defense counsel then discussed what he perceived to be the evidence regarding whether the appellant’s gun was concealed:

[Pete Fornols] testified [that] at some point early in the evening. This is before the shooting ever occurred or [the appellant] ever went over next door. That [the appellant] had two handguns in plain view.… … [S]o that has no relevance as to the time of the shooting, if [the appellant] was legally carrying a firearm. In other words, at the time of self-defense when he shot the weapon, was he unlawfully displaying a firearm, that would negate that. And so that testimony doesn’t really relate to that at all.

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The only other testimony was, Marshall Stetson [one of the partiers] said something on direct examination about how Raul Rodriguez had a firearm and it was visible. And it was a little unclear what he said. But [co-counsel] cross-examined him. And he clearly said … that what he meant was he saw the firearm when [the appellant] had actually drawn it on Kelly Danaher.… And so with that, I don’t think there’s evidence that supports the instruction. And I also think it’s an improper comment on the weight of the evidence.

(9 RR 110-11).

The State replied that the Penal Code Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) exception “talks about carrying a weapon in violation of the law,” and therefore, the jury charge should include laws that the evidence showed the appellant violated, specifically Penal Code Section 46.035. (9 RR 112). The State argued that there was evidence the appellant’s handgun was not concealed when he went to discuss his differences with the partiers; the trial court agreed and overruled the appellant’s objections. (9 RR 112-13).

II. The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the appellant’s objection was sufficient to preserve for review the trial court’s use of the wrong statute.

On appeal, the State argued that the appellant’s objection did not apprise the trial court of the errors raised in his brief. (State’s Reply to the Appellant’s Amended Brief at 9-12). Indeed the trial court was correct to overrule the appellant’s trial objections because there was evidence that his *10 handgun was unconcealed and that he was intoxicated. (See 5 RR 187-88 (appellant told paramedics he was on multiple anti-depressants and painkillers); 6 RR 80-81 (witness: appellant’s gun “not concealed” at beginning of confrontation)). To the extent that “comment on the weight of the evidence” is a standalone objection, it was too vague to have meaning. See Andrews v. State, 774 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1989, pet. ref’d) (citing James v. State, 418 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); see also Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting multiple meanings of “comment on the weight of the evidence”).

The Court of Appeals, however, interpreted the appellant’s objection much differently. First, it said that the appellant’s invocation of Fornols’s testimony apprised the trial court of the incorrect tense in the fifth paragraph of the erroneous charge. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7206226 at *11. On this matter, the Court of Appeals simply misread the record; the appellant’s objection did not mention the erroneous tense at all. However, this misreading played no role in the Court of Appeals’s judgment, as it held that the erroneous tense was, at worst, harmless. Id. at *10.

Regarding the other errors in the charge, however, the Court of Appeals made this holding: “Although [the appellant] did not parse the instruction and *11 detail each of the errors in it, we conclude that his objection was sufficient to preserve the error he complains of on appeal.” Id. at 11.

But “pars[ing] the instruction and detail[ing] … the errors in it” is generally what is meant by “preserv[ing] the error.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14 (defendant must “distinctly specif[y] each ground of objection”). The Court of Appeals cited to several cases for boilerplate language supporting the liberal interpretation of trial complaints, but it did not follow the language it cited. For instance, it quoted Clark v. State, 364 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) for the proposition that an “issue [is] preserved without having been explicitly stated if ‘there have been statements or actions on the record that clearly indicate what the judge and opposing counsel understood the argument to be.” Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7206226 at *11. But in this case, the record shows that the trial court and the State thought the appellant’s objection was that there was no evidence to support a discussion-of-differences instruction. There is no hint in the record that the trial court or the State understood the appellant to be objecting to the errors that were found on appeal: an irrelevant phrase at the end of one paragraph, two paragraphs based on the wrong statute, and an incorrect tense in another paragraph.

The problems in the charge that were found on appeal were technical in nature; to be preserved, the appellant needed to “parse” and “detail” what was *12 wrong with the charge. See Taylor v. State, 769 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (“the adequacy of an objection must be judged on whether it isolates the portion of the charge which is alleged to be deficient and identifies the reason for its deficiency”). The appellant’s appellate complaint was substantially different from his trial objection. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by holding his objection sufficient to preserve the errors that it found.

Second Ground for Review

The Court of Appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Reeves by holding that confusion alone was sufficient to constitute “some harm,” regardless of whether that confusion actually helped the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the errors in the discussion-of-differences instruction allowed the jury to reject his self-defense claim based solely on his being intoxicated while carrying a handgun. (Appellant’s Amended Brief at 35). The State argued that the errors in the jury charge either were meaningless or they aided the appellant by increasing the State’s burden of proof. (State’s Reply to Appellant’s Amended Brief at 15-17). The Court of Appeals claimed that both of these interpretations of the instruction were plausible, but held that it need not further analyze the matter because, regardless of which reading was more plausible, the instruction “was *13 confusing. This is enough to weigh in favor of finding some harm.” Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7206226 at *12.

The Court of Appeals attributed its holding — that “confusion” per se weighs in favor of finding harm — to this Court’s recent opinion in Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). See Rodriguez, 2014 W 7206226 at *12 (“See Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 818 (function of charge is to ‘prevent confusion’)”). However, the Court of Appeals’s use of Reeves as a basis for not conducting an actual harm analysis stands in sharp contrast to Reeves itself, which involved a detailed harm analysis. This Court should grant review of this case to prevent the Court of Appeals’s holding from becoming an accepted view of Reeves.

In Reeves, a murder defendant raised the issue of self-defense and the trial court, over objection, erroneously instructed the jury on the law of provocation as a qualification on the right of self-defense. Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 815. As part of its harm analysis, this Court noted that, while the provocation instruction was relatively clear and well-written, the remainder of the jury charge’s instruction on self-defense was “a six-page impenetrable forest of legal ‘argle-bargle’…” Id. at 817. This Court concluded that the result of the indecipherable language in the self-defense portion of the charge was to *14 bring attention to the erroneously-submitted provocation instruction. Id. at 819.

The Court of Appeals’s interpretation of Reeves as holding that any confusion is harmful is incorrect. Reeves conducted a detailed and subtle analysis to show that the confusion in the charge brought attention to an erroneously-submitted portion of the charge, and it was that focus, not the underlying confusion, that contributed to the harm. Anytime there is error in a jury charge (and often when there is not) there will be confusion. The Court of Appeals did not use Reeves as an example of a harm analysis, but as a reason not to conduct a harm analysis.

There is a significant difference in the types of errors involved in Reeves and this case that makes the Court of Appeals’s misuse of Reeves particularly egregious. Reeves dealt with an erroneously-submitted instruction that limited the defendant’s right of self-defense. In such a case, there is no conceivable way the error could have benefited the defendant. This case, by contrast, dealt with a limitation on self-defense that was supported by the evidence, but which was improperly worded when it was submitted to the jury. The presence of a misworded charge is not necessarily harmful; if the miswording increased the State’s burden of proof or discredited a theory of guilt, that would actually aid the defendant. Determining whether a miswording was *15 harmful requires analyzing how it fit into the overall jury charge and what it instructed the jury to do. The Court of Appeals refused to consider these matters.

The Court of Appeals’s focus on “confusion,” rather than actual harm, went so far that at one point it noted an error that objectively aided the appellant but then counted it as harmful because it was “confusing.” In footnote 4, the Court of Appeals took note of the trial court’s instruction regarding the duty to retreat, which was erroneous but was not brought up by either party. That instruction told the jury that a defendant does not have a duty to retreat if, inter alia, he is “not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used”; the instruction followed this up by instructing the jury not to consider whether the appellant had a duty to retreat. (CR 2363). As the Court of Appeals noted, the plain inference to be drawn from those statements is that the appellant was not engaged in criminal activity. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7205226 at *8 n.4. Instead of taking this inference to the next logical step — that if the jury was instructed in the duty-to-retreat paragraph that the appellant was not engaged in criminal activity, the jury could not have used the complained-of discussion-of-differences instruction to find against the appellant — the Court of Appeals described the duty-to-retreat instruction as “confusing” and moved on. See ibid.

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The Court of Appeals used this Court’s opinion in Reeves as a reason not to conduct a meaningful harm analysis. Confusion alone is not a basis for reversal if it does not harm the defendant, and Reeves did not hold that it is. Unless this Court grants review, however, this will become an accepted use of Reeves.

Third Ground for Review

The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the State’s Almanza harm argument based on its belief that the State was estopped from making that argument.

The most jurisprudentially far-reaching part of the Court of Appeals’s opinion is its holding that the doctrine of estoppel can prevent an appellee from raising harm arguments in response to claims of jury-charge error.

I. The State argued that the appellant’s self-defense claim failed as a matter of law, thus he was not harmed by minor errors in the discussion-of-differences instruction.

At trial, the State was content to fight the appellant’s self-defense claims by arguing his actions were not reasonable. (see 10 RR 7-20, 52-86). On appeal, though, the State pointed out that, as a matter of law, the appellant’s use of force was not justified. (State’s Reply to the Appellant’s Amended Brief at 17-21). As discussed earlier, the appellant sought a discussion of differences while carrying a handgun at a place that was not property he *17 owned or controlled, therefore the qualification on self-defense found in Penal Code Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) would apply to him; the only way to avoid the application of this qualification would be to show that, under Penal Code Section 46.15, he was exempt from the purview of Penal Code Section 46.02.

There is no evidence in this case that any of the Section 46.15 exceptions apply to the appellant. The appellant has acted all along as though the CHL exception found in Section 46.15(b)(6) applies to him, but that exception only applies to an individual who “is carrying a concealed handgun and a [CHL].” TEX. PENAL CODE § 46.16(b)(6). There was no evidence at trial that the appellant was carrying either.

Only one witness, Marshall Stetson, testified about whether the appellant’s handgun was concealed, and he said the appellant drew his gun from an unconcealed holster. (6 RR 80-82). There was no evidence whatsoever as to whether the appellant carried his CHL. (See 5 RR 156-57 (defense counsel stating he did not know if the appellant had his wallet the night of the incident, and testifying officer stating he did not remember seeing the appellant’s CHL)). Because the appellant failed to produce evidence showing he was not in violation of Penal Code Section 46.02 when he went to discuss his differences with Kelly Danaher, his use of force was not justified as a matter of law. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(b)(5)(A).

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As part of its harm argument related to the jury-charge error, the State argued that the fact that the appellant’s self-defense claim failed as a matter of law meant that any errors in the self-defense portion of the jury charge were harmless, because whatever instruction he got was more beneficial than what he was entitled to. That is, had the jury charge been correct, there would have been no self-defense instruction at all, and if this case were remanded for another trial on the same evidence and a correct charge the result would be a foregone conclusion. The Court of Appeals refused to consider this argument because it believed the State was estopped from making it. Rodriguez, 2014 WL 7206226 at *14.

II. The Court of Appeals erred to apply the doctrine of estoppel to an Almanza harm analysis because there is no burden of proof in a harm analysis and estoppel only has meaning if one party has a burden of proof or persuasion.

The Court of Appeals erred to apply the doctrine of estoppel to a jury-charge harm analysis. “[B]urdens of proof or persuasion have no place in a harm analysis conducted under Almanza.” Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). While the parties may advance arguments to aid an appellate court’s harm analysis, the actual analysis is something that the court is obliged to conduct based on the content of the record, regardless of *19 the arguments of the parties. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Thus, application of the estoppel doctrine in this context is inappropriate. Even if the State did not make a harm argument, the Court of Appeals would still have to conduct a harm analysis. A harm analysis is supposed to assess the likelihood that an error affected the proceedings, but the legal positions the parties took at trial do not make an error more or less harmful. “Estopping” a party from making a particular harm argument only has meaning if that party has a burden to show that the error was harmless. The law is clear that there is no such burden.

The Court of Appeals cited no authority for the proposition that estoppel applied to an Almanza harm analysis. Its only authority for using estoppel was Reed v. State, 14 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). In that case, the defense and the State made a joint pre-trial motion to have Reed psychologically evaluated, but the evaluation never occurred. Reed, 14 S.W.3d at 442. On appeal, the State argued that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with Reed’s trial because there was no evidence that would raise a “bona fide doubt” as to Reed’s competency. Ibid. The Fourteenth Court held that the State was estopped from making that argument because it conflicted with the position the State took in its trial motion. Ibid.

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Reed applied estoppel to an argument regarding whether the trial court erred. Even if estoppel was appropriate in that context,2 that does not make it applicable to a harm argument; the question of whether there was error is wholly distinct from the question of whether the error was harmful. By holding that the State’s harm argument was, essentially, unpreserved, the Court of Appeals has issued a published opinion that conflicts with this Court’s repeated holdings that there is no burden of proof or persuasion in an Almanza harm analysis. This Court should review that significant holding.

2 The State is not convinced that Reed was correct to use estoppel to prohibit an appellee from advancing an argument in defense of the trial court’s judgment, but that matter is too complex to get into in this petition. As a side note, it is worth contrasting the actions that led to estoppel in Reed and in this case. In Reed, the State filed a motion questioning the defendant’s competence, and then on appeal asserted there was no evidence that the defendant was incompetent. In this case, the Court of Appeals pointed to the State’s actions at trial that contested the appellant’s claim of self-defense as a basis for holding that, on appeal, the State was estopped from pointing out that the appellant had no right of self-defense.

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Conclusion

The State asks this Court to grant review, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand this case for consideration of the appellant’s remaining points.

DEVON ANDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas

/s/ C.A. Morgan CLINTON A. MORGAN Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002-1923 (713) 755-5826 Texas Bar No. 24071454

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Certificate of Compliance and Service

I certify that, according to Microsoft Word’s word-counting function, the portion of this brief for which Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1) requires a word count contains 4,494 words.

I also certify that I have requested that efile.txcourts.gov electronically serve a copy of this brief to:

Neal Davis ndavis@sdrfirm.com

Jonathan Landers jlanderslaw@gmail.com

Lisa McMinn State Prosecuting Attorney information@spa.texas.gov

/s/ C.A. Morgan CLINTON A. MORGAN Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002-1923 (713) 755-5826 Texas Bar No. 24071454

Date: February 5, 2014

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Appendix

Rodriguez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-12-00688-CR, 2014 WL 7206226 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2014).

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

in the street. Two others were struggling to hold down 2014 WL 7205226 Rodriguez, who had fired the shots. Everyone other than Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. Rodriguez had been at a party inside. Danaher, the host of the party, died at the scene. NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE Rodriguez’s defensive theory was that he fired his PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, handgun in self-defense after the partygoers threatened IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. him. The jury rejected Rodriguez’s claim after a two- OPINION week trial during which it heard the testimony of Court of Appeals of Texas, numerous witnesses and observed an audio and video Houston (1st Dist. recording of the incident that Rodriguez captured on his video camera. Raul Rodriguez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee NO. 01–12–00688–CR | Opinion issued December The video recording 18, 2014 Much of the video recording consists of Rodriguez filming the party from across the street, where he was On Appeal from the 178th District Court, Harris standing at the side of the road, commenting about the County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1348372 noise level, and shining a flashlight in the direction of the party. Attorneys and Law Firms Neal Davis, Bill Stradley, Jonathan Landers, of counsel, About fifteen minutes into the recording, James Storm, Stradley, Davis & Reynal LLP, Houston, TX, for Danaher’s father-in-law, approached Rodriguez in a Appellant. truck.1 Storm and Rodriguez argued about the noise level Devon Anderson, District Attorney, Clinton A. Morgan, and, eventually, a few partygoers, including Danaher, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, TX, for State. approached them.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices 1 Danaher and his family lived in the home, which was Massengale and Huddle. owned by Storm.

As Danaher approached, Rodriguez said, “You need to stop right there. Don’t come any closer, please.” Danaher OPINION continued walking towards Rodriguez and responded, “I, Rebeca Huddle, Justice you’re telling me what to do?” Storm added, “Don’t tell *1 A jury convicted Appellant Raul Rodriguez of murder us to stop coming close to you.” and sentenced him to 40 years’ confinement, rejecting his claim that he shot his neighbor, Kelly Danaher, in self- With Danaher still approaching, and two other partygoers defense. Rodriguez and the State agree that the trial now nearby, Rodriguez said, “I’m telling you, I’m telling court’s charge included erroneous instructions regarding a you to stop. I said stop right now, or I will shoot you! qualification on self-defense, but they disagree about Stop! Get back!” A partygoer yelled, “Back up Kelly” and whether reversal is warranted. We conclude that it is, and Rodriguez repeated, “Get back!” Danaher can be seen we reverse and remand for a new trial. backing away from Rodriguez with his hands up, saying “I ain’t got nothing.” Rodriguez responded, “Y’all are drunk. Get away from me.”

Danaher moved across the street from Rodriguez, where Background other partygoers had gathered and then asked Rodriguez, In the early morning of May 2, 2010, Harris County “You pulled a gun on me?” Rodriguez acknowledged that police responded to reports of a weapons disturbance in a he had, adding “I told you to stop.” Then, from opposite rural neighborhood. Upon arriving at the scene, they sides of the road, Danaher and Rodriguez continued discovered that the complainant, Danaher, had been shot arguing about why Rodriguez drew the gun, while Storm

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told the partygoers to call the police: my life.” Storm challenged Rodriguez to a fist fight, saying, “You drop the gun and let’s go ahead and duke it Danaher: I haven’t done nothing to you. out mother f__er.”As the exchange continued, Rodriguez, still on the phone, told the dispatcher, “Listen. Now Rodriguez: My life is in danger. You got weapons on they’re wanting to kick my ass. And now they’re calling you. me mother f__er and they want to kick my ass and all this other stuff.” Danaher: Your life’s in danger? The video depicts another partygoer starting to cross the Rodriguez: Stay away from me. You’re over here street toward Rodriguez. Danaher stopped him, saying, cussing at me and hollering. “Hey, hey, hey, Ricky.... No, no, no, no. This dude is a ... f__ing idiot, he will shoot you. He’s an idiot.”

*2 Rodriguez: Get away from me. Keep it down. I got Meanwhile, Rodriguez continued talking to the everything videotaped. dispatcher:

Storm: Yeah, call the cops on this jack-off. He’s down I’ve got about 15 people here, here out in the middle of the street with a gun. they’re wanting to kick my ass. They want to beat me down. I had Rodriguez: Yeah, I told you to stop. I asked you to to draw my weapon to stop them to stop. keep them from coming to me. I felt my life was in danger, I drew Danaher: And what happened? I stopped. my weapon and then they stopped. I told them to get back. I told them Rodriguez: No, you stopped after I drew my weapon. to just to turn it down and then, they started cussing, saying we’re Danaher: And I pulled back. going to kick his you know, f’ing Rodriguez: You stopped after I drew my weapon. I ass and all this other stuff, calling asked you to stop and get back.... I asked you to turn all kinds of names and everything this crap down. cuz I’m, and I says look, I’m videotaping all this right now.... Rodriguez and Danaher continued arguing from opposite And I mean, I’m scared to death sides of the road about the volume of the music, and here. Rodriguez called the police, to whom he admitted having drawn his gun, and asserted that he was in fear for his life: Storm told Rodriguez, “I tell you what pal, you pulled a gun on the wrong mother f__er, ok? ... You remember Yes, my name is Raul Rodriguez. I called again. I had that.” Storm then drove his truck up the driveway toward to draw my weapon on somebody because I had, I told the house. them to stop. They were drunk, they coming at me. I told them to stop. They kept coming and I drew my Danaher continued arguing with Rodriguez: “You’re weapon. Then they stopped, I put my weapon up but gonna flash your God damn gun. You’re gonna flash your now they’re saying I’m sitting there waving my gun gun?” Danaher again began walking toward Rodriguez, and everything and I’m not. I’m videotaping everything but was stopped by Wilcox, who held him back, saying, right now.... “No, no, no.”

You know, it’s just me against everybody. I’ve got, *3 Rodriguez told the dispatcher, “Ok. They’re going to I’ve got ... Ah look, there’s about 15 people here. Look, escalate this.... They’re going to the house to get I’m in fear for my life right now. I’m in very ... That’s something to shoot me with.” As Storm drove toward the why I drew my weapon. I’m in fear for my life. Please house, Rodriguez said, “Ok look, I’m going to defend help me now.... They’re going to kill me. myself.... I have to defend myself. I’m gonna have to defend myself.” After hearing a loud bang from up the Storm then initiated another exchange with Rodriguez. driveway, Rodriguez exclaimed, “Oh s__t.” Storm said that Rodriguez would go to jail for drawing his gun, and Rodriguez again asserted “well, I was in fear for The video recording became dark, but a partygoer can be

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heard yelling, “Don’t even do it. Brandon, Brandon, don’t Rodriguez draw the gun. On cross-examination, Tyler do it.” Another voice said, “This is bulls__t. You don’t admitted that after he watched the video, he realized that pull a gun on me.” Rodriguez pleaded with the dispatcher Danaher was in the road when Rodriguez first drew his to help, asserting that the partygoers were going to try to gun. According to Tyler, Rodriguez put the gun down kill him: when Danaher backed off, but Tyler did not see where Rodriguez put the gun. It’s about to get out of hand, sir. Please help me. Please help me sir. Tyler testified that no one was talking about rushing My life is in danger now. He’s Rodriguez or taking the gun from him, but he about to, he says he’s about to go in acknowledged that in the moments before Rodriguez the house, he’s gonna be more than fired, Johnson walked towards Rodriguez at a “pretty equal than me. Now I’m standing rushed pace,” “cackling and laughing with his arms my ground here. Now these people waving in the air, like he thought it was funny, being are gonna try and kill me. goofy for the camera, and then [Danaher] followed immediately behind him.” According to Tyler, Danaher Toward the end of the recording, the partygoers continued moved toward Rodriguez to try to stop Johnson, and Tyler arguing with Rodriguez. Danaher again asked, “You pull moved forward to pull Danaher back, but Danaher had a f__ing gun on me at my house?”Wilcox then interjected, already been shot. saying, “You got a gun in your f__ing ... you got a gun?... What are you, hopped up on coke?” Danaher warned *4 Tyler testified that when the shots were fired, he was Wilcox, “No, no, no, he’s videoing us,” and Wilcox still standing at the edge of Storm’s driveway, and responds, “I know he is.” Danaher said, “Mother f__er Danaher and Johnson were “maybe a step and a half, two pulled a gun on me.” steps into the street,” but neither had crossed the center line on the road. Tyler acknowledged that in his statement In the final moments of the recording, Rodriguez told the to police, he said that Johnson “kind of ran to [Rodriguez] dispatcher, “Look, I’m not losing to these people any to apprehend him and take [the gun] from him.” more. I’m just gonna just tell them to stay back. They’re drunk. They’re swearing.” Then a partygoer later identified as Ricky Johnson moved toward Rodriguez and yelled, “Ha ha ha!” Rodriguez dropped the camera, fired b. Marshall Stetson his gun and yelled, “God dang it!” Stetson, who is Danaher’s wife’s cousin, testified that as soon as he and Danaher walked out to the street, Rodriguez drew his gun and told them to get back. He testified that they were not in the street, but in the middle Testimony of partygoers of the driveway, when Rodriguez first drew the gun. Five partygoers testified at trial. In general, they testified that as the party was winding down, a few of them noticed Stetson testified that when they approached, he could a flashlight on the road and walked to the end of the “immediately see” that Rodriguez had a gun on his left driveway, where they discovered Storm and Rodriguez side. But he also testified that “when he pulled it straight arguing. Only a few partygoers were present when out on us, that’s the first time I seen it in the hand. He was Rodriguez first drew, then put away, his handgun, but pulling it out.” According to Stetson, Rodriguez pulled multiple partygoers arrived by the time Rodriguez fired. the gun from a holster on the outside of his pants, he did The partygoers acknowledged that Johnson had stepped not see him move any clothing before drawing the into the road, waved his arms, and laughed loudly in the weapon out, and the gun was “not concealed” and was seconds before Rodriguez fired. But they maintained that “outside his shirt.” neither Johnson nor anyone else crossed the center line of the road before Rodriguez fired. Stetson did not remember Johnson laughing in the moments before Rodriguez fired, but he was about an arms-length behind Johnson, on the phone with the police, when Johnson took “two steps” toward Rodriguez and the a. James Tyler shooting began. Stetson grabbed for Johnson’s shirt, but Tyler, Danaher’s best friend, testified that Danaher had Johnson fell on the other side of the street, where not yet stepped into the road when Rodriguez first drew Rodriguez was standing. According to Stetson, Johnson his gun, but Tyler acknowledged that he did not see had not crossed over the center line of the road and was still 10 to 12 feet from Rodriguez when Rodriguez fired. © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

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Stetson ran towards Rodriguez, grabbed for the gun and front door, he heard three gunshots, and turned and ran was himself shot in the buttocks. He struggled with back towards the road. Storm denied that he was going in Rodriguez until Wilcox and Storm came to help. the house to get a gun.

On cross-examination, Stetson admitted that he told police in his initial statement that Johnson took it upon himself to try to wrestle the gun away from Rodriguez d. Ricky Johnson and was going after Rodriguez when Rodriguez fired. Johnson testified that he was intoxicated, and he did not Rodriguez’s counsel cross-examined Stetson about remember the details of the incident.2 He did not know whether Rodriguez’s gun had been concealed: who had shot him, and he had no memory of anything that happened before he was shot. Rodriguez’s counsel: Now, when you—when you first walked down that driveway and you and Kelly 2 Johnson was placed in a sedated coma for several days [Danaher] came upon Raul, however far away you after the incident. The coma was induced with were from him, I believe you—in—in response to Propofol, which can cause amnesia. questioning from Ms. Logan, you said that—that the clothing that—that Raul had on made it so that you could see his weapon. Is that what you’re saying? Johnson gave a statement 17 days after the shooting, which contained more detail. Johnson admitted that his Stetson: No. I said the way he pulled his gun so quick, statement was based on his own recollection free from he didn’t— outside influences, because he had not talked to other Rodriguez’s counsel: And that’s—this is kind of an witnesses at the time he gave it. In the statement, Johnson important point, and that’s why I’m bringing it up. said that some people appeared to be arguing by the road, and that he remembered a man standing in the road, but Stetson: All right. that he did not see a gun. According to Johnson’s statement, he was “pretty sure” that when he got to the Rodriguez’s counsel: I believe that you said—and end of the driveway, the man said take two more steps correct me if I’m wrong. I believe you said in your and I’ll shoot, and Johnson took two more normal steps. testimony earlier today, when he pulled it straight out, But Johnson also asserted in his statement that he was 20 it was the first that you could see it? or 25 yards from Rodriguez when Rodriguez fired, and Johnson disagreed that the video indicated he was much Stetson: Yeah. closer.

Rodriguez’s counsel: All right. So your—your testimony is that the first time you saw the weapon is when Raul pulled it out and showed it to you? e. Brandon Wilcox Wilcox testified that he walked toward the road when he Stetson: Yeah, showed it to us. heard arguing and learned that someone had a gun. When Wilcox approached the road, he only saw Rodriguez’s flashlight and video camera, and did not know at the time whether Rodriguez had drawn a gun. c. James Storm Storm, Danaher’s father-in-law, testified that around Wilcox knew that others had called the police and midnight, he saw someone standing in the road and believed they were on their way. He saw a flash and a stopped. According to Storm, when Danaher walked up pop, and he ran behind Stetson towards Rodriguez. and started talking to Rodriguez, Rodriguez pulled his Stetson fell down, and Wilcox ended up on top of gun, even though Danaher was not threatening or Rodriguez. Wilcox did not see Johnson charge Rodriguez, aggressive. Storm was “pissed off” when he saw and believed he would have seen it if it happened. Rodriguez draw a gun. Although Rodriguez was saying he was in fear of his life, Storm “didn’t know what he Wilcox did not recall any discussion among the feared.” partygoers about rushing Rodriguez. He testified that when someone on the video recording said, “Brandon, *5 Storm eventually drove up the driveway because he Brandon, don’t do it,” it was probably in response to believed everyone was going to let the police handle the Wilcox’s comment that Rodriguez “need[ed] his ass situation. When he was walking across his porch to the © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

kicked.” that on the night of the party, he was on his porch around ten minutes before midnight and could hear music playing at Storm’s house. Ellis saw Rodriguez leaving his property and shouting “shut it down” towards Storm’s Testimony of officers, investigators, & medical house. According to Ellis, Rodriguez was waving his personnel flashlight and walking angrily up the street. Ellis heard Deputy J. Soto with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office gunshots about 10 or 15 minutes later. testified that he did not smell alcohol on Rodriguez, but Wilcox, who had been holding down Rodriguez, smelled of alcohol and slurred his speech. Deputy Whitlock, who accompanied Deputy Soto, testified that partygoers were b. Terry Hackathorn intoxicated. Hackathorn, who lived with Ellis, testified about her conversation with Rodriguez two months before the Detective J. Brown of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office shooting in which Rodriguez encouraged her to get a testified that Rodriguez had a concealed handgun license, concealed handgun license. She described Rodriguez as although Brown did not recall seeing the license itself. “very self-confident, very assured” and “excited” during When Brown arrived at the scene, Rodriguez “still had a the conversation: nylon holster on his belt.” Brown testified that Rodriguez reported taking ASA, Lisinopril, Norco, Paxil, He had suggested I get hand—a concealed handgun methadone, Effexor, and Xanax, but Brown also testified license. And I told him I didn’t want one. But he told that he did not believe Rodriguez was intoxicated. me it would be my benefit, because if I had a handgun and if I was in public anywhere, then if anybody was, As part of the ensuing investigation, Brown and two other you know, bothering me and if I needed to shoot detectives watched the video recording. Brown testified somebody, that as long as I told the authorities that I that the initial perception of all three detectives was that was in fear for my life and that I needed to defend someone was attacking Rodriguez when Rodriguez myself, and that I believed they had weapons and I dropped the camera and fired. Brown agreed that stood my ground. And so I shot the son of a bitch. Rodriguez’s broken leg constituted serious bodily injury. He testified that some of the partygoers smelled of Prosecutor: And he said that you could “shoot the son alcohol and that some marijuana was found at the party. of a bitch”? He also testified that Danaher’s level of intoxication was “relatively high.” Hackathorn: Yes.

Prosecutor: Did he specifically say to you, to use the *6 Pramod Gumpeni, an assistant medical examiner at the words “in fear of your life”? Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences, performed Danaher’s autopsy. Danaher had two gunshot wounds, Hackathorn: Yes. one to the chest and one to the right leg. Gumpeni concluded, based on the lack of stippling on Danaher’s Prosecutor: And did it surprise you when he said this? skin, that the gun was at least 18 to 24 inches away from Danaher when it was fired, but he admitted that he did not Hackathorn: No. test Danaher’s shirt for stippling or gunpowder residue. 3 Gumpeni testified that Danaher had a blood alcohol Prosecutor: Okay. And why not? content of .21. Hackathorn: Because he always stayed up-to-date on 3 the law changes when it came to owning handguns. According to Gumpeni, stippling results when gunpowder particles contact the skin.

c. Pete Fornols Fornols lived between the Danahers and Rodriguez. On the night of the party, Rodriguez called Fornols three Testimony of neighbors times before 8:00 p.m. Rodriguez asked whether Fornols could hear “all of the loud s__t” and whether Fornols a. Ken Ellis would go with Rodriguez to “put a stop to this s__t” if it Ellis, who lived across the street from Rodriguez, testified kept going on. Rodriguez told Fornols that he “would

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

have [his] back,” but Fornols “did not want to be a part of A. Standard of Review it.” In analyzing a jury-charge issue, our first duty is to decide if error exists. SeeAlmanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 Rodriguez went to Fornols’s house around 8:30 p.m. (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (op. on reh’g); Tottenham v. State, According to Fornols, Rodriguez was “rambling on about 285 S.W.3d 19, 30 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, the noise and that ... if I would go down there with him, pet. ref’d). Only if we find error do we then consider that once again that he would have my back....” Fornols whether an objection to the charge was made and analyze testified that Rodriguez seemed “aggressive. His eyes for harm. Tottenham, 285 S.W.3d at 30; see alsoWarner were bulgy, and he was in a—almost like a frantic stage, v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) like, you know, he was just about to pop.” Fornols (“The failure to preserve jury-charge error is not a bar to testified that Rodriguez had two weapons on him when he appellate review, but rather it establishes the degree of visited at 8:30: one handgun in the front of his pants, and harm necessary for reversal.”). one in the back. They were outside his t-shirt, which was tucked in, and in “plain sight.” “The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends upon whether the error was preserved.” Hutch v. State, 922 Fornols spoke to Rodriguez on the phone again after his S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Error properly 8:30 visit, and Rodriguez was agitated that the police who preserved by a timely objection to the charge will require had responded to the noise complaints “didn’t do s__t. reversal “as long as the error is not harmless.” Almanza, They came out here, they sat and they drove off.” 686 S.W.2d at 171. The Court of Criminal Appeals has Rodriguez returned to Fornols’s house around 10:30 p.m. interpreted this to mean that any harm, regardless of and asked Fornols to call the police to complain about the degree, is sufficient to require reversal. Arline v. State, noise. Fornols placed the call anonymously, only to try to 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). However, calm Rodriguez. when the charging error is not preserved “and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will *7 Rodriguez called Fornols again at 11:13 p.m., 12:01 obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and a.m. and 12:11 a.m., but Fornols did not answer. When created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial Fornols heard three gunshots around 20 minutes after trial’—in short ‘egregious harm.’ ” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d midnight, he looked out his window into Rodriguez’s at 171; seeNava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 backyard to see if he was out there “shooting his gun off (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (egregious harm “is a difficult like he’s done a lot.” standard to meet and requires a showing that the defendants were deprived of a fair and impartial trial.”). Fornols also testified about his interaction with Rodriguez Fundamental errors that result in egregious harm are those on the day before the party. Danaher had come over to which affect “the very basis of the case,” deprive the Fornols’s house to borrow some tools. Rodriguez arrived defendant of a “valuable right,” or “vitally affect his within two minutes after Danaher left and asked Fornols, defensive theory.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172 (citations “What did that cocksucker want?” Fornols said that and quotations omitted). Danaher had borrowed some tools, and Rodriguez responded, “I wouldn’t loan that son of a b__ch sweat off When considering whether a defendant suffered harm, the my balls if he was dying of thirst. He’s one of the son of a reviewing court must consider: (1) the entire jury charge; b__ches that keep us awake at night with loud music.” (2) the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence; (3) the argument of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id. at 171. The reviewing court must conduct this examination of the Discussion record to “illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm Rodriguez argues that the trial court’s guilt-innocence to the accused.” Id. at 174; seeNava, 415 S.W.3d at 298 charge erroneously abrogated his justification defense in (record must disclose “actual rather than theoretical that it included incorrect and confusing instructions harm”). regarding a qualification on self-defense. The State concedes that there was charge error, but argues that the errors did not harm Rodriguez because he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction in the first instance. B. Applicable Law *8 Texas Penal Code Section 9.31(a) provides that a person is justified in using force against another “when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6

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immediately necessary to protect the actor against the pages 10–11instructed the jury to consider whether other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” TEX. Rodriguez provoked Danaher. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (West 2011). Penal Code Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) qualifies this defense. It states that the use of force against another is not justified “if the Rodriguez argues that the trial court’s instructions actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the regarding the “discussion of differences” qualification other person concerning the actor’s differences with the contained multiple errors. Among other things, Rodriguez other person while the actor was carrying a weapon in complains that the trial court incorrectly instructed the violation of Section 46.02.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § jury on irrelevant provisions of Penal Code Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) (West 2011). 46.035, which defines the offense of unlawful carrying of a handgun by a license holder. The State agrees that it was A person violates Section 46.02 of the Penal Code if he error to include the irrelevant provisions of Section intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about 46.035. We agree with the parties that the instructions his person a handgun, illegal knife, or club if the person is regarding the “discussion of differences” qualification not (1) on the person’s own premises or premises under were erroneous. the person’s control; or (2) inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person The instructions appeared on page 9 of the charge. It said: or under the person’s control. SeeTEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02(a) (West Supp.2014). Importantly, You are further instructed, as part of the law of this however, Section 46.02 does not apply to a person who case, and as a qualification of the law on self-defense, “is carrying a concealed handgun and a valid license that the use of force by a defendant against another is issued under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government not justified if the defendant sought an explanation Code, to carry a concealed handgun.” TEX. PENAL from or discussion with the other person concerning the CODE ANN. § 46.15(b)(6) (West Supp.2014). defendant’s differences with the other person while the defendant was failing to conceal the handgun that he was carrying as a concealed handgun license holder, in violation of the law. C. Analysis *9 A person commits an offense if, while the person 1. Errors in the charge was a holder of a license to carry a concealed handgun, The charge spanned 16 pages. The first three pages set the person intentionally failed to conceal the handgun. forth the abstract law of murder and applied the law of murder to the case. The next five pages set forth the A person commits an offense if, while the person was a abstract law on self-defense and deadly force and applied holder of a license to carry a concealed handgun, the this law to the case.”4 Next came three pages of person carried a handgun and was intoxicated. instructions regarding two qualifications on self-defense: the “discussion of differences” qualification and “Handgun” means any firearm that is designed, made, provocation. The balance of the charge contained general or adapted to be fired with one hand. instructions and an extraneous offense instruction. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable 4 One paragraph on page 4 instructed the jury not to doubt that the defendant, Raul Rodriguez, did then and consider whether Rodriguez failed to retreat, noting that there on May 2 nd, 2010, fail to conceal a handgun in one “who has not provoked the person against whom violation of the law stated above, before seeking an deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in explanation from or discussion with the other person criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is concerning the defendant’s differences with the other not required to retreat before using deadly force.” The person, then you will find against the defendant on the parties devote little attention to this instruction, but we issue of self-defense. find it noteworthy insofar as it, implicitly if not explicitly, instructs the jury that Rodriguez did not provoke Danaher and that Rodriguez was not engaged The first paragraph tracks much of Section 9.31(b)(5)(A), in criminal activity at the time he used deadly force but modifies its final clause. The purpose of the against Danaher. This was confusing because later modification was to account for the fact that Rodriguez portions of the charge posed those very questions: page was carrying a handgun “as a concealed handgun license 9 instructed the jury to consider whether Rodriguez holder” to whom Section 46.02 would not apply, provided committed an offense by intentionally failing to conceal the handgun was concealed. SeeTEX. PENAL CODE his handgun or by carrying it while intoxicated, and ANN. § 46.15(b)(6) (noting that section 46.02 does not © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

apply to a person who “is carrying a concealed handgun arguing that the jury could not have been misled in this and a valid license”). The first paragraph ends with the manner because the paragraph refers expressly to May 2, phrase “in violation of the law,” which is superfluous and while the visit to Fornols took place at 8:30 p.m. on May confusing in light of the two paragraphs that follow. 1.

The second and third paragraphs on page 9 are based on The final paragraph on page 9 expressly referred to failing Section 46.035 of the Penal Code, which defines the to conceal a handgun on May 2nd, 2010. Because well- offense of unlawful carrying of a handgun by a license established law requires us to presume, in the absence of holder. The second paragraph is based on subsection (a), evidence to the contrary, that the jury followed the trial while paragraph three was based on subsection (d). court’s instructions, we do not presume that the jury SeeTEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035(a) (“A license wrongly believed that it could convict based on holder commits an offense if the license holder carries a Rodriguez’s failure to conceal his handguns at Fornols’s handgun on or about the license holder’s person under the home at 8:30 p.m. on May 1. Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d authority of Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government 812, 818 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (generally, in the absence Code, and intentionally displays the handgun in plain of evidence to the contrary, appellate court assumes that view of another person in a public place.”), (d) (“A jury followed charge instructions). license holder commits an offense if, while intoxicated, the license holder carries a handgun under the authority of We do, however, conclude that the use of “before” in the Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code, regardless final paragraph on page 9 is, at a minimum, confusing in of whether the handgun is concealed.”) (West light of the use of “while” in the first and second Supp.2014). The inclusion of both paragraphs was error paragraphs. If the jury believed that Rodriguez acted in because, as the State concedes, “[t]he commission of th[e] self-defense, the applicability of Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) offense [of unlawful carrying of a handgun by a license turned on whether Rodriguez’s handgun was concealed holder] ... does not alter one’s ability to invoke the right to from the time he sought the discussion of differences until self defense....”5 It is a violation of Section 46.02, not the moment the jury determined he was justified in using Section 46.035, that may abrogate a self-defense claim. force. Thus, it was critical for the jury to determine w hen SeeTEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(5)(A) during the sequence of events Rodriguez failed to conceal (discussion of differences qualification on self-defense his handgun. applies if the actor was carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02). In short, we agree with the parties that the The charge fell short of making that clear. The first trial court erred in submitting the second and third paragraph instructed the jury to consider whether paragraphs on page 9. Rodriguez sought a discussion of differences while failing to conceal the handgun he was carrying as a concealed 5 Indeed, Section 46.035(h) states that it is a defense to a handgun license holder; the second instructed it to violation of Section 46.035(a) “that the actor, at the consider whether Rodriguez failed to conceal while he time of the offense, displayed the handgun under was a holder of a license to carry a concealed handgun; circumstances in which the actor would have been and the final paragraph instructed it to consider whether justified in the use of force or deadly force under Rodriguez failed to conceal before seeking a discussion of Chapter 9.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035(h) differences. This is far from “the way instructions should (West Supp.2014). be—clear, concise, and to the point.” Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 817, 818 (function of charge is not merely to avoid misleading but to lead and to prevent confusion). *10 Rodriguez argues that the use in the final paragraph on page 9 of the word “before” was also erroneous. Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) applies if the actor sought a discussion of differences “while... carrying a weapon in 2. Did Rodriguez preserve error? violation of Section 46.02.” SeeTEX. PENAL CODE Having found error in the charge, we next consider ANN. § 9.31(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). In light of the preservation. Tottenham, 285 S.W.3d at 30. The record evidence that Rodriguez’s handguns were not concealed reflects that Rodriguez lodged the following objection to when he visited Fornols a few hours before the shooting, page 9: Rodriguez argues that the application paragraph’s use of “before” could have caused the jury to reject Rodriguez’s [B]asically, Judge, I think this is improper comment on self-defense claim based on his failure to conceal his the weight of the evidence. Also, I don’t think the handguns while at Fornols’s home. The State disagrees, evidence supports this charge in this case.

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

Specifically, there’s absolutely no evidence that—or instruction, that’s their decision to make. credible evidence that Raul Rodriguez failed to conceal his firearm or that he was intoxicated. ....

All right. So let me take both of those if I can, one-by- [I]t tracks the original charge instruction. Tracks the one. statute and since there’s some evidence that in our particular case, the defendant has a concealed handgun Failure to conceal a handgun. There was some license. That’s why we clarified it. Because if you just testimony from Pete—Peter Fornols.... And he testified give it to the jury in violation of the law, they need to at some point early in the evening. This is before the be instructed on what that law is. shooting ever occurred or Raul ever went over next door. That Raul Rodriguez had two handguns in plain The trial court then made the following ruling: view. One was in the front center waistband, one was to his back center waistband. Well, I heard the testimony. And Fornols is one thing, statute is another. And he clearly said, “I—first time I And—and so that has no relevance as to the time of the saw it is when he pulled it out.” But anyway, be that as shooting, if Raul was legally carrying a firearm. In it may. He said other things too. other words, at the time of self-defense when he shot the weapon, was he unlawfully displaying a firearm, So, the issue’s been raised and y’all are just going to that would negate that. And so that testimony doesn’t have to argue the fact question. But I think the issue’s really relate to that at all. been raised, so I’m going to allow that. Objection’s overruled. *11 The only other testimony was, Marshall Stetson said something on direct examination about how Raul Error preservation “is not an inflexible concept.” Thomas Rodriguez had a firearm and it was visible. And it was v. State, 408 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). a little unclear what he said. “[A]ll a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he But Bill Stradley cross-examined him. And he clearly wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so said, based on my recollection, that what he meant was, clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time he saw the firearm when Raul Rodriguez had actually when the trial court is in a proper position to do drawn it on Kelly Danaher. And so, therefore, I don’t something about it.” Id. (quoting Lankston v. State, 827 think there’s any credible evidence that Raul—and the S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)). State’s theory has never been that he didn’t conceal the handgun. Here, Rodriguez argued that page 9 should not be submitted to the jury at all, because the evidence did not And so with that, I don’t think there’s evidence that support the submission, and because the instructions supports the instruction. And I also think it’s an constituted an improper comment on the weight of the improper comment on the weight of the evidence. evidence. He argued that the instructions would allow the jury to incorrectly reject his claim of self-defense based The State argued in favor of submitting page 9 as it was on testimony regarding his alleged failure to conceal ultimately submitted: during his visit to Fornols’s house at 8:30 p.m. In Section 931(b), Number 5A, it talks about carrying a The State responded that the charge should include the weapon in violation of the law. In order to explain what violation of law instructions contained in the second and violation of the law is and tracks the statute, that’s third paragraphs. It argued that Pete Fornols’s testimony where we proposed unlawfully carrying a weapon by a to the effect that Rodriguez’s handguns were not concealed handgun license holder. concealed hours before the shooting was at least some evidence that supported submission of the instructions it And the Court, as you know, is required to put an now concedes were erroneous. The trial court agreed with instruction in, if there’s some evidence, whether the State and overruled the objection. Although Rodriguez believable or not. And there was evidence by Marshall did not parse the instruction and detail each of the errors Stetson and by Pete Fornols, that indicated the in it, we conclude that his objection was sufficient to defendant was carrying a weapon that was visible. preserve the error he complains of on appeal. SeeClark v. So if the jury, who is going to be the trier of fact, State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (noting determines that they’re in violation based upon the that issue preserved without having been explicitly stated

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

if “there have been statements or actions on the record benefitted Rodriguez and increased the State’s burden. It that clearly indicate what the judge and opposing counsel argues that the jury could have believed that it must find understood the argument to be”); Lankston, 827 S.W.2d at for Rodriguez on the discussion of differences 909 (in issue-preservation context, there are “no technical qualification unless the State showed that Rodriguez considerations or form of words to be used”); see intentionally failed to conceal and was intoxicated. This is alsoState v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 555 a plausible interpretation of the charge, and it could be the (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (although defendant’s challenge one the jury adopted. While we cannot know how the jury “could have been more clearly presented,” “magic interpreted page 9, we know for certain—and the State language” was not required). concedes—that it was confusing. This is enough to weigh in favor of finding some harm. SeeReeves, 420 S.W.3d at 818 (function of charge is to “prevent confusion”).

3. Were the errors harmless? *12 Because Rodriguez preserved his complaint, we must reverse unless the error is harmless. SeeAlmanza, 686 b. The evidence S.W.2d at 171; see alsoArline, 721 S.W.2d at 351 (any The second Almanza factor likewise weighs in favor of harm, regardless of degree, is sufficient to require finding some harm. Rodriguez conceded that he shot reversal). To gauge harm, we review (1) the entire jury Danaher, and the evidence regarding Rodriguez’s only charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including the defense, self-defense, was conflicting. On the one hand, contested issues and weight of probative evidence; (3) the the partygoers uniformly testified that they never got argument of counsel; and (4) any other relevant close to Rodriguez, emphasizing that they did not cross information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. the center line onto Rodriguez’s side of the street before SeeAlmanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. he began firing. The State also adduced evidence that Rodriguez told Hackathorn that, with the benefit of a concealed handgun license, one could shoot somebody and get away with it by telling the authorities that she was a. The entire charge in fear for her life and needed to defend herself. This Rodriguez argues that the errors on Page 9 harmed him in evidence supported the State’s theory that Rodriguez two ways: (1) paragraphs two and three allowed the jury manufactured his self-defense claim. to conclude that either Rodriguez’s intoxication or his failure to conceal a handgun, alone, would render his use On the other hand, the evidence showed that before of force unjustified; and (2) the erroneous use of “before” Rodriguez first drew his gun, Danaher, at least, had in the final paragraph allowed the jury to conclude that his crossed the center line and approached Rodriguez, that use of force was not justified because he failed to conceal Storm and multiple partygoers threatened Rodriguez with his handguns earlier in the evening, while talking with bodily injury, and that Rodriguez in fact sustained serious Fornols. bodily injury, a broken leg. The evidence also showed that, immediately before Rodriguez fired, Johnson As discussed above, the inclusion of the phrase “in suddenly and loudly charged Rodriguez, with his friends violation of the law” in the first paragraph, followed by following closely behind. Both Johnson and Stetson fell paragraphs two and three, which have no place in the on the side of the street where Rodriguez had been instruction, permitted the jury to find against Rodriguez standing, and the forensic testimony showed that on self-defense if, during the discussion of differences, he Danaher, who was behind Johnson, could have been as either (1) “intentionally failed to conceal” the handgun or close as 18 inches to Rodriguez when he was shot. (2) was intoxicated. The jury heard Rodriguez admit on the video recording that he intentionally drew his handgun *13 Given the conflicting evidence, we conclude that and, thus, “intentionally failed to conceal” it during the conviction was not a foregone conclusion absent the altercation. Under the trial court’s charge, that bare fact charge error, and that this factor supports reversal. See, was sufficient to abrogate Rodriguez’s self-defense claim, e.g.,Burd v. State, 404 S.W.3d 64, 74–75 (Tex.App.– regardless of whether the jury believed Rodriguez was Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)(finding harm sufficient justified in using deadly force. Nothing in the charge to warrant reversal where self-defense was only issue in ameliorated this problem. Indeed, the final paragraph on case, charge contained error regarding self-defense, and page 9 exacerbated it by referring the jury back to the evidence regarding events that led to shooting conflicted). violations of the law “stated above.”

The State contends that the errors on page 9 actually © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

c. Counsel’s argument of the handgun’s concealment, which was erroneously The State began its closing by arguing that Rodriguez addressed in the charge. The third factor thus weighs in believed that his concealed handgun license conferred favor of finding some harm. special privileges and that Rodriguez lied about fearing for his life. The State then told the jury that Rodriguez had no right to self-defense because he armed himself, sought an explanation, and did not retreat: d. Other information in the record We find two jury questions also weigh in favor of finding Then starting on Page 9 of your charge, will be a some harm. During deliberations, the jury asked whether portion that deals with arming yourself and seeking the a holster had been “taken into evidence.” Detective difficulty, or seeking an explanation for the difficulty. Brown had testified that Rodriguez had a holster on his belt at the time of the shooting, and Stetson testified that This is one of the two factors that you find in this Rodriguez drew his gun from a holster. However, Fornols charge that takes away this defendant’s right to self- testified that, when Rodriguez visited him four hours defense. Because he armed himself, because he went earlier, Rodriguez’s two guns were in his waistband, and down the road to seek an explanation, because he did did not mention a holster. The question suggests that the not abandon his efforts to get an answer out of Kelly jury reached and was focused on the issue of Danaher, he has no right to self-defense. concealment.

The State thus advanced an incorrect, or at least *14 The jury also asked to see Rodriguez’s medical incomplete, argument regarding the limitations on records. Rodriguez argues that this demonstrates the jury Rodriguez’s claim of self-defense. This argument also was focused on the question of his intoxication, an issue contradicted the instruction on page 4 to the effect that the wrongly submitted in the third paragraph of page 9. The jury should not consider Rodriguez’s failure to retreat. State points out that the jury may have wanted the records to verify Rodriguez’s claimed disability. We cannot and Defense counsel argued in closing that the handgun was need not discern the reason for the jury’s inquiry; it is not visible before Rodriguez drew it. He said: “There’s enough that the jury asked for evidence that related to the absolutely no credible evidence in this case that erroneous intoxication instruction. See, e.g.,Villarreal v. [Rodriguez] walked over there with a gun on his hip that State, 205 S.W.3d 103, 110 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2006, people saw and then he pulled it on Kelly Danaher.... Raul pet. dism’d) (jury note was evidence that jury considered Rodriguez is in the street and everything he’s done is erroneous instruction and supported finding of egregious legal. It’s a public road. He has his gun concealed. He has harm). a concealed handgun license.” Although all of the Almanza factors point toward the Following the defense closing, the State again argued the conclusion that the charge errors harmed Rodriguez, the issue of concealment: State argues for the first time on appeal that Rodriguez was not entitled to a self-defense instruction at all. They brought up the fact that Marshall Stetson made Therefore, the State’s argument goes, the errors in the comments during closing—or excuse me, on cross, that qualification instructions could not have caused harm. he couldn’t see a weapon. Well, you’ll remember on Specifically, the State contends: (1) Rodriguez does not direct, Donna asked him, “He pulled it straight out. It’s dispute that he sought a discussion of differences while the first time I seen it in his hand.” “Could you tell carrying a weapon; and (2) there is no evidence that whether it was one of those holsters that goes inside Rodriguez was carrying a concealed handgun or a your pants, on the outside or the inside?” “It was on the concealed handgun license as provided by Section outside.” 46.15(b)(6); therefore, Section 9.31(b)(5)(A) conclusively applied to prohibit submission of self-defense. We know from the evidence that he didn’t pull his shirt back. We know that he pulled the gun right out. We The State’s argument raises the question of whether it was know that right there, use your common sense, he Rodriguez’s burden to raise evidence demonstrating that didn’t go down there with a jacket on in May. He went Section 46.15(b)(6) applied. While it is well-settled that a down there as a person who knew exactly what he was defendant bears the burden of adducing some evidence to going to do. raise a defense, see, e.g.,Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.2003), few cases address the burden In short, the State, in closing, misstated the law regarding to adduce evidence to raise an exception to a qualification the qualification on self-defense and highlighted the issue of a defense such as Section 46.15(b)(6). © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11

Rodriguez v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2014) 2014 WL 7205226

In post-submission briefing, the parties pointed us to 6 The State also relies upon Davis v. State, 276 S.W.3d Barron v. State, No. 05–08–00637–CR, 2010 WL 491 (Tex.App.–Waco 2008, pet. ref’d), and Williams v. 1294078 (Tex.App.–Dallas Apr. 6, 2010, pet. ref’d). In State, 35 S.W.3d 783 (Tex.App.–Beaumont 2001, pet. Barron, the court of appeals held that the trial court ref’d), to support its argument that self-defense should properly denied a self-defense instruction. Barron, 2010 not have been submitted. But these cases, like Barron, WL 1294078, at *3. But in Barron, the evidence are inapposite, because in each, the State proved as a established as a matter of law that Barron sought an matter of law that the defendant could not lawfully explanation or discussion of differences with the carry a gun. complainant while illegally carrying a handgun; there was “no evidence presented at trial to establish that [Barron] qualified for the traveling exception or that he held a *15 In sum, the trial court’s erroneous charge caused license to carry the handgun used in the shooting.” Id. Rodriguez some harm because Rodriguez conceded that Thus, the court concluded that there was no fact issue he shot Danaher, and his claim of self-defense was thus raised regarding Section 9.31(b)(5)(A); Barron was not the focus of, and, indeed, “the very basis of the case.” justified in using force as a matter of law. Id. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172. The errors were not cured by other instructions or closing argument, the evidence on This case is different. First, the State introduced self-defense was conflicting, closing argument Rodriguez’s concealed handgun license records and highlighted the issues addressed in the erroneous emphasized to the jury that Rodriguez was a concealed instructions, and questions from the jury demonstrated handgun license holder. Second, the State adduced that it focused on the erroneous instructions during evidence regarding whether Rodriguez’s gun was deliberations. SeeAlmanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see concealed. This mattered only if Rodriguez was licensed alsoArline, 721 S.W.2d at 351 (any harm, regardless of to carry the gun and the jury was being asked to decide degree, is sufficient to require reversal). whether the handgun was properly concealed. Third, the State proposed the jury instruction incorporating the We sustain Rodriguez’s first issue. Because we have Section 46.15(b)(6) exception, and the trial court obliged. found that the guilt-innocence charge error regarding the Rodriguez could have and would have tried the case discussion of differences qualification on self-defense differently (i.e., by offering additional evidence to raise warrants reversal, we need not consider Rodriguez’s Section 46.15(b)(6)) if the State had not conducted itself remaining issues. as if it agreed that a fact issue concerning Section 46.15(b)(6) had been raised. Because the State conducted itself as it did, it is estopped from reversing course now. See, e.g.,Reed v. State, 14 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex.App.– Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (where State Conclusion requested defendant undergo psychiatric examination, We conclude that the charge error related to self-defense, State was estopped from claiming on appeal that there Rodriguez’s sole defense, was not harmless. Therefore, was no evidence to show a bona fide doubt as to we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for defendant’s competence). We therefore reject the State’s a new trial. argument that Rodriguez suffered no harm because he was not entitled to a self-defense instruction in the first instance.6 See id. End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.