Gilder, Craig Anthony

PD-0975-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 8/31/2015 10:32:20 AM Accepted 9/1/2015 11:48:49 AM PD-0975-15 ABEL ACOSTA CLERK IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS

__________________________________________________________________

CRAIG ANTHONY GILDER

Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee ________________________________________________________________

Petition for Discretionary Review from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals No. 14-14-00523-CR, affirming the conviction of Cause No. 1388541 177th District Court of Harris County, Texas Honorable Ryan Patrick, Judge Presiding

__________________________________________________________________

ALEXANDER BUNIN Chief Public Defender, Harris County, Texas ________________________ MELISSA MARTIN Assistant Public Defender Harris County, Texas TBN. 24002532 1310 Prairie, Suite 980 Houston, TX 77002 Phone: (713)274-6709 September 1, 2015 Fax: (713)437-4319 melissa.martin@pdo.hctx.net

Attorney for Appellant

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT: Craig Anthony Gilder SPN# 00291119 1200 Baker Houston, TX 77002

TRIAL PROSECUTOR: Nathan P. Hennigan Assistant District Attorney Harris County Texas 1201 Franklin St, 6th Floor Houston, TX 77002

DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL: Anthony Balderas, Jr. Attorney at Law 10701 Corporate Dr Ste 185 Houston, TX 77002

COUNSEL ON APPEAL FOR APPELLANT: Melissa Martin Assistant Public Defender Harris County TX 1201 Franklin St, 13th Floor Houston, TX 77002 melissa.martin@pdo.hctx.net

PRESIDING JUDGE: Hon. Ryan Patrick 177th District Court Harris County, TX 1201 Franklin St, 19th Floor Houston, TX 77002

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ...................................................................................ii TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY .............................................................................. 1 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 1

GROUND FOR REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 1 The Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s conviction. Gilder v. State, __S.W.3d __ , 2015 WL 3917924, 14-14-00523- CR. Mr. Gilder contends that this Court did not intend, its holding in Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4 (2014) to abrogate the intermediate court’s holding in Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 2012, pet ref’d.) Rather, appellant argues that Thomas is explicitly limited to its facts and the court of appeals incorrectly extended the reach of this Court’s holding to include both Green and Gilder. This Court should review Gilder in order to clarify its position regarding the requirements set out in Art. 62.055(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

ARGUMENT

A. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 2

B. ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 4

C. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 7 PRAYER .................................................................................................................................... 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 8 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................................. 9

APPENDIX iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Gilder v. State, __S.W.3d __ , 2015 WL 3917924, 14-14-00523-CR ..................................... 1, 3, 7 Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 2012, pet ref’d.) ......... 1, 3, 7 Thomas v. State, 411 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2014, pet. granted) ............................ 1 Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4 (2014) .................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 7 Thomas v. State, 454 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2014, pet ref’d) .................................. 4 Statutes Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.055(a) ...........................................................................................2, 7

iv

Statement of the Case

On June 26, 2014 Craig Gilder was convicted by a jury of failure to comply with a sex-offender registration requirement and sentenced to seven years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (C.R. at 9, 88, and 92). Notice of appeal was filed June 26, 2014.

Statement of Procedural History

Appellant’s brief was filed on January 6, 2015, and his reply to the state’s brief was filed on March 17, 2015. The First Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on June 25, 2015. No motion for rehearing was filed.

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

Appellant requests oral argument in this matter because there appears to be some ambiguity as to this Court’s intention in reversing Thomas v. State, 411 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2014, pet. granted)(hereafter, Thomas 1). Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4 (2014)(hereafter, Thomas 2). Argument could be helpful in resolving the confusion.

Ground for Review

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s conviction. Gilder v. State, __S.W.3d __ , 2015 WL 3917924, 14-14-00523-CR. Mr. Gilder contends that this Court did not intend, its holding in Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4 (2014) to abrogate the intermediate court’s holding in Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 2012, pet ref’d.) Rather, appellant argues that Thomas is explicitly limited to *2 its facts and the court of appeals incorrectly extended the reach of this Court’s holding to include both Green and Gilder. This Court should review Gilder in order to clarify its position regarding the requirements set out in Art. 62.055(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Argument A. Background

The indictment in this case charged “[appellant] did then and there unlawfully, while a person with a reportable conviction for the offense of sexual assault, and while subjection to registration under the Texas sex offender registration program, and while intending to change his residential address, intentionally and knowingly fail[ed] to timely provide in person [his] anticipated move date and new address…at least seven days before the defendant (sic) change of address” (C.R. at 9).

Art. 62.055(a) provides two ways to comply with its requirements:

(a) If a person required to register under this chapter intends to change address, regardless of whether the person intends to move to another state, the person shall, not later than the seventh day before the intended change, report in person to the local law enforcement authority designated as the person’s primary registration authority … and provide the authority … with the person’s anticipated move date and new address. If a person required to register changes address, the person shall, not later than the later of seven days after changing the address or the first date the applicable local law enforcement authority, by policy, allows the person to report, shall report in person to the local law enforcement authority in the municipality or county in which the person’s new residence is located and provide the authority with proof of identity and proof of residence.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art 62.055(a).

The state chose to indict Mr. Gilder only for failing to comply with the first way. The state proved up a violation of the other way, which it did not plead. The Green court, under the same scenario, found a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof and acquitted Green on the basis of insufficient evidence that Green had ever intended to move to an anticipated address. Green, 350 S.W.3d at 6241.

The state in Thomas, like in Green and Gilder, had alleged only the violation of the first means of complying with Art. 65.055(a). This Court followed the same steps the court of appeals took in analyzing Green:

In this case … the indictment was not as broad as authorized by law because the State alleged a specific manner and means. As a result of specifying a specific statutory manner and means in the indictment, the “law as authorized by the indictment” in this case allowed the jury to convict Appellant only if he failed to report a change in address “not later that the seventh day before the intended change.” Thus, the hypothetically correct jury charge in this case was one that authorized a jury to convict Appellant only if (1) he was required to register as a sex offender, and (2) he failed to report an anticipated change of address seven days before the intended change.

Id at 10 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original); Green, S.W.3d 620.

This Court decided the evidence in Thomas was legally sufficient and remanded to the court of appeals to consider whether the application paragraph permitting the jury to consider both manners and means of violating the requirements caused Thomas

1This opinion in Green, supra, was issued on remand to the court of appeals by this Court’s opinion on review of the State’s petition asking for review in light of Brooks v. State, which abolished factual sufficiency. The court of appeals, in the first appeal, had found the evidence factually insufficient to support the conviction. Green, 350 S.W.3d at 620.

egregious harm. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 11. On remand, the court of appeals found egregious harm; this Court refused the state’s petition for review. Thomas v. State, 454 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2014, pet ref’d)(hereafter Thomas 3). B. Analysis

In Thomas 2, this Court found the jurors, as the sole judges of credibility, were entitled to believe all or some of the testimony from the arresting officer and the defendant and to infer from their testimony that Thomas had intended to move to the address he did, in fact, move to and then failed to report the move seven days prior to moving. The jury found, however, that the date alleged in the indictment was not the correct date. This Court found that the “on or about” language in the indictment was sufficient to find the state’s evidence legally sufficient to convict. Thomas 2, 444 S.W.3d at 10-11.

Thomas reported he lived at 1900 South Green Street, apartment 210, when he registered as a sex offender with the Longview authorities. An officer contacted the manager of the apartment building to inform her that a registered sex offender was living at the address; she asked that a criminal-trespass warrant be issued to Thomas. On April 3, 2012, officers delivered the warrant to him at the South Green Street address. At that time the apartment manager warned Thomas’s girlfriend’s daughter, the leaseholder, that she would be evicted if Thomas continued living there. Thomas 2, 444 S.W.3d at 6.

Officers arrested Thomas at that time for outstanding warrants. When he was booked into the jail, he listed his address at 1703 Houston Street. On June 13, an officer contacted Officer Brownlee, to inform him that Thomas was apparently living at an address different from the one he listed for the sex-offender registry. Brownlee testified that on June 25, 2012 he checked with the apartment manager to find out if Thomas was still at the South Green Street address; she told him he was not. Brownlee testified he then went to the Houston Street address, where he found Thomas. Id.

According to Brownlee, Thomas told him he was living at the Houston Street home and that he had called the authorities to notify them of the address change. Since the address change was required to be made in person and because the South Green was still his registered address, Brownlee arrested him on failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. Id.

Thomas testified that he had lied about living at Houston Street and that he had been living at South Green Street even after Brownlee encountered him at the Houston address; he stated he had lied about being at South Green Street to protect his girlfriend’s daughter from being evicted. Id at 7.

This majority opinion (five to four) concluded that on this evidence, the jurors could have believed Brownlee’s testimony that Thomas had told him he was living at Houston Street. The jurors had also been entitled to disbelieve the part of Thomas’s testimony where he claimed he had lied about Houston Street. From that evidence jurors could have properly inferred his intent to live at Houston Street. Id. This makes *6 sense, because Thomas reported living at Houston Street to the jail on April 3, 2012 and was actually found there on June 25, 2012—he had another place to go at least as early as April 3, 2012.

These facts are quite different from those in Mr. Green’s and Mr. Gilder’s cases. In neither of those cases did the defendants testify and there was no evidence that they told anyone they had another address at the time they moved.

In Mr. Gilder’s case, the testifying officer explained the reporting requirements as they were told to registrants—incorrectly--stating that all moves had to be reported seven days before the move. The apartment manager testified she had not known Mr. Gilder had been living in his mother’s apartment until August 2012, when neighbors began to complain (4 R.R. at 50). She also testified had not seen Mr. Gilder after the criminal-trespass warrant was issued on August 13, but she had never seen him leave (4 R.R. at 50-51). She could not say when Mr. Gilder’s mother actually vacated the apartment complex, due to upcoming renovations to the complex (4 R.R. at 45 and 47).

The state offered no evidence as to where the arresting officer found Mr. Gilder after he had determined no one was living at the apartment on the day he checked on Mr. Gilder. There is nothing from which the jurors could have inferred Mr. Gilder’s intent to move prior to having done so or his having had an anticipated address to move to. There is no evidence about the date he moved. There is no evidence he had even had an address when he was arrested.

Conclusion

In Thomas, this Court made clear that the second part of 65.055(a) is a separate manner and means from the first one and that having pleaded only the first one, the state has limited itself to convicting on evidence of that only that manner and means. As further evidence the Court considers the statute provides two manners and means, the Court stated the Thomas jury should not have been permitted to consider the second manner and means included in the charge, leaving only the harm for the court of appeals to consider on remand.

The majority opinion by this Court in Thomas makes no mention of the Green case, which it refused to review on the state’s petition. The Thomas Court carefully laid out the factual bases from which the jurors could infer Thomas’s intent to move to an anticipated address. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate the Court was making a blanket statement that simply showing someone moved creates a permissible inference that he violated the first manner and means of the statute. The dissent by Justice Cochran, joined by Justices Price and Johnson, and with which Justice Womack concurred, discusses Green, yet the majority does not state an intent to abrogate that decision.

Prayer

Mr. Gilder asks this Court to review the court of appeals decision in Gilder v. State (attached as an Appendix) by allowing him to fully brief the issue, with argument, and ultimately remand to the court of appeals for appropriate action.

Respectfully Submitted,

ALEXANDER BUNIN Harris County Public Defender

/s/ Melissa Martin ______________________________ MELISSA MARTIN Assistant Public Defender 1201 Franklin, 13th Floor Houston, TX 77002 Phone 713-274-6709 Fax 713-437-4319 Texas Bar No. 24002532 melissa.martin@pdo.hctx.net

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review was eserved to Alan Curry, Assistant District Attorney, Harris County Texas and to the State Prosecuting Attorney.

/s/Melissa Martin _______________________________ MELISSA MARTIN

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to proposed Rule 9.4(i)(3), undersigned counsel certifies that this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(e)(i). 1. Exclusive of the portions exempted by Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4 (i)(1), this brief contains 1,909 words printed in a proportionally spaced typeface. 2. This brief is printed in a proportionally spaced, serif typeface using Garamond 14 point font in text and Garamond 12 point font in footnotes produced by Microsoft Word software. 3. Upon request, undersigned counsel will provide an electronic version of this brief and/or a copy of the word printout to the Court. 4. Undersigned counsel understands that a material misrepresentation in completing this certificate, or circumvention of the type-volume limits in Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(j), may result in the Court's striking this brief and imposing sanctions against the person who signed it.

/s/ Melissa Martin ____________________________ MELISSA MARTIN

Gilder v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2015)

conducted compliance check. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 62 .102(a). 2015 WL 3917924

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

Cases that ci tc this headnote NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN

RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE [2] Mental Health PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, Offenses and prosecutions IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. When the indictment alleges that a defendant "intentionally and knowingly" failed to comply Court of Appeals of Texas,

with a requirement of the sex-offender Houston (14th Dist.).

registration program, the appellate court reviews Craig Anthony Gilder, Appellant the record for evidence that the defendant's v. failure was intentional or knowing.

The State of Texas, Appellee Cases that cite this headnote

NO. 14-14-00523-CR Opinion filed June 25, 2015 [3] Criminal Law Circumstantial Evidence Synopsis Criminal Law Background: Defendant was convicted in the 177th District Relative strength of circumstantial and Court, Harris County, of failure to comply with sex offender direct evidence registration requirements, based on his failure to report Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct intended move to new residence within seven days of move. evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and Defendant appealed. circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.

IHolding:] The Court of Appeals, Martha Hill Jamison, 1., Cases that cite this headnote held that evidence was sufficient to support conviction. 14] Criminal Law Elements of offenses in general Affirmed. Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence.

West Headnotes (5) Cases that cite this headnote

11] Mental Health [5] Criminal Law Offenses and proseclltions "" Intent Evidence was sufficient to support finding that Criminal Law defendant's failure to report intended move Elements of offenses to new address within seven days of move Intent may be determined from a defendant's was intentional and knowing, as required to words, acts, and conduct, and is a matter of fact support conviction for failure to comply with to be determined from all of the circumstances. sex offender registration requirements; officer conducted compliance check at apartment at Cases that cite this headnote address that defendant had registered, apartment was vacant due to renovation, and it had been vacant for five months when police officer APPENDIX

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required vouchers issued by the Department of Housing and On Appeal from the 177th District Court, Harris County, Urban Development to be issued as a condition of residence. Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1388541 In order to comply with federal regulations, the apartment complex underwent renovation beginning in November 2012. Attorneys and Law Firms The renovation was completed in January 2014. Jenkins Melissa Martin, for Craig Anthony Gilder. testified that appellant was never a legal resident at the apartment complex, but his mother lived in apartment number Devon Anderson, Clinton Morgan, for the State of Texas. 2 until she had to relocate due to the renovation. Jenkins testified that appellant was living in the apartment illegally. Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and She explained that because the housing was subsidized, Busby. appellant's mother could only have an overnight guest for a period of 30 days. After the 30- day period, appellant was required to move. On August 13, 2012, a trespass warning OPINION was issued to appellant because he was living at the apartment illegally. Martha Hill Jamison, Justice

*1 Appellant Craig Anthony Gilder appeals his conviction The jury found appellant guilty of failure to comply with for failure to comply with a sex-offender registration sex-offender registration and assessed punishment at seven requirement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102 years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas (West Supp.20 14). In a single issue, he contends the evidence Department of Criminal Justice. is legally insufficient to support his conviction because no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense with the requisite SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE culpable mental state. We affirm. II] In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant argues the State did not prove he intentionally or knowingly BACKGROUND failed to comply with the requirement that he report in In 1988, appellant was convicted of sexual assault, which person to the appropriate authority and provide the authority subjected him to registration as a sex offender under with appellant's anticipated move date and new address at article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. least seven days prior to an anticipated change of address. Officer C.R. Black of the Houston Police Department Sexual Appellant challenges the State's proof that appellant intended Compliance Unit testified that by being subject to sex­ to change his address. offender registration, appellant was required to register once a year. On May 14, 20l3, at 10:30 in the morning, *2 In a sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the Black conducted a compliance check at appellant's registered light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any address, 7601 Curry Rd. , No . 2. Appellant had registered this rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements address on July 24, 2012 . The apartment appellant had listed of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . Salinas v. State, as his residence was vacant; the apartment manager informed 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tcx.Crim.App .2005) . The jury, as Black that the apartment complex was being renovated, which the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, is free to is why the apartment was vacant. A Sex Offender Compliance believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony. Jones Report that was admitted into evidence at trial recites that this v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). The apartment was vacated on January 3, 2013. After finding the jury reasonably may infer facts from the evidence presented, apartment vacant, Black determined that appellant was not credit the witnesses it chooses to credit, disbelieve any or registered at any other address in the State of Texas or the all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the United States, and he was not in custody. evidence as it sees fit. Sharp v. Slate, 707 S. W.2d 611, 614 (Tex .Crim .App. 1986). Reconciliation of conflicts in the Andrea Jenkins, the apartment manager at 7601 Curry Rd., evidence is within the jury's discretion . Losada v. State, testified that the property was federally subsidized and 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex.Crim.App .1986). An appellate

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court may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of of the seventh day after changing the address or the first date the evidence produced at trial or substitute its judgment the applicable authority by policy allows the person to report, for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 and fails to provide the authority with proof of identity and (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence are proof of residence ("Failing to Report an Actual Move"). See resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S. W.3d Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.055(a); Thomas v. State, 394,406 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We do not engage in a second 444 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2014). Although there was evaluation of the weight and credibility of the evidence, but evidence that would support a conviction of appellant based only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. on Failing to Report an Actual Move, appellant was charged State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). only with intentionally and knowingly Failing to Report an Intended Move. [21 [31 141 [51 When the indictment alleges that a defendant "intentionally and knowingly" failed to comply *3 An individual acts intentionally, or with intent, with with a requirement of the sex-offender registration program, respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his as in the present case, we review the record for evidence conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage the defendant's failure was intentional or knowing. See in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § Tatum v. State, 431 S.\V.3d 839, 841 (Tex.App.-·Houston 6.03(a) (West 2013). An individual acts knowingly, or with [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. refd). "Circumstantial evidence is as knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. ld. to establish guilt." Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, § 6.03(b). An individual acts knowingly, or with knowledge, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.20 II). Proof of a culpable mental state with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that generally relies on circumstantial evidence. Lane v. State, 763 his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. ld. S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex.Crim .App.1989) ("Establishment of culpable mental states is almost invariably grounded upon Appellant argues the State did not prove that he intended to inferences to be drawn by the factfinder from the attendant move to a known new address; therefore, appellant claims circumstances ."); see also Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, the evidence is insufficient to support appellant's conviction 833 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no peL). Intent based on Failing to Report an Intended Move. Appellant may be determined from a defendant's words, acts, and cites this court's opinion in Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617, conduct, and "is a matter of fact to be determined from all 630-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. refd), in of the circumstances." Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 support of his argument. In Green, the defendant, similar to (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also Kelley v. State, 429 S.W.3d appellant in this case, was charged only with intentionally and 865,872 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.12014, pet. refd). knowingly Failing to Report an Intended Move. ld. at 631. Green lived in Texas, but worked in Arizona for extended Texas Code of Criminal Procedure mtic\e 62 . 102(a) states periods of time. ld. at 633. Green's wife testified that while that a person commits an offense if the person is required to Green was working in Arizona, she moved to another address register and fails to comply with any requirement of Chapter in Texas without telling Green, and took his possessions 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Sex with her. ld. Under the legal-sufficiency standard of review, Offender Registration Program." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. this court presumed that the jury did not believe the wife's art. 62.1 02(a). There are two alternative manners and means testimony, which indicated that appellant had no intent to of violating the requirement contained in Texas Code of change his address that would require him to report his Criminal Procedure section 62.055(a): (1) a person required anticipated move date and new address. ld. Nonetheless, this to register intends to change address and fails to report in court concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to person, not later than the seventh day before the intended support a finding that appellant ever had an intent to change change, to the applicable authorities and to provide then with his address that triggered a duty to report under 62.055(a). the person's anticipated move date and new address ("Failing Jd. This court found the evidence legally insufficient despite to Report an Intended Move"); and (2) a person required to evidence that, more than two weeks after the move, appellant register changes address and fails to report in person to the reported to the applicable authority that he had moved from applicable authority in the municipality or county in which the prior address and was currently living at a different the person's new residence is located, not later than the later address. See id. at 619 (plurality op.); id. at 632-33 (majority

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Gilder v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2015)

op.). In concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient, this court noted as follows: *4 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, concluding that the evidence was legally sufficient There are various ways that a person's to support Thomas's conviction based on Failing to Report an belongings can be moved out of a Intended Move. See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 6. The high court residence in the absence of that person concluded that, because there was evidence that appellant intending to move. The testimony of was living at a new address as of June 25, 2012, the jury Guthrie and Graham that appellant reasonably could have concluded that Thomas intended to had moved out of the 602 Highland change address on June 25, 2012, and that he violated article Avenue residence on or about April 62.055(a) by failing to report this intended address change on 15,2007, is not evidence that appeUant or before June 18, 2012. See id. at 10-· 11. In so holding, the had an intent to move out during this Thomas court effectively abrogated the part of Green in which time that he failed to report at least this court concluded that evidence the defendant was living seven days before the date of the at a different address at some point in time did not, by itself, intended move . justify a reasonable inference that the defendant ever had an intent to change his address that he failed to report not later /d. at 633. than the seventh day before the date of the intended address change. Compare Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10·- 11, with Green In Thomas v. Slate. the defendant registered the address 350 S.W.3d at 633. of an apartment leased by the daughter of his girlfriend. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 6. After a police officer contacted In the case under review, Officer Black testified that appellant the property manager to ask if she was aware that Thomas registered 7601 Curry Rd., No.2 as his address on July 24, lived on the premises, the manager requested that local police 2012. On May 14, 2013, that apartment was vacant. The officers issue a criminal trespass warning. /d. Ultimately, evidence is sufficient to support a finding that appellant was Thomas was given a trespass warning and arrested on other living at a new address as of January 3, 2013. Under Thomas, outstanding warrants. ld. When he was booked into the county because there was evidence that appellant was living at a new jail, Thomas gave an address different than his registered address as of January 3, 2013, the jury reasonably could have address. /d. On June 25, 2012, after Thomas was released, a concluded that appellant intended to change address on this police officer went to this address and found Thomas there. date and that he violated article 62.055(a) by failing to report ld. Thomas told the officer that he was living there and that this intended address change on or before December 27,2012. he had updated his sex-offender registration address by a See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10 - 11. Under this precedent, telephone call. ld. As in Green and the case under review, the the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant's defendant (Thomas) was charged only with Failing to Report conviction based on Failing to Report an Intended Move. See an Intended Move. /d. at 10. Thomas appealed his conviction, id. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole issue on appea\. and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the State did not prove that Thomas intended to change his address and that We affirm the trial court's judgment. the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Thomas intentionally or knowingly failed to register an intended change of address seven days before the intended change. All Citations Thomas v. Slate, 411 S.W.3d 685,693 (Tex.App.--Texarkana --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 3917924 2013), rev'd 444 S.W.3d 4, 6 (Tcx.Crim.App.20 14).

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