Byron Walker v. Sheryl Walker

32591 . Filedl 10»'5/2015 12:01;07 PM Young County - Disin'ci C|erk Jamie Freeze Land ' Distfici Cierk Yoiing Coiinty, Texas Teresa Ki|patn`ck CAUSE NO. 32591 IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT BYRON WALKER ' AND _ 90TH JUDICIAL DISTRIC'I` SHERYL WALKER AND IN 'I`HE INTEREST OF C.L.W., A CHILD_ QMW>W°OMCMWW¢O¢GM Y()UNG COUNTY, TEXAS BYRON WALKER’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Byron Walker (“Byron”) files this Motion for New Trial. In Support of this Motion, Byron shows the following: I. PRoCEi)URAL HisTORY l. Bryon filed his Bill of Review on March lO, 2015, alleging that he lacked legal remedy due to Sheryl Walker’s (“Sheryl”) improper withholding of discovery documents and her, and her family’s, threats to Byron. 2. Sheryl Walker filed her Original Answer on April 14, 20]5. On April 28, 2015, Sheryl filed her First Amended Answer simultaneously With her Motion for Summary Judgment. 3. On May 12, 2015, Byron served Sheryl With Requests for Disclosure, Reqiiests for Production, Requests for Admission, and lnterrogatories. On May 20, 2015, Byron filed a l\/lotion for Continuance for the hearing `on Sheryl’s Moti`on for Summary Judgment because he needed the discovery responses to adequately respond to the Motion for Sumrnary Judgment. Thereafter, Bryon filed his Response to Sheryl’s l\/lotion for Summary Judgrnent and Objections to Sheryl’s Surnrna.ry Judgrnent Evidence. 4. On May 29, 2015, the Court heard Byron’s Motion for Continuance, Object`ions to Sheryl’s Sumrnaxy Judgrnerit Evidence and Sheryl’s Motiori for Sun'irnary Judgment. The ' BYRON WALKER’S MoTioiv FOR Ni-:w TRIAL PAGE l or 6 Court ordered that Sheryl did not need to respond to any written discovery until thirty (30) days after a ruling on her Motion for Summary ludgment. On September 9, 2015, the Court granted Sheryl‘s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Byron’s Motion for a Continuance. Additiorially, the Court signed an order denying all of Byron’s objections to Sheryl’s Surnmary Judgment Evidence. n Il. MoTioN FoR Ni~;w TRiAL ii 5. A Court may grant a new trial and set the judgment as§ide for good cause. TEX. R, Civ. P. 32i). Byron has good cause to seek a new trial because the: Court erred-in denying his Motion for Coritinuance and granting Sheryl’s Summary Judgment. i A. The Court Erred in Denying Byron’s Motion for Continuance 6. When a party files a motion for summary judgn"i:ent shortly after the filing instituting the proceeding, the trial court should grant a motion for ccintinuance if requested See, e.g., Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Ci'i'nic, P.A.,' 902 S.W.Zd 508, 51;2 (Tex. App.~Houston [lSt Dist.] 1994, no writ) (trial court abused its discretion by not granting a continuance when motion for summary judgment was filed within three months of Plaintiff" instituting lawsuit and before Defendant responded to discovery); Verkz'n v. Southwest Ctr. One, Li‘d._. 784 S.W.Zd 92, 96 ('l`ex. App._Houston [lst Dist. 1989, writ denied) (Defendant’s motion for continuance should have been granted because Plairitiff filed for summary judgment 50 days after filing lawsuit and before Defendant responded to discovery)4 7. Sheryl filed her Motion for Summary Judgment on _'April 28, 2015-just over a month after Bryon initiated the proceeding Byron served Sheryl with written discovery on May 12, 2015 and filed his Motiori for Continuance on May 20, 2015. Tliis Court’s ruling on Byron’s Motion for a Continuance was an abuse of discretion because it prevented Byrori from BYRON WALKER’S MoTio:v FoR NEW TRI,`L PAGE 2 OF 6 adequately responding to Sheryl’s Motion for Summary Judgmerit. It prevented him from securing evidence of his claims Theref`ore, the Court should gran:t Byron’s Motion for New Trial and vacate the summary judgmentl B. The Court Erred in Overruling Byron’s Objections to Sheryl’s Summary Judgment Evidenee 8. Bryon made several objections to Sheryl’s Summary Judgment evidence, which the Court overruled The objections and the Court’s order on them are attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Court erred in overruling these objections and should not have considered this evidence in granting summary judgment Therefore, the Court should vacate the summary judgment and grant a new trial. C. The Court Erred in Granting Sheryi’s Motion for Summary Judgment 9. Under the traditional summary judgment Standard, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist and she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. Clv. P. loda(c); Nixon v_. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.Zd 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). The non-movant in a traditional summary judgment proceeding is not required to produce summary judgment evidence until after the movant establishes she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Casso v. Bland, 776 S.W.Zd 551, 556 (Tex. 1989). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment, the Court presumes all evidence favorable to the non-movant is true. Limestorie Prods. Di`strr`b., Inc. v. McNamara, 7l S.W.Bd 308, 3ll (Tex. 2002). The Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of him. Id. l{). Sheryl failed to meet her burden to prove that as a matter of law Byron is precluded from succeeding on his Bill of Review by not filing an untimely, amended motion for Rvnnni Wnl.mrn’§ MnTrnN wm Nr_w Tm.\i PAr:ir__'\nFG new trial. To file a bill of review, a petitioner is required to exhaust all adequate legal remedies See Ti`ce v. Ci`ty of Pasadena, 767 S.W.Zd 700, 702 (Tex. 1989). An amended motion for new trial is only timely, and may be filed without leave of court, before any preceding motion for new trial is overruled and within thirty days after the court signs the judgment TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(b). l-Iowever, Byron did not discover the missing discovery documents until past the deadline to file a motion for new trial. Thus, his failure to file an untimely motion for new trial is not a failure to exhaust adequate legal remedies, and the Court should have denied summary judgment on this ground Therefore, the Court should vacate the summary judgment and grant this Motion for New Trial. ll. Sheryl failed to meet her burden to prove that the fraud alleged in Byron’s Bill of Review was intrinsic, rather than extrinsic naud. _A party’s misrepresentation coupled with threats “does, in fact, constitute extrinsic fraud.” See Hester v. Prickett, No. 03-11*00677-€\/, 2012 WL 3252721 at *4 (Tex. App,_Corpus Christi Aug. 9, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). See also Rathmell v. Morri`son, 732 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. App._l-loustori [llfl‘h Dist.] 1987, no writ.); Marti'n v. Marti`n, 840 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App._Tyler 1992, writ denied). Here, Sheryl made several misrepresentations regarding the existence of the cattle, and she withheld documents that were responsive to discovery requests that showed the cattle existed Additionally, Sheryl and her family members improperly threatened Bryon with financial ruin. All of these factors taken together amount to extrinsic fraud, and the Court should have denied summary judgment on this ground Therefore, the Court should vacate the summary judgment and grant this i\/lotion for New Trial. l2. Sheryl failed to meet her burden to prove that Byron accepted benefits under the divorce decree that would estop his Bill of Review. First, a party’s acceptance of a judgment’s BYRON WALKER’s MOTioN ron Naw TniAL PAGE 4 or 6 community property disposition does not bar him, as a matter of law, from a review of that disposition if that party alleges and offers proof that the judgment was procured by fraud and threats of the other without his own fault or negligence Kessler v. Kessler, 693 S.W.Zd 522, 525 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). Further, economic necessity is an exception that applies to the acceptance of benefits doctrine when the acceptance occurs only due to financial duress or other economic circumstances See Waz'te, 150 S.W.3d at 803-04. Because thejudgment was procured by fraud and threats, and Byron only accepted part of the judgment to avoid a formal foreclosure, summary judgment should have been denied on this point, and the Court should grant Byron’s l\/lotion for New Trial. 13. Sheryl argued that Bryon’s Bill of Review should be barred by laches. However, laches should not bar an action within the limitations period unless allowing the action “would work a grave injustice.” fn re Marriage of Stroud, 376 S.W.Bd 346, 357 (Tex. App. 2012) (quoting Culver v. Pz`ckeris, 142 Tex. 87 , 176 S.W.2d 167, 170 (1943)). Sheryl did not produce any evidence to establish that preventing Byron from moving forward With his Bill of Review would create a grave injustice; therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted on this point. The Court should vacate the summary judgment and grant Byron’s Motion for New Trial. 14. Sheryl failed to prove that Byron’s claim is barred by res judicata because the Bill of Review involves Sheryl’s underlying fraud, a new matter not raised in the original divorce _proceeding, and the previously late filed motion for new trial does not adjudicate the merits such that res judicata is proper. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted on this point, and the Court should vacate the summary judgment and grant Byron’s Motion for New Trial. BvRo.\' WALKEn’s MoTioN FOR NEW 'I`RIAL PAGE 5 oF 6 III. CoNcLUsioN Ai\'i) PRA\/sn Bryon prays that the Court grant this Motion for New Trial, set aside the judgment, and for whatever other relief to which he may be entitled in law or in equity. Respectfully submitted, LovELACE KILLEN, PLLC /s/ W. Cade Lovelace W. Cade Lovelace State Bar No. 24050956 clovelace@lovelacel<illen.com Jennifer L. Lovelace State Bar No. 24051110 jlovelace@lovelacekillen.com DaNae Couch 7 State Bar No. 240?3483 dcouch@lovelacekillen.com 100 E. 15th St., Suite 350 Fort Woith, TX 76102 Tel: (817) 953-9656 Fax: (817) 385-6656 ATTORNEYS FOR PETiTiONER CER'I`IFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on the 5‘h day of October, 2015, a true and correct copy of Byron Wall<er’s Motion for New Trial was served in the following manner on the persons named below: Kerwin Stephens STEPHENS & MYERS, L.L.P. 515 Fourth Street _Graham, Texas 76450 BYRON WA LKER’s MorioN FoR N sw TRiAL Vr`a CMRRR No. 7014 1820 0002 0429 3111 and First Class Mail /s/ Cade Lovelace W. Cade Lovelace PAGE 6 or 6 ' _; ~ . 32591 - 'j' § _ Young County - Districi C|erk;' FI E_E D _ .Z__L£O'CLOCK_'QM t l 1 `_ srP.-ii 9 luis 'lN m MA',!."I-`.ER l:)!%.` run mcmillan olp 'BYRONWALKER Anl). ' . 5 linn claims cramer susan women § §_ §. §_. § §. § § § ANDIN _THE- mccann pit ` c.l,.w.,li calling ` "vouNc-counrx,rsxasr _. ` onnui`t on illino`t~i"wlllacs' ' ' "r't"s oatisc*rlo' N's 150 sHERYL Wir.l:tlc'lru"s scm " .IUDGME'NT EVIDENCE `AND_ RESPBNSE TO SHERYL WALKER*,S Mo*rloi~l irons ' _ _ l leBGMENT t carol 291-tdc .cl‘May;hls. case is ucdzupoodccsh¢ci water-curacao ` summary imagan summarizing tile roth ibp pleadwss,,:any moses led are .'hfswnents cf cccnscl.; the 'Ccurt is cf the csihicc thct`Brrch ‘Wallicr*s objections tc Shm'l - walkers Mooon for soporlaly_ ludrgmenl'~stiould accusatan all-overruled as protested horace 1. Byron Wallcer’ s relevance objection to Exhiblt A l / SuSta-i!;led . . _ ._ Overruled v" 2, Byrcn Wallcers.re'leva'nce cbjectionto ExltibitB _ _ Sustamed , , ,, . Ovcmll€’€l \/ 3.. .'Byron_ Wa|ker’ s objection to -Paragraph 2 of Exla`bit C Aefi"ldavi’t of Damly Lynri Cusc'nbar.y, because it recites factual conclusions without descrihiiig underlying facts sustained _ complies _ \/_ 4. By`roo Walker’- s hearsay objection to Paragraph 2 of Exhihit C, AHi`d`avit of Daarly Lylm Cusellbal_y . sustained _ n overruled \/. 5. '_ Byr_ort W'allcer’ s relevance objection to Patagraph 2 cf Exhibit C, AUdavit cf Danlrly Lyna Cuscaba,ry dallas_l,on'llvncx_lwl\i..lccli's ommtchsw$mwiuiccn‘s Sumiurla'v illicit = __ y _ PAce'licr-Z' E w ' ' / i..___'_¢.r_ ' spence ' _ mertens 6. `Byron Walkcp s relevance objection te Exl'llbit D. AHidevi't of Ker_wir`l.B., Ste'phens panels escape Esislblr“ll” ~ -' r/ . . Snstamcd ` ' - . Ovemli¢d l ’l. Byton Walk§r’ s objection tc Faragraph 2 cf Exllibit' E_ Affldavit of Sheryl I_=..ee W.allccr becau`pse it recites factcal_- conclusions will _ut detailing mi¢lel~lyillg facts .._....._. Stlstaln_ed- ` " 8. 1Bymn Walkcr’ s relevance objection tie Paragrap: 2 of Exhlhlt E Afficlavlt of Sheryl y Lee 'Walker S_ueisillecl l preceded l/ 9. Byro'n_ Walk`ci’.s objection to Pa`reg_rirpll 3 o_f; '__x_h__l`bit E, Affdavit of Sheryl lee Wa_lker becae'pc' it recites formal conclusions wl out describing underlying facts Susiai`,tled - l virtual \/_ `1.`0,`. Byron_ W.aik eli objection tc Paragreph Bof”Exh‘§lt E AMdavit ofSllcryl Lce Walicel_-- becach she d as trot]lave personal knowledge atari t_c the sale cf tire horse trailei. Suista'liled 4 _ ipverruled l `l/r _ ll. Byron Walker’s objection to Pnra'gr`aph itcwa lt E Al'i'alavit of Sheryl L~_ee Walker because her klpowledge related tc tile sale ct`- the tsc trailer is based `c_li inadmissible hearsay § . ~` team teresa Olioi_l\{)ii B¥RQN WMR’S OB-.!B€MONSTDSHERYL WALHRR’SSUMMAM williams t l P'A`GE Zo'lr';z t l