Wesley Spears and Renee Jacobs v. Falcon Pointe Community Homeowner's Association

ACCEPTED 03-14-00650-CV 4396595 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS March 18, 2015 AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/6/2015 10:46:40 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK

WESLEY SPEARS AND RENEE JACOBS, APPELLANTS RECEIVED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS V. AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/6/2015 10:46:40 AM FALCON POINTE COMMUNITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, JEFFREY D. KYLE APPELLEE Clerk

NO.  03-­‐14-­‐00650

MARCH  5,  2015

APPELLANTS’  OPENING  BRIEF  WITH  SEPARATE  APPENDIX

Wesley S. Spears, State Bar No. 18898400, Spears Law, 401 Congress Avenue., Suite 1540, Austin, Texas 78701, Tel. 512-­‐696-­‐2222, Fax. 512-­‐ 687-­‐3499 Attorney for Appellants, email, wesleys637@yahoo.com.

ORAL  ARGUMENT  IS  REQUESTED

Appeal  from  County  Court  One  of  Travis  County,  Texas

C-­‐1-­‐CV-­‐13-­‐010214

IDENTITY  OF  PARTIES  AND  COUNSEL

Appellants,  Wesley  Spears  and  Renee  Jacobs

Appellants’  counsel

Wesley S. Spears, State Bar No. 18898400, Spears Law, 401 Congress Avenue., Suite 1540, Austin, Texas 78701, Tel (512)696-­‐2222, Fax. 512-­‐ 687-­‐3401.

Appellee,  Falcon  Pointe  Community  Homeowners’  Association

Appellee’s  Counsel

David Chamberlain, Chamberlain and McHaney, 301 Congress Avenue, 22nd Floor, Austin, Texas 78701 Tel. 512-­‐474-­‐9124, Fax. 512-­‐474-­‐8582

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS

Identity of the parties and Counsel…………………………………………………………… …………………………i

Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………………ii-­‐iii

Index of Authorities………………………………………………………………………………….iv-­‐ix

Issues Presented For Review………………………………………………………………………………………... x

Statement of the Case…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1

Statement Regarding Oral Argument……………………………………………………………………………………...4

Statement of Facts……………………………………………………………………………………………5-­‐28

Summary of Argument…………………………………………………………………………………29-­‐32

Argument………………………………………………………………………………….33

Did the trial court, Phillips, J., err in granting appellee’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment and denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for New Trial?............................................................................................................................33-­‐41

(A)  The  subject  Notice  of  Violation  is  defective……………..……..41-­‐48

ii

(B) Appellee violated Texas Property Code § 209.005 and refused to produce relevant documents that appellants are entitled to obtain by statute……………………………………………………………………………………….48-­‐57

Did the trial court, Phillips, J., err in refusing to hear appellants’ Three Motions to Compel Discovery and their Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery, before granting appellee’s Motion for Traditional and No-­‐Evidence Summary Judgment and denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment?.......................................................................58-­‐65

Did the trial court err in dismissing appellants’ two Texas Deceptive Trade Practices claims without allowing any oral argument on the matter and without any basis in law to dismiss the claims?.........................................................................................................................65-­‐72

Did the trial court Phillips, J., and Wisser, J., err in denying appellants’ Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips?.………………………………72-­‐76

Prayer……….………………………………………………………………………………..76-­‐77 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..…77 Certificate  of  Compliance….…...……………………………………………………..78 Certificate  of  Service…………………………………………………………………….79

iii

INDEX  OF  AUTHORITIES

Abdygappariva v. State, 243 S.W. 3d 191, 198 (Tex. App.-­‐San Antonio 2007), p. 74.

Ashcreek Homeowner’s Association v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586 (App. 1 Dist. 1995), p. 43, 46, 47.

Axelson,  Inc.,  et  al.,  v.  The  Honorable  Grainger  W.  McIIhany,  798  S.W.  2d 550,  555  (Tex.  1990),  p.  59.

Benitz v. Gould Group, 27 S.W. 3d 109, 112 9Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000), no writ), p. 33.

Brewer  &  Pritchard,  PC  v.  Johnson,  167  S.W.  3d  460,  469  (Tex.  App Houston  (14th  Dist.)  2005,  rehearing  overruled),  p.  60  and  64. Brown  v.  Galleria  Area  Ford,  Inc.,  752  S.W.  2d  114,  116  (Tex.  1988),  p.  70. Burton  v.  Cravey,  759  S.W.  2d  160  (Houston  1st  District  1988),  p.  57.

Celotex Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-­‐324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986), p. 33.

Chastain  v.  Koonce,  700  S.W.  2d  579,  584  (Tex.  1985),  p.  70-­‐71. Cire  v.  Cummings,  134  S.W.  3d  835,  838-­‐39  (Tex.  2004),  p.  73.

City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W. 2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979), p. 33.

City of Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W. 687 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th District]), p 45.

Cf.  Creel  v.  Dist.  Attorney  for  Medina  County,  818  S.W.  2d  45,  46  (Tex.

iv 1991)  p.  63.

Clary Corp., v. Smith, 949 S.W. 2d 452, 464 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ), p. 70.

Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W. 3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006), p. 73.

Crispin v. Paragan Home, Inc., 888 S.W. 2d 78 (Tex. App.-­‐Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied.), p. 46.

Davis  v.  Huey,  620  S.W.  2d  at  566,  p.  45. Downer  v.  Aquamarine  Operations,  Inc.,  701  S.W.  2d.  238,  241-­‐242  (Tex. 1985),  cert  denied,  476  U.S.  1159,  106  S.Ct.  2279,  90  L.Ed.  2d  721  (1986), p.  73. Peter  Enters,  Inc.,  v.,  51  S.W.  3d  616,  623  (Tex.  App-­‐-­‐Tyler  2000,  pet. denied),  p.  71. Estate  of  William  H.  Arlitt  v.  Paterson,  995  S.W.  2d  713,  717  (Tex.  App.— San  Antonio  1999),  p.  35. Flamont  Design  v.  Pennzoil  Casplan,  994  S.W.  2d  830,  834  (Tex.  App.— Houston  [1st  Dist.]  1999),  p.  36. Friesenhahn,  960  S.  W.  2d  656,  654  (Tex.  1998),  p.  35. See  Galbraith  Eng’g  Consultants,  Inc.  v.  Pochucha,  290  S.W.  3d  863,  867

v (Tex.  2009),  p.  74. Gaines  v.  Hamman,  163  Tex.  618,  626,  358  S.W.  2d  557,  563  (Tex.  1962),  p. 34. Helfand  v.  Coane,  12  S.W.  3d  152,  155  (Tex.  App.  Houston  [1st  Dist.]  2000, pet  denied),  p.  58. Hodas  v.  Scenic  Oaks  Property  Ass’n,  47  S.W.  2d  747  (App.  4  Dist.  2000), p.  43 Horizon/CMS  Healthcare  Corp.,  v.  Auld,  34  S.W.  3d  887,  897  (Tex.  2000),  p. 35. In  re  Cerebus  Capital  Mgmt.,  L.P.,  164  S.W.  3d  379,  382  (Tex.  2005),  p.  73. In  re  Olshan  Found  Repair  Co.,  328  S.W.  3d  883,  888  (Tex.  2010),  p.  73. In  re  Ramirez,  994  S.W.  2d  682,  683  (Tex.  App.  San  Antonio  1998,  orig. proceeding),  p.  63. Jackson  v.  Fiesta  Mart,  979  S.W.  2d  68,  70-­‐71  (Tex.  App.—Austin1998),  p. 36. Jampole  v.  Touchy,  673  S.W.  2d  569,  573  (Tex.  1984)  p.  64.

J. P. Bdg. Enterprises, Inc., v. Timberwood Development Co., 718 S. W. 2d 841 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1986 , writ refused n.r.), p. 45.

Kindred  v.  Con/Chemical,  Inc.  650  S.W.  2d  61,  63  (Tex.  1983),  p.  36.

Lear Siegler, Inc., v. Perez, 819 S.W. 2d 470,471 (Tex. 1991), p. 33. vi

Limestone  Products  Distributor  v.  McNamara,  71  S.W.  3d  308,  310  (Tex. 2002),  p.  34. State  Farm  Lloyds  v.  Nicolau,  951  S.W.  2d  444,  451  (Tex.  1997).  P.  70. Low  v.  Henry,  221  S.W.  2d  609,  614  (Tex.  2007),  p.  73. Macdonald  v.  Painter,  441  S.  W.  2d  179  (Tex.  1969),  p.  45.

Marroquin v. D & N Funding, Inc., 943 S.W. 2d 112, 114 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.), p. 73.

Matinez  v.  City  of  San  Antonio,  40  S.W.  3d  587,  591  (Tex.  App.—San Antonio  2001,  pet  denied),  p.  60. Merrill  Dow  Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.  v.  Havner,  953  S.W.  2d  706,  711  (Tex. 1997),  p.  36. M.D.  Anderson  Hospital,  Willrich,  28  S.W.  3d  22,  23  (Tex.  2000),  p.  34. Moorehouse  v.  Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  76  S.W.  3d  587,  591  (Tex.  App— San  Antonio  2002,  no  writ),  p.  60. Moore  v.  K-­‐Mart  Corp.,  981  S.W.  2d  266,  269  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio 1998,  pet.  denied),  p.  34. Munson  v.  Milton,  948  S.W.  2d  813  (Tex.  App.-­‐  San  Antonio  1997),  p.  45. Nast  v.  State  Farm  Fire  &  Cas.  Co.,  82  S.W.  2d  42,  47  (  Tex.  App.—Corpus Christie  1990  (no  pet.),  p.  70.

vii Nelson  v.  PNC  Mortgage  Corp.,  139  S.W.  3d  442  (2004),  p.  62,  63,  64. Nixon  v.  Mr.  Property  Management,  Co.,  690  S.W.  2d  546,  548-­‐549  (Te 1985),  34-­‐35. Perry  v.  S.N.,  973  S.  W.  2d.  301,303  (Tex.  1998),  p.  35. Perry  Homes  v.  Cull,  258  S.W.  3d  580,  598  (Tex.  2008),  p.  74.

Pheasant Run Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., v. Kastor, 47 S.W. 2d 74 (Tex. App. _ Houston [14th District]) 2001), p. 45.

Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. At Garland, 20 S.. 3d 880,891 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2000, no pet.), p. 34.

Simon Property Group (Texas) L.P. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 943 S.W. 2d 64 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1997), p. 45.

Tempay, Inc., v. TNT Concrete & Construction, Inc., 37 S.W. 3d 517, 521-­‐ 522 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no writ) citing Robert W. Clore, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(1); A New Weapon for Texas Defendants, 29 St. Mary’s L. J. 813, 843 (1998), p. 61, 64.

Walker  v.  Guiterrez,  111  S.W.  3d  56,  62  (Tex.  2003),  p.  73. Walker  v.  Harris,  924  S.W.  2d  375,  378  Tex.  1996),  p.  35. West  v.  Solite,  563  S.W.  2d  240,  243  (Tex.  1978),  p.  58. Wilmoth  v.  Wilcox,  743  S.W.  2d  at  658,  p.  46-­‐47. Tex.  R.  Civ.  Proc.  192.3  (a),  p.  58-­‐59. U.S.  Const.  Fourteenth  Amendment,  p.  58. Texas  Constitution  Article  1  § 19,  p.  58.

viii Tex.  R.  Civ.  Proc.  166a(i),  p.  28,  46,  47,  49. Texas  Property  Code  § 209.002  et.  seg. Texas  Property  Code  § 209.009,  p.  11. Texas  Property  Code  § 209.005,  p.  11,  29,  48,  49,  50,  51,  52,  55,  56. Texas  Property  Code  § 209.006  P.  41,  44,  45. Texas  Property  Code  § 209.007,  p.  7,  14,  19. Texas  Deceptive  Trade  Practices  Act    (DTPA)  section(s): V.T.C.A.,  Bus.  &  C.,    §17.50,  p.  65,  68  and  71. V.T.C.A.,  Bus.  &  C.    §17.46,  p.  69.

ix

ISSUES  PRESENTED  FOR  REVIEW

1. Did the trial court, Phillips, J., err in granting appellee’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment and denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for New Trial?

2. Did the trial court, Phillips, J., err in refusing to hear appellants’ Three Motions to Compel Discovery and their Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery, before granting appellee’s Motion for Traditional and No-­‐Evidence Summary Judgment and denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment?

3. Did the trial court err in dismissing appellants’ two Texas Deceptive Trade Practices claims without allowing any oral argument on the matter and without any basis in law to dismiss the claims?

4. Did the trial court Phillips, J., and Wisser, J., err in denying appellants’ Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips.

x. TO  THE  HONORABLE  THIRD  DISTRICT  COURT  OF  APPEALS:

Appellants,  Wesley  Spears  and  Renee  Jacobs  submit  this  Brief  in Support  of  their  Appeal  and  request  that  this  court  reverse  the  ruling  of the  Honorable  David  Phillips,  from  County  Court  One,  Travis  County, Texas  granting  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  and  No-­‐Evidence Summary  Judgment.      Appellants  also  request  that  the  this  court  order the  trial  court  to  enter  an  order  granting  appellants’  Motion  for  Partial Summary  Judgment  and  order  the  trial  court  to  hold  a  Hearing regarding  appellants’  right  to  attorneys’  fees  and  to  restore  the remainder  of  appellants’  claims  to  the  trial  court  docket  to  complete discovery  and  for  trial.

STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE

This  matter  involves  a  declaratory  judgment  action  brought  by  the appellants,  Wesley  Spears  and  Renee  Jacobs  (hereinafter  “appellants”) against  Falcon  Pointe  Community  Homeowners  Association  (hereinafter “appellee”).        The  action  was  brought  by  the  appellants  asking  the  court to  determine  whether  the  actions  taken  by  the  appellee,  Falcon  Pointe

1. Community  Homeowners’  Association  which  found  the  appellants  in violations  of  unspecified  deed  restrictions  of  the  appellee  was  done  in violation  of  the  Texas  Property  Code.

Appellants’  pled  in  their  Petition  that  the  appellee’s  Violation Notice  was  defective  and  therefore,  unenforceable  because  it  failed  to cite  a  specific  deed  restriction  that  appellants  allegedly  violated.    In addition,  the  appellants  pled,  the  Violation  Notice  gave  an  invalid  cure date  of  “before  the  August  inspection”  even  though  the  Notice  was  dated October  22,  2013.    The  Hearing,  which  appellee  relies  on  to  support  it’s actions  finding  the  appellants  in  violation  of  the  deed  restrictions occurred  on  November  13,  2013.    Therefore,  the  cure  date  provided  in the  Violation  Notice  was  defective  because  it  did  not  give  appellants  a reasonable  opportunity  to  cure  the  alleged  defect  and  contained  an invalid  date.

The  Trial  Court,  Phillips,  J.,  erred  in  granting  appellee’s  Motion  for Traditional  and  No-­‐Evidence  Summary  Judgment  and  denying appellants’  Motion  for  Partial  Summary  Judgment  prior  to  hearing appellants’  three  outstanding  Motions  to  Compel  Discovery  and

2.

appellants’,  Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery.

The  court  also,  erred  in  dismissing  appellants  Texas  Deceptive Practices  Act,  claims  without  allowing  oral  argument  and  without indicating  any  reason  for  the  dismissal.        Appellants  alleged  that appellee  had  violated  the  Texas  Deceptive  Practices  Act  by  refusing  to provide  the  appellants  with  a  Hearing  in  regards  to  first  Violation Notice.      Appellants  also  alleged  that  appellee  fraudulently  omitted appellant,  Wesley  Spears’  name  from  being  placed  on  the  Ballot  for  the election  of  Neighborhood  Representatives  on  June  7,  2014,  in  violation of  his  rights  to  due  process  and  equal  protection  of  the  law. The  court  in  it’s  rulings,  demeanor  and  behavior  in  this  case exhibited  extreme  bias  against  the  appellants,  who  are  African  American and  in  favor  of  appellee,  which  is  controlled  by  Newland  Communities the  largest  private  developer  in  the  United  States  .    The  appellants moved  for  the  Court  to  recuse  itself  on  the  basis  of  bias.    The  court, Phillips,  J.,  and  Wisser  J.,  erred  when  it  denied  appellants’  Motions  to Recuse  Judge  Phillips.

3.

STATEMENT  REGARDING  ORAL  ARGUMENT

Appellants’,  request  that  court  allow  oral  argument  in  this  matter. There  is  no  record  of  the  Hearing  of    the  parties  cross  Motions  for Summary  Judgment  Motion,  therefore,  appellants  believe  oral  argument would  be  very  helpful  to  the  court.      This  court  should  hear  from  counsel and  the  justices  should  have  an  opportunity  to  inquire  of  counsel,  in order  to  get  a  clear  picture  of  what  took  place  at  the  September  15, 2014,  Hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment  and the  question  of  whether  the  appellee  refused  to  cooperate  with discovery  and  the  other  issues  raised  in  this  Appeal.

4.

STATEMENT  OF  FACTS

Appellants  purchased  a  home  in  Falcon  Pointe,  a  planned community,  developed  by  Newland  Communities,  the  largest  private developer  in  the  United  States  on  January  15,  2013.    Thereafter,  with  the permission  of  the  Falcon  Pointe  Community  Homeowners’  Association (hereinafter  the  “appellee”  or  the  “Association),  appellants  installed  a swimming  pool  on  the  subject  property  in  April,  2013.    After  the  pool was  installed,  appellants  became  aware  that  the  fence  on  their  property sat  in  a  depression  and  was  only  four  feet  high  along  the  side  of  the  pool.

Appellants  sought  to  extend  the  height  of  the  fence  to  the  full  six-­‐ foot  height  allowed  by  the  rules  and  bylaws  of  the  Association  and  did so  using  lattice.    By  Violation  Notice  dated  July  26,  2013,  Diane  Bottema, appellee’s  property  manager  notified  appellants  that  the  lattice extension  that  appellants  installed  to  their  fence  violated  the  rules  of  the Association.

Ms.  Bottema  deposition  testimony  was  the  property  inspector assigned  to  inspect  the  properties  in  the  Association,  Mr.  Morales, prepared  the  letter  and  stamped  it  with  Diane  Bottema’s  signature  using

5. a  rubber  stamp.    Appellants  advised  appellee  that  they  wanted  a Hearing  and  would  request  a  Hearing  in  writing  within  the  thirty  (30) days  provided  in  the  Violation  Notice  and  applicable  law.  1

Thereafter,  Ms.  Bottema  sent  appellants  an  email  that  stated despite  the  clear  language  of  the  Violation  Notice  and  the  Texas Property  Code  appellants  were  not  entitled  to  a  Hearing.      The  email stated  that  in  matters  of  clear  violations  of  the  rules  of  the  Association, the  President  of  the  Association,  Ranier  Ficken,  could  act  for the  Board  without  a  Hearing.2

At  his  deposition,  Ranier  Ficken,  president  of  the  appellee, testified  that  contrary  to  Ms.  Bottema’s  email  he  had  no  authority  to  act for  the  board  of  the  appellee,  in  matters  of  clear  violations  of  the  rules  of the  Association.3    The  Association  was  established  in  2002,  more  than ten  years  before  the  appellants’  purchased  their  home.4    The  Board  of the  appellee  is  still  under  the  control  of  the  Developer,  Newland Communities.

The  Board  of  the  Association  is  comprised  of  two  employees  of  the developer  and  a  member  selected  by  the  Neighborhood  Representatives of  the  Association.    Appellants  requested  a  meeting  with  Ms.  Bottema

6. and  the  President  of  the  Association,  Ranier  Ficken  after  Ms.  Bottema refused  to  grant  appellants  a  Hearing  in  violation  of  Texas  Property  Code §  209.007  and  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the  appellee.5

A  meeting  was  scheduled  and  held  as  a  result  of  the  emails  that were  exchanged  between  Ms.  Bottema,  the  property  manager  and appellants.6    Prior  to  that  meeting  appellants  removed  the  lattice addition  to  the  fence  as  requested  in  the  first  Violation  Notice.    At  the meeting,  Ms.  Bottema  and  Mr.  Ficken  gave  appellants  oral  instructions regarding  what  kind  of  privacy  screen,  appellants,  could  build.

Pursuant  to  that  meeting  and  further  emails  that  were  exchanged between  the  parties,  appellants  built  a  completely  free  standing  privacy screen,  which  was  not  attached  to  the  existing  fence  in  any  way  in September  of  2013.

Appellants  did  not  receive  any  Notices  of  Violation  in  either August  or  September  of  2013.    By  letter  dated  October  22,  2013, appellee  sent  appellants  a  purported  Violation  Notice  that  they  were  in violation  of  the  rules  of  the  Association  as  a  result  of  the  privacy  screen that  appellants  built  on  their  property,  based  on  the  instructions  given to  appellants,  by  the  president  of  the  Association,  Ranier  Ficken  and

7. Diane  Bottema,  the  property  manager.7

The  Notice  did  not  cite  any  specific  deed  restriction(s)  that appellants  were  alleged  to  have  violated.    The  Notice  provided  a  cure date  of  before  the  “August  inspection”,  even  though  the  Notice  is  dated October  22,  2013,  Ms.  Bottema  claimed  to  have  no  knowledge  as  to  how the  cure  date  was  determined.    Ms.  Bottema,  the  property  manager whose  name  appears  on  the  Violation  Notice  answered  as  follows concerning  the  cure  date  in  subject  the  Violation  Notice  during  her deposition:

Q.   What  cure  dates  were  you  trained  to  put  on  notices  of violation?

A.   I  don’t  know.

Q.   Well  the  date  of  the  letter  is  what?

A.   The  date  on  the  letter  is  October  22nd.

Q.   What  year?

A.   2013.

Q.   And  it  states  a  cure  date  of  August?

A.   With  no  date.

Q.   And  what  do  you  believe  the  August  they  were  referring  to?

8.

A.   I  don’t  know.

Q.   So  you  don’t  even  know  if  I  still  have  time  to  cure  the defect?

A.   I  don’t  know.

Q.   So  you  don’t  know  if  the  date  refers  to  2014,  correct?

A.   Right.

Q.   You  don’t  know  if  the  August  date  refers  to  2015?

A.   No.

Q.   You  don’t  know  if  the  August  date  refers  to  2016?

A.   No.

Q.   So  what  date  did  I  have  to  cure?

A.   I  don’t  know.

Q.   Well,  you  said  that  the  cure  date  could  have  been  the  August

2014  August,  2015,  August,  2016  August.    I  am  asking  which

date  it  was  intended  to  be  .

A.   I  don’t  know.8

When  asked  about  the  notice  Ranier  Ficken,  President  of  the appellee  testified  regarding  the  subject  October  22,  2013,  Violation

9. Notice:

Q.   Let’s  assume  that  letter  is  dated  correctly  for  the  purposes of  this  question.

A.   Okay.

Q.   Then  the  cure  date  would  have  been  wrong,  correct,  if  that date  was  right.

A.   Well,  certainly  August  comes  before  October,  yes.9….

Q.   And  so  from  this  Letter  could  you  tell  me  which  particular regulation  it  is  that  I  was  alleged  to  have  –  the  plaintiffs’  were  alleged  to have  violated.

A.   The  letter  just  list  in  violation  of  the  CCR’s.

Q.   How  would  someone  know  what  regulation  they  were  in violation  of  with  that  notice  letter?

A.   Relative  to  this  particular  letter  I  don’t  see  the  specific regulation.10

The  Appellee  held  a  Hearing  regarding  the  October  22,  2013, Violation  Notice  on  November  13,  2014.    The  By-­‐Laws  of  the  Association

10. provide  that  if,  appellants  appear  at  the  Hearing  they  waive  their  right to  contest  lack  of  legal  notice.11      Because  appellants  wished  to  contest the  validity  of  the  Notice,  they  did  not  appear  at  the  Hearing.

Thereafter,  appellants  began  to  make  a  series  of  requests  directed to  the  appellee  to  produce  documents.    Appellants  made  five  requests for  documents  as  homeowners’  in  the  Association.    The  Requests  were sent  certified  mail  return  receipt  requested  pursuant  to  Texas  Property Code  §  209.005.12

Appellee  refused  to  produce  any  documents  pursuant  to appellants’  six  requests  for  Production  of  Documents  to  appellee  as homeowners’,  in  violation  of  the  Texas  Property  Code  §  209.005. Thereafter,  appellants  made  six  formal  requests  for  the  Production  of Documents  in  the  subject  case.    Appellants  also  filed  six Motions  to  Compel,  the  production  of  documents  and  witnesses. Appellee  refused  to  produce  any  documents  that  appellants  requested except  for  its  liability  insurance  policy  and  less  than  twenty  pages  of minutes  of  Board  meetings,  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  case  and two  budgets.13

Appellee  refused  to  produce  any  correspondence  between  the

11. parties.    The  appellee,  refused  to  produce  the  Violation  Notice,  which  it relied  on  to  find  the  appellants  in  violation  of  the  rules  of  the Association.    Throughout  the  short  history  of  the  case  the  appellee  has refused  to  cooperate  with  any  discovery.    Appellee  admittedly,  refused to  cooperate  with  discovery  simply  asserting  it  believed  that  discovery was  unnecessary.14

Mr.  Campbell  stated  as  follows  at  plaintiffs’  first  Motion  to  Compel responding  to  a  question  by  the  court  Sheppard,  J.:

The  court:    Here  is  me  (sic)  question,  I  understand  your  position and  I  grant  that  can  have  that  position.    But  it’s  an  unusual circumstances  to  decide  that  because  that  is  your  position,  you  can’t give  discovery.    In  any  other  situation—I  mean  I’m  trying  to  figure  out how  it’s  and  unreasonable  request  for  him  to  ask  for  the  deposition  of the  key  person  who’s  been  telling  him  and  communicating  with  him.

MR.  CAMPBELL:    In  terms  of  the  deposition  which  is  the  only  issue he  brought  before  the  court;  trying  to  compel  this  deposition.    If  we need  to  that  we  can.    That  was  one  issue  I  raised  with  him.    We  got  the summary  judgment  arguments.    I  do  no  think  we  need  to  go  through  the process  doing  the  deposition.15

12.

The  counsel  for  the  appellants’  asked  the  following  questions  to the  court:

MR.  SPEARS:   If  he  says  he  is  not  going  to  produce  the documents,  how  do  we  get    that  resolved  before  the  deposition.

THE  COURT:   I  recessed  this  hearing.    This  hearing  is  in  recess and  it  is  not  over.    Call  my  Court  set  the  date  and  we  will  talk  about  what in  subpoena  duces  tecum  he  doesn’t  want  to  turnover.    We  will  have that  discussion.    When  we  are  through  with  that  discussion  we  will figure  out  what  discussion  needs  to  be  had  next.    I  am  likely  to  set  a scheduling  order  and  then  we  will  figure  out  where  we  are.16  During  the first  Hearing  the  court  Sheppard,  J.,  granted  appellants’  Motion  to Compel  the  Deposition,  Duces  Tecum,  of    Diane  Bottema.17

In  the  second  Hearing,  the  court,  Sheppard,  J.,  denied  appellants’ Motion  to  Compel  finding  that  the  Appellee  did  not  have  to  produce  a document  that  was  not  in  existence,  since  appellee  did  not  maintain records  of  the  dedicatory  violation  history  of  the  Association.    As  a result  the  court  ruled  appellants  must  request  the  minutes  of  the  Board meetings  and  compile  the  records  themselves.      Appellants  maintained

13. that,  the  Association  was  required  by,  Texas  Property  Code,      § 207.009, to  maintain  and  compile  the  requested  information.      Judge  Sheppard further  ruled  that  if  the  appellee  had  any  objections  to  appellants’ document  requests  they  must  submit  the  objections  to  the  court  before the  deposition  of  Diane  Bottema,  the  property  manager.18

Appellants  did  not  learn  that  Ms.  Bottema  was  replaced  by,  Natalie Boykin  until  appellants’  took  Ms.  Bottema’s  deposition.    Accordingly, appellants  were  then  forced  to  attempt  to  depose  Natalie  Boykin,  the new  property  manager.19      After  appellants  noticed  Ms.  Boykin’s deposition  appellee  moved  to  quash  appellants’  Notice  to  Take Deposition  and  appellants  filed  a  Motion  to  Compel  Ms.  Boykin’s Deposition.20

Based  on  the  court’s  ruling  appellants  amended  their  production requests  to  specifically  request  the  minutes  of  all  board  meetings, financial  records  and  all  other  records  of  the  Association.      The Association  has  never  filed  a  copy  policy  as  required  by  Texas  Property Code,    § 209.007,  and  therefore,  it  was  obligated  by  statute  to  produce copies  of  all  the  records  of  the  Association  without  cost  to  any homeowner  who  properly  requests  the  records,  with  private

14. information  redacted.21

Appellants’  pursuant  to  Judge  Sheppard’s  Order  filed  a  new  Notice to  take  the  Deposition,  Duces  Tecum  of  Diane  Bottema.    Appellants  filed another  Motion  to  Compel  after  the  appellants  and  appellee  exchanged emails  regarding  whether  Ms.  Bottema  would  produce  the  documents requested  in  appellants’  Notice  to  take  Deposition  Duces  Tecum. Appellee’s  counsel  indicated,  that  although  he  was  going  to  object  to producing  documents,  he  refused  to  submit  appellee’s  objections  to  the court  prior  to  Ms.  Bottema’s,  Deposition  as  ordered  by  Judge Shepperd.22

The  court,  Phillips  J.,  denied  appellants’  Motion  to  Compel  ruling since  the  deposition  has  not  taken  place,  the  Motion  was  premature despite  Judge  Sheppard’s  order  requiring  the  appellee  to  submit  it’s objections  before  Ms.  Bottema’s,  Deposition.23  Judge  Phillips’  Order ruling  the  Motion  was  premature  and  Judge  Shepperd’s  Order  are inconsistent  since  the  Hearing  of  the  parties  Motion  to  Compel  was simply  adjourned  to  deal  with  any  objections  by  appellee  to  the

15. production  of  records.

Appellants  subsequently  took  the  deposition  of  Ms.  Bottema  and she  produced  absolutely  no  documents  pursuant  to  appellants’  Notice  to take  her  Deposition  Duces  Tecum,  not  even  her  correspondence  with appellants  claiming  she  no  longer  had  access  to  her  own  emails  even though  she  now  worked  for  the  property  manger,  Goodwin Management  in  the  office  where  the  records  were  maintained  because the  Goodwin  Management  locked  her  of  her  email  account  and  the records  of  the  Appellee.24      The  transcripts  of  both  Ms.  Bottema  and  Mr. Ficken’s  deposition  were  not  available  prior  to  the  Hearing  of  the parties  cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment,  because  of  the  delays caused  by  appellee.

Appellants  were  deprived  of  their  right  to  produce  evidence obtained  from  those  depositions  to  refute  appellee’s  claims  in  support  of it’s  Summary  Judgment  Motion.25    Appellants  also  filed  a  Notice  to  take the  Deposition  Duces  Tecum  of  Ranier  Ficken,  the  president  of  the Association  and  the  developer,  Newland  Communities’  Project  Manager. The  appellee  oversees  yearly  dues  of  the  Association,  in  an  amount  over one  million  dollars  per  year,  while  allowing  no  oversight  by  the homeowners.26

The  Association  is  under  the  control  of  the  developer,  Newland Communities  that  has  through  its  actions  demonstrated  that  it  will not  comply  with  the  Texas  Property  Code  and  make  the  records  of  the Association  available  to  the  homeowners’  especially  the  appellants.    Mr. Ficken  testified  that  he  had  access  to  all  the  documents  of  the Association  but  relied  on  his  attorney  to  determine  what  documents  he would  produce.  Mr.  Ficken  testified  that  he  made  no  effort  to  comply with  appellants’  Notice  to  Take  his  Deposition  Duces  Tecum27

Appellants  also  served  appellee  with  notice  of  their  intent  to  take the  Deposition  Duces  Tecum,  of  Natalie  Boykin,  the  property  manager  of the  Association,  who  assumed  Ms.  Bottema’s  position  on  or  about  May  1, 2013.28    Ms.  Boykin  replaced  Ms.  Bottema  who  was  reassigned  because of  poor  performance,  including  complaints  by  other  residents,  according to  the  deposition  testimony  of  Ranier  Ficken.29      Ms.  Bottema  denied  that she  was  replaced  for  poor  performance.30

As  property  manager,  Ms.  Boykin  oversaw  the  June  7,  2014, election.    Appellant,  Wesley  Spears,  properly  applied  to  be  included  on the  ballot,  for  neighborhood  representative,  nevertheless  his  name  was fraudulently  left  off  the  ballot  by  Natalie  Boykin,  the  new  property manager.31           17.

Appellant  also  Noticed  the  Deposition  of  William  Meyer,  vice president  of  the  Association  and  vice  president  of  Newland Communities,  the  developer,  who  was  one  of  only  two  people  who  voted at  the  Hearing  finding  the  appellants  in  violation  of    rules  of  the Association,  based  on  the  Board’s  “business  judgment”,  not  because  of  a violation  of  specific  deed  restriction.32

Ms.  Bottema  and  Ms.  Boykin  were  the  property  managers responsible  for  the  issuance  of  Violation  Notices,  conducting  elections, collecting  dues,  and  the  overall  management  of  the  property  of  the Association.    Ms.  Boykin  became  custodian  of  records  when  she replaced  Ms.  Bottema,  as  property  manager  and  she  conducted  the election,  which  is  the  subject  of  one  of  appellants’  two  DTPA  claims. After  Ms.  Bottema  was  replaced  she  testified  at  her  deposition  that  she did  not  have  access  to  the  records  of  the  Association.

Obviously,  this  was  another  attempt  to  hide  the  ball  by  appellee, allowing  Ms.  Bottema  to  claim  she  did  not  have  access  to  her  records  not even  her  own  emails  or  letters  related  to  this  matter  even  though  she

18. was  still  employed  by  Goodwin  Management  the  property  management company.    Clearly,  the  four  witnesses  noticed  for  deposition  by  the appellants,  were  not  only  material  witnesses,  they  were  critical witnesses.

Appellants’  Fourth  and  Fifth  Amended  Complaint  alleged  that  the appellee  fraudulent  left  the  appellant,  Wesley  Spears’  name  off  of  the election  Ballot,  which  was  held  on  or  about  June  7,  2014,  for Neighborhood  Representative  in  violation  of  the  DTPA.    The  election took  place  approximately  seven  months  after  suit  was  filed  in  this matter  and  approximately  three  months  before  the  court  granted appellee’s  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment.    Nevertheless,  the  court dismissed  this  claim  without  allowing  argument  on  the  matter  or  stating any  reason  for  the  court’s  ruling.

Appellants  also  alleged  a  violation  of  the  Texas  Deceptive  Trade Practices  Act  (hereinafter  “DTPA”)  against  the  appellee  based  on appellee’s  property  manager,  Diane  Bottema’s,  misrepresentation  of  the law  and  the  rights  and  obligations  between  the  parties  when  she advised  the  appellants  that  they  were  not  entitled  to  a  Hearing  as provided  in  Texas  Property  Code  § 209.007,  and  the  by-­‐laws  of  the

19. Association  regarding  the  first  Violation  Notice.33

Appellants’  counsel  sent  two  emails  to  court  operations  officer, Darryl  Sanders  requesting  that  appellants’  three  outstanding  Motions  to Compel  Discovery  be  heard  before  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  No-­‐ Evidence  Summary  Judgment  and  appellants’  Motion  for  Partial Summary  Judgment  was  heard.34      Mr.  Sanders  was  also  copied  on  a series  of  emails  between  the  parties  in  which  appellants’  were attempting  to  get  the  appellee  to  agree  on  a  hearing  date  for  appellants’ three  Motion  to  Compel  Discover  prior  to  a  Hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross Motions  for  Summary  Judgment.35

All  disputed  court  dates  were  scheduled  in  the  exact  same  manner through  the  Court  Operations  Officer,  Darryl  Sanders  pursuant  to  emails throughout  this  case.36    Mr.  Sanders  would  only  communicate  with  the parties  by  email,  which  copied  opposing  counsel,  because  of  his  belief that  an  oral  conversation  might  constitute  an  improper  ex  parte communication.37

Despite  appellants’  requests  Mr.  Sanders  testified  at  the  Hearing of  appellants’  Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips,  that  he  did  not  advise Judge  Phillips  of  appellants’  request  that  their  three  Motions  to  Compel

20. be  heard  prior  to  the  hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary Judgment.38      Further,  Mr.  Sanders  testified,  without  explanation,  that  he did  not  even  respond  to  either  appellants’  emails  requesting  a  Hearing of  their  three  Discovery  Motions,  before  the  hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross Motion  for  Summary  judgment.    After  instructing  counsel  to communicate  with  him  only  by  email  Mr.  Sanders’  testified  that  he  did respond  to  appellants’  crucial  emails.    The  following  colloquy  is contained  in  one  email  to  Mr.  Sanders  testified  he  did  not  respond  to  or advise  the  court  of: A.   I  mean,  I  have  one  that’s  to  you—I  mean,  I’m  sorry  .    I  have one  September  9th  at  3:27  p.m.  where  it  is  copied  to  Mr.  Chamberlain. And  you’re  indicating  in  the  e-­‐mail  that  –well,  can  I  just  read  the  e-­‐mail? Q.   Yes. Mr.  Spears  I  think  it  is  short  enough,  Judge,  that  it wouldn’t  be  objectionable. A.   It  says,  “Dear  Mr.  Sanders.    Attorney  Campbell  would  give me  October  14  and  15  as  dates  he  is  available  for  hearing  on  the  above reference  motions.    The  discovery  cutoff  is  September  30th,  is  the discovery  cutoff”,  period.    “Therefore,  since  we  reserved  two  hours  on

21. September  15,  2014  for  the  parties’  motions  for  summary  judgment,  I thought  September  15,  2014.    I  will  leave  to  the  court’s  discretion  as  the as  to  the  appropriate  date  for  the  hearing  on  the  above  motions.    Please advise.    Thank  you,  Wesley  Spears.”39    The  testimony  of  Mr.  Sanders went  on: Q   You  ever  have  an  occasion,  (sic)  that  you  can  recall  where someone  asked  you  to  set  a  discovery  motion  before  a  summary judgment  motion  and  you  did  not  do  so? A.   In  this  cause  or  any  other  cause? Q.   Any  other  cause? A.   No. Q.   So  it  is  the  court’s  policy  to  hear  discovery  motions  before summary  judgment  motions? A.   It  can  be,  yes. Q.   It  can  be  or  it  is? A.   It  can  be,  yes. Q.   Well,  is  it  or  isn’t  it? A.   Well  it  depends  on  the  setting  party.

22. Q.   Well,  no.    I  am  asking,  isn’t  it  the  court’s  policy  to  hear  discovery motions  before  hearing  summary  judgment  motions? A.   Yes. Q.   And  in  this  case  there  were  three  outstanding  discover  motions that  were  pending  before  the  summary  judgment  motions.    That’s  what those  emails  were  about  Correct? A.   I  believe  so. Q.   So  the  court  did  not  follow  its  own  policy  in  failing  to  hear  those motions  before  ruling  on  summary  judgment. A.   I  can’t—… There  was  a  serious  of  objections  and  the  questioning  continued: Q.   So  as  court  operations  officer,  you  don’t  know  if  there  is  a  practice that  discovery  motions  are  heard  before  summary  judgment  motions? A.   Well  there  can  be  moyiond—discovery  motions  before  summary judgment,  yes. Q.   And  have  you  ever  experienced  an  occasion  where  someone  asks for  a  discovery  motion  to  be  heard  before  summary  judgment  it  was denied  before  it  could  be  hear? A.   I  don’t  know  of  any.

23. Q.   You  don’t  know  of  any  other  situation  where  that  has  occurred? A.   No  sir…. Q   So  you  would  not  dispute  if  I  testified  that  I  had  not  received  the instruction  because  you  don’t  recall  giving  them.  Correct? A.   That  would  be  true,  sir.    I  can’t  I  don’t  have  anything. Q.   And  in  hindsight,  you  would  have  given  me  those  instructions  had you  realized  that  I  did  not  have  such  instructions? A.   If  I  had  been  the  one,  yes  sir. Q.   And  then  the  only  other  question  is,  again,  why  would  you  not respond  to  that  e-­‐mail? A.   I  don’t  have  answer  for  you,  sir.40

Mr.  Sanders  took  the  civil  equivalent  of  asserting  his  Fifth Amendment  privilege  against  self-­‐incrimination.    He  scheduled  every Hearing  in  this  matter  that  was  not  set  by  the  Judge  in  court,  or  agreed to  by  the  parties,  pursuant  to  emails  from  the  parties.    He  even  sent  an email  to  the  parties  requesting  that  the  parties  communicate  with  him by  email  with  copy  to  the  opposing  counsel.41    The  parties  could  not agree  on  a  date  for  the  appellants’  First  Motion  to  Compel.    Counsel  for appellee  stated  to  Judge  Shepperd  that  Hearing  was  set  up  by  email  to

24. Mr.  Sanders.42    Mr.  Sanders  also  testified  that  he  never  advised  counsel for  the  appellants  that  his  requests  were  not  proper  nor  did  he  have  an explanation  as  to  why  he  did  not  respond  to  appellants’  emails.43

Mr.  Sanders  testified  that  he  was  not  aware  of  a  single  case,  other than  this  case,  in  which  the  court  did  not  hear  all  outstanding  discovery motions  before  ruling  on  motions  for  summary  judgment.    Mr.  Sanders testified  he  had  no  answer  why  he  did  not  respond  to  counsel  for  the appellants’  emails.    There  were  emails  addressed  directly  to  Mr.  Sanders and  several  others  he  was  copied  on  between  the  parties  because  the parties  could  not  agree  on  a  date  for  the  hearing  appellants’  three Discovery  Motions.

Mr.  Sanders  clearly  establishes  that  the  court  showed  bias  against appellants,  who  are  African  American,  in  favor  of  the  largest  private developer  in  the  United  States,  Newland  Communities  who  is  in  control of  appellee  by  violating  the  court’s  policy  to  hear  discovery  motions before  deciding  motions  for  summary  judgment.

On  September  15,  2015,  the  court  Phillips,  J.,  convened  a  Hearing of  the

25. parties  Cross-­‐Motions  for  Summary  Judgment.    Counsel  for  the appellants  advised  the  court  of  appellants’  three  outstanding  Discovery Motions  and  Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery.    Appellants have  only  filed  one  Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery  in this  matter.    The  court  refused  to  hear  the  appellants’  Motions  to Compel,  because  despite  appellants’,  timely  requests  for  a  hearing  to  Mr. Sanders,  the  Court  Operations  Officer  did  not  schedule  the  Motions, which  the  court  used  as  an  excuse  for  not  hearing  them.

Despite  the  anticipated  two  hours  to  hear  the  parties’  Cross Motions  for  Summary  Judgment  the  courtroom  was  full  of  lawyers’  with much  shorter  matters  waiting  to  be  heard.    Other  than  a  one  minute hearing  at  the  beginning  of  the  call  of  cases,  appellants’  case  was  called before  all  other  matters.44

Judge  Phillips  refused  to  recuse  himself,  after  appellants’  filed  a Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips  and  the  matter  was  referred  to  the Administrative  Judge,  Billy  Ray  Stubblefield,  who  denied  the  appellants’ first  Motion  to  Recuse  because  it  did  not  request  an  immediate  Hearing. Appellants’  filed  a  second  Motion  to  Recuse,  amending  the  original

26. motion  to  request  an  immediate  Hearing.      Again  Judge  Phillips  refused to  recuse  himself  and  the  matter  was  again  assigned  to  the Administrative  Judge  Stubblefield.    Judge  Stubblefield  assigned  the matter  for  a  Hearing  in  front  of  Judge  Wisser. On  November  7,  2014,  Judge  Wisser  held  a  Hearing  of  appellants’ Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips.        During  the  Hearing,  Judge  Phillips Court  reporter,  Cathy  Mata,  Court  Operations  Officer,  Darryl  Sanders, David  Campbell,  attorney  for  appellee  and  Wesley  Spears,  counsel  for appellant  testified  at  the  Hearing  of  appellants’  Motion  to  Recuse.

The  court  reporter,  Ms.  Cathy  Mata  testified  that  although  she  was on  the  record  for  the  first  matter  on  September  15,  2014,  which  lasted one  minute,  she  went  off  the  record  although  there  was  no announcement  that  the  court  was  going  off  the  record  or  that  the Summary  Judgment  Hearing  was  not  on  the  record.45    The  court reporter,  Ms.  Mata  was  still  seated  in  her  court  reporter’s  station throughout  the  Hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary Judgment.46

Counsel  for  Appellants  was  not  familiar  with  the  operations  of  this

27. trial  court  since  this  was  the  first  time  he  had  ever  argued  a  Summary Judgment  Motion  in  this  Court,  therefore,  counsel  believed  the  Hearing of  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment  was  on  the  record. Judge  Wisser  denied  appellants’  Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips.47 Appellants’  filed  a  Motion  for  New  Trial  and  a  Motion  for Reconsideration.    The  court  Phillips,  J.,  denied  Appellants  Motion  for New  Trial  and/or  for  Reconsideration  on  December  1,  2014.

28.

SUMMARY  OF  THE  ARGUMENT

The  trial  court  erred  by  denying  appellants’  Motion  for  Summary Judgment  which  was  based  on  their  claim  that  the  subject  Violation Notice  was  defective  because  it  failed  to  provide  a  citation  to  the  specific deed  restriction(s)  the  appellants  were  alleged  to  have  violated.    The Violation  Notice  was  also  defective  because  it  gave  a  cure  date  of  “before the  August  inspection”  even  though  the  Violation  Notice  was  dated October  22,  2013.    The  appellee  held  a  Hearing  based  on  the  subject Violation  Notice  on  November  13,  2013.48      The  subject  Hearing  which was  based  on  a  defective  Notice  is  also  defective. The  trial  court  also  erred  in  failing  to  grant  appellants’  Motion  for Partial  Summary  Judgment  regarding  appellants’  claim  that  the  appellee was  in  violation  of  Texas  Property  Code  §  209.005,  because  of appellee’s  failure  to  produce  the  books  and  records  of  the  Association. The  court  also  erred  in  failing  to  hear  appellants’  three  Motions  to Compel  Discovery  and  Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery before  granting  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  and  No-­‐Evidence Summary  Judgment.    The  court  refused  to  hear  appellants’  Motions

29. finding  that  they  were  not  scheduled  for  the  day  of  the  hearing  of  the parties’  Cross  Motion  s  for  Summary  Judgment.      The  court  abused  it’s discretion  and/or  denied  appellants  due  process  and  violated  court’s policy,  as  the  Court  Operations  Officer  testified,  by  failing  to  hear appellants’  three  Discovery  Motions  and  Motion  for  Continuance  to Complete  Discovery  before  granting  appellees’  Motion  for  Traditional and  No-­‐Evidence  Summary  Judgment.

The  appellants  also  alleged  a  violation  of  the  DTPA  as  a  result  of the  false  and  misleading  written  statements  of  the  property  manager, Diane  Bottema,  representing  that  the  appellants’  were  not  entitled  to  a hearing  in  matters  of  clear  violations  because  the  president  of  the Association,  Ranier  Ficken  could  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Board.49    Ranier Ficken  the  president  of  the  Association  testified  at  his  deposition  that Ms.  Bottema’s  claim  that  he  could  speak  for  the  Board  of  the  appellee  on matters  of  clear  violations  was  false.50

Appellants  also  alleged  that  appellant,  Wesley  Spears  was subjected  voting  fraud  when  his  name  was  left  off  the  ballot  for  the election  of  neighborhood  representatives  on  or  about  June  7,  2014.    This claim  only  existed  for  three  months  before  the  court  ruled  on  the

30. parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment.

The  court  erred  in  refusing  to  recuse  itself  based  on  it’s  refusal  to hear  appellants’  three  Motions  to  Compel  Discovery  and  Motion  for Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery  that  violated  court’s  policy  and  by showing  bias  against  the  appellants  by  refusing  to  allow  counsel  time  to argue,  as  well  as  making  demeaning  remarks  to  counsel  for  appellants.

The  trial  court’s  bias  was  also  demonstrated,  by  the  Court  verbally abusing  counsel  for  the  appellants,  giving  no  consideration  to  appellants arguments,  as  outlined  in  the  appellants’  Motion  to  Recuse.51        Even  the court  reporter,  Cathy  Mata,  testified  when  she  was  called  as  a  witness  by appellee’s  counsel,  that  Judge  Phillips  does  raise  his  voice  and  is sarcastic.      Counsel  was  attempting  to  impeach,  appellants’,  Wesley Spears  testimony  that  Judge  Phillips  was  shouting  at  him  and  acting sarcastically  toward  appellants’  counsel  at  the  Hearing.52    As  an  example of  the  bias  shown  by  Judge  Phillips  on  July  hearing  plaintiffs’  third Motion  to  Compel:

“Counsel  when  they  first  came  here  and  filed  their  Motion  for Summary  Judgment,  they  felt  there  wasn’t  any  discovery  that  was

31. necessary  before  the  summary  judgments  motions  where  heard.        I  now agree  with  them…”  the  court  went  on  …    The  court:    And  if  you  asked  for that  before  file  a  lawsuit  you’d  have  them  in  your  hands  right  now.    But once  you  file  a  lawsuit,  things  change….”53  The  Judge  also  made  a number  of  other  comments  which  counsel  for  the  appellant  felt  were derogatory.54

Finally,  the  court  Wisser,  J.,  erred  by  failing  to  grant  appellants’ Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips.    A  reasonable  person  presented  with the  facts  appellants  presented  to  the  court  would  lead  a  reasonable person  to  question  the  impartiality  of  Judge  Phillips.    Judge  Phillips rulings  were  so  clearly  against  the  rules  and  laws  of  the  State  of  Texas and  the  United  States  to  constitute  bias.

32.

ARGUMENT

I. Did the trial court, Phillips, J., err in granting appellee’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment and denying appellants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for New Trial

Summary  Judgment  is  available  to  the  movant  only  when  the movant  establishes  that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  of  material  fact;  and that  the  movant  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment  as  a  mater  of  law.    City of  Houston  v.  Clear  Creek  Basin  Authority,  589  S.W.  2d  671,  678  (Tex. 1979).    A  defendant/movant  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment  only  if  no evidence  exists  to  support  the  plaintiff’s  causes  of  action.    Celotex  Corp., v.  Catrett,  477  U.S.  317,  323-­‐324,  106  S.  Ct.  2548,  2553  (1986);    See  Benitz v.  Gould  Group,  27  S.W.  3d  109,  112  9Tex.    App.—San  Antonio  2000),  no writ). Further  a  defendant  is  entitled  to  summary  judgment  only  if  he disproves,  as  a  matter  of  law,  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  each  of  the plaintiffs’  causes  of  action.    Lear  Siegler,  Inc.,  v.  Perez,  819  S.W.  2d 470,471  (Tex.  1991).    A  no-­‐evidence  summary  judgment  is  essentially  a pretrial  directed  verdict,  and  courts  apply  the  same  legal  sufficiency standard  in  reviewing  a  no-­‐evidence  summary  judgment  as  they  apply

33. in  reviewing  a  directed  verdict.    Stephan  v.  Baylor  Med.  Ctr.  At  Garland, 20  S.W.  3d  880,891  (Tex.  App.—Dallas  2000,  no  pet.);  Moore  v.  K-­‐Mart Corp.,  981  S.W.  2d  266,  269  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  1998,  pet.  denied). Courts  are  to  consider  all  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable to  the  party  against  whom  the  no-­‐evidence  summary  judgment  is  to  be rendered  disregarding  all  contrary  evidence  and  inferences.    Stephan,  20 S.W3d  at  887,  see  also,  Havner,  953  S.W.  2d  at  711. It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  summary  judgment  rule  to  provide either  a  trial  by  deposition  or  a  trial  by  affidavit,  but  rather  to  provide  a method  of  summarily  terminating  a  case  when  it  clearly  appears  that only  a  question  of  law  is  involved  and  there  is  no  genuine  issue  of  fact. See  Gaines  v.  Hamman,  163  Tex.  618,  626,  358  S.W.  2d  557,  563  (Tex. 1962). At  summary  judgment,  the  court  must  consider  all  the  non-­‐ movant’s  proof  is  true.    Limestone  Products  Distributor  v.  McNamara,  71 S.W.  3d  308,  310  (Tex.  2002);  M.D.  Anderson  Hospital,  Willrich,  28  S.W.  3d 22,  23  (Tex.  2000);  Nixon  v.  Mr.  Property  Management,  Co.,  690  S.W.  2d 546,  548-­‐549  (Tex.  1985). Judge  Phillips  should  have  also  given  appellants  an  opportunity  to

34. amend  their  pleadings  to  cure  any  alleged  defects  in  the  pleadings. Perry  v.  S.N.,  973  S.  W.  2d.  301,303  (Tex.  1998);  Horizon/CMS  Healthcare Corp.,  v.  Auld,  34  S.W.  3d  887,  897  (Tex.  2000);  Friesenhahn,  960  S.  W.  2d 656,  654  (Tex.  1998). At  summary  judgment,  the  court  must  consider  the  record  as whole,  viewing  the  summary  judgment  evidence  and  inferences  from such  evidence  and  giving  the  non-­‐movant  the  benefit  of  all  reasonable inferences  that  may  be  drawn  from  such  evidence.    Nixon  v.  Property Management  Co.,  690  S.W.  2d  546,  548-­‐549  (Tex.  1985). At  summary  Judgment,  the  court  must  indulge  every  inference  in favor  of  the  non-­‐movant.    M.D.  Anderson  Hospital  v.  Willirich,  28  S.W.  3d 22,  23  (Tex.  2000);  Walker  v.  Harris,  924  S.W.  2d  375,  378  Tex.  1996); Nixon  v.  Property  Management  Co.,  690  S.W.  2d  546,  548-­‐549  (Tex. 1985). A  motion  for  summary  judgment  should  be  denied  if  the  non-­‐ movant  produces  more  than  a  scintilla  of  evidence  thereby  raising  a genuine  issue  of  fact  as  to  an  essential  element  of  a  cause  of  action  of which  the  non-­‐movant  would  have  the  burden  of  proof  at  trial.    See Estate  of  William  H.  Arlitt  v.  Paterson,  995  S.W.  2d  713,  717  (Tex.  App.—

35. San  Antonio  1999),  rehearing  overruled).    Evidence  is  more  than  a scintilla  when  it  “rises  to  the  level  that  would  enable  reasonable  and fair-­‐minded  people  to  differ  in  their  conclusions”.    Merrill  Dow Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.  v.  Havner,  953  S.W.  2d  706,  711  (Tex.  1997). Evidence  is  less  than  a  scintilla  when  it  is  so  weak  as  to  do  no more  than  create  a  mere  surmise  or  suspicion  of  the  existence  of  fact. Tex.  R.  Civ.  Proc.  166a;  Kindred  v.  Con/Chemical,  Inc.  650  S.W.  2d  61,  63 (Tex.  1983);  Flamont  Design  v.  Pennzoil  Casplan,  994  S.W.  2d  830,  834 (Tex.  App.—Houston  [1st  Dist.]  1999);  Jackson  v.  Fiesta  Mart,  979  S.W.  2d 68,  70-­‐71  (Tex.  App.—Austin1998).

As  will  be  demonstrated,  appellee’s  Motion  for  No-­‐Evidence  and Traditional  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  should  have  been  denied  and appellants’  Motion  for  Partial  Summary  Judgment  based  on  the defective  Violation  Notice  and  the  other  reasons  stated  herein  should have  been  granted.

Appellants  received  a  first  Violation  Notice  bearing  the  signature  of Diane  Bottema,  the  property  manager,  which  indicated  that  the  lattice

36. extension  that  appellants  installed  to  their  fence,  was  in  violation  of  the rules  and/or  deed  restrictions  of  the  Association.    By  e-­‐mail  appellants notified  the  property  manager  that  they  intended  to  ask  for  a  Hearing after  they  conducted  their  own  investigation.55

By  e-­‐mail  the  property  manager  told  the  appellants  that  they  were not  entitled  to  a  Hearing  in  this  matter  because  in  matters  of  clear violations  the  president  of  the  Association  could  act  for  the  Board  of Directors;  see  text  of  e-­‐mail  below:

“Yes the fence in the attached photo needs to be moved forward to screen the pool pump and the lattice removed from the fence. In a situation such as this, the Board President may speak on behalf of the Board of Directors when the home is in direct violations of the Deed Restrictions.”56

Mr.  Ficken  testified  that  as  President  of  the  Association  he  did  not have  authority  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Board.57    Based  on  Ms.  Bottema false  and  deceptive  statements  the  appellants  removed  the  lattice  from the  fence  all  to  their  loss  and  damage  and  requested  a  meeting  with  the association  president,  Mr.  Ficken  and  Ms.  Bottema,  the  property  at appellants’  home  to  discuss  what  type  of  privacy  screen  could  be  built

37. on  appellants’  property.    No  Violation  Letters  were  issued  in  August, September  or  November  of  2013. On  October  22,  2013,  appellants  received  a  second  Violation  Notice stating  the  Privacy  Screen  as  rebuilt  violated  the  rules  and  deed restrictions  of  the  Association.58    In  response  to  the  October  22,  2013, Second  Violation  Notice  the  appellant,  Wesley  Spears  sent  a  letter  to  the property  manager,  Diane  Bottema,  dated  October  23,  2013,  which  states in  pertinent  part:

“In  that  letter  you  cite  an  alleged  violation  of  the  rules  of  the Homeowners’  Association”:

“Improvement-­‐improvement  not  in  conformance  with  the

CCRs/Rules  of  the  association.      Comments:        Lattice  work  on  top  of

the  fence  not  in  conformance  with  Falcon  Pointe  Community  HOA

guidelines…”59

The  Violation  Notice  did  not  cite  the  specific  deed  restriction appellant(s)  allegedly  violated.        The  subject  Violation  Notice  also

38. provides  an  invalid  cure  date  of  “before  the  August  inspection”  even though  the  Violation  Notice  was  dated  October  22,  2013,  and  the Hearing  on  the  subject  Violation  Notice  was  held  on  November  11,  2013.

In  regards  to  defective  Violation  Notice  as  outlined  in  Appellants’ Motion  for  Partial  Summary  Judgment,  the  Texas  Property  Code  and  the Bylaws  of  the  Association,  provide  that  in  order  for  a  Homeowner’s Association  to  take  enforcement  action  it  must  provide  the  homeowner with  Notice  that  provides  the  specific  deed  restriction  that  the Homeowner  is  alleged  to  have  violated  and  to  provide  a  reasonable  cure date.      Appellants’  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  provided  in  pertinent part  as  follows  regarding  the  issue  of  defective  Violation  Notices:

The  Second  Violation  Notice,  just  like  the  First  Violation  Notice does  not  cite  any  specific  rule(s)  and/or  deed  restriction(s)  that  the Association  claims  that  the  appellants  violated,  on  that  basis  alone appellants’  Motion  for  Partial  Summary  Judgment  should  have  been granted.

A  Hearing  of  the  subject  Violation  Notice  was  held  by  the  Board  of the  appellee,  on  November  11,  2013.    The  matter  was  heard  by  two

39. directors,  Ranier  Ficken,  president  and  William  Meyers,  vice  president of  the  appellee,  who  are  also  both  high  ranking  employees  of  the Developer,  Newland  Communities.    The  neighborhood  representative  on the  board  did  not  appear  or  vote  at  the  subject  hearing.

The  Hearing  was  conducted  at  the  direction  of  Alex  Valdes,  an attorney  for  the  appellee.    Mr.  Valdes  announced  the  decision  of  the Board,  on  November  26,  2013,  in  a  letter  to  appellant,  Wesley  Spears, which  states  as  follows:

“Upon careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances exercise their business judgment as to the best interests of the Association, the Board has made a final determination regarding your installation of improvements and modifications that were not approved by the Association. The Board hereby reaffirms and upholds it’s previous decision regarding the violation set forth in its prior correspondence to you.”60

Just  like  the  subject  Violation  Notice,  Attorney  Valdes’  letter  cites no  deed  restriction  that  appellants  were  alleged  to  have  violated  or upon  which  the  Board’s  decision  was  based.      The  decision  of  the  board of  the  Association  was  based  on  the  “business  judgment”  of  the  Board  of Directors  of  the  Association.61

Accordingly,  the  Hearing,  which  was  based  on  a  defective  Notice

40. and  which  cites  no  specific  deed  restriction  upon  which  the  board’s ruling  was  based  was  invalid  as  a  matter  of  law.    The  only  valid  basis  for the  taking  the  enforcement  action  by  a  homeowners’  association  against a  homeowner  is  the  violation  of  a  specific  deed  restriction.

A  “business  decision”  is  not  a  valid  basis  for  finding  the  appellants where  in  violation  of  unspecified  deed  restrictions.    In  fact,  the  Texas Property  Owners’  Protection  Act  was  intended  to  protect  homeowners’ from  Homeowners’  Associations  from  exercising  of  business  judgments that  restricts  the  homeowners’  use  of  their  property,  based  on  any reason  other  than  the  violation  of  a  deed  restriction.

(A)  THE  SUBJECT  NOTICE  OF  VIOLATION  IS  DEFECTIVE.

The  subject  Notice  of  Violation,  which  was  sent  to  the  appellants, at  the  direction  of  appellee’s,  property  manager,  Diane  Bottema  was defective  and  did  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Texas  Property Code    § 209.006,  and  the  Bylaws  and  Rules  of  the  Association.62

The Bylaws of the Association provide in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Notice. Prior to the imposition of any sanction hereunder, the Board or its delegate shall serve the alleged violator with written notice describing (i) the nature of the alleged violation, (ii) the proposed sanction to be imposed, (iii) a period of not less than the (10) days 41.

within which the alleged violator may present written request to the Board of Directors for a hearing; and (iv) a statement that the proposed sanction shall be imposed as contained in the notice unless a challenge is begun within ten days (10) days of the notice. If a timely challenge is not made, the sanction stated in the notice shall be imposed.

(b) Hearing. If a hearing is requested within the allotted ten (10) day period, the hearing shall be held in executive session affording the alleged violator a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Prior to the effectiveness of any sanction hereunder, proof of proper notice shall be placed in the minutes of the meeting. Such proof shall be deemed adequate if a copy of the notice, together with a statement of the date and manner of delivery is entered by the officer, Director, or agent who delivered the notice. The notice requirement shall be deemed satisfied if the alleged violator appears at the meeting. The minutes of the meeting shall contain a written statement of the results of the hearing and the sanction, if any, imposed. The Board of Directors may, but shall not be obligated to, suspend any proposed sanction if the violation is cured within the ten (10) day period. Such suspension shall not constitute a waiver of the right to sanction future violations of the same or other provisions and rules by any Person.63

Appellants  did  not  appear  at  the  Hearing  because  the  Violation Notice  were  defective  and  failed  to  give  the  appellants’  adequate  notice of  the  specific  deed  restriction  that  appellants’  were  alleged  to  have violated.    Further,  the  bylaws  provided  that  a  homeowner  waives  notice, if  they  appear  at  the  Hearing,  so  appellants  did  not  appear  and, therefore,  appellants  did  not  waive  proper  notice.

The  Bylaws  require  the  Association  to  send  a  Notice,  which

42. provides  the  “nature”,  (emphasis  added)  of  the  alleged  violations. Restrictive  covenants  are  subject  to  general  rules  of  construction. Hodas  v.  Scenic  Oaks  Property  Ass’n,  47  S.W.  2d  747  (App.  4  Dist.  2000).

Accordingly,  the  court  must  give  a  restrictive  covenant’s  words  and phrases  their  commonly  accepted  meaning.    In  this  case,  the  by-­‐laws  of the  Association  requires  it  to  state  the  specific  deed  restriction  and  rule that  the  appellants’  are  alleged  to  have  violated.    The  explicit  language  of the  by-­‐laws  requires  the  Association  to  identify  the  “nature”  of  the violations,  which  requires  the  Association  to  identify  the  specific  deed restriction  the  appellants  were  alleged  to  have  violated.

The  Court  of  Appeals,  in  Ashcreek  Homeowner’s  Association    v. Smith,  902  S.W.2d  586  (App.  1  Dist.  1995),  the  leading  case  on  defective Notice(s)  under  the  Texas  Property  Code  as  it  relates  to  Homeowners’ Associations  held  that  a  Notice  was  defective  and  a  Hearing  invalid because  of  the  Association’s  failure  to  identify  the  specific  deed restriction  the  homeowner’  was  alleged  to  have  violated.    The  Ashcreek by-­‐laws,  which  the  court  interpreted,  were  almost  identical  to  the  By-­‐ laws  of  the  Association  in  this  case.64    The  Court  in  the  Ashcreek  case

43. held,  that  the  Notice  of  Violation  must  cite  the  specific  deed  restriction that  the  homeowner  is  alleged  to  have  violated  and  the  Association  must hold  a  Hearing  based  on  the  specific  provision  of  the  deed  restriction(s) the  homeowner  is  alleged  to  have  violated.

Therefore,  as  a  matter  of  law  the  subject  Violation  Notice  was defective  because  the  failed  to  cite  the  specific  deed  restriction(s) and/or  rule(s)  the  appellants  are  alleged  to  have  violated.    Further,  the subject  Violation  Notice  also  failed  to  identify  a  specific  cure  date  simply saying  comply  before  the  “August  inspection”,  which  was  particularly invalid  in  regards  to  the  subject  Notice  of  Violation  which  is  dated October  22,  2013.65

Even  if  the  Appellee  argues  that  no  cure  date  was  necessary because  this  was  a  second  violation,  once  the  subject  Violation  Notice provides  a  cure  date,  it  must  provide  a  valid  cure  date,  which  complies which  the  Texas  Property  Code,  § 209.006,  and  the  bylaws  of  the Association.    A  cure  date  of  before  the  August  inspection  for  a  violation that  allegedly  occurred  in  October  is  clearly  defective.

44.

Texas  Property  Code  §  209.006  provides  that  Notice  is  Required Before  Enforcement  Action:

(a) Before a property owners’ association may suspend an owner’s right to use a common area, file a suit against an owner other than a suit to collect a regular or special assessment or foreclose under an association’s lien, charge, an owner for property damage or levy a fine for a violation of the restrictions or bylaws or rules of the association, the association or it’s agent must give written notice to the owner by certified mail, return receipt requested.

(b)  The  notice  must:

(1) describe the violation or property damage that is the basis for the suspension, action, charge, or fine and state the amount due the association from the owner, and…

“While a restrictive covenant should be liberally construed to give effect to the purpose and intent, equitable principles require that covenants restricting free use of land which give rise to ambiguity or substantial doubt as to interpretation be construed strictly in favor of the homeowner and the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises.” Simon Property Group (Texas) L.P. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 943 S.W. 2d 64 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1997); Macdonald v. Painter, 441 S. W. 2d 179 (Tex. 1969); J. P. Bdg. Enterprises, Inc., v. Timberwood Development Co., 718 S. W. 2d 841 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1986 , writ refused n.r.); City of Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W. 687 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th District]). Pheasant Run Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., v. Kastor, 47 S.W. 2d 74 (Tex. App. _ Houston [14th District]) 2001; Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W. 2d 813 (Tex. App.-­‐ San Antonio 1997).

In  Davis  v.  Huey,  620  S.W.  2d  at  566,  the  Texas  Supreme

45. Court  addressed  the  validity  of  covenant  requiring  submission  of construction  plans  to  an  “architectural  control  committee”,  while applying  Texas  common-­‐law  rules  of  construction.    In  this  case,  the subdivision  developers  attempted  to  enjoin  Davies  from  building  a home  on  their  lot,  citing  a  refusal  of  the  architectural  control committee  to  approve  their  plan  for  construction.    The  court  found that  the  developers  had  exceeded  their  authority,  and  determined that  the  restrict  covenant  was  void.    Id.  at  566.

The  Texas  Supreme  Court  extended  the  rules  in  the  Davis Case  in  Wilmoth  v.  Wilcox,  743  S.W.  2d  at  658.

“The court again employed the strict construction standard requirements established in the Davis case to construe restrictive covenants strictly against the party seeking to enforce it. Davis and its progeny provide a common-­‐law strict construction of restrictive covenant to protect property owners by construing covenants with ambiguous language in favor of the free and unrestricted use of real property. In 1987, the Texas legislature enacted chapter 202 of the Texas Property Code. This chapter was intended to create a mechanism for developers and property owner associations to enforce restrictive covenants.”

In  the  Ashcreek  case  the  court  stated:

“This Court recently addressed this issue in Crispin v. Paragan Home, Inc., 888 S.W. 2d 78 (Tex. App.-­‐Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied.) There we concluded that:

46.

We are unable to discern a conflict between liberally construing a restrictive covenant to give effect to its purpose, and construing a restrictive covenant either in favor of the free and unrestricted use of land or to strictly construe it against a party seeking enforce it Furthermore, section 201.003(a) was effective… The supreme court in Wilmoth on July 1, 1987, and denied a motion for rehearing on September 16, 1987. In its decision, the Supreme Court also failed to recognize that the property code had overruled the principles upon which relied.

Id.  At  81,  n.1.

In  this  case,  appellants  were  not  given  any  indication  of  what specific  deed  restriction  they  are  alleged  to  have  violated  and,  thus appellants  were  denied  legal  Notice  and  a  fair  Hearing.    The  court’s ruling  in  Ashcreek  reiterates  a  simply  principle  that  before  a homeowner’  can  be  found  in  violation  of  the  deed  restriction(s)  of  the Association  they  must  receive  Notice  of  the  specific  provision  of the  deed  restriction(s)  they  are  alleged  to  have  violated  and  they  must be  given  a  fair  Hearing  based  on  the  specific  deed  restriction  the homeowner’  is  alleged  to  have  violated.

In  this  case,  the  appellee  clearly  based  its  decision  on  a  business decision  and  said  so  in  a  letter  from  their  counsel  announcing  the decision  of  the  Board.      The  Board’s  decision  was  based  on  a  “business

47. decision”  as  to  the  best  interests  of  the  Association  (in  other  words  the best  interest  of  the  developer,  Newland  Properties,  who  the  only  voting members  of  the  Board  worked  for),  not  because  a  violation  of  a  deed restriction.

The  appellants  were  denied  their  most  basic  rights,  that  of reasonable  Notice  and  a  fair  Hearing  with  a  reasonable  opportunity  to be  heard  and  present  evidence,  “due  process”.    Allowing  a  homeowners’ association  to  take  enforcement  action  without  giving  a  homeowners specific  notice  of  the  deed  restriction  that  it  claimed  the  homeowner violated  is  a  denial  of  due  process.        It  would  be  akin  to  charging  a person  with  a  crime  and  not  telling  them  what  offense  they  were charged  with.

(B) APPELLEE VIOLATED TEXAS PROPERTY CODE 209.005 AND REFUSED TO PRODUCE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS TO WHICH APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO OBTAIN BY STATUTE

Appellee  has  violated  the  Texas  Property  Code    § 209.005,  by  failing to  provide  appellants  with  the  properly  requested  records  of  the appellee.    Appellants’  have  made  numerous  requests  pursuant  to  Texas Property  Code    § 209.005,  for  records  of  the  Association.66    As  part  of

48. appellee’s  dilatory  strategy,  counsel  for  appellee  objected  to  producing the  records  primarily  arguing  that  since  suit  has  been  filed  all  requests for  documents  must  be  made  by  a  formal  document  requests.67

Appellants  are  unaware  of  any  legal  authority,  which  suspends appellee’s  obligations  under  Texas  Property  Code    § 209.005,  to  make the  books  and  records  of  the  Association  reasonably  available  to homeowners’  after  they  have  filed  suit.

Texas  Property    § 209.005  in  pertinent  part  provides:

(c) Notwithstanding a provision in a dedicatory instrument, a property owners’ association shall make the books and records of the association, including financial records, open to and reasonably available to for examination by an owner, or a person designated in a writing signed by the owner as the owners’ agent, attorney, or certified public accountant, in accordance with this section. An owner is entitled to obtain from the association copies of information contained in the books and records…

(i) ….An Association may not charge an owner for the compilation, production, or reproduction of information requested under this section unless the policy prescribing those costs has been recorded as required by this subsection.

The  appellee  is  in  violation  of  the  Texas  Property  Code  § 209.005, because  of  its  failure  to  produce  any  records  pursuant  to  appellants’ many  requests  for  the  production  records.      Appellants’  first  request

49. sent,  pursuant  to  the  Texas  Property  Code,  was  dated  December  9,  2013, and  was  sent  to  the  Appellee  by  certified  mail.

The  letter  requested  a  summary  of  the  dedicatory  violation  history of  the  Association,  with  confidential  information  redacted  as  specifically provided  in  Texas  Property  Code    § 209.005.68      The  Appellee  has  refused to  provide  any  records  pursuant  to  appellants’  five  requests  for documents  pursuant  to  Texas  Property  Code  §  209.005.69    The  appellee has  never  communicated  to  the  appellants  that  they  were  unable  to produce  the  records  as  required  by,    § 209.005  (f)(1)(2)  of  the  Texas Property  Code.

The  appellee  and  the  trial  court  took  the  position  that  the  Texas Property  Code  is  not  applicable  after  appellants  filed  suit  with  regards to  the  Association’s  obligation  to  make  the  books  and  records  of  the Association  reasonably  available  to  appellants.70    The  court  Phillips  J., went  so  far  as  to  say  that  appellants  should  have  obtained  the  records before  filing  suit.71

In  fact,  the  limited  authority  discovered  by  appellants’  counsel, suggests  that  the  statutory  rights  of  the  appellants  to  records  of  appellee

50. do  not  change  after  suit  is  filed.    Appellee  has  refused  to  produce documents  requested  pursuant  to  a  series  of  requests  that  Appellants’ have  made  pursuant  to  Texas  Property  Code,  § 209.005,  saying  while this  matter  is  in  litigation  any  requests  for  documents  must  be  made  as a  formal  document  request.72

From  December  9,  2013,  until  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for Summary  Judgment  the  appellants’  have  made  several  other  Formal Discovery  Requests  for  records  which  complies  with  Texas  Property Code    § 209.005  and  the  Association  has  failed  to  follow  the  procedure laid  out  in  Texas  Property  Code  § 209.005,  and  simply  refused  to  provide the  requested  information.73

Appellants’  first  formal  request  dated  December  9,  2013,  was contained  in  a  certified  letter  to  Diane  Bottema,  property  manager, requested:

“I am again requesting a copy of the dedicatory violation history of the Falcon Pointe Community Association. I am also requesting a summary of the fines imposed for each violation identified. To be perfectly clear, I am not seeking the identity or names and addresses of the Homeowners’ involved. I agree any information regarding the identity of homeowners may be redacted or otherwise deleted.”74

51.

In  response  to  that  request  appellants  were  advised  pursuant  to  a letter  dated  January  13,  2013,  letter  from  an  attorney  who  represented the  Association:

“The Association will comply with all lawful requests for documents submitted under the Property Code. Under Texas Property Code § 209.005, certain records must be made available; however, a property owners’ association “is not required to release or allow inspection of any books or records that identify the dedicatory instrument violation history of an individual owner of an association.”

“To the extent that you wish for a summary of information. I believe that should be requested through an interrogatory now that this matter is in litigation and the parties are conducting discovery. To the extent that your letter constitutes a discovery request, Falcon Pointe Community Association objects to the discovery request, as vague, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seeking information that is neither relevant nor likely to lead to the discovery of any relevant or admissible evidence. In addition, objection is made insofar as the requests (sic) seek information that is confidential under Texas law”.75

Appellants’  request  for  production  of  a  summary  dedicatory violation  history  of  the  Association,  with  all  confidential  information redacted  was  entirely  consistent  with  Tex.  Prop.  Code  §  209.005.    On  May 23,  2014,  appellants’  sent  a  letter  certified  mail  to  counsel  for  appellee asking  for  copies  of  all  financial  records  of  the  Association.76 Appellants’  received  the  following  response  to  that  request  pursuant  to a  letter  from  David  Campbell  dated  June  10,  2014:

52.

“I write this correspondence in response to your letter dated May 23, 2014, in which you state that you “wish to get copies of the financial records” of appellee, Falcon Pointe Community Association. Any requests for documents should be submitted as a formal discovery requests as this matter is in litigation. After receiving your letter, we have received a request for production “any and all of the books and records of the Falcon Pointe Community Association, including but not limited to all financial records….” Defendant Falcon Pointe Community Association will respond to this discovery request pursuant the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.77

On  June  12,  2014,  appellants’  sent  a  certified  letter  to  Diane Bottema,  Property  Manager  for  the  Association  requesting  the  following documents:

“I  hereby  requests  copies  of  all  of  the  books  and  records  of  the Falcon  Pointe  Community  Association  pursuant  to  the  Texas  Property Code”.78

Appellants’  received  the  following  reply  to  that  request  in pertinent  part:

“As  this  matter  is  in  litigation,  all  requests  for  documents  should be  submitted  as  a  formal  discovery  request  to  the  Falcon  Pointe Community  association  (“Falcon  Pointe”)  through  it’s  counsel.”79 By  letter  dated  June  20,  2014,  appellee  reiterated  its  position  that any  request  for  documents  had  to  be  made  by  formal  document

53. request.80    Appellee’s  attorneys’  have  also  requested  that  appellants make  discovery  requests  formally  in  court.81    The  only  documents appellee’s  have  released  to  appellants  were  a  copy  of  it’s  policy  of insurance,  and  less  than  twenty  pages  of  minutes  of  irrelevant  board meetings  and  two  Budgets.      Those  documents  were  produced  by  Ranier Ficken,  President  of  the  Association  pursuant  to  the  Notice  to  take  his Deposition  Duces  Tecum  that  requested  virtually  all  of  the  records  of the  Association.82

Those  documents  were  produced  pursuant  to  the  Notice  to  Take the  Deposition  Duces  Tecum,  of  Ranier  Ficken,  the  president  of  the Association.    Appellee  has  refused  to  produce  any  correspondence between  the  parties  or  any  other  document  relevant  to  this  case.    The appellee  even  refused  to  produce  copies  of  the  subject  Violation  Notice.

Appellants  have  requested  formal  discovery  in  the  form  of Requests  for  Production  of  Documents  and  Notice  to  take  Depositions Duces  Tecum.    Appellants  have  requested  copies  of  all  books  and records  of  the  Association.  The  attorney  for  the  appellee  indicated  that appellee  would  not  comply  with  future  requests  for  documents  unless

54. they  were  submitted  and  ordered  through  the  court  in  violation  of  Texas Property  Code  §    209.005.83

Appellants’  requests  were  made  to  the  appellee  pursuant  to  Texas Property  Code,  §  209.005  which  grants  to  the  appellants  a  statutory  right to  the  requested  documents.    Appellee  cannot  escape  its  responsibilities under  Texas  Property  Code  § 209.005,  by  relying  on  the  claim  that  once appellants’  filed  suit  they  must  make  a  formal  discovery  requests  to obtain  the  requested  documents  and  then  appellee  is  free  to  assert standard  discovery  objection  to  the  production.

The  appellee  has  circumvented  the  rights  granted  homeowners’ under  Texas  Property  Code  §  209.005.    The  books  and  records  of  the Association  belong  to  the  homeowners’  of  the  Association,  and therefore,  the  rules  of  evidence  do  not  effect  the  obligation  of  the appellee  to  release  records  requested  pursuant  to  Texas  Property  Code§ 209.005.      The  appellants  have  made  numerous  formal  requests  under Texas  Property  Code  § 209.005,  after  filing  suit  in  this  matter,  as  well  as numerous  discovery  requests.

The  appellee  has  refused  to  produce  the  requested  documents

55. responding  by  saying  since  suit  has  been  filed,  appellants  must  make  an official  document  request  in  the  lawsuit  in  order  to  obtain  the  books  and records  of  the  Association  and  the  trial  court  must  order  the  same. Appellee  is  basically  saying  any  homeowner’  except  the  appellants  are entitled  to  copies  of  the  books  and  records  of  the  Association,  because they  filed  suit.

Homeowners’  who  have  filed  suit  are  the  homeowners’  who  need the  books  and  records  of  the  Association  the  most.    Appellee  should have  been  found  by  the  trial  court,  as  a  matter  of  law  to  have  violated Texas  Property  Code    §  209.005,  for  failing  to  produce  the  books  and records  of  the  Association  pursuant  to  appellants’  many  requests enumerated  above.

The  trial  court  should  have  also  granted  appellants’  Motion  for Partial  Summary  Judgment  and  denied  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional and  No-­‐Evidence  Summary  Judgment.    Further  the  trial  court  refused  to hear  appellants’  three  Motions  to  Compel  the  production  of  documents and  witnesses  in  violation  of  its’ own  policy.

56.

In  Burton  v.  Cravey,  759  S.W.  2d  160  (Houston  1st  District  1988): The  Court  of  Appeals,  Duggan,  J.,  held  absent  proof  by  association  of improper  purpose  for  inspecting  records,  owners  were  entitled  to inspect  all  pertinent  records  including  those  of  association’s  attorney. In  this  case,  appellants’  numerous  requests  for  documents  were necessary  in  order  for  the  appellants  to  prosecute  their  Declaratory Judgment  Action,  which  included  claims  of  deceptive  trade  practices.84

In  the  Burton  case  the  court,  rejected  appellee’s  argument  that  the request  for  inspection  of  records  were  subject  the  rules  of  discovery, specifically  rejecting  the  appellee’s  argument  that  the  request  was unduly  burdensome.    Ruling  that  unduly  burdensome  was  not applicable  to  appellants’  statutory  requests  for  records.      Accordingly, this  court  should  also  reject  the  appellee’s  argument  that  appellants’ requests  were  unduly  burdensome  and  not  relevant  which  are  the  only reasons  appellee  has  put  forth  for  not  producing  the  requested  copies  of the  books  and  records  of  the  appellee.

57.

2. DID THE TRIAL COURT, PHILLIPS, J., ERR IN REFUSING TO RULE ON APPELLANTS’ THREE MOTIONS TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE TO COMPLETE DISCOVERY PRIOR TO RULING ON THE PARTIES’ CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Fundamental  requirements  of  due  process  demand  that  a  party  be

given  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  be  heard  U.S.  Const.  Amendment  14.85

Similarly,  the  Constitution  of  the  State  of  Texas  provides  that  “no  citizen

of  this  State  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  property,  privileges  or

immunities,  or  in  any  manner  disenfranchised,  except  by  the  due  course

of  the  law  of  the  land.    Texas  Const.  Art.  1  §19.86

The  purpose  of  discovery  is  to  allow  the  parties  to  obtain  the  fullest

knowledge  of  facts  and  issues  prior  to  trial.  West  v.  Solite,  563  S.W.  2d

240,  243  (Tex.  1978).    Thus,  orders  prohibiting  discovery  may  constitute

an  abuse  of  discretion.    See  Helfand  v.  Coane,  12  S.W.  3d  152,  155  (Tex.

App.  Houston  [1st  Dist.]  2000,  pet  denied),  also  Tex.  R.  Civ.  P.  192.3,  (“A

court  abuses  its  discretion  in  unreasonably  restricting  a  party’s  access

to  information  through  discovery.”).

The  rule  regarding  the  scope  of  discovery  is  broad.    “In  general  a

party  may  obtain  discovery  regarding  any  matter  that  is  not  privileged

and  is  relevant  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  pending  action,  whether  it

58. relates  to  the  claim  or  defense  of  the  party  seeking  discovery  or  the claim  or  defense  of  any  other  party.”    TEX  CIV.  192.3  (a).    This  rule reflects  the  ultimate  purpose  of  discovery,  which  is  to  “seek  truth,  so that  disputes  may  be  decided  by  those  facts  that  are  revealed,  rather than  concealed.”    Axelson,  Inc.,  et  al.,  v.  The  Honorable  Grainger  W. McIIhany,  798  S.W.  2d  550,  555  (Tex.  1990).    Due  process  in  all  cases  is necessary  to  insure  that  all  people  have  equal  rights  to  petition  the court  and  to  be  heard  and  have  equal  protection  of  the  law.    A  trial  court abuses  its  discretion  when  it  acts  without  reference  to  any  guiding  rules and  principles,  or  in  other  words  acts  in  an  arbitrary  or  unreasonable manner.    Downer  v.  Aquamarine  Operations,  Inc.,  701  S.W.  2d.  238,  241-­‐ 242  (Tex.  1985),  cert  denied,  476  U.S.  1159,  106  S.Ct.  2279,  90  L.Ed.  2d  721 (1986).

Before  granting  a  no-­‐evidence  motion  for  summary  judgment  the trial  court  must  allow  the  non-­‐movants  an  adequate  time  for  discovery. Tex.  R.  Civ.  Proc.  166a(1).    In  determining  whether  the  trial  court  has allowed  adequate  time  for  discovery,  the  reviewing  court  should determine  (a)  the  nature  of  the  case;  (b)  the  nature  of  evidence

59. necessary  to  controvert  the  no  evidence  motion;  (3)  the  length  of  time the  case  was  active;  (4)  the  amount  of  time  the  no  evidence  motion  was on  file;  (5)  whether  the  movant  for  summary  judgment  had  requested stricter  deadlines  for  discovery;  (6)  The  amount  of  discovery  that  had already  taken  place;  and  whether  the  discovery  deadlines  in  place  were specific  or  vague.    Moorehouse  v.  Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  76  S.W.  3d  587, 591  (Tex.  App—San  Antonio  2002,  no  writ);  Martinez  v.  City  of  San Antonio,  40  S.W.  3d  587,  591  (Tex.  App.—San  Antonio  2001,  pet  denied).

Appellants’  have  been  denied  due  process  by  the  refusal  of  Judge Phillips  to  allow  them  to  be  heard  on  their  three  Discovery  Motions  and Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery,  before  ruling  on  the parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment.      There  is  no  justifiable reason  why  Judge  Phillips  refused  to  hear  Appellants’  properly  filed three  Motions  to  Compel  Discovery  and  Motion  for  Continuance  to Complete  Discovery.    The  discovery  sought  by  appellant  was  intended  to respond  to  the  appellee’s  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment.    Brewer  & Pritchard,  PC  v.  Johnson,  167  S.W.  3d  460,  469  (Tex.  App.—Houston  (14th Dist.)  2005,  rehearing  overruled).

60. A  litigant  who  blocks  discovery  and  withholds  evidence  cannot use  the  non-­‐movant’s  lack  of  evidence  to  win  a  summary  judgment. Tempay,  Inc.,  v.  TNT  Concrete  &  Construction,  Inc.,  37  S.W.  3d  517,  521-­‐ 522  (Tex.  App.—Austion  2001,  no  writ)  citing  Robert  W.  Clore,  Texas  Rule of  Civil  Procedure  166a(1);  A  New  Weapon  for  Texas  Defendants,  29  St. Mary’s  L.  J.  813,  843  (1998).    “The  ultimate  purpose  of  Discovery  is  to seek  the  truth  so  that  disputes  are  decided  by  what  the  facts  reveal,  not by  what  facts  are  concealed.”    Jampole  v.  Touchy,  673  S.W.  2d  569,  573 (Tex.  1984).

In  this  case,  the  Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery was  not  only  timely  filed  but  it  states  a  number  of  irrefutable  reasons why  the  Motion  should  have  been  heard  and  granted.    The  Motion  was also  verified  and  had  a  detailed  affidavit  explaining  the  specific  need  for the  requested  discovery.87

The  subject  case  has  been  on  file  for  ten  months  prior  to  the  court granting  Appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  No-­‐Evidence  Summary Judgment.    The  discovery  cutoff  set  by  Judge  Phillips  was  September  30,

61. 2014.    The  court  granted  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  and  No-­‐ Evidence  Summary  Judgment  on  September  15,  2014.88    Appellants have  filed  Six  Motions  to  Compel  Discovery  and,  only  three  have  been heard.

The  Motions  were  made  necessary  by  the  planned  dilatory  actions of  defense  counsel  in  refusing  to  cooperate  with  discovery.      Appellants did  not  even  have  the  transcripts  of  the  two  depositions  they  were allowed  to  take  of  Ranier  Ficken,  president  of  the  appellee  and  Diane Bottema,  the  property  manager,  at  the  time  the  Summary  Judgment Briefs  in  this  matter  were  due  in  the  trial  court.89

The  appellate  court,  in  Nelson  v.  PNC  Mortgage  Corp.,  139  S.W.  3d 442  (2004),  held:  “But  Nelson,  even  as  an  incarcerated  prisoner  was entitled  to  a  ruling  on  the  numerous  discovery  motions  he  filed  and requests  to  be  heard.    The  trial  court’s  failure  to  rule  on  Nelson’s discovery  motions  foreclosed  any  possibility  of  Nelson  exercising  his right  to  obtain  reasonable  discovery  before  summary  judgment  was rendered  against  him.”    Id.  at  444,  445.      The  court  also  ruled  that  the court  should  have  held  a  hearing  on  Nelson’s  Motion  for  Continuance.

62.

The  court  went  on  to  state:

“In  reviewing  this  case  on  appeal  our  concern  is  not  so  much  with the  alleged  errors  in  the  trial  court  rulings.    Instead,  our  concern  lies with  the  trial  court’s  repeated  failure  to  hear  or  rule  on  the  numerous Motions  filed  by  Nelson  despite  Nelson’s  persistent  requests  for  action.

A  trial  court  is  required  to  consider  and  rule  upon  a  motion  within a  reasonable  time.    See  In  re  Ramirez,  994  S.W.  2d  682,  683  (Tex.  App. San  Antonio  1998,  orig.  proceeding).    In  this  case  the  vast  majority  of Nelson’s  Motions  were  never  ruled  on.    Yet  Washington  Mutual  and Barrett  Burke’s  were  set  promptly  and  ruled  on  in  Nelson’s  absence.  ”  Id. at  444.

“The  trial  court  granted  summary  judgment  against  Nelson without  giving  any  apparent  consideration  to  his  discovery  motions before  ordering  that  he  take  nothing  by  his  claims,  Nelson  was  not  given a  reasonable  opportunity  to  be  heard  on  the  significant  issue  of  his access  to  evidence  that  may  have  supported  his  claims.    Fundamental requirements  of  due  process  demand  that  a  party  to  cause  be  given  and opportunity  to  be  heard.    Cf.  Creel  v.  Dist.  Attorney  for  Medina  County,

63. 818  S.W.  2d  45,  46  (Tex.  1991).

“In  his  motions  to  continue  the  hearing  on  Washington  Mutual and  Barrett  Burke’s  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,  Nelson  made  the trial  court  aware  of  the  fact  it  had  not  ruled  on  his  pending  discovery motions  including  motions  to  compel  discovery.”    Id.  at  444.    The  Nelson case  is  factually  analogous  to  this  case.    Appellants  filed  six  Motions  to Compel  Discovery,  three  of  their  Motions  remain  unheard.      Appellants’ Motion  for  Continuance  to  Complete  Discovery  also  remains  unheard.

Repeatedly  in  this  case  the  trial  court,  Phillips,  J.,  refused  to  grant the  discovery  requested  by  appellants.    The  trial  court  repeatedly granted  appellee’s  requests  that  the  appellants’  requested  discovery  be blocked  and  stopped.    However,  appellee  cannot  block  discovery  and then  be  granted  dismissal  of  appellants’  causes  of  action.    Fair  play,  Rule 166a  and  due  process  do  not  allow  this  maneuver.    Tex.  R.  Civ.  Proc. 166a;  Tempay,  Inc.  v.  TNT  Concrete  Construction,  Inc.,  37  S.W.  3d  517, 521-­‐522  (Tex.  App—Austin  2001,  no  writ)  citing  Thomas  R.  Phillips,  Texas Supreme  Court  Update,  60  Tex.  B.J.  858,  861  (1997);  Brewer  &  Pritchard, PC  v.  Johnson,  167  S.W.  3d  460,  469  (Tex.  App.—Houston  [14th  Dist.]  2005, rehearing  overruled);  Jampole  v.  Touchy,  673  S.W.  2d  569,  573  (Tex.

64. 1984).

The  trial  court  erred  and  abused  its  discretion,  when  it  granted appellees’  demands  to  block  and  stop  appellants’  requested  Discovery, and  then  dismissed  appellants’  causes  of  action  by  granting  appellee’s No-­‐Evidence  and  Traditional  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  and awarding  attorneys’  fees.    The  trial  court’s  granting  of  the  No  Evidence and  Traditional  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  should  be  reversed  and the  court  ordered  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  appellants’  on  their  Motion for  Partial  Summary  Judgment  and  to  remand  appellants’  other  claims for  full  discovery  and  a  trial  on  the  merits.

3. DID THE TRIAL COURT, PHILLIPS, J., ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS’ TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT CLAIMS CONTAINED IN THEIR FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINTS

Appellee  has  violated  the  Texas  Deceptive  Trade  Practices  Act, (hereinafter  “DTPA”).90    V.T.C.A.,  Bus.  &  C.,  Section  17.50:  (a),  in  two regards.    First,  as  outlined  above  the  property  manager,  Diane  Bottema made  false  and  misleading  statements  orally  and  in  writing  that appellants’  were  not  entitled  to  a  Hearing  of  their  alleged  violations  of the  deed  restrictions,  in  matters  of  clear  violations  of  the  rules  of  the

65. Association.

Based  on  the  property  managers  misrepresentation  of  the appellants  did  not  request  a  Hearing  regarding  the  first  Violation  Notice and  tore  down  the  lattice  from  their  fence,  as  demanded  by  appellee. Appellants  consequently  suffered  damage  for  the  fair  value  of  the materials  and  labor  expend  to  add  the  lattice  to  the  fence  and  to  remove it.

While  this  matter  was  pending,  appellant,  Wesley  Spears  applied  to be  on  the  ballot  to  be  a  voting  Neighborhood  Representative  of  the Association,  the  election  was  held  on  June  7,  2014.    Appellant,  Wesley Spears’  name  was  intentionally  omitted  from  the  Ballot  for Neighborhood  Representative  by  Appellee,  effectively  disenfranchising, appellant,  Wesley  Spears,  an  African  American  attorney.

What  is  very  ironic  is  this  occurred  in  a  courthouse  named  for  the first  african-­‐american  student  at  the  University  of  Texas,  School  of  Law. Heman  Marion  Sweatt  was  denied  of  his  dream  of  becoming  a  lawyer, because  of  discrimination.    After  climbing  the  ladder  on  the  backs  of great  men  like  Marion  Sweat,  appellant,  Wesley  Spears,  who  was  born  in the  same  year

66. Marion  Sweat  became  the  first  african-­‐american  law  student  at  the University  of  Texas,  and  appellant,  Wesley  Spears,  became  a  lawyer  in 1979,  twenty  five  years  later.  Nevertheless,  appellant,  Wesley  Spears was  denied  his  most  basic  human  rights  that  is  to  serve  in  an  elected position.

Ranier  Ficken,  President  of  Appellee,  testified  at  his  deposition,  that there  was  no  reason  why  Appellant’,  Wesley  Spears’  name  was  not placed  on  the  Ballot  for  Neighborhood  Representative.91  It  was  a violation  of  DTPA  for  the  appellee  to  deny  appellant,  Wesley  Spears  of his  basic  civil  and  human  rights  to  apply  and  serve  in  an  elective position  because  he  has  brought  a  lawsuit  or  because  he  is  African-­‐ American.

Appellants,  in  addition,  to  the  affidavit  of  appellant,  Wesley  Spears, provided  two  affidavits  from  residents  of  Falcon  Pointe  who  live  on Appellants’  street,  who  also  affirmed  that  appellant,  Wesley  Spears name  was  not  on  the  Ballot  for  neighborhood  representative  when  they attempted  to  vote  for  him  on  June  7,  2014.92

Plaintiff  also  provided  copies  of  the  election  Ballot  that  omitted

67. Appellant,  Wesley  Spears’  name  downloaded  from  Appellee’s  website.93 Election  Ballots  dated  June  7,  2014,  the  same  Ballot  was  again downloaded  by  appellants  from  appellee’s  website  on  August  17,  2014, neither  ballot  contained,  appellant,  Wesley  Spears’  name.

Appellants  were  denied  the  right  to  fully  develop  their  DTPA  claim regarding  election  fraud  since  the  facts  giving  rise  to  the  claim  occurred approximately  ninety  days  before  the  court  granted  appellee’s  No-­‐ Evidence  and  Traditional  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  The  court  did not  allow  any  oral  argument  regarding  plaintiffs’  DTPA.    Appellants moved  to  Compel  the  Deposition  of  Natalie  Boykin,  the  Property Manager,  of  the  appellee  who  replaced  Diane  Bottema  and  conducted the  election  that  is  the  subject  one  of  Appellant’s  Deceptive  Trade Practices  Act  claims.

Appellee  filed  a  Motion  to  Quash  Appellants’  Motion  to  Compel  the Deposition  of  Natalie  Boykin.94      The  court  refused  to  hear  appellants’ Motion  to  Compel  Natalie  Boykin’  Deposition  even  though  it  was  timely filed  and  appellants  made  two  requests,  to  the  Court  Operations  for appellants’  three  Motions  to  Compel  to  before  the  hearing  of  the  parties’ Cross  Motion’s  for  Summary  Judgment.    The  emails  informed  Mr.

68. Sanders  that  counsel  for  the  appellee  refused  to  agree  to  a  date  on  or before  the  Hearing  of  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for  Summary  Judgment.

Ms.  Boykin  was  the  property  manager  who  conducted  the  election, which  appellants  second  DTPA  claim  is  based.    Clearly,  her  testimony was  relevant  to  whether  there  was  election  fraud  since  she  was  in charge  of  conducting  the  election  and  was  the  current  property manager.

Texas’  DTPA,  V.T.C.A.,  Bus.  &  C.,  Section  17.50:  (a)  A  consumer  may maintain  an  action  where  any  of  the  following  constitute  a  producing cause  of  economic  damages  or  damages  for  mental  anguish:

(1)  the  use  or  employment  by  any  person  of  a  false,  misleading,  or deceptive  act  or  practice  that  is:

(A)  specifically  enumerated  in  a  subdivision  of  Subsection  (b)  of Section  17.46  of  this  subchapter;  and…..

V.T.C.A.,  Bus.  &  C.  Section  17.46:

(a)  False,  misleading,  or  deceptive  acts  or  practices  in  the  conduct of  any  trade  or  commerce  are  hereby  declared  unlawful  and  are  subject to  action  by  the  consumer  protection  division…

69.

(3)  any  unconscionable  action  or  course  of  action  by  any  person; or…

(12)  representing  that  an  agreement  confers  or  involves  rights,  or remedies  or  obligations  which  it  does  not  have  or  involve,  or  which  are prohibited  by  law…

Appellants  as  homeowners  are  clearly  consumers  of  the  services  of the  Association  they  pay  dues  and  receive  services.    Courts  liberally construe  the  DTPA  and  give  it  the  most  comprehensive  application possible  without  doing  damage  to  its  terms.    Clary  Corp.,  v.  Smith,  949 S.W.  2d  452,  464  (Tex.  App.—Fort  Worth  1997,  no  writ);  In  addition,  a appellants  do  not  have  to  prove  he  actually  acquired  goods  or  services. See  e.g.  Nast  v.  State  Farm  Fire  &  Cas.  Co.,  82  S.W.  2d  42,  47  (  Tex.  App.— Corpus  Christie  1990  (no  pet.)    The  appellee  owed  appellants  a  fiduciary duty  of  good  faith  and  fair  dealing.    Appellee  failed  to  fulfill  its  fiduciary obligation  to  the  appellants  by  refusing  to  produce  documents  properly requested  from  appellee.

The  DTPA  defines  “unconscionable  action  or  course  of  action”  as follows:  (5)    “Unconscionable  action  or  course  of  action”  means  an  act  or

70. practice  which  to  a  person’s  detriment:

(A)  takes  advantage  of  the  lack  of  knowledge,  ability  experience  or capacity  of  a  person’s  to  a  grossly  unfair  degree;  or

(B)  results  in  a  gross  disparity  between  the  value  received  and consideration  paid,  in  a  transaction  involving  transfer  of  consideration.

The  relevant  inquiry  examines  the  entire  transaction,  not  the defendant’s  intent.    Chastain  v.  Koonce,  700  S.W.  2d  579,  584  (Tex.  1985); see  also  Brown  v.  Galleria  Area  Ford,  Inc.,  752  S.W.  2d  114,  116  (Tex. 1988);  State  Farm  Lloyds  v.  Nicolau,  951  S.W.  2d  444,  451  (Tex.  1997). The  relevant  inquiry  examines  the  entire  transaction,  not  the defendant’s  intent.    Chastain,  700  S.W.  2d  at  583.    In  addition,  there  must be  a  showing  of  what  the  consumer  could  have  or  would  have  done  if  he had  known  about  the  information.    Peter  Enters,  Inc.,  v.  Hilton,  51  S.W.  3d 616,  623  (Tex.  App-­‐-­‐Tyler  2000,  pet.  denied).

Clearly,  it  would  be  an  unconscionable  course  of  action  for  appellee to  prevent  appellant,  Wesley  Spears,  to  serve  in  an  elected  position,  for which  he  is  legally  eligible,  as  a  neighborhood  representative  of  the appellee  because  of  his  race  or  the  fact  he  filed  suit  to  address

71. grievances  against  the  appellee  or  for  any  other  purported  reason.

Likewise,  it  is  a  violation  of  the  V.T.C.A.,  Bus.,  &  C  Section  17.50:  to represent  that  an  agreement  confers  or  involves  rights  or  remedies  or obligations  which  it  does  not  have  or  involve  or  which  is  also  a  violation of  the  law.    In  this  case  this  appellants  were  denied  there  right  to  a Hearing  of  the  first  Violation  Notice  due  to  the  misrepresentation  of their  rights  perpetrated  by  the  property  manager,  Diane  Bottema  as outlined  above.      Appellants  produced  much  more  than  a  scintilla  of evidence  to  support  their  claims.

Appellants  produced  an  email  from  the  property  manager, misrepresenting  the  law,  and  saying  in  matters  of  clear  violations  the president  of  the  Association  can  act  on  behalf  of  the  Board  to  support their  first  DTPA  claim.    The  laws  governing  the  conduct  of  Associations, was  designed  to  protect  homeowner’s  from  the  arbitrary  actions  of Homeowners’  Associations.    The  court  abused  its  discretion  by dismissing  appellants’  DTPA  claims  and  without  hearing  any  argument regarding  appellants’  claims.

72.

4. DID THE TRIAL COURT PHILLIPS, J., AND WIZER J., ERR BY DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE PHILLIPS FROM PRESIDING OVER THIS MATTER.

Recusal  of  judge  is  concerned  not  only  with  actual  personal  or pecuniary  interests,  but  also  the  appearance  of  impartiality.    Beyond  the demand  that  judge  be  impartial  is  the  requirement  that  a  Judge  appear to  be  impartial  so  that  no  doubts  or  suspicions  exist  as  the  fairness  or integrity  of  the  court.    Vernon’s  Ann.  Texas  Rules  of  Civ.  Proc.,  Rule 18b(b)(1).95        There  is  no  standard  of  appellate  review  specifically enumerated  in  Rule  18a  for  the  denial  of  a  Motion  to  Disqualify. Pursuant  to  Texas  Rules  of  Civ.  Proc.,  Rule  18a  (j)  (2)  application  of  an abuse  of  discretion  standard  is  the  appropriate  standard  to  review  the denial  of  appellants’  Motion  to  Recuse  Judge  Phillips.96

An  abuse  of  discretion  occurs  when  the  trial  court  acts  arbitrarily and  unreasonably,  without  reference  to  guiding  rules  or  principles  or misapplies  the  law  to  the  facts  of  the  case.    The  reviewing  court  must determine  whether  the  trial  court’s  action  was  so  arbitrary  as  to  exceed the  bounds  of  reasonable  discretion.    Marroquin  v.  D  &  N  Funding,  Inc., 943  S.W.  2d  112,  114  (Tex.  App.—Corpus  Christi  1997,  no  pet.);    Low  v.

73. Henry,  221  S.W.  2d  609,  614  (Tex.  2007);  Cooper  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v. Mendez,  204  S.W.  3d  797,  800  (Tex.  2006);    In  re  Cerebus  Capital  Mgmt., L.P.,  164  S.W.  3d  379,  382  (Tex.  2005);  Cire  v.  Cummings,  134  S.W.  3d  835, 838-­‐39  (Tex.  2004);  Downer  v.  Aquamarine  Operations,  Inc.,  701  S.W.  2d 238,  241-­‐242  (Tex.  1985).

A  trial  court  abuses  it’s  discretion  when  it  reaches  a  decision  so arbitrary  and  unreasonable  that  it  amounts  to  a  clear  and  prejudicial error  of  law.    In  re  Olshan  Found  Repair  Co.,  328  S.W.  3d  883,  888  (Tex. 2010);  In  re  Cerebus  Capital  Mgmt.,  L.P.,  164  S.W.  3d  379,  382  (Tex.  2005). Essentially,  when  reviewing  issues  committed  to  the  discretion  of  the trial  court,  the  reviewing  court  is  not  to  substitute  its  own  judgment  for the  trial  court’s  judgment.    Walker  v.  Guiterrez,  111  S.W.  3d  56,  62  (Tex. 2003).

The  decision  whether  recusal  is  necessary  is  to  be  assessed  on  a case-­‐by-­‐case,  fact  intensive  basis.    Abdygappariva  v.  State,  243  S.W.  3d 191,  198  (Tex.  App.-­‐San  Antonio  2007).    Even  under  the  abuse  of discretion  standard  the  reviewing  court  does  not  defer  to  the  trial  court

74. on  questions  of  law.    Perry  Homes  v.  Cull,  258  S.W.  3d  580,  598  (Tex. 2008).

In  this  regard,  the  construction  of  statutes  and  procedural  rules are  questions  of  law,  which  are  reviewed  de  novo.    See  Galbraith  Eng’g Consultants,  Inc.  v.  Pochucha,  290  S.W.  3d  863,  867  (Tex.  2009);  HCBeck, LTD.  V.  Rice,  284  S.W.  3d  349,  352  (Tex.  2009);  In  re  Christus  Spohn  Hosp. Kieberg,  222  S.W.  3d  434,  437  (Tex.  2007);    State  v.  Gonzales,  82  S.W.  3d 322,  327  (Tex.  2002);    Brown  v.  Villegas,  202  S.W.    3d  803,  805  (Tex. App.—San  Antonio  2006,  no  pet.).    Similarly,  a  de  novo  standard  of review  is  applied  to  the  interpretation  of  the  state  constitution.    See Tesco  Am.,  Inc.,  v.  Strong  Indus.,  Inc.,  221  S.W.  3d  550,  554  n.  15  (Tex. 2006);  Ross  v.  Union  Carbide  Corp.,  296  S.W.  3d  206,  211  (Tex.  App.-­‐App.— Houston  [14th  Dist.]  209,  pet.  denied).

Under  Texas  law,  courts  have  delineated  that  the  test  for  recusal on  the  basis  of  bias  or  lack  of  impartiality,  is  whether  a  reasonable member  of  the  public  at  large,  knowing  all  the  facts  in  the  public  domain concerning  the  judge’s  conduct  in  the  case,  would  have  a  reasonable doubt  that  the  judge  is  actually  impartial.    Hansen  v  J.P.  Morgan  Chase

p.  75 Bank,  N.A.,  346  S.W.  3d  769,  776  (Tex.  App.-­‐Dallas  2011);  Ex  Parte  Ellis, 275  S.W.  3d  109,  116  (Tex.  App.-­‐Austin  2008);  Burkett  v.  State,  196  S.W.  3d 892,  896  (Tex.  App.-­‐Texarkana  2006).

Stated  another  way,  if  a  reasonable  person,  knowing  all  of  the circumstances  involved,  harbors  doubt  as  to  the  judge’s  bias  or impartiality  then  the  burden  is  met  and  the  judge  should  be  recused. Mendez  v.  Quarterman,  625  F.  Supp.  2d  415,  424  (S.D.  Tex.  2009); Abdygappariva  v.  State,  243  S.W.  3d  191,  198  (Tex.  App.-­‐San  Antonio 2007).

The  comments  that  Judge  Phillips’  directed  at  appellants  counsel and/or  appellants  identified  earlier  in  this  case  taken  together  with unfair  and  legally  unsupportable  rulings  of  the  court,  leave  the appellants,  with  the  good  faith  belief  that  Judge  Phillips  was  biased against  them.97

PRAYER

The  appellants  pray  that  the  court  reverse  the  ruling  of  Judge Phillips  granting  appellee’s  Motion  for  Traditional  and  No  Evidence Summary  Judgment  and  direct  the  court  to  grant  appellants’  Motion  for

p.  76 Partial  Summary  Judgment  and  to  restore  appellants’  other  claims  to  the trial  court  docket  and  to  order  the  trial  court  to  hold  a  hearing  regarding whether  appellants’  are  entitled  to  Attorneys’  fees.      Appellants  requests that  this  court  rule  that  the  court  erred  in  not  hearing  appellants discovery  motions  before  ruling  on  the  parties’  Cross  Motions  for Summary  Judgment.    Further,  appellants  also  requests  that  this  court rule  that  Judge  Phillips  and  Judge  Wisser  erred  in  not  recusing  Judge Phillips.

CONCLUSION

Based  on  the  arguments  and  law  stated  herein    appellants respectfully  request  that  the  Third  Court  of  Appeals  grant  appellants’ prayer  for  relief  and  reverse  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  and  direct  the trial  court  to  enter  judgment  on  appellants’  Motion  for  Partial  Summary Judgment  and  restore  appellants  remaining  claims  to  the  trial  court docket  for  discovery  and  trial.

Respectfully Submitted By Appellants

/S/Wesley Spears____________________ Wesley Spears Their Attorney

77.

CERTIFICATION  OF  COMPLIANCE

This  is  to  certify  that  the  word  count  on  this  document  is  in  excess of  15,000  words.    The  total  word  count  is  18,124,  and  is  therefore,  not  in compliance  with  the  rules  of  the  Third  Court  of  Appeals.    Therefore, plaintiff  is  filing  a  Motion  contemporaneously  herewith,  requesting permission  to  submit  this  Brief,  which  exceeds  the  word  count  provided in  the  rules  of  the  Third  Court  of  Appeals.

/s/s Wesley Spears Wesley Spears Attorney for Appellant

78.

CERTIFICATION  OF  SERVICE

This  is  to  certify  that  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  Brief  in  Support  of Appellants  Appeal  to  the  Third  Court  of  Appeals  was  served  on  counsel for  appellee,  David  Chamberlain,  Chamberlain  and  McHaney,  301 Congress  Avenue,  22nd  Floor,  Austin,  Texas  78701  Tel.  512-­‐474-­‐9124, Fax.  512C 474C 8582  by hand delivery  on  this  6th  day  of  March,  2015.

/s/s Wesley S. Spears Wesley S. Spears Bar No.18898400 401 Congress Avenue, Suite 1540 Austin, Texas 78701 Tel.: 512C 696C 2222 Fax.: 512C 687C 3499 Attorney for Appellants

79.

1 See Appendix p. 1 Email from Wesley Spears to Diane Bottema 2 See Appendix p. 3 Email from Diane Bottema to Wesley Spears regarding the rights of

homeowners to seek a Hearing before the Board regarding alleged violations. 3 See Appendix p. 68-­‐69, Transcript of Deposition of Ranier Ficken pages 79-­‐80. 4 See Appendix p. 4-­‐6, Articles of Incorporation of the Association dated August 6, 2001. 5 See Appendix p. 90-­‐94, Texas Property Code § 209.005. 6 See Appendix p. 4-­‐5 Emails between Wesley Spears and Diane Botttema, dated 7 See Appendix p. 1 Violation Notice dated October 22, 2013. 8 See Appendix p. 49-­‐51, Transcript of Diane Bottema’s Deposition pages 81-­‐83. 9 See Appendix p. 117 Transcript of Ranier Ficken Deposition p. 56 L. 13 -­‐ L 18. 10 See Appendix p. 118 Transcript of Ranier Ficken Deposition p. 57 L. 11 -­‐ L 18. 11 See Appendix p.7-­‐23, Bylaws of the Association paragraph 22 (b) Hearing Appendix

p. 18. 12 See Certified letters requesting documents from the Association Court Record p. 788,

789 790 and 791. 13 See Appendix p. 72-­‐84, Transcript of the Depositon of Ranier Ficken, Exhibit 2,

documents produced by Mr. Ficken. 14 See Transcript of Hearing of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel dated May 28, 2013, p. 8. 15 See Transcript of Hearing of Appellants’ Motion to Compel Deposition Duces Tecum

of Diane Bottema dated May 15, 2013 p. 13-­‐17 16 See Transcript of Hearing of appellants’ Motion to Compel Deposition Duces Tecum

of Diane Bottema dated May 15, 2013 p. 18. 17 See Transcript of Hearing appellants’ Motion to Compel deposition of Diane Bottema

Duces Tecum dated May 15, 2014 p. 14-­‐20. 18 See Transcript of Hearing of appellants’ Motion to Compel dated May 15, 2013 p. 15-­‐

18. 19 See Appendix p. 48, Transcript of Deposition of Diane Bottema p. 9. 20 See Court Record p. 820-­‐822, Motion to Compel Deposition of Natalie Boykin. 21 See Appendix p. 103, Texas Property Code § 209.007. 22 See Transcript of Hearing of appellants’ Motion to Compel Deposition of Diane

Bottema dated May 15, 2014 p. 13-­‐18. 23 See Transcript of Hearing of Appellants’ Motion to Compel dated May 15, 2013 p. 13-­‐

18. 24 See Appendix p. 45, Transcript of Diane Bottema’s deposition p. 5. 25 See Court Record p. 961-­‐966, Affidavit of Appellant, Wesley Spears attached to

appellants’ Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery. 26 See Appendix p. 72-­‐84, Budgets and minutes of board meetings produced by Ranier

Ficken which other than an insurance policy were the only documents that appellee produced to appellants throughout the pendency of this case. 27 See Appendix Transcript of Ranier Ficken’s deposition p. 15-­‐18. 28 See Notice to take Deposition of Natalie Boykin, Duces Tecum, Court Record p.

396-­‐402.

80.

29 See Appendix p. 57-­‐58, Deposition of Ranier Ficken p. 11 -­‐12. 30 See Appendix p. 47, Transcript of Diane Bottema’s deposition p. 7.

631 See Appendix p. 24-­‐25, Election Ballots showing appellants’ Wesley Spears was left off the ballot for Neighborhood Representative also see Court Record p. Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery affidavits of two of appellants’ neighbors attesting to the fact the Wesley Spears name was left off the ballot for neighborhood representative. See Appendix p. 42-­‐46, Transcript of Deposition of Ranier Ficken verifying that the pages downloaded from appellee’s website appeared authentic and there was no reason that appellant, Wesley Spears’, name was left off the ballot for neighborhood representatives pages. 32 See Court Record p. 843-­‐849 and 863-­‐873. Appellee moved to in bad faith to quash

both depositions of Natalie Boykin, who conducted the election, which took place on June 7, 2014, and William Meyer, Board Member who voted to find appellants in violation of unspecified deed restriction(s). The trial court, Phillips, J., refused to hear appellants’ Motion to Compel the Depositions of Natalie Boykin, the property manager, who conducted the election that the appellants, allege Ms. Boykin intentionally and fraudulently left appellant, Wesley Spears’ name off the ballot for neighborhood representative. Mr. Meyer is also Vice President of the developer Newland Communities and was the deciding vote to find the appellants’ in violation of unspecified deed restrictions developer two votes, homeowners’ no votes, big surprise! See Court Record p. 961-­‐966, Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery. 33 See Appendix p. 46-­‐47, Transcript of Diane Bottema’s deposition regarding her lack

of access to her own emails and the records of the Association p. 6 and 7 when Ms. Bottema claims she has no access to her emails or other records because, although she worked in the office where the records were located her employer Goodwin Management, the property manager locked out her access to her emails and the records of the Association. Again appellee’s were playing hide the ball, a million dollar budget with no oversight by the homeowners’. Ms. Bottema contradicted the sworn testimony of Ranier Ficken when she denied being replaced by Natalie Boykin because of her poor performance and locked out of her email. See Appendix p. 47. 34 See Court record p. 1059 and Transcript of appellants’ Motion to Recuse Judge

Phillips Exhibit 34, Vol. 3. Emails to Darryl Sanders, Court Operations Officer requesting that appellants’ Motion to Compel be heard before the parties Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 35 See Transcript of Appellants’ Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014,

Emails requesting appellants’ three Motions to Compel Discovery be heard prior to the parties cross Motions for Summary Judgment p. 36-­‐39. 36 See Transcript of the appellant’s Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7,

2014, testimony of Wesley Spears p. 41-­‐54. 37 See Transcript Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014, testimony of

Wesley Spears p. 41-­‐54 and Darryl Sanders p. 13-­‐22. Mr. Sanders’ admits that he was 81.

the only Court Operations Officer involved in this matter up to the hearing of the parties Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and that he never gave counsel for the appellants’ any instructions informing that it was in appropriate to ask for a setting by email. He admits in hindsight he should have given those instructions and it was his job to give those instructions and it was his job to respond to counsel for the appellants’ email. Appellants’ should not lose their case because of an inadvertent mistake by the Court Operations Officer or appellants’ counsel, especially after it was brought to the court’s attention. Judge Phillips abused his discretion when he refused to correct this wrong at the Hearing of Appellants’ Motion for New Trial. Judge Phillips again denied appellants’ request that that the court hear their three Discovery Motions and Motion for Continuance to Complete Discovery, in their Motion for New Trial, Court Record p. 1105-­‐1119. See Appendix p. 116, email from Darryl Sanders, Court Operations Officer, to counsel for the appellants specifically asking that counsel for the appellants should contact his office only by email to avoid any ex parte communications, with copy to opposing counsel. Counsel for the appellants’ was following the directions of the Court Operations Officer. 38 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014, p. 20. 39 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips, November 7, 2014, p. 19-­‐20. 40 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014, p. 22 L1-­‐L12. 41 See Appendix p. 116 Email from Darryl Sanders to counsel for appellants asking

them to communicate with him by email to avoid ex parte communications. 42 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014 p. 21-­‐22. 43 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November 7, 2014, p. 21, L1-­‐25. 44 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips Hearing November 7, 2014,

testimony of Cathy Mata P 11 L 1 through p 12 L 7. 45 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips p. 12 L. 8 to L22. 46 See Transcript of Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips p. 11 L20 to page 12 L4. 47 See Appendix p. 40, Judge Wisser Order denying Appellants’ Motion to Recuse

Judge Phillips. 48 See Appendix p. 30-­‐31, Attorney Alex Valdes’ November 26, 2013, Letter announcing

the decision of the Board finding the appellants’ in violation based on it’s “business judgment”. 49 See Appendix p.3 Bottema’s email representing that appellants’ were not entitled to

a Hearing. 50 See Appendix p. 79-­‐80, Transcript of Deposition for Ranier Ficken Appendix. 51 See Transcript of July 1, 2014, Hearing of Appellants’ Motion to Compel Deposition of

Diane Bottema p. 23-­‐26. 52 See Transcript of the Hearing Appellants’ Motion to Recuse Judge Phillips November

7, testimony of Cathy Mata p. 66 L 16 to L21 and P. 67 L 17 to L22. 53 See Transcript of Hearing Appellants Motion to Compel, July 1, 2014, p. 24 L 4

through p. 26 L. 10. 54 See Court Record p. 1176-­‐1186 bias and/or sarcastic comments made by Judge

Phillips to counsel for appellant. 82.

55  See  Appendix  p.  1  Email  to  Diane  Bottema  from  Wesley  Spears  responding  to  the

first violation letter. 56 See Appendix p. 2, Email from Diane Bottema to requesting the fence to be moved in

front of the pool pump. 57 See Appendix p. 68-­‐69, Transcript of Deposition of Ranier Ficken 79-­‐80. 58 See Appendix p. 1, Violation Notice dated October 22, 2013. 59 See Appendix p. 1, Violation Notice dated October 22, 2013. 60 See Appendix p. 30-­‐31, Valdes letter dated November 26, 2013 61 See Appendix p. 30-­‐31, Valdes letter dated November 26, 2013. 62 See Appendix p. 100, Texas Property Code Section 209.006 and the Bylaws of the

Association. 63 See Appendix p. 7-­‐23, Bylaws of the Association. The only notes of the 11-­‐13-­‐13,

Hearing were contained in handwritten minutes of the 11-­‐13-­‐2013, by Diane Bottema. Ms. Bottema’s notes do not comply with Tex. Prop. Code § 209.006 because they do not indicate the sanction imposed. 64 See Appendix p. 7-­‐23, Bylaws of the Association 65 See Violation Notice, dated October 22, 2013, Appendix p. 1. 66 See Court Record p. 788, 789, 790, 791 Appellants’ requests for documents. 67 See Appendix p. 32-­‐33, letter from Alex Valdes, Esq., January 13, 2014 68 See Appendix p. 90-­‐93 Texas Property Code § 209.005. 69 See Appendix p. 32-­‐33 letter from Alex Valdes, Esq., January 13, 2014. 70 See statement by Judge Phillips indicating the rules change once suit if filed

transcript July 1, 2014, Motion to Compel Court Record p. 1176 to 1186. 71 See Transcript of Motion to Compel dated May 28, 2014 p. Court Record 1176-­‐

1186. 72 See Court Record p. 792-­‐793, letter from Alex Valdes, Esq., dated January 13, 2014. 73 See Court Record p. 788, 789, 790, 791 Appellants’ requests for documents

and Appellee’s responses to Appellants’ requests for records 792-­‐793, 794, 793-­‐ 796, 797. 74 See Court Record appellants’, December 9, 2013, letter to Diane Bottema p. 788. 75 See Court Record letter from Alex Valdes Esq., to Wesley Spears, dated January 13,

2014 p. 792-­‐793. 76 See Appendix p. 34 appellants’ letter to David Campbell dated May 23, 2014 77 See Court Record p. 788-­‐791, letter from David Campbell to Wesley Spears dated

June 10, 2014. 78 See Court Record 788-­‐791, Appellants’ letter to Diane Bottema dated June 12,

2014. 79 See Court Record p. 788-­‐791, letter from David Campbell to the appellants dated

June 18, 2014. See Court Record 788-­‐791 and Court Record p. 407, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 15, letter to Diane Bottema requesting copies of all the books and records of the Association, dated June 18, 2014.

83. 80  See  Court  Record  788-­‐791,  Letter  from  David  Campbell  to  appellants  dated  June

20, 2014. 81 See Court Record p. 788, 789, 790, 791 Appellants’ requests for documents. 82 See Appendix p. 72-­‐84, Transcript of the Depositon of Ranier Ficken, Exhibit 2,

documents produced by Mr. Ficken at his deposition. 83 See Court record appellee’s responses to appellants’ requests for records 792-­‐793,

794, 793-­‐796, 797. 84 See Court Record p. 804-­‐816 appellants’ Fourth Amended Complaint 804-­‐816. See

also Court Record appellants’ Fifth Amended Complaint p 922-­‐939. 85 See Appendix p. 119, U.S. Const. Amendment 14. 86 See Appendix p. 120, Texas Const. Art. 1 § 19. 87 See Court Record p 965-­‐966, Affidavit of Wesley Spears attached to appellants’

Motion for Continuance. 88 See Appendix p. 37, Court’s Order Granting Appellee’s Motion for Traditional and

No-­‐Evidence Summary Judgment. 89 See Court Record Affidavit of Wesley Spears attached as an exhibit to Appellant’s

Motion for Continuance 961-­‐968. 90 See Appendix p. 113-­‐114,Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act §§ 17.50 and 1746. 91 See Appendix p. 63-­‐67, Transcript of Deposition of Ranier Ficken pages 42-­‐46. 92 See Court Record p. 966-­‐968, Affidavits of Jonathan Concepcion and Vahness

Swilley Concepcion attached to Appellants’ Motion for Continuance attesting to the fact that appellant, Wesley Spears’ name was left off the ballot for neighborhood representative in support of appellants DTPA claims. 93 See Court Record Motion for Continuance election ballots with appellant, Wesley

Spears name omitted Court Record 961-­‐968 not legible. See also, Appendix p. legible copies of election ballots with appellant, Wesley Spears’ name omitted Exhibit to Ranier Ficken’s deposition. 94 See Court Record p. 863-­‐873, Appellee’s Motion to Quash the deposition of Diane

Boykin. 95 See Appendix p. 121,Texas Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 18b(b)(1). 96 See Appendix p. 122, Texas Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 18a (j) (2) 97 See Statements by Judge Phillips demonstrating his bias: See Transcript of July 1,

appellants’ Motion to Compel Deposition of Diane Bottema p. 23-­‐26, Judge Phillips made the following comments: “The Court: You got good common sense I hope. Mr. Spears: I think so. The court: That’s what were counting on… Counsel, when they first came here and filed their motion for summary judgment, they felt there wasn’t any discovery that was necessary before the summary judgment motions were heard. I know agree with them…. The court: I was going to ask if you filed a request for production. Mr. Spears: Yes. And I requested all the Books and Records of the Association, which is everything. The Court: You’re not going to get that. Mr. Spears: Well, I will get whatever I’m going to get. The Court: Well, no. They’re going to object that it’s overly broad and burdensome and I’m going to sustain it… The Court: Shakespeare wrote a play about this case didn’t he? I can’t remember whether it was a

84.

“Comedy of Errors” or “Much Ado about Nothing. Mr. Spears: Well, it is much ado about nothing. I agree with you there.”

85.