the Burks Group, Inc., D/B/A Integrated Partners v. Integrated Partners, Inc., Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., John P. Barnett, David Dreiling, & Allen Thomas Georgi

ACCEPTED 07-14-00443C V SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 4/10/2015 4:41:10 PM Vivian Long, Clerk

NO. 07-14-00443-CV

FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS In The Court of Appeals AMARILLO, TEXAS for the Seventh District of Texas 4/10/2015 4:41:10 PM at Amarillo VIVIAN LONG CLERK

The Burks Group, Inc., d/b/a Integrated Partners, Plaintiff-Appellant,

V.

Integrated Partners, Inc., Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., John P. Barnett, David Dreiling, & Allen Thomas Georgi Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the 44th District Court of Dallas County, Texas, And Transferred from the 5th Court of Appeals

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Appellant Requests Oral Argument

JENSEN & JENSEN A Professional Corporation JOHN R. JENSEN STATE BAR OF TEXAS I.D. #10646500 6025 Interstate 20 West Arlington, Texas 76017 Tel: (817) 478-4940 Fax: (817) 478-4707 Email: jrj@jensen-law-firm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

I. IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

The following is a complete list of the parties to this suit: 1. Plaintiff: The Burks Group, Inc. d/b/a Integrated Partners

Attorney: John R. Jensen Jensen & Jensen, PC 6025 Interstate 20 West Arlington, Texas 76017

2. Defendant: Integrated Partners, Inc.

Attorney: Brian T. Cartwright 1710 Westminster Denton, Texas 76205

3. Defendant: Dalrock Transport, L.L.C.

Attorney: Brian T. Cartwright 1710 Westminster Denton, Texas 76205

4. Defendant: John P. Barnett

Attorney: Brian T. Cartwright 1710 Westminster Denton, Texas 76205

5. Defendant: David Dreiling

Attorney: Pro Se 1408 Melody Ln. Carrollton, Texas 75006

6. Defendant: Allen Thomas Georgi

Attorney: Pro Se 2701 North Grapevine Mills #714 Grapevine, Texas 76051

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II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PARTIES TO SUIT ....................................... i II. TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 V. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............. 2

VI. ISSUES PRESENTED ....................................... 2

VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................. 2

VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

IX. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AT THE HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE TO CONFORM TO THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT/PROMISOR, THEREBY RENDERING IT MEANINGLESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE JURY FINDING ON THE ISSUE OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT WAS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT AND PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

ii X. PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 XI. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 XII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 XI. APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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III. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law:

Aguirre v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

AKB Hendrick, LP v. Musgrave Enters., 380 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 19

Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 309 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

EMSL Analytical, Inc. v. Younker, 154 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist] 2004, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

G. C. Murphy Company v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. – Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Gray Wireline Serv., Inc. v. Cavanna, 374 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App. – Waco 2011, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Company, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993) . . 20

Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436, 216 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Randalls Food Mkts., Inc., 17 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. App. – Austin 2000, pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

iv

Mendoza v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriter’s Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Prudential Ins. v. Financial Rev. Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2000) . . . . . . . . 19 Seelback v. Clubb, 7 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) . . . 19

Sentinel Integrity Solutions, Inc. v. Mistras Group, Inc., 414 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, reh’g overruled (Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (Oct. 3, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Rules and Statutes: Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 14, 16, 17 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants, John P. Barnett and Integrated Partners, Inc., sold their optical courier business to The Burks Group, Inc. on August 21, 2009. Just over three years later, Barnett reassumed complete operational control of the very same optical courier business without paying one penny.

This case was brought by The Burks Group, Inc. against John P. Barnett, Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., and Integrated Partners, Inc., alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant not to compete, and tortious interference with contractual relationships.

The trial court reformed the Covenant Not to Compete to conform with the behavior of the promisor, John P. Barnett, at the hearing on Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction, which was brought to enforce the Covenant Not to Compete.

A jury trial on the tortious interference with contractual relationships cause of action resulted in a final judgment entered on the jury verdict, which was for the defendants and denied Plaintiff’s requested relief.

This appeal is from both the court’s order denying the temporary injunction and reforming the covenant not to compete, and from the judgment on the tort claim as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

V. STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The issues on appeal raise many questions relating to the current status of the law in the State of Texas. Oral argument may prove helpful in answering the questions raised in this lawsuit.

VI. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. The Trial Court Erred by Reforming the Covenant Not to Compete at the Hearing on Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Injunction.

2. The Trial Court Erred by Reforming the Covenant Not to Compete to Conform to the Conduct of the Defendant/Promisor, thereby rendering it meaningless.

3. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto and Motion for New Trial in that the Jury Finding on the Issue of Tortious Interference with a Contract was Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence.

VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 21, 2009, The Burks Group, Inc. purchased the business owned and operated by Integrated Partners, Inc., a sophisticated courier service that delivered optical products from laboratories to dispensaries of optical products, such as eye doctors. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1). The purchase price of $750,000.00 was paid in exchange for substantially all of the tangible and intangible assets of Integrated Partners, Inc., including: (1) the trade name “Integrated Partners”; (2) good will; (3) customer contracts; (4) customer list; (5) telephone number; and (6) more, all as set forth in the contract of purchase. (RR, Volume 6, Page 29, Line 4 *3 through Page 30, Line 4). The complete terms of the parties’ arrangement are contained in their Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”). (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1). As part of the APA, Integrated Partners, Inc. sold existing courier contracts for the delivery of optical products it had with Hoya Vision Care, Legends 4.0 Optical Lab, and Southwest Lens Optical Lab. (RR, Volume 6, Page 43, Line 22 through Page 44, Line 25; and Volume 13, Exhibit P-1, Exhibit H). Each courier contract continued on a month-to-month basis after the expiration of the initial term in accordance with the provision contained within each contract. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibits P-3, P-4, and P-5). After August 21, 2009, The Burks Group, Inc. entered into separate individual contracts with David Dreiling, Allen Thomas Georgi, Gerry Williams, Christopher R. Gonzalez, Kuffour Donkor-Boateng, Suzane A. Thomaz, Rhenda Gonzalez, Steven J. Green, and Luis Alejandro Fernandez to act as courier drivers for the business of Integrated Partners. (RR, Volume 6, Page 73, Line 2 through Line 25; and Volume 13, Exhibits P-7, P-8, and P-9). As the APA required Barnett to dissolve the corporate entity or change the name within six months (which was never done), the Burks Group, Inc. operated the business known as Integrated Partners for the next three years under the assumed name “Integrated Partners.” (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1, Paragraph XXVII; and Volume 2, Page 65, Line 11 through Line 17).

The APA in paragraph XXVIII and “Exhibit M” contained a Covenant Not To Compete specifically for Barnett, which contained: (1) a stipulation as to the appropriateness of injunctive relief; (2) a provision for the extension of the three-year term in the event of Barnett’s violation by “tolling” the restriction period; and (3) an award of attorney’s fees in the event of a dispute. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1, Exhibit M). Barnett agreed individually to restrict his business activities for a period of three years within the State of Texas by: (1) not engaging in the courier or “hot shot” business as an investor or employee; (2) by not taking employees -including its independent contractors - away from The Burks Group, Inc.; (3) by not soliciting The Burks Group, Inc.’s customers; and (4) by not tampering with suppliers of The Burks Group, Inc. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1, Exhibit M).

After selling his business to The Burks Group, Inc., Barnett took some classes and seminars in the stock market and real estate investing, and engaged in those activities until he ran out of money. (RR, Volume 9, Page 24, Line 18 through Page 25, Line 18). Barnett’s employment history after selling his business started with a roofing company called Healy, where he worked from August 2010 to May 2011. (RR, Volume 9, Page 26, Line 16 through Line 24). Barnett left Healy to go to work for Town and Country Roofing Company. (RR, Volume 9, Page Line 2 through Line 10). In response to the question, “Do you have any other employment, initially his answer was “no”. (RR, Volume 9, Page 27, Line 24 through Page 28, Line 3). Later, *5 Barnett conceded to working for Celerity Logistics. (RR, Volume 9, Page 47, Line 7 through Line 18).

In October, 2010, just over a year after the APA was entered, Barnett took employment with Celerity Logistics. (RR, Volume 9, Page 47, Line 13 through Line 15). Celerity Logistics was a courier and “hot shot” business. (RR, Volume 12, Exhibit B, Page 4, Line 23 through Page 6, Line 8; and Page 17, Line 22 through Page 21, Line 24). Barnett worked for Celerity Logistics until August 21, 2012, or exactly the same day Barnett believed was the last day of the Covenant Not to Compete. (RR, Volume 9, Page 47, Line 7 through Line 18).

The Confidential Business Review, upon which Plaintiff relied in the asset purchase, listed four major competitors. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-2, Page 5). The first, in order of perceived threat, was Marquis Messenger and Edge Logistics, which are the same company. (RR, Volume 6, Page 36, Line 20 through Line 24). Marquis Messenger and Edge Logistics later became a company by the name of Tex Express. Tex Express was then purchased by Beavex. (RR, Volume 6, Page 37, Line 1 through Line 3). Beavex is the same company that purchased Celerity Logistics. (RR, Volume 6, Page 37, Line 4 through Line 7).

Stephen Edward Sullivan, an employee of Beavex (company that acquired Celerity Logistics in 2012), was previously employed at Celerity Logistics as Senior VP of sales, in charge of marketing, sales, budget, managing sales team and bringing *6 on board new revenue. (RR, Volume 12, Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, Page 4, Line 23 through Page 7, Line 14). Sullivan knew Barnett worked at Celerity Logistics, beginning in October, 2010, as a salesman. (RR, Volume 12, Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, Page 9, Line 18 through Page 10, Line 2). Sullivan acknowledged Celerity Logistics scheduled and routed deliveries as a courier. (RR, Volume 12, Page 18, Line 4 through Line 22). Additionally, Celerity Logistics, according to Sullivan, provided “hot shot” services. (RR, Volume 12, Page 20, Line 7 through Page 21, Line 24).

On August 22, 2012, the day after his termination as an employee of Celerity Logistics, Barnett through his daughter Peyton Barnett filed an assumed name certificate in Denton County, Texas to operate a business under the name “Dalrock Transport.” (RR, Volume 9, Page 74, Line 12 through Line 20; and Volume 13, Exhibit P-10).

Barnett knew that in order for his venture to succeed he would need to take back the three specifically named optical companies whose contracts he had sold to The Burks Group, Inc. in the APA. (RR, Volume 2, Page 70, Line 20 through Page 71, Line 14; Page 76, Line 5 through Line 10; and Volume 6, Page 19, Line 3 through Line 22). Barnett immediately initiated a series of clandestine meetings with customers and drivers of The Burks Group Inc. to induce them into breaching their respective contracts with The Burks Group Inc. and to form contracts with Dalrock Transport. (RR, Volume 6, Page 80, Line 6 through Line 20; Page 82, Line 7 through *7 Line 11; Volume 7, Page 188, Line 13 through Line 23; Page 190, Line 19 through Line 22; and Page 192, Line 10 through Line 14). Specifically, Barnett willfully and intentionally induced customers, Essilor Laboratories of America, Inc. and its affiliates, Legends 4.0 Optical Lab, and lastly Hoya Vision Care, who were all under written contract with The Burks Group, Inc. into breaching those contracts. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-12; Volume 7, Page 37, Line 6 through Line 11; Page 41, Line 19 through Page 42, Line 7; Page 23, Line 6 through Page 24, Line 12; and Page 42, Line 8 through Line 17).

Barnett, through Dalrock Transport, started doing business with Legends 4.0 Optical Lab as early as October 1, 2012 by utilizing the services of his former employer Celerity Logistics to make deliveries, as he had yet to secure drivers for Dalrock Transport. (RR, Volume 6, Page 123, Line 25 through Page 124, Line 16). Barnett operated as Dalrock Transport until Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. came into existence on October 11, 2012. (RR, Volume 6, Page 14, Line 13 through Page 15, Line 17).

On October 22, 2012, the entire delivery operation previously purchased by The Burks Group, Inc. was taken over by John P. Barnett and Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., including the customers then under written contract with The Burks Group, Inc. and the drivers also under written contract with The Burks Group, Inc. (RR, Volume 6, Page 92, Line 13 through Line 16; and Page 93, Line 3 through Line 7). *8 The entire business was taken over and it was not discovered by the principals of Plaintiff until the take-over of the business had already occurred. (RR, Volume 7, Page 38, Line 17 through Line 24; and Page 39, Line 16 through Line 20).

While the three-year term of the Covenant Not to Compete appeared on its face to have expired at the time of Barnett’s takeover, in fact, Barnett began violating the Covenant Not to Compete as early as October, 2010, when he began working for Celerity Logistics, a courier service, with offices in 700 cities nationally, and every major city in Texas. (RR, Volume 9, Page 50, Line 23 through Line 25; and Volume 12, Exhibit B, Page 17, Line 16 through Page 21, Line 24). This violation was not only actionable, but it extended the expiration date of the Covenant Not to Compete for the almost two year period during which Barnett was employed by the courier service. (RR, Volume 13, Exhibit P-1, Exhibit M).

The Burks Group, Inc. sought injunctive relief restricting the activities of Barnett and his newly formed entity, Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. in the place and manner set out in the Covenant Not to Compete for a time period that is the same number of days during which Barnett conducted activities contrary to the terms of the Covenant Not to Compete, and further requested Barnett be enjoined, along with Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., from engaging in the courier business for such a time as would equal the number of days the three year covenant was tolled during Barnett’s employment with Celerity Logistics, Inc. and operation of Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. *9 (CR 9, Page 22). The trial court had other notions and not only denied the temporary injunction, but reformed the Covenant Not to Compete in the face of Barnett admitting to using Celerity Logistics to deliver optical product after he was fired by Celerity Logistics and before he ultimately took over the entire operations of The Burks Group, Inc. (RR, Volume 2, Page 76, Line 16 through Page 78, Line 4; and CR 11, Page 31).

At trial, beginning March 17, 2014, Barnett testified he was acting individually and on behalf of Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. and admitted to having interfered with the delivery contracts with optical laboratories for the delivery and distribution of product as part of the network of Integrated Partners, and his interference caused the Plaintiff’s loss of the business to him. (RR, Volume 6, Page 19, Line 3 through Line 22; Page 74, Line 4 through Line 11; Page 75, Line 10 through Line 20; Page 121, Line 13 through Line 18; Page 53, Line 3 through Line 25; Page 80, Line 6 through Line 20; Page 82, Line 7 through Line 11; Page 83, Line 1 through Line 12; Page 86, Line 20 through Page 87, Line 18; and Volume 13, Exhibit P-12). Barnett testified that through his company Dalrock Transport he took over the entire business he had sold three years before including the drivers, and the only difference after October 22, 2012 being that the optical companies sent their checks to him and not The Burks Group, Inc. (RR, Volume 6, Page 91, Line 7 through Page 93, Line 7). Against the weight of Defendant Barnett’s own testimony, *10 the jury found there was no tortious interference with a contract. (CR 14, Page 76).

VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in reforming the Covenant Not to Compete at the hearing on Plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction, as reformation is a final remedy to be granted after a final hearing on the merits, or at summary judgment. The court should have maintained its focus on the issue of whether or not to grant the application for temporary injunction, and not stray from the purpose of the hearing. Reformation at such an early stage in the litigation is outcome determinative and completely destroyed Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the Covenant Not to Compete.

Additionally, the trial court erred in reforming the Covenant Not to Compete to conform to the Defendant’s conduct, as the promisor openly admitted to violating the Covenant by taking a job with a competing business only one year into the three year prohibition. The injunction sought would have maintained the status quo and allowed Plaintiff to recover his damages for the breach of the Covenant at final trial. Instead the Covenant was reformed to render it meaningless and gave Defendant the green light to take back what he had sold just three years earlier.

Furthermore, the trial court erred in failing to grant a Judgment Non Obstante Veredicto and in denying Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial, as Defendant openly admitted in court to tortiously interfering with Plaintiff’s contractual relationships. *11 Such statements rose above the level of quasi-admissions, and became true judicial admissions. Any jury verdict finding that Defendant had not tortiously interfered with the contractual relationships of Plaintiff would have been against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

IX. ARGUMENT

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.

In an attempt to salvage what he could of his business, Plaintiff filed its application for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. With a temporary injunction in place, Plaintiff could continue to build his existing customer retention and prevent the annihilation of his business that ultimately occurred.

While the basic three-year term of the Covenant Not to Compete had expired at that time, Defendant’s employment by competitor Celerity Logistics triggered the “tolling” provisions of the Covenant Not to Compete for a period of two years beyond the term.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, and while Plaintiff did not request the statutory relief of reformation, the trial court’s order reformed the Covenant Not to Compete in a manner that effectively restricted none of Defendant’s activities in its hostile and meditated takeover of the business that the Defendant sold to Plaintiff three years previously and deprived Plaintiff of a jury *12 trial on the issue of whether Defendant violated the Covenant Not to Compete and should pay damages to Plaintiff.

The Court’s order reformed the scope of the activity of the Covenant Not to Compete from its industry-wide exclusion to:

“… prohibit Defendant JOHN BARNETT between August 21, 2009 and August 21, 2012, being employed by any person, venture, partnership or other entity that is a courier or “hot shot” business providing services only to customers in the optical industry that were actual customers of INTEGRATED PARTNERS, INC. between August 21, 2009 and August 21, 2012.” (CR 11, Page 31)

To prevail on a cause of action for breach of a Covenant Not to Compete, the Plaintiff must prove the following:

1. The parties entered into an enforceable agreement, separate from a covenant not to compete;

2. The covenant not to compete was ancillary to or part of the agreement at the time the agreement was made;

3. The covenant’s limitations were reasonable as to each of the following:

a. time b. geographic area c. scope of activity to be restrained

4. The covenant’s limitations did not impose a greater restraint than was necessary to protect the promisee’s business interest;

5. The promisor breached the covenant not to compete. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 15.50-15.52.

However, if the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is different than to render personal services, the promisor has the burden of establishing that the covenant does not meet those criteria. Tex. Bus. Com. Code § 15.51(b).

The enforceability of a covenant not to compete is a question of law. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50 and § 15.51 only govern final remedies and do not preempt common law relating to temporary injunctions. EMSL Analytical, Inc. v. Younker, 154 S.W.3d 693, 695 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist] 2004, no pet.).

To obtain a temporary injunction, the party seeking the temporary injunction must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury for which there is no adequate legal remedy. EMSL Analytical, at 696; EMS USA, Inc. v. Shary, 309 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)

To obtain a permanent injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show that the covenant meets the criteria for enforceability in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50. Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

Injunctive relief is only available to the promisee. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51.

If the court reforms the covenant to make it reasonable, the promisee cannot recover damages for any breach that occurred before the reformation. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51(c).

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AT THE HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION.

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). However, reformation under Tex. Bus. Com. Code § 15.51 is a remedy to be granted at a final hearing, whether on the merits or by summary judgment, and not as interim relief. Cardinal Health, at 238-39; Sentinel Integrity Solutions, Inc. v. Mistras Group, Inc., 414 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, reh’g overruled (Dec. 19, 2013), review denied (Oct. 3, 2014); Gray Wireline Serv., Inc. v. Cavanna, 374 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Tex. App. – Waco 2011, no pet.).

In Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, Cardinal Health sued Bowen to enforce a covenant not to compete and for tortious interference, as well as various other causes of action. Cardinal Health, at 234. The relevant issue before *15 the court was whether or not the procedures of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51 preempted the common law requirements for temporary injunction hearings. Id. at 237. The court concluded that the Legislature intended for § 15.51(a) to govern only final remedies, as it uses the terms “award” and “damages”. Id. at 238. The court reasoned that § 15.51(b) must therefore logically follow final adjudications and not apply to the pursuit of preliminary relief. Id. at 238-39.

In the present case, the Covenant Not to Compete was reformed following the trial court’s disjointed review of the evidence at a temporary hearing requesting injunctive relief. The trial court’s attempted reformation of the Covenant Not To Compete did not occur following a final hearing on the merits, a hearing dedicated solely to that purpose, or even at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. The only issue before the court at hearing was whether or not a temporary injunction should be issued to prevent Defendant from engaging in the activities prohibited by the Covenant Not to Compete, thereby preserving the status quo. However, the trial court committed a fundamental error and decided an issue that was not yet before it, effectively obliterating Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the Covenant Not to Compete.

The denial of the application for temporary injunction should have opened the door to a request for reformation, instead of the court’s reformation closing the door to the grant of a temporary injunction. Such an overbearing issue requires supportive *16 pleading, notice, briefing, and hearing. It cannot be relegated to a sideshow at a hearing on an application for temporary injunction, for its disposition is most certainly outcome determinative. By the time of trial, Plaintiff’s business was completely destroyed and all the customers and drivers were doing business with Defendant. The grant of a temporary injunction followed by the grant of a permanent injunction at the end of trial could have prevented this harm and allowed Plaintiff the time he needed to protect his business.

Furthermore, throughout this entire lawsuit, no request has been made by the promisee to reform the covenant not to compete, which was traditionally required in Texas to protect the interest of the promisee. As reformed by the trial court, only one party received any protection, and it is not the one who has historically been entitled to it.

Therefore, the trial court erred in reforming the Covenant Not to Compete at the hearing on the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFORMING THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE TO CONFORM TO THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT/PROMISOR, THEREBY RENDERING IT MEANINGLESS.

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code, § 15.51 allows a trial court to reform a covenant not to compete:

“… to the extent necessary to cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the

promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.51.

As reformed, John Barnett could not work for a company that serviced only the customers of Integrated Partners, Inc. (the Defendant) between August 21, 2009 and August 21, 2012. However, Integrated Partners, Inc. sold its customer list to The Burks Group, Inc. d/b/a Integrated Partners as part of the Asset Purchase Agreement. Effective on the Closing of the Asset Purchase Agreement, there were no customers of Integrated Partners, Inc. Therefore, as reformed, Defendant could have gone to work for anybody, including a company that only serviced customers in the optical industry, and even if those customers were also customers of Plaintiff.

The trial court interpreted and reformed the Covenant Not to Compete completely out of existence, rendered it impotent in protecting Plaintiff’s interests, and declared open season on Plaintiff’s business, ensuring Defendant could keep both his business and the Plaintiff’s $750,000.00 purchase price

Furthermore, the trial court’s reformation meant that Plaintiff could not recover for damages based on the breach of the Covenant Not to Compete, as the trial court’s order excluded from the realm of possibility any practical set of circumstances under which Defendant could have violated the Covenant Not to Compete. Although Defendant readily admitted soliciting and inducing the customers of Plaintiff to terminate their relationship with Plaintiff, the result of the *18 trial court’s reformation was that Defendant had committed no foul, unless Plaintiff could prove his case for tortious interference, effectively rendering summary judgment on Plaintiff’s cause of action for the violation of the Covenant Not to Compete without the inconvenience to the court of the summary judgment procedure.

Therefore, the court erred in reforming the Covenant Not to Compete to conform to the conduct of the defendant/promisor.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE JURY FINDING ON THE ISSUE OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT WAS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT AND PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.

Not only did Barnett make his own determination that he was not bound by the Covenant Not to Compete upon its literal expiration, but he also diagnosed himself as being immune from the consequences of intentionally interfering with Plaintiff’s business activities. As though to say, “so what? sue me,” Barnett readily admitted to:

1. interfering with the delivery contracts with optical laboratories;

2. causing the Plaintiff’s loss of these delivery contracts;

3. interfering with the courier driver contracts; and

4. using Dalrock Transport to take over the entire business he had sold to Plaintiff. (RR, Volume 6, Page 91, Line 7 through Page 93, Line 7).

The jury finding that Barnett had not committed tortious interference was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Plaintiff proved liability and damages through Barnett.

To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with contractual relationships, the Plaintiff must prove:

1. The plaintiff had a valid contact;

2. The defendant willfully and intentionally interfered with the contract;

3. The interference proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and

4. The plaintiff incurred actual damages or loss. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2002); Prudential Ins. v. Financial Rev. Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000).

A plaintiff can prove tortious interference by establishing the defendant intentionally induced or caused a third party to breach its contract with the plaintiff. John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Randalls Food Mkts., Inc., 17 S.W.3d 721, 730-31 (Tex. App. – Austin 2000, pet. denied). Furthermore, a plaintiff may establish interference by showing that the defendant prevented performance by making the performance impossible or more burdensome, difficult, or expensive. See Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); AKB Hendrick, LP v. Musgrave Enters., 380 S.W.3d 221, 236 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2012, no pet.); Seelback v. Clubb, 7 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).

Ordinarily, a party’s testimonial declarations that are contrary to his position are quasi-admissions. Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Company, Inc., 858 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1993). But, in this case, as a matter of public policy, Barnett’s testimonial quasi-admissions should be treated as a true judicial admission in that:

1. Barnett’s admissions were made during the course of a judicial proceeding;

2. Barnett’s admissions are contrary to an essential fact embraced in his defense;

3. Barnett’s admissions are deliberate, clear, and unequivocal (the hypothesis of mere mistake or slip of the tongue must be eliminated);

4. the giving of conclusive effect to Barnett’s admissions will be consistent with the public policy upon which the rule is based; and

5. Barnett’s admissions are not also destructive of the Plaintiff’s theory of recovery.

Aguirre v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 744, 756 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2007 no pet.).

Barnett has effectively sworn his defense right out of court by clear, unequivocal testimony. Mendoza v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriter’s Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. 1980).

Barnett’s testimonial evidence was clear and uncontradicted.

Specifically:

1. There were three written Contracts with the optical companies each containing a month to month renewal clause and a written notice of termination clause. (RR, Exhibits P-3, P-4, and P-5 and Volume 6,

Page 53, Line 3 through Line 25);

2. As a matter of law, each optical company contract was renewed on a month to month basis that started on the first of the month and ended on the last day of the month beginning at the expiration of the initial term of each contract. The courts do not favor forfeitures and unless compelled to do so by language that will admit no other construction, forfeiture will not be enforced. G. C. Murphy Company v. Lack, 404 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. Civ. App. – Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436, 444, 216 S.W.2d 566, 570 (Tex. 1949);

3. It was undisputed that not one of the three contracts (RR, Exhibit P-3, P-4, and P-5) were terminated, and certainly not by written notice as required by the provision in each contract. Accordingly, each optical company contract with the Plaintiff was in effect during the period October 1, 2012 through October 31, 2012;

4. Barnett knew that Plaintiff was making pickups and deliveries pursuant to the three optical company contracts October 1, 2012 through October 19, 2012. (RR, Volume 6, Page 59, Line 3 through Page 60, Line 3);

5. And Barnett knew the deliveries being made by Plaintiff were being made pursuant to a written contract, and not an oral contract. (RR, Volume 6, Page 63, Line 15 through Line 20);

6. Defendant Barnett convinced the three optical companies to quit using Plaintiff after October 19, 2012 and thereafter to use Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. starting October 21, 2012. (RR, Volume 6, Page 80, Line 6 through Page 88, Line 24);

7. By way of summary of the entire take over event, Defendant Barnett testified that Dalrock Transport used the same price structure, the same physical complex where the drivers collected optical product for delivery, the same drivers, each driver drove the same route, the same delivery lock boxes, and agreed that the ONLY (emphasis added) changes between October 19, 2012 and October 21, 2012 was that after October 22, 2012 the optical companies sent their checks to Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. rather than Plaintiff. (RR, Volume 6, Page 91, Line

7 through Page 93, Line 7);

8. Defendant Barnett testified that the only changes he brought to the optical companies by switching to Dalrock Transport, L.L.C. from Plaintiff was he personally contacted the upper level executives he had known for many years, became reacquainted with them, and took them to lunch. Otherwise, Dalrock Transport was the very same company in every respect as Plaintiff had. (RR, Volume 6, Page 95, Line 7 through Line 23); and

9. Defendant Barnett testified that the value of the company was $750,000.00 at the time he took over the company. (RR, Volume 6, Page 25, Line 8 through Page 27, Line 2).

From the testimony of Barnett himself coupled with the contract evidence, Plaintiff was able to conclusively establish every element of the cause of action and Plaintiff’s damages. Accordingly, the jury finding to Question 1 was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

X. PRAYER

Appellant prays that this Court reverse and render judgment on the claim for tortious interference with the contracts in the amount of damages equal to $750,000.00, and remand the case for trial on the issue of lost profits, attorney fees, and injunctive relief.

Alternatively, Appellant request that this Court reverse the trial court’s order denying the temporary injunction and reforming the covenant not to compete, and remand with instructions to enter an injunction preventing Defendant from engaging *23 in the prohibited activity, and for trial under the Covenant Not to Compete as it existed prior to reformation.

Finally, and in the alternative, Appellant respectfully prays reversal and remand of the entire case for retrial of both causes of action, and for such further relief, in law or in equity, as the Court deems Appellant justly entitled.

XI. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that the foregoing document contains 5127 words, and is in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B).

____________________________ John R. Jensen

XII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5, I certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant’s Brief was served on April 10, 2015 on the following parties in the following manner:

1. Defendants Integrated Partners, Inc., Dalrock Transport, L.L.C., and John P. Barnett were served through their attorney of record Brian T. Cartwright through the electronic filing manager.

2. Pro Se Defendant, David Dreiling, was served by first class mail to 1408 Melody Ln., Carrolton, Texas 75006.

3. Pro Se Defendant, Allen Thomas Georgi, was served by first class mail to 2701 North Grapevine Mills #714, Grapevine, Texas 76051.

____________________________ John R. Jensen

XIII. APPENDIX

Document Name Doc. & Page No. Tab#

Order on Plaintiff’s Application CR 11 Pg. 31 1 For Temporary And Permanent Injunction

Charge of Court CR 14 Pg. 76 2

Order Denying Plaintiff’s CR 17 Pg. 114 3 Motion for JNOV

Judgment and Charge of Court CR 18 Pg. 116 4

Order Denying Plaintiff’s CR 21 Pg. 256 5 Motion for New Trial

Subchapter E, Chapter 15, N/A 6 Title 2, Texas Business & Commerce Code

Asset Purchase Agreement RR Vol 13 P-1 7 Contracts RR Vol 13 P-1 Ex. H 8 Covenant Not to Compete RR Vol 13 P-1 Ex. M 9

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TAB 6

§ 15.50. Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, TX BUS & COM § 15.50

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices Chapter 15. Monopolies, Trusts and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (Refs & Annos) Subchapter E. Covenants Not to Compete (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 15.50

§ 15.50. Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete

Effective: September 1, 2009 Currentness

(a) Notwithstanding Section 15.05 of this code, and subject to any applicable provision of Subsection (b), a covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.

(b) A covenant not to compete relating to the practice of medicine is enforceable against a person licensed as a physician by the Texas Medical Board if such covenant complies with the following requirements:

(1) the covenant must:

(A) not deny the physician access to a list of his patients whom he had seen or treated within one year of termination of the contract or employment;

(B) provide access to medical records of the physician's patients upon authorization of the patient and any copies of medical records for a reasonable fee as established by the Texas Medical Board under Section 159.008, Occupations Code; and

(C) provide that any access to a list of patients or to patients' medical records after termination of the contract or employment shall not require such list or records to be provided in a format different than that by which such records are maintained except by mutual consent of the parties to the contract;

(2) the covenant must provide for a buy out of the covenant by the physician at a reasonable price or, at the option of either party, as determined by a mutually agreed upon arbitrator or, in the case of an inability to agree, an arbitrator of the court whose decision shall be binding on the parties; and

(3) the covenant must provide that the physician will not be prohibited from providing continuing care and treatment to a specific patient or patients during the course of an acute illness even after the contract or employment has been terminated.

(c) Subsection (b) does not apply to a physician's business ownership interest in a licensed hospital or licensed ambulatory surgical center.

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 § 15.50. Criteria for Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, TX BUS & COM § 15.50

Credits Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1193, § 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1989. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 965, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1574, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1420, § 14.729, eff. Sept. 1, 2001; Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 971, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2009.

Notes of Decisions (315)

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 15.50, TX BUS & COM § 15.50 Current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 § 15.51. Procedures and Remedies in Actions to Enforce..., TX BUS & COM § 15.51

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices Chapter 15. Monopolies, Trusts and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (Refs & Annos) Subchapter E. Covenants Not to Compete (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 15.51

§ 15.51. Procedures and Remedies in Actions to Enforce Covenants Not to Compete

Currentness

(a) Except as provided in Subsection (c) of this section, a court may award the promisee under a covenant not to compete damages, injunctive relief, or both damages and injunctive relief for a breach by the promisor of the covenant.

(b) If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, for a term or at will, the promisee has the burden of establishing that the covenant meets the criteria specified by Section 15.50 of this code. If the agreement has a different primary purpose, the promisor has the burden of establishing that the covenant does not meet those criteria. For the purposes of this subsection, the “burden of establishing” a fact means the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

(c) If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall be limited to injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the promisor establishes that the promisee knew at the time of the execution of the agreement that the covenant did not contain limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that were reasonable and the limitations imposed a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action to enforce the covenant.

Credits Added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1193, § 1, eff. Aug. 28, 1989. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 965, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1993.

Notes of Decisions (109)

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 15.51, TX BUS & COM § 15.51 Current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 § 15.51. Procedures and Remedies in Actions to Enforce..., TX BUS & COM § 15.51 End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 § 15.52. Preemption of Other Law, TX BUS & COM § 15.52

Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Business and Commerce Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2. Competition and Trade Practices Chapter 15. Monopolies, Trusts and Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade (Refs & Annos) Subchapter E. Covenants Not to Compete (Refs & Annos)

V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 15.52

§ 15.52. Preemption of Other Law

Currentness

The criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete provided by Section 15.50 of this code and the procedures and remedies in an action to enforce a covenant not to compete provided by Section 15.51 of this code are exclusive and preempt any other criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete or procedures and remedies in an action to enforce a covenant not to compete under common law or otherwise.

Credits Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 965, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1993.

Notes of Decisions (8)

V. T. C. A., Bus. & C. § 15.52, TX BUS & COM § 15.52 Current through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

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