SWETT, ALLEN J. v. SWETT, SHERYL A.

*1561 Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a second amended decree of divorce that, inter alia, equitably distributed the parties’ marital property. Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in awarding plaintiff a credit for his nonfinancial contributions to the appreciated value of a cottage that was purchased by defendant and her family prior to the marriage. Although defendant presented evidence that she sold her interest in the cottage to her father shortly after the marriage, plaintiff presented evidence that the deed was never modified and that the parties continued to use the cottage in a manner consistent with the use of property owners. “It is well established that ‘[e]quitable distribution presents issues of fact to be resolved by the trial court, and its judgment should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion’ ” (Prasinos v Prasinos, 283 AD2d 913, 913 [2001]). In light of the conflicting evidence presented by the parties at trial, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant in fact maintained a property interest in the cottage after the marriage and that plaintiff was entitled to a credit for his nonfinancial contributions to the appreciated value thereof (see generally Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [3]; Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 46 [1995]). We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in concluding that certain trust accounts and stock obtained by her during the marriage were marital property subject to equitable distribution (see generally Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]). “ ‘Property acquired during the marriage is *1562 presumed to be marital property and the party seeking to overcome such presumption has the burden of proving that the property in dispute was separate property’ ” (Galachiuk v Galachiuk, 262 AD2d 1026, 1027 [1999]; see Fields v Fields, 15 NY3d 158, 162-163 [2010], rearg denied 15 NY3d 819 [2010]). Here, defendant “ ‘failed to trace the source of the funds [and stock that she contended were separate property] with sufficient particularity to rebut the presumption that they were marital property’ ” (Bailey v Bailey, 48 AD3d 1123, 1124 [2008]; see Bennett v Bennett, 13 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2004], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding counsel fees to plaintiff in light of the “dilatory or obstructionist conduct” by defendant (Blake v Blake [appeal No. 1], 83 AD3d 1509 [2011]; see Johnson v Chapin, 12 NY3d 461, 467 [2009], rearg denied 13 NY3d 888 [2009]; see also McBride-Head v Head, 23 AD3d 1010, 1011 [2005]). We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in failing to award her a credit for paying off the mortgage on the marital residence with her separate property. “It is well settled that a spouse is entitled to a credit for his or her contribution of separate property toward the purchase of the marital residence” (Juhasz v Juhasz, 59 AD3d 1023, 1024 [2009], lv dismissed 12 NY3d 848 [2009]; see Fields, 15 NY3d at 166). Here, it is uncontested that the money used to pay off the mortgage on the marital residence shortly after the parties’ marriage was defendant’s separate property, and thus defendant is entitled to a credit in that amount prior to the equitable distribution of the marital residence (see Fields, 15 NY3d at 166; Juhasz, 59 AD3d at 1024; Mirand v Mirand, 53 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2008]; Chernoff v Chernoff, 31 AD3d 900, 903 [2006]). We therefore modify the second amended decree accordingly. Present — Centra, J.P., Fahey, Péradotto, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.