Grezak v. Grezak

*16 SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff Grazyna Grezak appeals from a judgment denying reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s May 15, 2015 order imposing a leave-to-file sanction. That order bars Grezak from (1) filing new claims in the Eastern District of New York against her daughter, appellee Evelina Grezak, and (2) alleging breach of her settlement agreement with appellee, without first obtaining leave from the magistrate judge. Grezak argues that she was entitled to reconsideration because sanctions were imposed without affording her the notice and opportunity to respond to Evelina’s motion for sanctions required by due process. We assume the parties’ familiarity, with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. We review both the imposition of a leave-to-file sanction and the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Wilson v. Citigroup, N.A., 702 F.3d 720, 723 (2d Cir. 2012) (sanction); Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 2015) (reconsideration), which we will identify only when a .court’s decision rests on an error of law or clearly erroneous factual finding, or cannot otherwise “be located within the range of permissible decisions,” Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is not this case. The challenged sanction order did not take effect here until the district court denied Grezak’s motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring notice and opportunity to be heard before imposition of leave-to-file sanction). 1 Thus, (1) the magistrate judge’s May 15, 2015 order, in addition to the March 24, 2015 order directing the plaintiff to “cease filing dupli-cative motions in this action,” S.A. 93, put Grezak on notice of the sanction, and (2) she was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the district court by virtue of her motion for reconsideration. In denying reconsideration, moreover, the district court provided an ample factual basis for the leave-to-file sanction, noting the “stream of motions, requests, and diatribes” received by the court over the course of the litigation and even after settlement. Pl’s App’x 37; see Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d at 528 (noting that among relevant factors are whether suits are “vexatious, harassing or duplicative” and whether litigant “has caused needless expense to other parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Its conclusion that the sanction crafted by the magistrate judge was sufficiently narrowly tailored was not outside the “range of permissible decisions.” Wolters Kluwer Fin. *17 Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we identify no abuse of discretion. 2 We have reviewed Grezak’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Footnotes [1] Grezak does not here suggest that the magistrate judge exceeded her authority in imposing the challenged sanction and, thus, we have no reason to consider whether the district court was required to conduct de novo review (or, if so, whether it effectively did so). Compare Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528-529 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that leave-to-file sanction is a form of injunctive relief); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (excluding injunctive relief from pretrial matters that can be decided by magistrate judge subject to abuse-of-discretion review by district court), with International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), immediately appealable orders are orders which “give or aid in giving some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint ... and [do not include] restraints or directions in orders concerning the conduct of the parties or their counsel, unrelated to the substantive issues in the action, while awaiting trial”); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 508 F.2d 399, 401 (2d Cir. 1974) (same); 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice P110.20(1), at 233 (2d ed. 1973) (same). [2] Grezak's brief might be read to suggest that she is also appealing the district court's denial of reconsideration with respect to a second order, which involved, inter alia, the denial of sanctions sought by Grezak. Because that order is not mentioned in Grezak’s statement of issues and no argument is ever developed, we deem any challenges to that court decision waived. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1998).