Michael White v. Aramark

MEMORANDUM ** Michael I. White appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action • alleging state law claims arising from'his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Henry v. Gill Indus., *579 Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm. Summary judgment was proper because Aramark’s unopposed motion for summary judgment demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to White’s claims. See id. (district court may grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face reveal a genuine dispute of material fact); see also Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal.4th 317, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089, 1113-14 (2000) (elements of Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) discrimination claim); Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522, 528 (1992) (elements of FEHA retaliation claim); Thompson v. City of Monrovia, 186 Cal.App.4th 860, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 377, 390 (2010) (elements of FEHA harassment claim). The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting White’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting forth standard of review). We do not consider arguments or claims that were not presented to the district court. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). White’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his reply brief, is denied. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.