Horne v. Internal Revenue Service

MEMORANDUM ** William F. Home appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action against the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) arising from the assessment of penalties and a tax lien. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. State of Neb. ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bentson, 146 F.3d 676, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Horne’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Horne failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he complied with the prerequisites to challenging a penalty assessed under 26 U.S.C. § 6700. See 26 U.S.C. § 6703(c)(1), (2) (prerequisites to challenging a § 6700 penalty); Korobkin v. United States, 988 F.2d 975, 976 (9th Cir. 1993) (method by which a taxpayer may challenge a § 6700 penalty); Thomas v. United States, 755 F.2d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 1985) (with one exception, the district court has no jurisdiction over suits for a refund of penalty amounts paid until the taxpayer has paid the full amount of the contested penalty assessment). The district court properly denied as moot Horne’s motion to remand. See Bentson, 146 F.3d at 678-79 (a district court’s *423 decision to remand a removed case is reviewed de novo and once a case is properly removed, a district court has the authority to decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims). All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.