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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for Citizens National Bank and Receiver for Strategic Capital Bank, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., Credit Suisse Management LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., HSBC Securities (USA), Inc., RBS Securities Inc., and UBS Secui’ities LLC., Defendants-Appellees, Bear Sterns Asset Backed Securities I L.L.C., the Bear Sterns Companies L.L.C., JP Morgan Securities L.L.C., Citicorp Mortgage Securities, Inc., CitiMortgage, Inc., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital, Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., and Ally Securities LLC, Defendants
SUMMARY ORDER Plaintiff-appellant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—as receiver for two failed banks, Citizens National *87 Bank (“Citizens”) and Strategic Capital Bank (“Strategic”)—appeals from a judgment dismissing its securities claims against defendants, issuers and/or underwriters of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, as time-barred. The FDIC filed its complaint alleging violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 on May 18, 2012.
The date of that filing was more than three years after Citizens and Strategic had purchased the certificates at issue, in 2006 and 2007, and thus the action would ordinarily be barred by the Securities Act’s statute of repose. See
15 U.S.C. § 77m.
But the so-called “FDIC Extender Statute,” enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, sets “the applicable statute of limitations” for an action brought by the FDIC in its capacity as receiver to be (at a minimum) three years from the FDIC’s appointment as receiver. See
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). Here, the complaint was filed within three years of FDIC’s appointment.
In granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, the District Court held that the FDIC Extender Statute “extends” or supersedes only statutes of limitations, and not statutes of repose. That holding, which we review de novo, was error.
Following the District Court’s ruling and the submission of briefing in this appeal, another panel of this Court held that the FDIC Extender Statute does supersede the Securities Act’s statute of repose, distinguishing CTS Corp. v. Wald-burger, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014), and reaffirming this Court’s earlier ruling on a substantively identical Extender Statute in Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc.,
712 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). See Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. First Horizon Asset Sec., Inc.,
821 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
2017 WL 69213, — U.S. -, — S.Ct. -, 196 L.Ed.2d 518 (Jan. 9, 2017). Our sister panel’s decision controls the outcome of this appeal, and the District Court’s order dismissing the case on timeliness grounds must be vacated. Accordingly, we VACATE the March 25, 2015 judgment of the District Court, and we REMAND the cause to the District Court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in light of this order.
