Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

rlOEN. L EZLl. *- a- October 16. 1974

The Honorable Jackie St. Clair Opinion NO. H- 422 Commiorioncr Texar Department of Labor Re: Duty of public officials to and Standard6 meet with public employees Box 12157, Capitol Station or their representatives to Austin, Texas 78711 diocurr grievancea.

Dear Commi8aioner St. Clair:

You have requested our opinion aa to the extent of the duty, if any, of publtc official8 to meet with public employees or their representatives to discuea grievance*.

Article 5154~. V. T. C. S., forbtdo collective bargaining between public employerr and their employees. At the rama time Article 5154~. in Sec. 6. recognisee and reaffirme the right of public cmp1oyce.a to prtrent their grievances:

The provirtons of thir Act shall not impair the exirting right of public employee8 to prerent grievancea concerning their wager, boura of wor~k, or conditions of work individually or through a representative that doea not claim the right to strike.

In Beverly v. City of Dallas, 292 S. W. 2d 172 (Tex. Civ.App. --El Paeo 1956, writ ref., n. r. l. ), the validity of Article 5154~ was challenged on the,ground that it fatally contradicted itoelf in permitting public employees to prerent grievancea while l imultaneoualy prohibiting collective bargaining. The court rejected this argument, explaining that there ie a dirtinction between collective bargaining and the presentation of grievance*:

The preacntation of a grievance is in effect a untlatoral procedure, whercae a contract or agree- ment rerulting from collective bargaining must of neceaatty be a bilateral procedure culminating

p. 1962 The Honorable Jackie St. Clair, page 2 (H-4221

in a meeting of the minds involved and binding the parties to the agreement. The presentation of a grievance is simply what the words imply, and no more, and here it must be remembered that the privilege is extended only with the ex- press restritition that strike6 by public employees are illegal and unlawful, as is collective bar- gaining, so it is clear that the statute carefully : ,. ,“prohibits , striking and collective bargaining; but : does permit the presentation of grievances, a unilateral proceeding resulting in no loss of sovereignty by the municipality. (292 S. W. 2d at 1761

See also Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. 330 S. W. 2d 702 (Tex. Civ.App. --Dallas 1959, writ ref., n. r. e. ), Attorney .General Opiniona H-389 (1974) ,and M-77 (19671.

- Under Article 5154c, then, public employees are given a right to present &ievs+ncer, either individually or through a representative which does not .dlaim the right to strike. This right, given as an alternative to collective bargaining, is of little value if public employer6 are entitled to refuse to hear or discuss grievances. Having the right to present grievance6 neces- sarily implies that someone in a position of authority is required to hear them even though he is under no legal compulsion to take any action to rec- tify them. Otherwise the right to preaeat grievances would be rendered meaningless. Therefore it is our opinion that implicit in Article 5154c, Sec. 6 is the notion that public officials should meet with public employee6 or their representatives at reasonable times and places to hear their ‘.,.. grievance6 concerning wagci, hourr of work, and condition6 of work: .~., .,,., SUMMARY I’_’

Under Article SK&, See. 6. public employer6 should meet with the employ~ees or their designated representatives at reasonable time6 and’p&s to hear grievances concerning wages, hours of wotk;+and conditions of work.

/Very truly yours,

p<6:ttorney General of Texas .

The Honorable Jackie St. Clair. page 3 (H-42.!) APPROV,ED:

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman Opinion Committee

p. 1964