United States v. Darren Lamont Keys

PER CURIAM. Darren Lamont Keys appeals the district court’s denial of his two motions for adjustment of his restitution payment schedule. 1 The district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm. *252 A defendant who (1) fails to challenge the district court’s calculation of restitution, either at his sentencing hearing or on direct appeal, and (2) fails to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances that would excuse such failure, waives his right to object to the initial restitution calculation. Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (11th Cir.2003). Even if a defendant waives his right to object to the initial restitution calculation, however, a district court can modify a restitution order to reflect “a bona fide change in the defendant’s financial condition, either positive or negative.” Id. at 1215, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Keys failed to challenge the district court’s restitution calculation either at his sentencing hearing or on direct appeal, and has failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances that would excuse such failure. Consequently, he has waived his right to object to the initial restitution calculation. See id. at 1213-14. Furthermore, Keys has failed to demonstrate that his economic circumstances have changed in any way since the imposition of his sentence, thereby justifying a modification to the restitution order. Accordingly, Keys’ “present financial status is no different from that contemplated by the district court when it imposed the restitution order.” See id. at 1216. The district court did not err in denying his motions. AFFIRMED. Footnotes [1] Keys also asserts the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous and that the dis *252 trict court’s construction of 18 U.S.C. § 371 "violated the principles of Due Process and ex post facto clauses. These arguments are not properly before this Court, as neither of these issues were raised in Keys’ motions below.” See United States v. Kent, 175 F.3d 870, 871 n. 1 (11th Cir.1999).