United States v. Christopher Torres

MEMORANDUM ** Christopher Jesse Torres appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Torres contends that the district court procedurally -erred by miscalculating the Guidelines range, failing to explain adequately the sentence, and relying on improper sentencing factors. Contrary to Torres’s contention, the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range because it properly concluded that his state criminal conviction was a Grade B violation. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2); United States v. Jones, 696 F.3d 932, 935-37 (9th Cir. 2012) (court properly treated conduct as Grade B violation where it was punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year due to application of enhancement). Furthermore, the district court’s explanation of the sentence was legally sufficient. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Finally, the record reflects that the district court considered only the proper 8 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, including Torres’s criminal history and the need to protect the -public. See United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007). Torres next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed it to run consecutive to his sentence for the state criminal conviction which formed the basis of the violation. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The consecutive sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3583(e) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Torres’s extensive criminal history, his failure to be deterred by prior sentences, and the need to protect the public. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; see also U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). AFFIRMED. Footnotes [**] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.